Cravotta v. County of Sacramento

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

ANTHONY CRAVOTTA II, No. 2:22-cv-00167-DJC-AC

Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, et al., Defendants.

Plaintiff Anthony Cravotta II, a former pretrial detainee in county jail, alleges he

was brutally assaulted by his cellmate Lemar Burleson after he had been found

mentally incompetent to stand trial and was awaiting transfer to a state hospital.

Plaintiff alleges that, as a result of the assault, he sustained catastrophic brain injuries.

Plaintiff brings six causes of action in his operative Third Amended Complaint

stemming from his detention at the jail and the assault.

Defendants , who oversee, operate, and provide mental health services at the jail, have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims arguing they are insufficiently pled. Having considered the Parties’ arguments and briefings, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims in part. The factual background of this case is well known to the Parties and is also set forth in the Court’s prior Order granting dismissal of Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. (Mot. Dismiss Order (ECF No. 83) at 2–5.) The Court will address Plaintiff’s

allegations as to specific Defendants as required below.

Plaintiff brought this action on January 26, 2022, asserting ten causes of action

in his First Amended Complaint for (1) deliberate indifference under the Fourteenth

Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) failure to provide timely restorative treatment

under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (3) violations of the

Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.; (4) violations of the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.; (5) deliberate indifference under

Cal. Const. art. I, § 7(a); (6) failure to provide timely restorative treatment under Cal.

Const. art. I, § 7(a); (7) right to medical care/treatment under Cal. Gov’t Code § 845.6;

(8) breach of mandatory duty under Cal. Gov’t Code § 815.6; (9) violations of the Tom

Bane Civil Rights Act (“Bane Act”), Cal. Civ. Code § 52.1; and (10) negligence. (ECF

No. 20.) The Court subsequently dismissed the first, third, fourth, seventh, ninth, and

tenth causes of action in part and granted Plaintiff leave to amend. (Mot. Dismiss

Order at 35–36.) The Court also dismissed Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action with

prejudice. (Id. at 35.)

Plaintiff filed his operative Third Amended Complaint on June 3, 2024,

asserting six causes of action for (1) deliberate indifference/special

relationship/failure-to-protect under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983; (2) violations of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq.; (3) violations of

the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq.; (4) failure to summon medical care under Gov’t

Code § 845.6; (5) violations of the Bane Act, Civ. Code § 52.1; and (6) negligence

against Defendants the County of Sacramento (“County”), Sacramento County Sheriff’s

Department (“Sheriff’s Department”), the Regents of the University of California (“Regents”), the State of California, the California Department of State Hospitals, Sheriff Scott Jones, Christopher Sturgis, Christina Albright-Mundy, Jacob Saesee, Daisy Rollon, Bradley Whiting, Jacquelyn Blevins, Ramandeep Singh, Andrea Haynes, Moises Paredes, Ronnie Mclean, Justin Higley, Takuya Noda, Bennett Preston, Nicole

Garces-Barrella, Diane Oran, Jaclyn DeCarlo, and Melissa Turner. (Third Am. Compl.

(“TAC”) (ECF No. 98) ¶¶ 172–222.)

Under submission are three separate motions to dismiss brought under Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1):

• The Regents and Defendants Garces-Barrella, Oran, Decarlo, and Turner

(collectively, “Regent Defendants”) seek dismissal of Plaintiff’s first cause

of action against Defendants Garces-Barrella, Oran, DeCarlo, and Turner;

second and third causes of action against the Regents; fourth cause of

action against the Regent Defendants; fifth cause of action against the

Regent Defendants; and sixth cause of action against the Regents.

(Regent Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (ECF No. 102) at 1–3.)

