In the Supreme Court of Georgia
Decided: September 30, 2025
S25A0579. CRAWFORD v. THE STATE.
LAGRUA, Justice.
Appellant Carl Crawford appeals his convictions for malice
murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Juanita
McFadden. 1 On appeal, Crawford argues that his convictions should
be reversed based on the following contentions: (1) the trial court
————————————————————— 1 McFadden was shot and killed on November 18, 2020. On February 25,
2021, a Cobb County grand jury indicted Crawford for the following counts: malice murder (Count 1); felony murder predicated on aggravated assault (Count 2); aggravated assault (Count 3); aggravated battery (Count 4); theft by taking (Count 5); and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 6). Crawford was tried from March 21 to 28, 2022, and the jury found Crawford guilty on all counts except theft by taking (Count 5). The trial court sentenced Crawford to life without the possibility of parole on Count 1 (malice murder) and five years, to run consecutively, on Count 6 (possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony). The remaining counts merged or were vacated by operation of law. Crawford filed a timely motion for new trial, which he later amended multiple times in 2023 through new counsel. After holding an evidentiary hearing on the motion for new trial, the trial court denied the motion on November 7, 2023. Crawford filed a timely notice of appeal on December 7, 2023, followed by an amended notice of appeal to this Court on February 21, 2024. The case was docketed in this Court to the April 2025 term and submitted for a decision on the briefs. plainly erred by admitting evidence of McFadden’s general good
character at trial; (2) the trial court erred by allowing witnesses to
give hearsay testimony about Crawford’s alcohol abuse; (3) the trial
court abused its discretion by allowing a non-eyewitness to opine
about Crawford’s state of mind during the homicide; (4) the trial
court committed plain error by allowing a detective to opine about
the meaning and significance of Crawford’s text communications
with others; and (5) the cumulative harm of the trial court’s errors
requires reversal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm Crawford’s
convictions and sentences.
The evidence presented at trial demonstrates that, shortly
before 1:00 a.m. on November 18, 2020, Crawford shot McFadden
approximately nine times in the entrance hall of the Cobb County
apartment Crawford shared with Jarvon Whitehead, his long-time
roommate. McFadden died at the scene. At trial, Crawford asserted
that he was justified in shooting McFadden because he suffered from
2 battered person syndrome, allegedly caused by his abusive
relationship with McFadden. 2
In 2012, McFadden met Crawford and Whitehead when she
attended a party at their apartment, and they all became close
friends. Over the years, Crawford’s relationship with McFadden was
“rocky” — McFadden was known to have a bad temper and to anger
easily — but she and Crawford “loved and cared” about each other
and frequently “h[u]ng out” together. McFadden also briefly dated
both Crawford and Whitehead, and she continued to be “involved
sexually” with Whitehead from “time to time.” Crawford expressed
to several friends that he still wanted to “be in a [romantic]
relationship” with McFadden, but she did not “reciprocate” those
feelings. McFadden had begun dating another man in September
2020.
On the night of November 16, 2020, McFadden, who worked as
a hair stylist, spent the night at Crawford’s and Whitehead’s
apartment because it was close to the homes of several clients with
————————————————————— 2 Crawford presented expert testimony in support of this defense at trial.
3 whom she had hair appointments scheduled the next day, and while
McFadden was at the apartment, she and Crawford got into a heated
argument. On the morning of November 17, McFadden left the
apartment, and McFadden’s cell phone records show that, later that
evening, several text messages were exchanged between
McFadden’s cell phone and Crawford’s cell phone. According to
McFadden’s cell phone records, on the evening of November 17,
McFadden’s cell phone texted Crawford’s cell phone, stating that
McFadden would be coming over to the apartment later that night
to pick up her personal items and “wo[uld]n’t be back.”3 Crawford’s
cell phone responded, stating “that’s probably best,” and indicating
that McFadden’s stuff would be left “at the door.” McFadden’s cell
phone then replied, “Don’t touch my s**t”; “If my s**t outside, it’s
hell to pay.” Crawford’s cell phone then responded, stating “Guess
I’ll pay.” Shortly thereafter, McFadden called Whitehead, who was
out of town for work at the time, to tell him she and Crawford had
————————————————————— 3 McFadden lived with her mother in College Park, but she spent a lot of
time at Crawford’s and Whitehead’s apartment and accumulated a number of personal belongings there. 4 an argument the night before; she wanted to “collect her stuff” from
the apartment; and Crawford was threatening to “put her stuff
outside,” which “upset” her. Whitehead called Crawford and told
him to let McFadden into the apartment to collect her things.
