Cropp v. Interstate Distributor Co.

880 P.2d 464, 129 Or. App. 510, 1994 Ore. App. LEXIS 1210

• Court: Court of Appeals of Oregon
• Decided: August 10, 1994
• Docket: 92-1255-L3; CA A79549
• Status: Published

Opinions

De MUNIZ, J.

Plaintiffs brought this action against defendants seeking money damages for personal injuries and property damage that they sustained when a truck, owned by defendant Interstate Distributor Company (Interstate) and operated by defendant Rust, collided with their parked truck in California. Plaintiffs appeal from a summary judgment that their action was barred by California’s one-year statute of limitations. We affirm.

Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ORCP 47C; Seeborg v. General Motors Corporation, 284 Or 695, 699, 588 P2d 1100 (1978). We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Stevens v. Bispham, 316 Or 221, 223, 851 P2d 556 (1993). The question is whether the statute of limitations of Oregon or California governs this action.

Plaintiffs are self-employed truck drivers. They live in Gervais, Oregon, which is also their principal place of business. In 1990, they worked in Oregon, Washington, California, Nevada and Arizona. Rust is a resident of Nevada and an employee of Interstate. He works mainly in California, but qlso works in Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, Washington and Oregon. He works in Oregon about twice a month and uses Interstate’s maintenance and fueling facility in Wilsonville, Oregon. Occasionally, he uses another company’s facility in White City, Oregon. Interstate is a Washington corporation with its principal office in Tacoma. It transacts most of its business in California.

On December 18, 1990, plaintiffs were returning to Oregon with a load of lime from Napa Valley, California. Near Doyle, California, they pulled to the side of Highway 395 to change drivers. Rust was also traveling on Highway 395, transporting merchandise north in an Interstate truck. His truck struck plaintiffs’ parked truck.

Plaintiffs retained counsel within one month of the accident. They began, but did not complete, the process of filing a lawsuit in Washington. Instead, in April, 1992, they filed this action, and the trial court granted summary judgment for defendants.

In their two assignments of error, which challenge the granting of defendants’ motion for summary judgment and the denial of their motion for partial summary judgment, plaintiffs assert that the trial court erred in concluding that, because the “greater contacts are outside of Oregon,” California’s one-year statute of limitations, California Civil Code section 340(3),¹ applied and barred plaintiffs’ claims. Plaintiffs assert that Oregon’s two-year statute of limitations, ORS 12.110(1),² applies to their personal injury claims, because only Oregon has a substantial interest in having its law applied, and, thus, there is no conflict of laws issue. Alternatively, they assert that ORS 12.110(1) applies according to Oregon tort conflict of laws rules.

We begin with the requirements of ORS 12.430 in the Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act:

“(1) Except as provided by ORS 12.450, if a claim is substantively based:

“(a) Upon the law of one other state, the limitation period of that state applies; or

“(b) Upon the law of more than one state, the limitation period of one of those states, chosen by the law of conflict of laws of this state, applies.

“(2) The limitation period of this state applies to all other claims.”

Section 1 indicates that, to determine which statute of limitations applies, we must decide which state’s substantive law forms the basis of plaintiffs’ claims. If only one state’s substantive law could form the basis of plaintiffs’ claims, we apply that state’s statute of limitations. ORS 12.430(l)(a). Alternatively, if plaintiffs’ claims could be based on more than one state’s substantive law, we use our conflict of laws rules to determine the applicable substantive law and apply the corresponding statute of limitations. ORS 12.430(l)(b). In short, the statute requires us to apply the statute of limitations that corresponds to the substantive law forming the basis of plaintiffs’ claims. See Commissioner’s Comment, 12 Uniform, Laws Annotated, § 2 at 63 (Supp 1994).

Substantive law creates, defines and regulates parties’ rights. Long v. Storms, 52 Or App 685, 687, 629 P2d 827 (1981). Plaintiffs allege that Rust was negligent in failing to keep a proper lookout, failing to keep his vehicle under control, driving his truck at a speed that was greater than reasonable and prudent under the circumstances and operating his truck “in violation of PUC regulations.” Those allegations concern the parties’ rights and responsibilities in operating motor vehicles on highways in California. California law, including its Vehicle Code, defines and regulates those rights. Cal Veh Code § 21000 et seq. Oregon motor vehicle laws do not define or regulate the operation of motor vehicles in California and thus have no bearing on plaintiffs’ claims. Therefore, we conclude that those claims are substantively based on California law only.³ Accordingly, California’s one-year statute of limitations applies and bars plaintiffs’ claims. ORS 12.430(l)(a); see Hein v. Taco Bell, 60 Wash App 325, 333, 803 P2d 329 (1991). The trial court did not err in granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment and denying plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment.

Affirmed.

1 Section 340 provides, in part:

“Within one year:

<«* * * * *

“3. * * * An action for * * * injury to or for the death of one caused by the wrongful act or neglect of another [must be commenced] * *

2 ORS 12.110(1) provides, in part:

“An action * * * for any injury to the person or rights of another, not arising on contract, and not especially enumerated in this chapter, shall be commenced within two years * * *.”

3 The dissent erroneously concludes that Oregon’s substantive law is applicable because of Oregon’s “substantial interest” and California’s “negligible interest” in the outcome of the case. As stated above, the proper inquiry, under ORS 12.430, is what law forms the substantive hasis of the claims, not which state has a more substantial interest in the application of its law. The dissent criticizes us for concluding that plaintiffs’ claims are substantively based on California law. It concludes that Oregon’s limitation period applies, but never explains how plaintiffs’ claims could be substantively based on Oregon law.