• The County, Sheriff’s Department, and Defendants Jones, Sturgis,

Albright-Mundy, Rollon, Whiting, Blevins, Singh, Haynes, Paredes,

McLean, Higley, and Noda (collectively, “County Defendants”) seek

dismissal of Plaintiff’s first cause of action against Defendants Sturgis,

Albright-Mundy, Rollon, Whiting, Blevins, Singh, Haynes, Paredes,

McLean, Higley, and Noda; fourth cause of action against the County,

Sheriff’s Department, and Defendants Jones, Haynes, Paredes, McLean,

Higley, and Noda; fifth cause of action against Defendants Sturgis,

Albright-Mundy, Rollon, Whiting, Blevins, Singh, Haynes, Paredes,

McLean, Higley, and Noda; and sixth cause of action against Defendants

Sturgis, Albright-Mundy, Rollon, Whiting, Blevins, Singh, Haynes,

Paredes, McLean, Higley, and Noda. (County Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (ECF

No. 103) at 2–3.) • Defendant Saesee seeks dismissal of Plaintiff’s first, fifth, and sixth causes of action. (Saesee Mot. Dismiss (ECF No. 114) at 2.) The Court held a hearing on October 17, 2024, with Paul Masuhara and Mark

Merin appearing for Plaintiff, Adriana Cervantes appearing for the Regent Defendants,

and Jill Nathan appearing for the County Defendants and Defendant Saesee.

A party may move to dismiss a complaint for “lack of subject matter jurisdiction”

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). “The party asserting federal subject

matter jurisdiction bears the burden of proving its existence.” Chandler v. State Farm

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 598 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 2010). Federal courts are courts of

limited jurisdiction, and the “case or controversy” requirement of Article III of the U.S.

Constitution “limits federal courts’ subject matter jurisdiction by requiring, inter alia,

that plaintiffs have standing.” Id. at 1121. To have Article III standing, a plaintiff must

allege they have “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the

challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a

favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016).

A party may also move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief

can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted only if the

complaint lacks a “cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a cognizable

legal theory.” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir.

2008). The court assumes all factual allegations are true and construes “them in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Steinle v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco,

919 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2019). That said, if the complaint's allegations do not

“plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief” the motion must be granted. Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). A complaint need contain only a “short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P.

8(a)(2), not “detailed factual allegations,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). However, this rule demands more than unadorned accusations; “sufficient factual matter” must make the claim at least plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In the same vein, conclusory or formulaic recitations of elements do not alone suffice. Id. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged.” Id.

In granting a motion to dismiss, a court must also decide whether to grant leave

to amend. Leave to amend should be freely given where there is no “undue delay,

bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . . undue prejudice to the

opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of amendment

. . . .” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc.,

316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). Dismissal without leave to amend is proper only

if it is clear that “the complaint could not be saved by any amendment.” Intri-Plex

Techs., Inc. v. Crest Grp., Inc., 499 F. 3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting In re Daou

Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005)).

I. The Regent Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

A. Relevant Factual Allegations

Plaintiff alleges that, on November 11, 2020, he was arrested and booked into

the Sacramento County Main Jail. (TAC ¶¶ 43–44.) Plaintiff was subjected to a

classification interview, during which he was diagnosed with mental health issues

including schizoaffective disorder, prescribed anti-psychotics, and classified for

specialized housing in the Jail Psychiatric Services (“JPS”) unit. (Id. ¶¶ 45–49, 52, 54.)

While in the JPS unit, Plaintiff alleges that jail staff frequently observed and

documented him taking a “boxer’s stance” or “fighting position” with “fists in the air”

and expressing a need to “defend” himself from “threats,” including “invisible” and

“visible enemies.” (Id. ¶ 51.)

On December 10, 2020, Defendant Garces-Barrella, a registered nurse, documented in Plaintiff’s mental health records that the “problems and conditions identified at the time of admission have been resolved” and “Patient to be discharged to the general population, recommend [outpatient psychiatric (“OPP”)] housing.” (Id. ¶¶ 24, 57.) Plaintiff alleges he was subsequently discharged from the JPS unit into

general population OPP housing based on Defendant Garces-Barrella’s

recommendation. (Id. ¶¶ 58–59.)

On December 17, 2020, Defendant Oran, a nurse practitioner, conducted a

mental health appointment with Plaintiff during which she noted Plaintiff presented as

“delusional and continu[ing] to be disorganized.” (Id. ¶¶ 25, 62.) However, Defendant

Oran concluded that, “since he is taking his medications and was recently discharged

from 2 P this seems to be his baseline.” (Id. ¶ 62.)