Sometime before midnight on November 17, McFadden
contacted her boyfriend, Thomas Smith, and told him she was going
over to Crawford’s apartment and asked him to meet her there to
help carry out her belongings and give her a ride home. Around
12:15 a.m. on November 18, McFadden arrived at Crawford’s
apartment, went inside, and stayed for about 20 or 30 minutes,
gathering her personal items. During that timeframe, Whitehead
received multiple calls from McFadden and Crawford. Whitehead
testified that Crawford was very “upset” and “frustrated” that
McFadden was at the apartment and “wanted her to leave.”
McFadden told Whitehead that she was “[w]aiting for a ride to come
pick her up”; she got “most of her stuff to the front door”; there were
“a few items she wouldn’t be able to grab by herself”; and “once [her]
ride arrived,” she would gather those other things and leave.
5 Smith testified that he arrived at Crawford’s apartment
complex between 12:45 and 1:00 a.m., and he texted McFadden’s cell
phone to let her know he was there. McFadden’s cell phone texted
back and asked him “to come downstairs” to the apartment and
“help her with her bags.” According to Smith, as he “started to go
downstairs” to Crawford’s apartment, he heard gunshots and
McFadden yell, “[D]id you just shoot me?”; followed by “multiple
gunshots”; and McFadden “scream[,] [‘]You shot me.[’]” Smith
testified that he ran away from the apartment and called 911.4
Lieutenant Kenneth Owens with the Smyrna Police
Department testified that he responded to the 911 call and arrived
at the apartment complex “right before 1:00 in the morning” on
November 18. Lieutenant Owens walked downstairs to Crawford’s
apartment, and when he “first had visibility of the apartment door,
the door was open,” and he saw McFadden lying “right in the middle
of the doorway” with “a puddle of blood underneath her body.”
————————————————————— 4 Smith’s 911 call was admitted into evidence and played for the jury at
trial. 6 Lieutenant Owens instructed Crawford to “come out of the
apartment unarmed with his hands up ..., which he did,” and
Crawford was detained “without incident.”
At trial, the medical examiner testified that, “at minimum,”
McFadden was shot nine times, including in the “right forearm,”
“right breast,” “middle and left side of the abdomen,” “left hip,” and
“left thigh,” and McFadden also suffered “a true fracture of ... the
right humerus,” as well as a “slight fracture” of the pelvis. The
medical examiner concluded that McFadden’s cause of death was
“multiple gunshot wounds of the torso.”
Smyrna Police Detective Tasia Melvin also responded to the
scene on November 18 and interviewed Crawford in the parking lot
of the apartment complex. Before the interview, Detective Melvin
advised Crawford of his Miranda 5 rights, and Crawford agreed to
waive his rights and speak to Detective Melvin. The interview was
recorded on Detective Melvin’s body camera. 6 During Crawford’s
————————————————————— 5 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966). 6 The video footage from Detective Melvin’s body camera, including Crawford’s interview, was admitted at trial and played for the jury. 7 video-recorded interview, Crawford admitted that he shot
McFadden, whom he described as his “roommate’s ex-girlfriend,”
and that the gun he used to shoot her — a 9mm handgun — was on
the couch in the apartment. Crawford then explained the
circumstances surrounding the shooting. Crawford stated that,
about an hour earlier, McFadden arrived at the apartment “to get
her s**t,” and he “kept telling her to get her stuff and just leave.”
