UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
ANTHONY CRAVOTTA II, No. 2:22-cv-00167-DJC-AC
Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., Defendants.
Plaintiff Anthony Cravotta II, a former pretrial detainee in county jail, alleges he
was brutally assaulted by his cellmate Lemar Burleson after he had been found
mentally incompetent to stand trial and was awaiting transfer to a state hospital.
Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of the assault, he sustained catastrophic brain injuries.
Plaintiff brings six causes of action in his operative Fourth Amended Complaint
stemming from his detention at the jail and the assault.
Defendants , who oversee, operate, and provide mental health services at the jail, have moved to dismiss certain of Plaintiff’s claims arguing they are insufficiently pled. Defendants have also moved to strike several of Plaintiff’s allegations. Having considered the Parties’ arguments and briefings, the Court will dismiss and strike Plaintiff’s claims in part. //// ////
The factual background of this case is well known to the Parties and is also set
forth in the Court’s prior Order granting dismissal in part of Plaintiff’s First Amended
Complaint (ECF No. 83 at 2–5), as well as the Court’s Order granting dismissal in part
of Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (Dismissal Order (ECF No. 122) at 5–6, 17–19,
28–29.) The Court will address Plaintiff’s allegations as to specific Defendants as
required below.
Plaintiff brought this action on January 26, 2022, filing his Third Amended
Complaint on June 3, 2024, for (1) deliberate indifference/special relationship/failure-
to-protect under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) violations of
the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.; (3) violations of the ADA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101, et seq.; (4) failure to summon medical care under California Government
Code section 845.6; (5) violations of the Bane Act, California Civil Code section 52.1;
and (6) negligence against Defendants the County of Sacramento (“County”),
Sacramento County Sheriff’s Department (“Sheriff’s Department”), the Regents of the
University of California (“Regents”), the State of California, the California Department
of State Hospitals, Sheriff Scott Jones, Christopher Sturgis, Christina Albright-Mundy,
Jacob Saesee, Daisy Rollon, Bradley Whiting, Jacquelyn Blevins, Ramandeep Singh,
Andrea Haynes, Moises Paredes, Ronnie Mclean, Justin Higley, Takuya Noda, Bennett
Preston, Nicole Garces-Barrella, Diane Oran, Jaclyn DeCarlo, and Melissa Turner.
(ECF No. 98 ¶¶ 172–222.) The Court subsequently dismissed the first through sixth
causes of action in part with leave to amend. (Dismissal Order at 31–32.) The Court
also dismissed the first cause of action against Defendants Paredes and McLean,
fourth cause of action against Defendants Paredes, McLean, Haynes, and Higley, and sixth cause of action against Defendants Paredes and McLean without leave to amend. (Id.) //// Plaintiff filed his operative Fourth Amended Complaint on March 14, 2025,
asserting the same six causes of action for deliberate indifference, violations of the
Rehabilitation Act, violations of the ADA, failure to summon medical care, violations of
the Bane Act, and negligence against the County, the Sheriff’s Department, the
Regents, the State of California, the California Department of State Hospitals, Sheriff
Jones, and Defendants Saesee, Rollon, Whiting, Blevins, Singh, Haynes, Higley, Noda,
Preston, and Turner. (Fourth Am. Compl. (“FAC”) (ECF No. 124) ¶¶ 7–23, 160–204.)
Plaintiff no longer asserts claims against Sturgis, Albright-Mundy, Paredes, McLean,
Garcelles-Barrella, Oran, or DeCarlo in his Fourth Amended Complaint.
Under submission now are two separate motions to dismiss brought under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and a motion to strike brought under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f):
• The Regents and Defendant Turner (collectively, “Regents Defendants”)
move to dismiss Plaintiff’s first cause of action against Defendant Turner;
fifth cause of action against the Regents Defendants; and sixth cause of
action against Defendant Turner. (Regents Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (ECF No.
127) at 2.)
• The County, Sheriff’s Department, Sheriff Jones, and Defendants Saesee,
Rollon, Whiting, Blevins, Singh, Haynes, Higley, and Noda (collectively,
“County Defendants”) move to dismiss Plaintiff’s first cause of action
against Sturgis, Albright-Mundy, and Defendant Noda; fourth cause of
action against the County, Sheriff’s Department, Sheriff Jones, and
Defendant Noda; fifth cause of action against Sturgis, Albright-Mundy,
Paredes, McLean, and Defendant Noda; and sixth cause of action against
Sturgis, Albright-Mundy, and Defendant Noda. (County Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (ECF No. 130) at 2–3.) • The County Defendants move to strike references to Defendants Haynes and Higley from the fourth and fifth causes of action, and references to Paredes and McLean from the first, fourth, and sixth causes of action.
(County Defs.’ Mot. Strike (ECF No. 131) at 2.)