On April 30, 2021, Defendant DeCarlo, a social worker, conducted a mental

health appointment with Plaintiff during which he stated he sometimes missed meals

because people were trying to hit him, but confirmed he was not being hit physically

by his roommate or anyone else in his pod. (Id. ¶¶ 26, 76.) Defendant DeCarlo noted

that “[his] thought process appeared to be delusional as evidenced by [his]

endorsment [sic] of AH/VH [auditory hallucinations/visual hallucinations] and

perseveration regarding voices, radio frequencies and being attacked.” (Id. ¶ 76.)

On September 23, 2021, Plaintiff was assigned to share a cell with Burleson.

(Id. ¶¶ 95–98.) On September 24, 2021, Defendant Turner, a licensed clinical social

worker, conducted a mental health appointment with Plaintiff during which he stated

he had a new cellmate and it wasn’t working out too well. (Id. ¶¶ 27, 102.) Defendant

Turner asked Plaintiff to elaborate, but he refused, stating he would rather talk to his

lawyer about it. (Id. ¶ 102.) Plaintiff also denied any physical or sexual contact with his

cellmate but stated if he got physical “I’ll have to defend myself.” (Id. ¶ 102.) On

September 26, 2021, Plaintiff was brutally assaulted by Burleson. (Id. ¶ 106.)

B. First Cause of Action for Deliberate Indifference

The Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. 14 § 1. Pretrial detainees at correctional facilities have a protected liberty interest in adequate medical and mental health care under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gibson v. Cnty. of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1187 (9th Cir. 2002), overruled on other

grounds in Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1076 (9th Cir. 2016).

42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a right of action for the “deprivation of any rights, privileges,

or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” by persons acting under color of

state law. To state a plausible claim for failure to provide adequate medical care, a

plaintiff must show: (1) “a serious medical need, by demonstrating that failure to treat

a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and

wanton infliction of pain,” and (2) “the defendant’s response to the need was

deliberately indifferent.” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (internal

quotations and citations omitted).

To establish the deliberate indifference prong, a plaintiff must allege: (1) the

defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which

the plaintiff was confined; (2) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of

suffering serious harm; (3) the defendant did not take reasonably available measures

to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in those circumstances would

have appreciated the high degree of risk involved; and (4) by not taking such

measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange,

888 F.3d 1118, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2018). The third element requires that the

defendant’s conduct be objectively unreasonable. Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071. The

mere lack of due care by a state official does not deprive an individual of life, liberty,

or property under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. Rather, the plaintiff must “prove

more than negligence but less than subjective intent—something akin to reckless

disregard.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff brings deliberate indifference claims against Defendants Garces-

Barrella, Oran, DeCarlo, and Turner based on Defendant Garces-Barrella’s failure to properly classify and house him, Defendants Garces-Barrella, Oran, DeCarlo, and Turner’s failure to provide him with sufficient mental health care, and Defendant Turner’s failure to protect against and report threats made against Plaintiff. (TAC

¶ 174.) The Court will dismiss each of these claims.

First, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege Defendant Garces-Barrella made an

intentional decision to improperly classify or house him. Plaintiff alleges that the

County and Sheriff’s Department jail staff are responsible for classifying inmates based

on information obtained during an inmate’s classification interview. (Id. ¶¶ 35–38, 40–

42.) Plaintiff alleges that the County and Sheriff’s Department contract with the

Regents for the provision of psychiatric/mental health services to inmates housed at

jail facilities but does not allege that Regents’ employees are responsible for

classification of inmates. (Id. ¶ 39.) Defendant Garces-Barrella is a Regents employee.

(Id. ¶ 24.) Plaintiff alleges that he was discharged from the jail’s JPS unit to the general

population for OPP housing based on Defendant Garces-Barrella’s “discharge

decision.” (Id. ¶ 58.) However, Plaintiff also alleges he was “discharged and housed

without jail staff conducting any classification interview, and that a classification

deputy subsequently reviewed Plaintiff’s classification file and concluded he was

moved without a proper classification interview having been conducted.” (Id. ¶ 59.)