Crawford said that McFadden was in the apartment for about 30
minutes, and while she was there, she kept “belittling” him; “calling
[him] a b**ch”; and “putting her hands on him.” Crawford told
Detective Melvin that, after McFadden got her stuff and they were
in the front hallway of the apartment, McFadden “started swinging
on [him]” and “punching [him].” Detective Melvin asked Crawford
how many times McFadden hit him, and he responded, “[a]bout 6 or
7 times.” Crawford stated that, while McFadden was “swinging on”
him, “[he] drew and [he] shot her,” “about 5 or 6 times,” with a 9mm
he pulled from “[his] pants pocket.” Crawford said he “typically”
carried this handgun in his pocket, even “around the house.”
8 Crawford stated that he shot McFadden because “[s]he’s not fixing
to just come over here and just keep putting her hands on me in my
house. I have a right to defend myself. Period.” Crawford was
arrested at the conclusion of this interview.
After obtaining a search warrant, Smyrna Police Sergeant Ron
Eaten photographed and processed Crawford’s apartment on
November 18. Sergeant Eaten testified that, upon arriving at the
apartment, he found the apartment door open, and McFadden was
positioned “in the [front] doorway” of the apartment, with one foot
partially outside the front door. Sergeant Eaten located a 9mm
handgun — which was later determined to be the murder weapon —
“laying on the armrest of the couch,” as well as extra 9mm bullets,
“gun part[s],” and “gun magazine[s]” spread throughout the
apartment. Sergeant Eaten photographed a bullet fragment
“embedded” in the “door frame” of the front door, and he collected
multiple shell casings and bullet fragments in the front hallway of
the apartment and outside the front door.
9 During the early morning hours of November 18, Smyrna
Police Detective Kristee Pettis spoke to Whitehead on the telephone.
Detective Pettis testified that Whitehead explained to her that he
was out of town, but he had spoken to Crawford and McFadden
multiple times on the telephone shortly before the shooting
occurred. Whitehead told Detective Pettis that, sometimes,
Crawford could be “heavy-handed,” and “[h]e didn’t know his own
strength.” Whitehead also said that he “felt like” the “whole murder”
“didn’t make sense,” and he thought Crawford’s “temper got the best
of him.” At trial, Whitehead testified that, over the years, he had
witnessed and tried to “mediate” arguments between Crawford and
McFadden, but he had never seen McFadden and Crawford “be
violent toward each other” or ever witnessed “an incident where
there had been any physical contact between the two of them.”
On the morning of November 18, after being advised of and
waiving his Miranda rights, Crawford was interviewed by Detective
Pettis and another detective while he was in custody at the Smyrna
10 Police Department. 7 During this second video-recorded interview,
Crawford again explained that McFadden had arrived at his
apartment the night before to collect her things, and she stayed for
“twenty to thirty minutes.” Crawford said he told McFadden
repeatedly to leave, and as he was “trying to get to the [front] door
to open the door” to force her outside, she “just start[ed] swinging”
at him in the front hallway and calling him, “b**ch,” “s**t,” and
“p**sy,” at which point, he “just shot her.” Crawford said there had
always been a lot of arguing between them, but it had never been
physical “until today.” The detectives asked Crawford if he had a
gun on him when the altercation began, and he affirmed that the
gun was already in his “pocket.” The detectives asked whether
McFadden had “a gun, a knife, anything like that” on her, and
Crawford responded that “[s]he didn’t have a gun” and he “didn’t see
the knife,” but he “kn[e]w she carrie[d]” “[l]ike a pocketknife,” a
“little black one.” The detectives asked if McFadden threatened to
————————————————————— 7 Crawford’s interview was video-recorded, and that interview was later
transcribed by a court reporter and presented to the jury at trial — both in video and written format. 11 stab Crawford that night, and Crawford responded that McFadden
did not pull a knife on him; he just knew her to carry one. Crawford
said McFadden hit him “six or seven” times with “closed fists,” but
he did not sustain any injuries or bruising. Crawford also told the
detectives that the front door was still closed when he shot
McFadden, and Detective Pettis advised him that, when the police
officers arrived and observed McFadden’s body, she was lying
“through the door and her feet were outside.” Crawford said he
might have moved her body after the shooting, and Detective Pettis
responded that McFadden’s body did not appear to have been moved;
that police officers located shell casings outside the front door, as
well as a bullet fragment in the door jamb; and that someone
standing outside the apartment at the time of the shooting clearly
heard McFadden say, “Did you just shoot me.” When Detective
Pettis told Crawford that he shot McFadden “nine times,” Crawford
said he did not realize he shot her that many times and insisted that
he only shot her because she kept putting her “hands on” him and
“wouldn’t leave.” Crawford said he “didn’t want to kill nobody
12 today,” but he was “always told[,] if you’re gonna shoot, shoot to kill.”