Following the Motion to Strike, Plaintiff filed a Notice of Partial Dismissal of Fourth
Claim voluntarily dismissing Defendants Haynes and Higley from the fourth cause of
action. (ECF No. 133.) All of the motions were subsequently submitted without oral
argument pursuant to Local Rule 230(g) on June 25, 2025. (ECF No. 143.)
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), a court may strike “any insufficient
defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(f). “Motions to strike are generally regarded with disfavor because of the
limited importance of pleading in federal practice, and because they are often used as
a delaying tactic.” Cal. Dep’t of Toxic Substances Control v. Alco Pac., Inc., 217 F.
Supp. 2d 1028, 1033 (C.D. Cal. 2002). When considering a motion to strike, the court
views the pleading in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and will
“resolve[ ] any doubt as to the relevance of the challenged allegations or sufficiency of
a defense” in the nonmoving party’s favor. Id. Ultimately, the decision as to whether
to strike allegations “lies within the sound discretion of the district court.” Id.
A party may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted only if the complaint
lacks a “cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal
theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008).
The court assumes all factual allegations are true and construes “them in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Steinle v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 919 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995)). That said, if the complaint’s allegations do not “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief” the motion must be granted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). A complaint need contain only a “short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not
“detailed factual allegations,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
However, this rule demands more than unadorned accusations; “sufficient factual
matter” must make the claim at least plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In the same
vein, conclusory or formulaic recitations of elements alone do not suffice. Id. “A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.” Id.
In granting a motion to dismiss, a court must also decide whether to grant leave
to amend. Leave to amend should be freely given where there is no “undue delay,
bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice to the
opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of amendment
. . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc.,
316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only
if it is clear that “the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Intri-Plex
Techs., Inc. v. Crest Grp., Inc., 499 F. 3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Daou
Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005)).
I. County Defendants’ Motion to Strike
The County Defendants move to strike “impertinent and immaterial” references
to Defendants Haynes and Higley, and former defendants Paredes and McLean, in the
Fourth Amended Complaint based on the Court’s prior dismissal of claims against
those Defendants. (County Defs.’ Mot. Strike at 2–6.) In particular, the County
Defendants move to strike references to Defendants Haynes and Higley from paragraphs 178, 180, 182, 183, and 184 in the fourth cause of action, and paragraph 191 in the fifth cause of action. (Id. at 5–6.) They also move to strike references to Paredes and McLean from paragraph 165 in the first cause of action, paragraphs 182 and 184 in the fourth cause of action, and paragraphs 200, 202, and 204 in the sixth
cause of action. (Id. at 6.)
Plaintiff has voluntarily stricken Defendants Haynes and Higley from his fourth
cause of action for failure to summon medical care. (ECF No. 133.) Thus, the County
Defendants’ Motion to Strike on that basis is moot. The Court will, however, strike the
reference to Defendants Haynes and Higley in paragraph 191 of Plaintiff’s fifth cause
of action under the Bane Act, which premises Defendants Haynes and Higley’s Bane
Act liability on their failure to summon medical care. (See FAC ¶ 191.) As Plaintiff no
longer brings a claim against Defendants Haynes and Higley for failure to summon
medical care, he cannot premise his Bane Act claim on that basis.
However, the Court declines to strike the allegations as to Paredes and McLean
from paragraphs 165, 182, 184, 200, 202, and 204 in the Fourth Amended Complaint.
It is clear in the Fourth Amended Complaint that Plaintiff no longer asserts any causes
of action against those officers per this Court’s prior order. (See FAC ¶¶ 7–23, 160,
178, 197; Dismissal Order at 24–25, 28.) While Plaintiff still references Paredes and
McLean in the Fourth Amended Complaint, Plaintiff argues his allegations concerning
those officers are relevant to establishing background information and context for his
claims against the remaining Defendants. (Opp’n Mot. Strike (ECF No. 140) at 2–5.)
The County Defendants do not rebut Plaintiff’s contention that the allegations are at
least arguably relevant to Plaintiff’s remaining claims. (See Reply Mot. Strike (ECF No.
141) at 3–4.) As the County Defendants have not demonstrated why the allegations
against Paredes and McLean are clearly irrelevant or prejudicial, the Court declines to
strike them from the Fourth Amended Complaint.
In short, the Court will grant the County Defendants’ Motion to Strike in part
and strike the reference to Defendants Haynes and Higley from paragraph 191 in the Fourth Amended Complaint only. //// //// II. The Regents Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
A. Relevant Factual Allegations
On November 11, 2020, Plaintiff was arrested and booked on felony charges at
the Sacramento County Main Jail. (FAC ¶¶ 36–37.) Jail staff initially classified Plaintiff
for specialized housing in the Jail Psychiatric Services (“JPS”) unit based on Plaintiff’s
documented mental health history and his behavior. (Id. ¶¶ 40, 45, 48.) For example,
on November 16, 2020, Plaintiff’s jail mental health notes indicated: “FOSS I”; “Altered
Thought Process”; “Serious Mental Illness”; “Schizoaffective [D]isorder”; “2P Pre-
Admit”; and “Unspecified intellectual disabilities.” (Id. ¶ 41.) Plaintiff was also
frequently observed “taking a ‘boxer’s stance’ or ‘fighting position’ with ‘fists in the air’
and expressing a need to ‘defend’ himself from ‘threats,’ including ‘invisible’ and
‘visible enemies.’” (Id. ¶ 44.) His jail mental health notes stated he had “a history of
Schizoaffective Disorder . . . he is clearly psychotic . . . [and is] gravely disabled.” (Id.
