Croci v. Zoll Medical Corporation

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedOctober 24, 2024
Docket7:24-cv-02137
StatusUnknown

This text of Croci v. Zoll Medical Corporation (Croci v. Zoll Medical Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Croci v. Zoll Medical Corporation, (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ROBERT CROCI, AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF JOANN C. CROCI, DECEASED,

Plaintiff, 24-CV-02137 (NSR)

-against- OPINIION & ORDER

ZOLL MEDICAL CORPORATION AND ZOLL SERVICES, LLC,

Defendants. NELSON S. ROMÁN, United States District Judge Plaintiff Robert Croci, as Administrator of the Estate of Joann C. Croci, Deceased (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action in New York State Supreme Court, Orange County (the “action”), for alleged personal injuries sounding in negligence, strict products liability, breach of warranty, wrongful death and pecuniary losses to the estate of Joann C. Croci following her use of a defibrillator device designed and/or manufactured by Defendants Zoll Medical Corporation and Zoll Services, LLC (the “Defendants”). On March 21, 2024, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332 and 1446, Defendants removed the action from state court to this Court asserting diversity jurisdiction. Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion seeking to remand the action back to state court. For the following reasons, the motion is DENIED. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff filed this action in New York State Supreme Court, Orange County, on or about February 2024. The Defendants were served with a copy of the Complaint on or about March 1, 2024. Defendants removed the action to federal court on March 21, 2024. (ECF No. 1.) By letter dated March 28, 2024, Plaintiff sought leave of Court to file a motion to remand the action back to state court, which was granted. (ECF No. 4.) STANDARD Removal

28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(a) provides in relevant part, that when a defendant seeks to remove an action from state court, the defendant shall file a notice of removal in the district court of the United States for the district and division where the action is pending. The notice shall contain a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal along with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon the defendant or defendants in the action. The notice of removal shall be filed within 30 days after (1) the defendant receives a copy of the initial pleading setting forth the claim for relief, or (2) within 30 days after the defendant has been served the summons if the initial pleading has been filed in court and it is not required to be served on the defendant (whichever period is shorter). See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(b). A case, however, may not be removed on the basis of diversity jurisdiction more than one year after

commencement of the action, unless the district court finds that the plaintiff has acted in bad faith to prevent a defendant from removing the action. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1446(c); Moltner v. Starbucks Coffee Co., 624 F.3d 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2010). A case is removable to federal court when the initial pleadings enable the defendant to reasonably determine whether removal is permissible. See Whitaker v. Am. Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196, 205 (2d Cir. 2001). There is no requirement that a defendant look beyond the face of the initial pleading for facts giving rise to removability. Id. at 206. Similarly, there is no obligation imposed on a defendant to conduct an independent investigation into a plaintiff’s allegations to determine that removal is proper and to comply with the 30-day period of 28 U.S.C. § 1446. See Cutrone v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 749 F.3d 137, 145 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted). Diversity Jurisdiction 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), commonly referred to as the diversity statute, provides in relevant

part, that district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different states. “Subject matter jurisdiction [] based on 28 U.S.C. § 1332” requires “‘complete diversity,’ i.e. all plaintiffs must be citizens of states diverse from those of all defendants.” Pa. Pub. Sch. Emps. Retirement Sys. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., 772 F.3d 111, 117-18 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S 546, 553 (2005)). It is well-settled that the party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of demonstrating the propriety of the initial removal from state court to federal court. United Food & Com. Workers Union, Loc. 919, AFL-CIO v. CenterMark Properties Meriden Square, Inc., 30 F.3d 298, 301 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)); see

also California Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. WorldCom, Inc., 368 F.3d 86, 100 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Grimo v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Vermont, 34 F.3d 148, 151 (2d Cir.1994)). DISCUSSION Plaintiff commenced this action in Orange County Supreme Court asserting, what are in essence, state court claims. The Defendants removed the action to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Plaintiff moves to remand the action back to state court, on the basis, inter alia, that the Defendants have failed to demonstrate complete diversity, that the amount in controversy has not been met, and that the claims asserted do not involve a federal question.1

1 Plaintiff’s remaining basis for requiring remand—comity and abstention—are meritless. Federal subject matter jurisdiction is limited and only available when a federal question is presented or where the plaintiff and defendant are of diverse citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332(a). While the Plaintiff is correct that the claims asserted do not involve a federal question, the Defendants assert that subject matter jurisdiction exists by way of diversity jurisdiction.2

Defendants correctly assert that Plaintiff is a citizen of New York State. In their opposition to the motion to remand, Defendants evince they are non-citizens of New York. More specifically, Defendants have demonstrated that Zoll Medical Corporation is a foreign corporation with its principal place of business in Massachusetts. (See ECF No. 6, Rule 7.1 Corp. Discl.) A corporation’s “principal place of business” is best read as referring to the place where a corporation’s officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 92-93 (2010).

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Croci v. Zoll Medical Corporation, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/croci-v-zoll-medical-corporation-nysd-2024.