At trial, Detective Pettis testified that law enforcement officers did
not “find any weapons whatsoever on” McFadden or in her
immediate vicinity.
At trial, Crawford testified in his own defense, and for the first
time, he stated that, before the night of the shooting, there had been
“physical violence” between him and McFadden. According to
Crawford, McFadden had “slapped,” “kick[ed],” “pushed,” and
“shove[d]” him on several prior occasions, and he testified that she
was also known for carrying a knife, “maybe 3, 4 inches long.”
Crawford said he did not tell the detectives about this violence or
the knife during his custodial interviews because he was
“embarrassed.” When Crawford’s trial counsel asked whether, on
the night of the shooting, McFadden “threatened to kill” him,
Crawford responded, “She threatened to stab me. I would assume
that she wanted to kill me.” Crawford said he “was afraid for [his]
life” and that he “kill[ed] [McFadden] intentionally” because he “was
trying to defend [him]self.” Crawford later conceded on cross-
13 examination that he never saw McFadden with a weapon that night;
that she never threatened him with a weapon; and that the front
door was already open when the shooting occurred.
Crawford presented the testimony of several friends at trial,
who testified that Crawford and McFadden had many arguments, of
which McFadden was typically the instigator, and she would yell at
and “belittle” Crawford during those arguments. A few of Crawford’s
friends said they had witnessed McFadden strike Crawford on
occasion, while others testified that they had only witnessed “verbal
aggression” between them.
Crawford also presented expert testimony from Dr. Marti
Loring, a clinical social worker and sociologist, who was qualified as
an expert in “sociology and social psychology.” Dr. Loring testified
that Crawford had “symptoms and characteristics of battered person
syndrome and of severe trauma,” including “helpless[ness],”
“hopeless[ness],” and memory loss, and “his behavior was sometimes
that of a person very frightened and fearful for his life.” According
to Dr. Loring, on the night McFadden died, Crawford’s condition was
14 “very severe,” and “[h]e was terrified,” leading him to go into “shock”
and shoot McFadden multiple times.
1. Relying on OCGA §§ 24-4-404(a)(2) and 24-4-405(a),8
Crawford first contends that the trial court erred by allowing
McFadden’s mother to testify that her daughter was “nice” and
“beautiful” and had a “good spirit” because this testimony was
inadmissible good-character evidence. In support of this contention,
Crawford argues that, because he raised a “self-defense informed by
battered person syndrome” defense at trial pursuant to OCGA § 16-
3-21(a) (providing that “a person is justified in using force which is
intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm only if he ...
reasonably believes that such force is necessary to prevent death or
————————————————————— 8 Under OCGA § 24-4-404(a)(2),
[e]vidence of a person’s character or a trait of character shall not be admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except for ... evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first aggressor. Id. OCGA § 24-4-405(a) provides that, “[i]n all proceedings in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof shall be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion.” Id. 15 great bodily injury to himself ... or to prevent the commission of a
forcible felony”), and because his defense theory depended upon the
jury’s belief that McFadden behaved violently toward Crawford,
McFadden’s mother’s description of McFadden as a “beautiful, nice
person” was improperly admitted and clearly affected the outcome
of his trial.