¶ 47.)
On December 11, 2020, Plaintiff was discharged from the jail’s JPS unit to
general population for outpatient psychiatric (“OPP”) housing. (Id. ¶ 51.) While
Plaintiff was housed in OPP housing, mental health professionals employed by the
Regents, who contract with the County and Sheriff’s Department to provide psychiatric
and mental health services at the jail, conducted several mental health appointments
with Plaintiff, during which they documented that Plaintiff presented as “delusional
and continu[ed] to be disorganized”; that he “stated that someone is hitting him inside
his cell, however, upon further explanation . . . stated ‘I get an electric shock’”; that he
complained he sometimes missed meals because people were trying to hit him; and
that he complained that “[t]he officers are in my head and they hit me in my head,” but
confirmed he was not being hit by his cellmate or anyone else in his pod. (Id. ¶¶ 32, 53–54, 65.) In March of 2021, Plaintiff’s mental health notes also indicated he reported his cellmate had attacked him at the end of February or early March, but that nothing had happened since then. (Id. ¶ 62.) Subsequently, on April 5, 2021, Plaintiff was found incompetent to stand trial
and was ordered to be transferred to a state hospital pending restoration of his
competency. (Id. ¶¶ 63–64.) A “state hospital hold” notation was placed in Plaintiff’s
jail records. (Id. ¶ 64.)
On September 9, 2021, Burleson was booked into the jail. (Id. ¶ 72.) Burleson,
who had previously been incarcerated, had a documented history of mental illness,
“was frequently documented by jail staff as assaultive” towards other
inmates/cellmates, and had stated he “wanted to kill white people” and “threatened to
assault any inmate he is housed with.” (Id. ¶¶ 73–74.) On September 20, 2021, jail
staff classified Burleson and housed him in general population with OPP housing. (Id.
¶ 75.) Burleson was not referred for mental health services, connected with JPS staff,
or prescribed any mood-stabilizing medications “despite his documented history of
mental illness.” (Id. ¶ 79.)
On September 23, 2021, jail staff removed Plaintiff from his assigned cell
because he “stated his cellmate Rodriguez, Jesus X-5187464 (224) was being violent
towards him.” (Id. ¶ 80.) Plaintiff was reassigned to share a cell with Burleson that
same day. (Id. ¶¶ 81–82.) On September 24, 2021, Defendant Turner, a licensed
clinical social worker employed by the Regents, conducted a mental health
appointment with Plaintiff during which he stated he had a new cellmate and “[i]t’s not
working out too well.” (Id. ¶¶ 20, 86.) Defendant Turner asked Plaintiff to elaborate,
but he refused, stating he would rather talk to his lawyer about it. (Id. ¶ 86.) Plaintiff
also denied any physical or sexual contact with his cellmate but stated if he got
physical “I’ll have to defend myself.” (Id.) Defendant Turner did not report Plaintiff’s
concerns about Burleson to any jail staff. (Id. ¶ 87.) However, Plaintiff alleges
Defendant Turner had access to Plaintiff and Burleson’s records, and that if she had reviewed the records, she would have learned that Plaintiff and Burleson were both severely mentally ill, that Plaintiff was reportedly the victim of two prior assaults by cellmates during his incarceration, that Burleson had a history of violence against other inmates, and that Burleson had not received any medication despite his
assaultive history. (Id. ¶¶ 88–89.) Plaintiff alleges a reasonable official in Defendant
Turner’s position would have investigated the risk to Plaintiff under the circumstances
and reported it. (Id. ¶ 90.) On September 26, 2021, Plaintiff was brutally assaulted by
Burleson in their shared cell. (Id. ¶ 93.)
B. First Cause of Action for Deliberate Indifference
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. 14
§ 1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a right of action for the “deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” by persons acting
under color of state law. Pretrial detainees have the right to be free from violence
from other inmates, and prison officials therefore have a duty to protect them from
such violence. Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1067 (9th Cir. 2016). To
state a plausible claim for failure to protect under the Fourteenth Amendment, a
plaintiff must plead and prove that the defendant acted with “deliberate indifference.”
Id. at 1067–68.
