Crawford v. State of California

District Court, E.D. California·Decided July 24, 2025·No. 1:25-cv-00869·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DUSTIN LAMONT CRAWFORD, Case No. 1:25-cv-00869-JLT-SAB

Plaintiff, ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT GRANTING PLAINTIFF LEAVE TO v. AMEND

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, (ECF No. 1)

Defendant. THIRTY-DAY DEADLINE

Dustin Lamont Crawford (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this action on July 16, 2025. Plaintiff’s complaint is currently before the Court for screening. I. Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court may dismiss a case at any time if the Court determines the complaint “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (section 1915(e) applies to all in forma pauperis complaints, not just those filed by prisoners); Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2001) (dismissal required of in forma pauperis proceedings which seek monetary relief from immune defendants); Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995) (district court has discretion to dismiss in forma pauperis complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)); Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193 (9th Cir. 1998) (affirming sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a claim). In determining whether a complaint fails to state a claim, the Court uses the same pleading standard used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief…” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In reviewing the pro se complaint, the Court is to liberally construe the pleadings and accept as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007); see also Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[W]here the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, [courts should] construe the pleadings liberally and … afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt” (quoting Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010)).). Although a court must accept as true all factual allegations contained in a complaint, a court need not accept a plaintiff’s legal conclusions as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “[A] complaint [that] pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability … ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’ ” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Therefore, the complaint must contain sufficient factual content for the court to draw the reasonable conclusion that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Id. Leave to amend may be granted to the extent that the deficiencies of the complaint can be cured by amendment. Cato v. U.S., 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). II. The Court accepts Plaintiff’s allegations in the complaint as true only for the purpose of the sua sponte screening requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. this action. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff states the basis for jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship jurisdiction but states the amount in controversy is “unknown.” (Id. at 3, 5.) Under statement of the claim, Plaintiff states in whole: “Rap[e]. When [incarcerated] I were [sic] inserted by dedoor. Ran up [buttocks] while in prison and had personal part mess aro[u]nd with while [incarcerated] among other things going on there had blood [coming] out of penis etc. Rap[e].” (Id.) Under requested relief, Plaintiff states he is “filing for mental problem [he is] having among other stuff that is going on in my head can’t sleep hear voices someone touching seeing stuff all [kinds] of damage going on inside my heads.” (Id. at 6.) A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 Pursuant to Rule 8(a), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “Such a statement must simply give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (citations and quotations omitted). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). This is because, while factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57; Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). Therefore, Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). As currently pled, it is unclear how Plaintiff was harmed or how any such harm is attributable to Defendant. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff does not state any specific action that Defendant took relating to the alleged misconduct. For these reasons, Plaintiff's complaint does amended complaint to allow Plaintiff to provide additional factual details to the Court to state a cognizable claim. Should Plaintiff choose to amend his complaint, he must separate his causes of action; state which Defendant he believes is liable for that cause of action; and identify concise factual allegations that support both the legal standard for the cause of action and show that the particular Defendant committed the violation asserted. B. State of California as a Defendant The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution sets out the principle of State sovereign immunity, and states that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. Amend. XI.; Martin v. Johnson, No. 2:20-cv-11342-FWS-SHK, 2022 WL 20273644, at *6–7 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2022). In other words, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought against an unconsenting

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