As Crawford concedes on appeal, he failed to object to the
admission of McFadden’s mother’s testimony at trial, so we review
his claim for plain error only. See McKinney v. State, 307 Ga. 129,
133 (2019) (explaining that, because the appellant did not object to
the disputed testimony at trial, the “claims are reviewed only for
plain error”). For an appellant to establish plain error, he must
establish the following: (1) “there must be an error or defect — some
sort of deviation from a legal rule — that has not been intentionally
relinquished or abandoned … by the appellant”; (2) “the legal error
must be clear or obvious”; (3) “the error must have affected the
appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means he
must demonstrate that it affected the outcome of the trial court
16 proceedings”; and (4) “if the above three prongs are satisfied, the
appellate court has the discretion to remedy the error,” but “only if the
error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” Wipfel v. State, 320 Ga. 84, 87 (2024) (quotation
marks omitted). “An appellant must establish all four elements of the
test in order to demonstrate plain error, so satisfying this test is
difficult, as it should be.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). In this case,
even if Crawford had satisfied the first two prongs of the plain-error
test, Crawford has not satisfied the third prong because he has failed
to show that the admission of McFadden’s mother’s testimony
“affected the outcome of the trial court proceedings.” Id. (quotation
marks omitted).
The evidence presented in this case was substantial and
included Crawford’s admission that he shot McFadden multiple
times, even though she was not armed and did not threaten him or
injure him, as well as his inconsistent statements about what led to
her death. The evidence also included Whitehead’s testimony that
he had never seen any violence between McFadden and Crawford
17 during the years they had been friends and that, in his opinion —
based on his communications with Crawford prior to the shooting —
Crawford’s temper led to the shooting of McFadden. Detective Pettis
also testified that McFadden was not armed with a weapon when
the shooting occurred. Additionally, while McFadden’s mother
briefly described McFadden’s positive attributes at trial, she also
testified about McFadden’s tendencies to anger and become
argumentative, and Crawford and his friends testified at length
about McFadden’s volatile nature and her hostile treatment of
Crawford.
Given the considerable evidence in this case — including the
negative-character testimony about McFadden — Crawford has not
shown that the passing references to McFadden’s good character,
which were elicited from her own mother, likely affected the outcome
of the trial court proceedings. See Watson v. State, 303 Ga. 758, 761
(2018) (determining there was no plain error where it was “not
probable that the jury would have reached a different verdict had it
not heard [the challenged evidence]”). Thus, Crawford has not
18 demonstrated plain error, and this claim fails.
2. Crawford next contends that the trial court erred by
admitting hearsay testimony describing Crawford’s alcohol abuse at
trial. Specifically, Crawford claims that certain of the trial
testimony from McFadden’s mother — to which he did object — and
certain of the trial testimony from Whitehead — to which he did not
object — repeated McFadden’s out-of-court statements describing
Crawford’s drinking, and because those statements were relied upon
by the State for their truth, the trial court erred in admitting them.
See OCGA § 24-8-801(c) (providing that hearsay “is a statement,
other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or
hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter
asserted”). For the reasons explained below, this claim fails.
(a) At trial, the State sought to introduce evidence of Instagram
“conversations” between McFadden and her mother, and Crawford
objected to this evidence based on relevance and hearsay. The trial
court overruled the objection and allowed the evidence to be
admitted, concluding that it was relevant to Crawford’s battered-
19 person defense and helped demonstrate the nature of the “exact
relationship” between McFadden and Crawford. McFadden’s mother
testified that, during one of her Instagram conversations with
McFadden in early 2020, McFadden expressed concerns about
Crawford’s alcohol use. McFadden’s mother testified that
McFadden’s father struggled with a drinking problem, and so,
McFadden wanted to know what her mother did to “get him to stop
drinking.”
On appeal, Crawford argues that the “wrongly admitted
hearsay testimony” from McFadden’s mother was harmful because
“Crawford’s drinking was one of the few bases upon which the jury
could have rejected the presumption that Crawford’s actions were
justified.” We disagree and conclude that, even if the trial court
erred in admitting this testimony, the error was harmless.