To establish deliberate indifference, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the defendant
made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff
was confined; (2) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering
serious harm; (3) the defendant did not take reasonably available measures to abate
that risk, even though a reasonable official in those circumstances would have
appreciated the high degree of risk involved, making the consequences of the
defendant’s conduct obvious; and (4) by not taking such measures, the defendant
caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Id. at 1071. The third element requires that the
defendant’s conduct be objectively unreasonable. Id. The mere lack of due care by a state official does not deprive an individual of life, liberty, or property under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Rather, the plaintiff must “prove more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless disregard.” Id. Here, Plaintiff brings a deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Turner,
alleging Defendant Turner failed to protect Plaintiff by neglecting to review Plaintiff
and Burleson’s jail records in response to Plaintiff’s concerns voiced during his
appointment in order to assess any risk posed by Burleson, and then failing to report
that risk to jail staff who had the ability to “move monitor or otherwise account for
Plaintiff . . . and . . . Burleson.” (FAC ¶¶ 91, 162.) The Court previously dismissed
Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Turner, reasoning that
Plaintiff’s allegations did not “plausibly establish that Defendant Turner could have
appreciated that Plaintiff was at a serious risk of harm based on his comments”
because it was “unclear from the Third Amended Complaint whether Defendant
Turner, as an employee of the Regents, had access to Burleson’s records and thus
could have recognized the specific threat that Burleson posed to Plaintiff” and
because Plaintiff declined to elaborate further when Defendant Turner asked Plaintiff
about his comment that “[i]t’s not working out too well.” (Dismissal Order at 10.)
Defendant Turner urges the Court to dismiss this claim again because “[e]ven if, as
Plaintiff alleges, Turner had access to [Plaintiff and Burleson’s] records, there are no
allegations to support an inference that a reasonable person in Turner’s position
would have or should have reviewed those records” as “Plaintiff’s statements were
insufficient to put a reasonable person in Turner’s position on notice that Plaintiff was
at substantial risk of serious harm.” (Regents Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at 14.)
The Court agrees and finds that Plaintiff has insufficiently pled deliberate
indifference. Plaintiff argues that his statements concerning Burleson were sufficient
to put Defendant Turner on notice that she should investigate and report potential
risks to Plaintiff, her mental health patient, to jail staff, which she failed to do.
However, the record shows that Defendant Turner did attempt to investigate Plaintiff’s statements by asking Plaintiff to elaborate on why he was concerned about his situation with his cellmate. In response, Plaintiff declined to clarify his statements beyond speculating that if Burleson became physical “I’ll have to defend myself.” Plaintiff also denied, however, that any physical or sexual contact had occurred thus
far. Taken together, these statements do not implicate any deliberate indifference on
Defendant Turner’s part, as Defendant Turner specifically asked about Plaintiff’s
concerns, and Plaintiff declined to provide any further details clearly indicating an
imminent attack. Otherwise stated, Plaintiff’s statements neither indicated a “high
degree of risk” to his safety, nor that the potential consequence of Defendant Turner’s
failure to further investigate or report his statements to jail staff were “obvious.” While
Defendant Turner could have gone above and beyond to review Plaintiff and
Burleson’s records, given the vagueness of Plaintiff’s statements Defendant Turner’s
failure to do so was not objectively unreasonable under the circumstances.
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s first cause of action against
Defendant Turner for deliberate indifference with leave to amend.
C. Fifth Cause of Action under the Bane Act
The Bane Act “protects individuals from conduct aimed at interfering with rights
that are secured by federal or state law, where the interference is carried out ‘by
threats, intimidation or coercion.’” Reese v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1040
(9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Venegas v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 153 Cal. App. 4th 1230
(2007)). When a Bane Act claim is based on alleged federal constitutional violations,
plaintiffs may rely on the same allegations to prove both that the defendant deprived
them of a constitutional right and threatened, intimidated, or coerced them. See id. at
1043 (“[T]he Bane Act does not require the ‘threat, intimidation or coercion’ element
of the claim to be transactionally independent from the constitutional violation
alleged.”). But the claim must also rest on factual allegations that would allow an
inference the defendant had a specific intent to violate the plaintiff’s rights. See id.
“[S]pecific intent” may be shown by demonstrating that the defendant “acted . . . ‘in reckless disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibitions or guarantees.’” Cornell v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 17 Cal. App. 5th 766, 803–04 (2017), as modified (Nov. 17, 2017) (citation omitted); Reese, 888 F.3d at 1045 (“[A] reckless disregard for a person’s constitutional rights is evidence of a specific intent to deprive that person of
those rights.”).
As to the specific intent inquiry, courts have held that if a plaintiff adequately
pleads a claim for deliberate indifference, which requires a pleading of reckless
disregard, then he has sufficiently alleged the intent required for a Bane Act claim.
See Scalia v. Cnty. of Kern, 308 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1084 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (finding
coercive act element of Bane Act claim satisfied by allegation of prison official’s
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs); see also M.H. v. Cnty. of Alameda,
90 F. Supp. 3d 889, 898 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (holding that because deliberate indifference
“has been associated with affirmatively culpable conduct, . . . a prisoner who
successfully proves that prison officials acted or failed to act with deliberate
indifference to his medical needs in violation of his constitutional rights . . . adequately
states a claim for relief under the Bane Act”).