These allegations imply that the decision to reclassify Plaintiff was made by jail staff

employed by the County and the Sheriff’s Department, not Defendant Garces-Barrella,

as none of Plaintiff’s allegations indicate Defendant Garces-Barrella had the authority

to reclassify Plaintiff.

Even if Defendant Garces-Barrella was responsible for Plaintiff’s discharge from

the JPS unit, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege Defendant Garces-Barrella’s discharge

decision put him at substantial risk of suffering harm. Defendant Garces-Barrella’s

notes indicate that many of the issues Plaintiff presented at intake had been resolved,

and she recommended he continue to receive psychiatric treatment while in general population housing. Plaintiff also continued to receive anti-psychotic medication when he was discharged. //// In contrast, cases alleging deliberate indifference claims in the context of

psychiatric illnesses typically involve plaintiffs who are “in the midst of an ongoing

psychiatric episode that, without immediate medical care, create[] a present and

substantial risk of serious harm.” Gilbert v. Turner, No. 22-56217, 2024 WL 1947137,

at *2 (9th Cir. May 3, 2024). For example, in Clouthier v. County of Contra Costa, 591

F.3d 1232 (9th Cir. 2010), the court reversed summary judgment on a deliberate

indifference claim brought against a mental health worker by the family of a pretrial

detainee who committed suicide, reasoning that the mental health worker was “on

notice” of the decedent’s “depressive, suicidal condition and need for mental health

treatment” yet did not take steps to prevent “the risk of harm that he faced if denied

medical treatment.” Id. at 1245. Similarly, in Kodimer v. Cnty. of San Diego, No. 07–

CV–2221–BEN (NLS), 2010 WL 2635548 (S.D. Cal. June 30, 2010), the court denied

summary judgment on a deliberate indifference claim when the nurse who screened a

pretrial detainee at a detention center knew or could have known plaintiff was

suffering from a psychotic break but, instead of calling for an immediate psychological

evaluation, or directing plaintiff be transported to an emergency psychiatric facility for

treatment, simply “handed off Plaintiff to the classification deputy for a housing

assignment.” Id. at *3–4. Here, Plaintiff’s allegations do not clearly indicate that he

was a danger to himself or others, or that his placement in OPP housing would

dangerously deteriorate his mental state. Thus, Defendant Garces-Barrella’s

discharge decision was not deliberately indifferent.

As for Defendants Oran and DeCarlo, when they evaluated Plaintiff, they noted

that he was delusional, disorganized, and believed people were trying to hit him.

Plaintiff alleges these Defendants should have reported Plaintiff’s medical needs, and

that their failure to do so caused Plaintiff serious harm, including the continued deterioration of his mental health and a heightened risk of safety. (TAC ¶¶ 63, 65, 77, 79.) However, Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations fail to establish that Defendants Oran and DeCarlo put Plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm as their notes (the contents of which are alleged in the Third Amended Complaint) establish Plaintiff had

been stabilized in JPS housing, was receiving mental health treatment while in OPP

housing, was taking his medication, and was not being physically assaulted or

threatened by other inmates. Thus, as with Defendant Garces-Barrella, there are no

plausible allegations Defendants’ actions exposed Plaintiff to a risk of deteriorating

mental health or a heightened safety risk.

Finally, Plaintiff’s claim for deliberate indifference against Defendant Turner is

inadequately pled. Defendant Turner conducted a mental health appointment with

Plaintiff on September 24, 2021, at which point Plaintiff was sharing a cell with

Burleson. (See TAC ¶¶ 95, 98, 102.) Plaintiff expressed to Defendant Turner that it

was not working out well with his new cellmate, and if it got physical, he would have to

defend himself. (Id. ¶ 102.) Plaintiff was assaulted by Burleson two days later. (Id.

¶ 106.) Plaintiff contends that Defendant Turner is liable for failing to report that

Plaintiff felt threatened on September 24 because, had she made that report, the later

assault could have been avoided.