“In determining whether the error was harmless, we review the
record de novo and weigh the evidence as we would expect
reasonable jurors to have done. The test for determining
nonconstitutional harmless error is whether it is highly probable
20 that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” Boone v. State, 321
Ga. 820, 827 (2025) (cleaned up). As noted in Division 1, the evidence
of Crawford’s guilt in this case was strong, and it included
Crawford’s statements that, on November 18, 2020, he shot “to kill”
McFadden after she swung at and punched him, shooting her at
least nine times. And Crawford admitted that, on the night of the
shooting, McFadden did not have or threaten him with a knife or
any other kind of weapon, and Crawford suffered no injuries as a
result of their altercation. Detective Pettis also testified that
McFadden was not armed when Crawford shot her. Additionally,
Whitehead, who lived with Crawford for more than a decade and
who had spoken to Crawford and McFadden multiple times in the
30 minutes leading up to the shooting, testified that he had never
witnessed any violence between Crawford and McFadden, and he
thought Crawford’s “temper got the best of him” that night. The
evidence also reflected that McFadden was on her way out the door
of the apartment when the shooting occurred —the front door was
already open; McFadden had asked her boyfriend to come down to
21 the apartment to assist her with her bags; her boyfriend was on his
way downstairs when he clearly heard multiple gunshots and
McFadden’s exclamations that Crawford had shot her; and
McFadden’s body was partially outside the front door when she fell
— evidence that contradicted Crawford’s assertion that McFadden
was in the midst of attacking him when he shot in self-defense. And,
at trial, Crawford testified on cross-examination that, during “the
pandemic,” he was drinking a lot of alcohol, and McFadden was
concerned about him and “wanted him to be healthy.”
In light of the significant evidence of Crawford’s guilt in this
case and Crawford’s own testimony that he was drinking heavily in
2020 and McFadden was concerned about him, it is highly probable
that — although McFadden’s mother’s testimony about Crawford’s
drinking relied upon out-of-court statements made by McFadden —
this testimony did not contribute to the verdict. See Kitchens v.
State, 310 Ga. 698, 702 (2021) (assuming error in the admission of
hearsay testimony, it was highly probable that the admission did
not contribute to the verdict given the strong evidence of appellant’s
22 guilt). Accordingly, any trial-court error was harmless, and
Crawford’s claim fails.
(b) With respect to Crawford’s contentions concerning
Whitehead’s trial testimony, Whitehead testified that, in 2020, he
became concerned about the “frequency” of Crawford’s drinking, and
McFadden also told Whitehead she was worried Crawford “might
have a problem with his drinking.” On appeal, Crawford argues that
the trial court abused its discretion by admitting this testimony
because, in giving it, Whitehead partially relied on out-of-court
statements made by McFadden. Crawford further argues that this
hearsay evidence affected his substantial rights because “there is a
reasonable probability” that it led the jury to reject his justification
defense.
Our review of this claim is limited to plain error because
Crawford failed to object when Whitehead gave this testimony at
trial. See Dees v. State, ___ Ga. ___ (2025), S25A0600, slip op. at 6
(Ga. Sept. 16, 2025) (concluding that, because the appellant did not
object to the law enforcement officers’ hearsay testimony at trial,
23 “our review is for plain error only,” which requires the appellant to
show that the trial court made an error that “(1) was not
affirmatively waived, (2) was clear and obvious …, (3) likely affected
the outcome of the trial, and (4) seriously affected the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings”) (quotation
marks omitted). After applying the plain-error test here, see id., we
first conclude that Crawford failed to meet the second part of that
test to show clear and obvious error because a portion of Whitehead’s
testimony was based on his own perceptions of Crawford’s drinking
and, thus, was admissible under OCGA § 24-7-701(a).9 “A lay
witness may relate his or her opinion as to the existence of any fact
so long as the opinion is based upon the person’s own experiences
and observations, and so long as the matter referred to is within the
————————————————————— 9 This statute provides that,
[i]f the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness’s testimony in the form of opinions or inferences shall be limited to those opinions or inferences which are: (1) Rationally based on the perception of the witness; (2) Helpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or the determination of a fact in issue; and (3) Not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of [OCGA §] 24-7-702. OCGA § 24-7-701(a)(1)-(3).
24 scope of the average juror’s knowledge.” Harris v. State, 279 Ga. 304,
306 (2005). Because some of Whitehead’s testimony was based on
his “own experiences and observations” of Crawford’s increased
alcohol intake and because a person’s apparent drinking problem is
a matter “within the scope of an average juror’s knowledge,” it was
not clear or obvious error for the trial court to allow this testimony
from Whitehead at trial. Id.