Here, Plaintiff pleads his Bane Act claim against Defendant Turner based on her
alleged deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s safety in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Article I, Section 7(a) of the California Constitution. (FAC ¶ 187.)
Plaintiff also pleads a Bane Act claim against the Regents based on theories of
supervisory and vicarious liability. (Id. ¶¶ 188, 194.) However, as held above, Plaintiff
has failed to plead deliberate indifference under the Fourteenth Amendment against
Defendant Turner. See Section II.B supra. Thus, those allegations cannot support
Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim here.
Plaintiff argues that he had pled a Bane Act claim premised on violations of
both the United States and California Constitutions, and that the Regents Defendants
have failed to specifically seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim based on
violations of Article I, Section 7(a) of the California Constitution, weighing against dismissal. (Opp’n Regents Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (ECF No. 129) at 7–8.) Article I, Section 7(a) of the California Constitution, much like the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that a “person may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” However, Plaintiff argues the analysis of Article I, Section 7(a) “is not necessarily
duplicative of the Fourteenth Amendment, where ‘the California Constitution is, and
always has been, a document of independent force, and [] the rights embodied in and
protected by the state Constitution are not invariably identical to the rights contained
in the federal Constitution.’” (Opp’n Regents Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at 8 (quoting Am.
Acad. of Pediatrics v. Lungren, 16 Cal. 4th 307, 325 (Cal. 1997)).) While that may be,
the fact remains that, in order to state a Bane Act claim, a plaintiff must plausibly
allege that the defendant had a specific intent to interfere with the plaintiff’s rights,
and that the interference was carried out by “threats, intimidation or coercion.” Civ.
Code § 52.1(b); Reese, 888 F.3d at 1040. Here, for the reasons discussed in Section
II.B supra, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege Defendant Turner
had a specific intent to deprive Plaintiff of his rights under the California Constitution.
Given that Plaintiff has failed to allege either deliberate indifference or other
evidence of Defendant Turner’s reckless disregard for Plaintiff’s constitutional rights,
the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim against Defendant Turner as well as the
Regents with leave to amend.
D. Sixth Cause of Action for Negligence
In California, a cause of action for negligence requires (1) a legal duty to use
reasonable care; (2) breach of that duty; and (3) proximate cause between the breach
and (4) the plaintiff’s injury. Mendoza v. City of Los Angeles, 66 Cal. App. 4th 1333,
1339 (1998). This standard requires a much lower level of culpability than deliberate
indifference. See Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071.
Here, Plaintiff pleads that Defendant Turner is liable for negligence based on
several theories, “including by inadequately supervising, monitoring, and responding
to [Plaintiff]’s safety and/or medical needs, in violation of the United States and California Constitutions, federal and state laws, regulations, policies, standards, general orders, procedures, training, national and local standards, and/or California Civil Code § 1714(a).” (FAC ¶ 199.) Defendant Turner argues that Plaintiff’s claim fails because Plaintiff has insufficiently pled Defendant Turner owed Plaintiff a duty of care
to protect him from his cellmate Burleson. (Regents Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at 15–18.)
The Court agrees that Plaintiff has insufficiently alleged a duty to protect. First,
Plaintiff argues that, to the extent he has alleged a deliberate indifference claim, he
has also stated a negligence claim as negligence requires a much lower level of
culpability. (Opp’n Regents Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at 13.) However, Plaintiff has
insufficiently alleged deliberate indifference. See Section II.B supra. Thus, those
allegations alone cannot support his negligence claim.
Plaintiff also argues that, under California law, there is a special relationship
between a jailer and a prisoner giving rise to a duty of care to protect the prisoner
from foreseeable harm inflicted by a third party. Giraldo v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. &
Rehab., 168 Cal. App. 4th 231, 246–53 (2008). However, the reasoning behind the
Giraldo court’s imposition of a special relationship does not clearly extend to health
care providers in prisons, who occupy a very different role than prison officials. In
recognizing a jailer’s duty to prisoners in their care, the court in Giraldo reasoned that
the “typical setting for the recognition of a special relationship is where ‘the plaintiff is
particularly vulnerable and dependent upon the defendant who, correspondingly, has
some control over the plaintiff’s welfare.’” Id. at 245–46. Turning to the relationship
between jailers and prisoners, the court concluded that jailers, who have taken
custody of their prisoners and thereby deprived them of the ability to protect
themselves, are under a duty to protect the persons in their custody from foreseeable
harm, including by controlling the conduct of third persons. See id. at 246–50.