However, Plaintiff’s allegations do not plausibly establish that Defendant Turner

could have appreciated that Plaintiff was at a serious risk of harm based on his

comments. First, it is unclear from the Third Amended Complaint whether Defendant

Turner, as an employee of the Regents, had access to Burleson’s records and thus

could have recognized the specific threat that Burleson posed to Plaintiff as his

cellmate. Further, when Defendant Turner followed up with Plaintiff about his

comment that things might get physical, Plaintiff declined to elaborate further and

denied any physical or sexual contact with Burleson. (Id. ¶ 102.) Plaintiff’s comment

that things might get physical, without more, is “too vague to support an inference

that [Defendant Turner] was aware of, but failed to address, a legitimate safety concern on behalf of Plaintiff.” Sisneros v. Krittman, No. 14cv891 GPC (RBB), 2016 WL 11447608, at *4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 3517600 (S.D. Cal. June 28, 2016). For example, in Sisneros the court dismissed failure-to-protect claims brought

against mental health professionals by a prisoner after he was attacked by his cellmate

when he had allegedly told the professionals that problems could develop if his

cellmate didn’t receive psychiatric medication, his cellmate engaged in “weird loud

angry behavior,” and his cellmate displayed “demented” behavior. Id. The court

reasoned that dismissal was appropriate because “Plaintiff’s complaints about his

cellmate’s strange behavior could not establish ‘more than a mere suspicion’ that an

attack might occur” given that plaintiff’s cellmate had not made any threats against

him and there was no history of prior conflicts between them. Id. A similar conclusion

is compelled here.

As Plaintiff has not previously pled deliberate indifference claims against

Defendants Garces-Barrella, Oran, DeCarlo, or Turner, the Court will dismiss these

claims with leave to amend.

C. Second and Third Causes of Action under the Rehabilitation Act and

ADA

Plaintiff alleges the Regents are liable under the Rehabilitation Act and ADA for

maintaining policies or customs of action or inaction that resulted in the denial of

adequate mental health care to Plaintiff and failure to reasonably accommodate

Plaintiff’s disabilities. (TAC ¶¶ 178–89.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state an ADA or Rehabilitation Act

claim for the reasons stated in the Court’s prior Order. (See Mot. Dismiss Order at 13–

17.) Specifically, Plaintiff does not allege he was denied mental health care because

of his disability, an essential pleading requirement for both ADA and Rehabilitation

Act claims. See O’Guinn v. Lovelock Corr. Ctr., 502 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007).

Courts have identified ADA or Rehabilitation Act violations in cases where the denial of medical care is so extreme as to suggest a discriminatory refusal to accommodate a disability-related need. See Atayde v. Napa State Hosp., 255 F. Supp. 3d 978, 1001– 02 (E.D. Cal. 2017). However, Plaintiff has not alleged he experienced an extreme denial of mental health services while in jail. Rather, he was provided regular mental

health care from the time of admission through the time of his assault, even after his

discharge from the JPS unit. (TAC ¶¶ 46, 48-49, 54-58, 62, 66-67, 73, 76, 81.)

Indeed, Plaintiff alleges he received several mental health check-ins from

Defendants Garces-Barrella, Oran, DeCarlo, and Turner, all Regents employees. (Id.

¶¶ 57, 62, 66, 102.) While the care Plaintiff received from the Regents and their

employees may not have been sufficient, there is no evidence of any discriminatory

refusal to provide care, and neither the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act provide a

remedy for inadequate treatment alone. See Simmons v. Navajo Cnty., 609 F.3d 1011,

1022 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The ADA prohibits discrimination because of disability, not

inadequate treatment for disability.”); see also O'Guinn v. Nev. Dep’t of Corr., 468 Fed.

App’x 651, 653 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding that plaintiff’s allegations of inadequate

medical care did not state a cognizable ADA or Rehabilitation Act claim after finding

that plaintiff did not identify any evidence demonstrating “a total lack of treatment”).

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s second and third claims under the Rehabilitation Act and

ADA against the Regents are dismissed. As this is the Court’s first order regarding

these claims, the Court will grant leave to amend.