Additionally, as to Whitehead’s testimony recounting what
McFadden told him about Crawford’s drinking, the trial court did
“not commit a clear and obvious error” by failing to exclude this
testimony as hearsay “because the relevant authority did not make
clear that the trial court was required to exclude this hearsay
evidence when no one raised a hearsay objection.” Dees, S25A0600,
slip op. at 7. Accordingly, this claim fails.
3. Crawford next argues that the trial court abused its
discretion under OCGA § 24-7-701(a) (“Rule 701(a)”)10 by allowing
————————————————————— 10 Again, Rule 701(a) provides that lay opinions are only admissible if
they are “[r]ationally based on the perception of the witness”; “[h]elpful to a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or the determination of a fact 25 Whitehead to testify that Crawford shot McFadden “in anger”
because this testimony was not founded on Whitehead’s first-hand
knowledge and was not helpful to the jury. We disagree.
During the State’s direct examination of Whitehead, the
prosecutor asked if Whitehead recalled speaking to Detective Pettis
after the shooting and giving his opinion “about [Crawford’s] temper
that day.” Crawford’s trial counsel objected, arguing that the
question “ask[ed] for speculation” and “ask[ed] for information [for]
which [Whitehead] was not present” nor “privy to.” In response, the
State argued that, because Whitehead “already testified to having
phone calls and text communications with both parties that night
right up until the incident occurred,” he could give his lay opinion
“based on the events as they were happening.” The trial court
overruled Crawford’s objection. Whitehead then testified, “The
detective asked me if I thought that [Crawford’s] temper got the best
of him and I agreed it had.”
————————————————————— in issue”; and “[n]ot based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.” OCGA § 24-7-701(a)(1)-(3). 26 Again, Rule 701(a) “allows lay witness testimony in the form of
opinions or inferences that are rationally based on the witness’s
perception, helpful to a clear understanding of the determination of
a fact in issue, and not based on scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge.” Bullard v. State, 307 Ga. 482, 491 (2019)
(quotation marks omitted). “Whether to allow such lay opinion
testimony under Rule 701(a) is a matter for the trial court’s sound
discretion.” Id.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
allowing Whitehead to testify at trial about Crawford’s state of mind
on the night of the shooting. Whitehead’s testimony regarding
Crawford’s temper was based on what he personally observed in
communicating through text messages and phone calls with
Crawford and McFadden prior to the shooting and his own
perceptions of Crawford’s anger. See Gude v. State, 313 Ga. 859, 868
(2022) (determining that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
by admitting a witness’s testimony about her belief that the victim
was scared or upset because that testimony was “perceived from her
27 text message conversation with him in light of her close personal
relationship with him”). Additionally, Whitehead did not need
specialized or technical knowledge to conclude that Crawford was
angry. See Harris, 279 Ga. at 306 (holding that a witness may give
his lay opinion “as to the existence of any fact” if the opinion is based
upon the witness’s “own experiences and observations” and if the
matter referred to is “within the scope of the average juror’s
knowledge”). And Whitehead’s testimony was also helpful to the
jury because his determination that Crawford was angry with
McFadden — based on Whitehead’s familiarity with Crawford and
his communications with Crawford prior to the shooting — helped
the jury better understand the circumstances surrounding the
shooting and reach a determination as to why Crawford shot
McFadden that night. See Mitchell v. State, 320 Ga. 673, 679 (2025)
(explaining that a witness’s lay opinion testimony, which was based
on his familiarity with the defendant, was admissible under Rule
701(a) because, among other things, it helped the jury “determine a
fact in issue”). Therefore, because Whitehead’s testimony was
28 permissible lay-opinion testimony under Rule 701(a), we see no
abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to admit it, and this
claim also fails. See Gude, 313 Ga. at 868.
4. Crawford also contends that the trial court plainly erred
under Rule 701(a) by allowing Detective Pettis to testify about the
meaning and significance of certain text communications Crawford
exchanged with his friends. During trial, Detective Pettis testified
that, after obtaining a search warrant, she conducted an analysis of
the data on Crawford’s cell phone, and she ascertained — based on
her training and experience in law enforcement — that some of
Crawford’s text exchanges referenced strains of marijuana and/or
the use of marijuana. Detective Pettis also testified that, in some of
Crawford’s text communications with his friends, he discussed his
relationship with McFadden and complained about her negative
treatment of him.