Here, Defendant Turner was employed to provide mental health services to
inmates at the jail. Unlike a jailer or other prison official, she was not charged with the
inmates’ general safe keeping, nor was she in a position to control the conduct, classification, and housing of inmates. Therefore, the Court declines to extend the duty recognized under Giraldo to mental health care providers such as Defendant Turner, particularly given that Plaintiff fails to cite any case where a contracted mental health care provider was found to owe an inmate-patient a duty to protect them from
third-party conduct. Rather, Defendant Turner owed Plaintiff a duty to provide
adequate mental health care. See Calderon v. Glick, 131 Cal. App. 4th 224, 234
(2005) (mental health care providers have “‘a duty to use a reasonable degree of skill,
knowledge and care in treating a patient, commensurate with that possessed and
exercised by others practicing within that specialty in the professional community’”
(quoting Kockelman v. Segal, 61 Cal. App. 4th 491, 505 (1998))). However, Plaintiff
has not alleged that that duty was breached here. Thus, Plaintiff has failed to allege
any applicable duty arising under the common law.
Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Turner failed to comply with various
established policies, trainings, standards, and procedures relating to protecting and
reporting threats to patients which Plaintiff argues sufficiently states a negligence
claim. (Opp’n Regents Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at 14–15.) However, while Plaintiff lists the
relevant policies, he has failed to allege what these policies required of Defendant
Turner (i.e., duty), or how she violated them (i.e., breach). (See FAC ¶ 92.) Such
conclusory pleading fails to state a plausible claim for relief.
Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s negligence claim against
Defendant Turner with leave to amend.
III. The County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
A. Relevant Factual Allegations
On December 11, 2020, Plaintiff was discharged from the JPS unit to general
population OPP housing. (FAC ¶ 51.) On September 23, 2021, Plaintiff and Burleson
were both assigned to cell #203. (Id. ¶¶ 80–82.) Plaintiff was assaulted by Burleson in
their cell on September 26, 2021. (Id. ¶ 93.) Defendant Noda, a records officer, along
with other Defendants, were the jail staff responsible for monitoring the inmates in the area of the jail where Plaintiff and Burleson were housed that day, including monitoring inmates via a closed-circuit television (“CCTV”) surveillance system and conducting direct visual checks of cells and inmates. (Id. ¶ 95.) After Plaintiff was assaulted, he was on the ground of his cell bleeding from a
headwound and struggling to breathe for about 30 minutes. (Id. ¶¶ 100, 102.)
Plaintiff’s blood was leaking underneath the cell door and was visible on at least two
different CCTV surveillance cameras. (Id. ¶ 101.) More than 22 minutes after the
blood was visible on the jail’s CCTV cameras, and about 55 minutes after the last cell
check, Josh Soules, an inmate-trustee, noticed the stream of blood leaking from cell
#203 and approached the cell for inspection. (Id. ¶ 106.) Burleson observed that
Soules had discovered his assault, used the emergency button to activate the
intercom inside of the jail, and informed Defendant Noda, who was located in the
control area, that he had attacked and “might have killed” Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 107–08.)
Defendant Noda relayed Burleson’s message to other Defendants, who responded to
the attack. (Id. ¶¶ 109–25.) Eventually, Plaintiff was transported to the hospital where
he was placed in a medically induced coma. (Id. ¶ 126.)
B. First Cause of Action for Deliberate Indifference
The County Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claims for deliberate indifference
against Sturgis, Albright-Mundy, and Defendant Noda should be dismissed, as Plaintiff
has failed to adequately remedy his allegations as to those claims. (County Defs.’ Mot.
Dismiss at 4-9.)
Plaintiff does not assert any claims against Sturgis and Albright-Mundy in his
Fourth Amended Complaint. (See FAC ¶¶ 6–23 (listing the Parties).) Thus, the County
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to those officers is denied as moot.
However, the Court will grant the County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss as to
Defendant Noda. The Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference
claim against Defendant Noda, reasoning that Plaintiff failed to plausibly allege
Defendant Noda made an intentional decision with respect to Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement as Plaintiff failed to explain how Defendant Noda deliberately failed to monitor Plaintiff’s cell. (Dismissal Order at 23.) Plaintiff has failed to add any allegations in the Fourth Amended Complaint remedying this shortcoming, as Plaintiff neither plausibly alleges Defendant Noda was scheduled to conduct a visual check of
Plaintiff’s cell but failed to do so, nor that Defendant Noda had access to CCTV
footage while he was in the control room to monitor Plaintiff’s cell but failed to do so.
At most, Plaintiff alleges that “NODA ignored or failed to detect or notice Plaintiff
ANTHONY CRAVOTTA II’s stream of blood that continuously grew and leaked from
under the cell door” and “fail[ed] adequately to monitor cell #203” via CCTV or visual
checks, “caus[ing] serious harm, including the non-detection of LEMAR BURLESON’s
assault on Plaintiff ANTHONY CRAVOTTA II and delay in summoning medical care.”