D. Fourth Cause of Action for Failure to Summon Medical Care

Under California Government Code section 845.6, public entities and public

employees are generally not liable for injury proximately caused by the failure of the

employee to furnish or obtain medical care for a prisoner in their custody. Gov’t Code

§ 845.6. However, a “public employee, and the public entity where the employee is

acting within the scope of his employment, is liable if the employee knows or has

reason to know that the prisoner is in need of immediate medical care and he fails to

take reasonable action to summon such medical care.” Id. Thus, a claim under section 845.6 requires three elements: (1) the public employee knew or had reason to know of the need (2) for immediate medical care, and (3) failed to reasonably summon such care. Jett, 439 F.3d at 1099. “Liability under section 845.6 is limited to serious and obvious medical conditions requiring immediate care.” Id. (quoting Watson v.

California, 21 Cal. App. 4th 836, 841 (1993)). In addition, “‘immediate’ does not

signify urgent; rather, the obligation to summon immediate medical care requires that

the public employee act in a ‘timely’ manner, so as to prevent further injury.” Horton v.

City of Santa Maria, 915 F.3d 592, 608 (9th Cir. 2019).

Under California law, “once an inmate is receiving medical care, [section] 845.6

does not create a duty to provide adequate or appropriate care.” Resendiz v. Cnty. of

Monterey, No. 5:14-cv-05495-LHK, 2015 WL 7075694, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2015).

Liability under section 845.6 attaches only when an employee fails to summon medical

care; failure to provide further treatment, or to ensure further diagnosis or treatment,

is not actionable under section 845.6. See Castaneda v. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 212

Cal. App. 4th 1051, 1072 (2013). “Thus, once a prisoner is receiving medical care,

prison employees are under no further obligation under [section] 845.6.” Pajas v.

Cnty. of Monterey, No. 5:16-cv-00945-LHK, 2016 WL 3648686, at *12 (N.D. Cal. July 8,

2016); see also Castaneda, 212 Cal. App. 4th at 1070 (“Section 845.6 is very narrowly

written to authorize a cause of action against a public entity for its employees’ failure

to summon immediate medical care only, not for certain employee’s malpractice in

providing that care.”).

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Garces-Barrella, Oran, DeCarlo, and Turner

failed to summon immediate medical care in violation of section 845.6. (TAC ¶ 192.)

Plaintiff further alleges the Regents are liable for those Defendants’ failure to summon

medical care under theories of supervisory and vicarious liability. (Id. ¶¶ 193–94.)

The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Garces-Barrella,

Oran, DeCarlo, and Turner. Plaintiff fails to allege that he was suffering from any

immediate medical needs during his interactions with the individual Regent Defendants such that they should have summoned medical care. (See id. ¶¶ 57–58, 62, 76, 102.) At most, Plaintiff’s mental health notes indicate he was delusional and had auditory and visual hallucinations. There is no indication in the notes that his mental health was so dire he was a harm to himself or others. Cf. Bock v. Cnty. of

Sutter, No. 2:11-cv-00536-MCE-GGH, 2012 WL 3778953, at *17 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 31,

2012) (denying dismissal of failure to summon medical care claim when defendants

observed plaintiff engaging in acts of self-harm, noted he was refusing his medication,

and noted he was severely delusional with suicidal thoughts, all of which resulted in

his death). In addition, the Regent Defendants were already providing Plaintiff with

mental health care. To the extent Plaintiff alleges the treatment the Regent

Defendants provided was insufficient, they cannot be held liable for their failure to

provide further diagnosis or treatment.

Thus, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims for failure to summon medical care

against the individual Regent Defendants, and against the Regents based on any

theory of vicarious or supervisory liability, with leave to amend.