On appeal, Crawford argues that Detective Pettis’s testimony
was improper because her opinions were not rationally based on her
own perceptions. See OCGA § 24-7-701(a)(1). He further argues
29 that, even if it was permissible for Detective Pettis to testify — based
on her experience — about certain drug references contained in
Crawford’s text communications, this testimony was not helpful to
either “a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or the
determination of a fact in issue,” OCGA § 24-7-701(a)(2), because
whether Crawford had used marijuana had no bearing on the crimes
with which he was charged or the strength of his justification claim.
Crawford concedes that he did not raise these objections at
trial, so we review this claim for plain error only. See Henderson v.
State, 317 Ga. 66, 78 (2023) (noting that the plain error standard
requires an appellant to show “not merely error,” but also that the
error “was not affirmatively waived,” “was obvious beyond
reasonable dispute,” and “affected the outcome of the trial”). And,
here, even if the trial court obviously erred in allowing Detective
Pettis to testify about the content of Crawford’s text
communications, Crawford has not shown plain error because he
has failed to establish that this testimony likely affected the
outcome of his trial. See id.
30 Even without this testimony from Detective Pettis, the
evidence against Crawford, as recounted above, was quite strong.
Moreover, when Crawford testified in his own defense at trial, he
testified that, in 2020, he was smoking marijuana “three to five
times a week,” and when Crawford’s friends testified at trial on his
behalf, they discussed their knowledge of Crawford’s “rocky”
relationship with McFadden — unobjected-to testimony that was
largely cumulative of Detective Pettis’s testimony about Crawford’s
drug references and his difficult relationship with McFadden. See
Durden v. State, 318 Ga. 729, 733–34 (2024) (holding that any error
in the admission of a detective’s lay opinion testimony about the
appellant did not affect the appellant’s substantial rights under the
plain error standard where the testimony was cumulative of other
unobjected-to testimony). Therefore, given the otherwise strong case
against Crawford, the admission of Detective Pettis’s lay opinion
testimony likely had no effect on the outcome of the trial, and
Crawford’s claim of plain error fails. See id.
5. In Crawford’s final enumeration of error, he contends that,
31 even apart from any of his individual enumerations of error, the
Court should conclude that the “combinations of the errors here”
would “clear the threshold for reversal” under a cumulative-error
theory. We disagree.
“To establish cumulative error a defendant must demonstrate
that at least two errors were committed in the course of the trial and
considered together along with the entire record, the multiple errors
so infected the jury’s deliberation that they denied the petitioner a
fundamentally fair trial.” Huff, 315 Ga. at 567–68 (2023) (quotation
marks omitted). This Court “considers collectively the prejudicial
effect, if any, of trial court errors.” Id. at 568 (cleaned up).
In this case, even if the good-character evidence regarding
McFadden, the hearsay testimony about Crawford’s drinking, and
Detective Pettis’s testimony about Crawford’s text exchanges with
his friends should not have been admitted at trial, these combined
errors did not deny Crawford a fundamentally fair trial. As noted
above, the evidence of Crawford’s guilt in this case was significant,
and the brief description of McFadden’s good character was offset by
32 a significant amount of testimony regarding the negative aspects of
her character. Additionally, the hearsay testimony at issue was
largely cumulative of other properly admitted evidence at trial,
including Crawford’s own testimony. See Durden, 318 Ga. at 733–
34.
In light of the other substantial evidence heard by the jury in
this case, we conclude that Crawford has not shown that “the
multiple errors so infected the jury’s deliberation that they denied
him a fundamentally fair trial.” Greene v. State, 316 Ga. 584, 608
(2023) (quotation marks omitted). See also Huff, 315 Ga. at 568
(holding that the appellant’s cumulative-error claim failed because
the appellant did not demonstrate that “the prejudicial effect of the
assumed trial-court errors ... denied him a fundamentally fair trial,
given the strong evidence against him”). Accordingly, Crawford’s
cumulative-error contention fails.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.