(FAC ¶¶ 103–04). These conclusory allegations are insufficient to establish Defendant
Noda made an intentional decision to inadequately monitor Plaintiff’s cell. See
Cavanaugh v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 3:18-cv-02557-BEN-LL, 2020 WL 6703592, at
*12–13 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2020) (finding plaintiff failed to allege a deliberate
indifference claim when his conclusory allegations that defendants “failed to properly
conduct cell checks required to verify an inmate’s safety and welfare” were insufficient
to create a plausible claim that defendants intentionally chose the conditions of
confinement and were not merely negligent).
Thus, the Court will grant dismissal of Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim
against Defendant Noda but will grant Plaintiff one final chance to amend.
C. Fourth Cause of Action for Failure to Summon Medical Care
The County Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim for failure to summon
medical care against Defendant Noda is inadequately pled and should be dismissed.
(County Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at 9–10.) The County Defendants also argue that Plaintiff
fails to adequately allege supervisory claims against Sheriff Jones, and that the County
and Sheriff’s Department are immune from liability pursuant to California Government
Code section 844.6(a). (Id. at 10–11.) The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Noda for the same reasons set forth in the Court’s prior Order: Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged Defendant Noda knew, or had reason to know, that Plaintiff was in need of immediate medical care during the 30-minute period between when Plaintiff was attacked and
the attack was reported. (Dismissal Order at 25.) Plaintiff generally alleges that
Defendant Noda was assigned, along with other Defendants, to monitor Plaintiff’s cell
during the period when he was assaulted, that blood was visibly leaking out from
underneath Plaintiff’s cell door for 22 minutes before the attack was reported, and that
Defendant Noda was in the control room when he received Burleson’s report that
Plaintiff had been attacked. (FAC ¶¶ 95, 101, 106–08.) These allegations fail to
establish, however, how Defendant Noda knew or should have known of the assault.
In other words, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant Noda failed to conduct a
scheduled safety check after the attack, or that he had access to CCTV footage while
in the control area during the time when blood was visibly leaking underneath the cell
door. Further, Plaintiff alleges that once Defendant Noda was made aware of the
attack, he promptly alerted other jail staff of the emergency and medical care was
swiftly summoned. (See id. ¶¶ 108–27.) Thus, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Noda
will be dismissed.
With respect to Sheriff Jones, courts have held that prison officials may be liable
for their employees’ failure to summon medical care because section 845.6 permits
claims against prison officials for negligent supervision and training as to when to
summon medical care. Villarreal v. Cnty. of Monterey, 254 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1189
(N.D. Cal. 2017) (“California Government Code § 845.6 permits claims against prison
officials for negligent supervision and training as to when to summon medical care.”);
Estate of Claypole v. Cnty. of San Mateo, No. 14–cv–02730–BLF, 2014 WL 5100696, at
*8 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2014) (finding Government Code section 845.6 could support
claim against a County defendant for negligent supervision and training). Here,
Plaintiff alleges that Sheriff Jones failed to adequately train and supervise jail staff in summoning necessary medical care for inmates at the jail. (See FAC ¶¶ 139–41, 181.) In support of these allegations, Plaintiff alleges numerous incidents when other inmates at the jail suffered injuries as a result of jail staff inadequately diagnosing, monitoring, and providing care for inmates, including failing to respond to immediate
medical needs. (Id. ¶ 145.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Preston, another
employee at the jail, failed to summon medical care in violation of section 845.6,
thereby resulting in Plaintiff’s harm. (See id. ¶¶ 178–84.) Plaintiff’s claim against
Defendant Preston has not been challenged here. Viewing these allegations as a
whole, Plaintiff has adequately pled Sheriff Jones inadequately trained and supervised
jail staff, including Defendant Preston, in summoning medical care, resulting in
Plaintiff’s injuries. Thus, Plaintiff’s claim against Sheriff Jones will not be dismissed.
Finally, concerning the County and Sheriff’s Department, section 845.6
provides that a “public entity” may be liable for a failure to summon medical care by
an “employee [who] is acting within the scope of his [or her] employment.” Gov’t
Code § 845.6. Here, Plaintiff alleges that the County and Sheriff’s Department are
vicariously liable for the injuries caused by Defendant Preston, against whom Plaintiff
has a viable claim for failure to summon medical care under section 845.6. (FAC
¶ 182.) The County Defendants argue that the County and Sheriff’s Department are
immune from liability under Government Code section 844.6(a). However, immunity
under section 844.6 is expressly “except[ed] as provided . . . in Section[] . . . 845.6
. . . .” Gov’t Code § 844.6(a); see, e.g., Lapachet v. Cal. Forensic Med. Grp., Inc., 313 F.
Supp. 3d 1183, 1198 n.4 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (recognizing “multiple exceptions to [section
844.6] immunity,” including liability under section 845.6); Cooks v. State of California,
No. 2:20-cv-1780-KJN P, 2022 WL 2110761, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 10, 2022) (“[T]here
are statutory exceptions to § 844.6, one of which is failure to summon medical care
under California Government Code § 845.6.”). The County Defendants have not
explained why, despite this clear language, they should benefit from the immunity
provisions of section 844.6 as to Plaintiff’s failure to summon medical care claim. Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action against Defendant Noda only with leave to amend. //// D. Fifth Cause of Action under the Bane Act
The County Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Bane Act claims against
Paredes, McLean, Albright-Mundy, Sturgis, and Defendant Noda, arguing all are
insufficiently pled. (County Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at 13–14.)
As this Court has already observed, Plaintiff does not assert any claims against
Sturgis and Albright-Mundy in his Fourth Amended Complaint. (See FAC ¶¶ 6–23
(listing the Parties).) Similarly, Plaintiff no longer asserts any claims against Paredes or
McLean in the Fourth Amended Complaint. (Id.) Accordingly, dismissal of Plaintiff’s
Bane Act claims as to those officers is denied as moot.
However, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim as to Defendant Noda.
That claim is premised on Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Noda for deliberate
indifference in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 7(a) of the California Constitution, and failure to
summon medical care in violation of Government Code section 845.6. (See id.
¶¶ 187, 191.) As held supra, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim against Defendant
Noda for either deliberate indifference under the Fourteenth Amendment or failure to
summon medical care under section 845.6. See Sections III.B–C supra. Thus, those
claims cannot support Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim here.
As with Defendant Turner, Plaintiff argues that the County Defendants have not
specifically sought dismissal of Plaintiff’s Bane Act claim premised on violations of
Article I, Section 7(a) of the California Constitution. (Opp’n County Mot. Dismiss (ECF
No. 139) at 13–14.) However, as discussed in Section II.C supra, to state a Bane Act
claim, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that the defendant had a specific intent to
interfere with the plaintiff’s rights, and that the interference was carried out by “threats,
intimidation or coercion.” Civ. Code § 52.1(b); Reese, 888 F.3d at 1040. Here, for the reasons discussed in Section III.B supra, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly allege Defendant Noda acted with reckless disregard for Plaintiff’s rights under the California Constitution. Thus, the Court will grant dismissal of Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action against
Defendant Noda with leave to amend.
E. Sixth Cause of Action for Negligence
Finally, the County Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for negligence
against Sturgis, Albright-Mundy, and Defendant Noda. (County Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at
11–13.)
Plaintiff does not assert any claims, including negligence, against Sturgis and
Albright-Mundy in his Fourth Amended Complaint. (See FAC ¶¶ 6–23 (listing the
Parties).) Thus, dismissal of Plaintiff’s negligence claims as to those officers is denied
as moot.
The Court will, however, dismiss Plaintiff’s negligence claim as to Defendant
Noda. “In California, prison officials owe detainees a duty to protect them from
foreseeable harm.” Cotta v. Cnty. of Kings, 686 F. App’x 467, 469 (9th Cir. 2017);
Edison v. United States, 822 F.3d 510, 521 (9th Cir. 2016); Giraldo, 168 Cal. App. 4th
at 252–53. Plaintiff alleges Defendant Noda breached this duty when he insufficiently
monitored Plaintiff. (FAC ¶ 199.) However, Plaintiff’s allegations are insufficient to
conclude Defendant Noda breached any duty, as Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged
Defendant Noda failed to conduct scheduled safety checks during the assault in
question, conducted insufficient safety checks during that time, or had access to but
failed to monitor CCTV footage of Plaintiff’s cell. See Section III.B supra. Thus, as held
in this Court’s prior order, Plaintiff has failed to state negligence a claim on that basis.
(See Dismissal Order at 27–28.)
The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s negligence claim against Defendant Noda with
one final chance to amend.
In accordance with the above, it is hereby ordered that the Regents Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 127) is GRANTED. It is further ordered that the County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 130) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Finally, the County Defendants’ Motion to Strike (ECF No. 131) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Specifically, the Court hereby STRIKES any reference to Defendants Haynes or Higley in paragraph 191 of Plaintiff's Fourth Amended Complaint. The Court also DISMISSES Plaintiff's first, fifth, and sixth causes of action against Defendant Turner; fifth cause of action against the Regents; and first, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action against Defendant Noda, all with leave to amend. The Court notes, however, that this is the Court's third order dismissing claims brought in a case that was filed over three and a half years ago and cautions Plaintiff that any future dismissals may well be with prejudice. The Court DENIES dismissal as to Plaintiff's remaining claims. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint within twenty-one (21) days of this Order. If Plaintiff wishes to add any additional claims or defendants to his amended complaint aside from those specifically contemplated by this Order, Plaintiff must seek the Court's leave to do so pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. The Parties are reminded of the Court's prior order requiring the Parties file a status report pursuant to this Court's Initial Case Management Order within thirty-five (35) days after the Court's ruling on these motions. (ECF No. 132.) Dated: _ August 14, 2025 Donel J CoDbnetto Hon. Daniel alabretta UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE DJca - Cravotta22ev167.ThirdMTD&MotStrike 99