E. Fifth Cause of Action under the Bane Act

The Bane Act “protects individuals from conduct aimed at interfering with rights

that are secured by federal or state law, where the interference is carried out ‘by

threats, intimidation or coercion.’” Reese v. Cnty. of Sacramento, 888 F.3d 1030, 1040

(9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Venegas v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 153 Cal. App. 4th 1230

(2007)). When a Bane Act claim is based on alleged federal constitutional violations,

plaintiffs may rely on the same allegations to prove both that the defendant deprived

them of a constitutional right and threatened, intimidated, or coerced them. See id. at

1043 (“[T]he Bane Act does not require the ‘threat, intimidation or coercion’ element

of the claim to be transactionally independent from the constitutional violation

alleged.”). But the claim must also rest on factual allegations that would allow an

inference the defendant had a specific intent to violate the plaintiff’s rights. See id.

“[S]pecific intent” may be shown by demonstrating that the defendant “acted . . . ‘in reckless disregard of constitutional or statutory prohibitions or guarantees.’” Cornell v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 17 Cal. App. 5th 766, 803–04 (2017), as modified (Nov. 17, 2017) (citation omitted); Reese, 888 F.3d at 1045 (“[A] reckless disregard for a person’s constitutional rights is evidence of a specific intent to deprive that person of

those rights.”).

These rules are applicable to claims of deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs. See Lapachet v. Cal. Forensic Med. Grp., Inc., 313 F. Supp. 3d 1183,

1196 (E.D. Cal. 2018). Multiple district courts have adopted the position that “a

prisoner who successfully proves that prison officials acted or failed to act with

deliberate indifference to his medical needs . . . adequately states a claim for relief

under the Bane Act” because deliberate indifference claims extend far beyond

ordinary tort claims and have been “associated with affirmatively culpable conduct.”

M.H. v. Cnty. of Alameda, 90 F. Supp. 3d 889, 898–99 (N.D. Cal. 2013); see also Scalia

v. Cnty. of Kern, 308 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1084 (E.D. Cal. 2018); Lapachet, 313 F. Supp.

3d at 1195; Est. of Neil v. Cnty. of Colusa, No. 2:19-cv-4291745-TLN-DB, 2022 WL

4291745, at *9–10 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2022). As previously explained, this Court

agrees, and joins the numerous district courts which have found a Bane Act claim may

be based on deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. (See Mot. Dismiss

Order at 27.)

That said, Plaintiff has failed to state Bane Act claims against the Regent

Defendants. Plaintiff pleads his Bane Act claims against Defendants Garces-Barrella,

Oran, DeCarlo, and Turner based on their deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical

needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article I, Section 7(a) of the

California Constitution, failure to accommodate his disabilities in violation of the ADA

and Rehabilitation Act, failure to summon medical care in violation of Government

Code section 845.6, and failure to provide adequate health care and screening to

Plaintiff in violation of California Code of Regulations title 15 §§ 1207, 1208. (TAC

¶¶ 199, 201, 203, 206.) Plaintiff also pleads his Bane Act claim against Defendant Garces-Barrella based on her failure to provide adequate classification and housing to Plaintiff in violation of California Code of Regulations title 15 § 1050. (Id. ¶ 210.) Finally, Plaintiff pleads Bane Act claims against the Regents based on theories of

supervisory and vicarious liability. (Id. ¶¶ 202, 204, 206, 211–12.)

As explained above, Plaintiff has failed to plead deliberate indifference claims

against Defendants Garces-Barrella, Oran, DeCarlo, and Turner. See Section I.B

supra. Plaintiff has also failed to plead any failure to accommodate his disabilities in

violation of the ADA and Rehabilitation Act or any failure to summon medical care in

violation of Government Code section 845.6. See Sections I.C–I.D supra. Finally,

Plaintiff does not contest that he has failed to plead a Bane Act claim based on alleged

violations of sections 1207, 1208, and 1050. (See Opp’n Regents Mot. Dismiss (ECF

No. 109) at 13–14.) Thus, Plaintiff has failed to state a Bane Act claim here.

Accordingly, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Bane Act claims against the Regent

Defendants with leave to amend.

F. Sixth Cause of Action for Negligence

Finally, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s negligence claim against the Regents.

As a public entity, the Regents are immune from liability for “[a]n injury proximately

caused by any prisoner . . . [or] to any prisoner.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 844.6(a). Pretrial

detainees are considered “prisoners.” Id. § 844.

At the time of his injuries Plaintiff was a pretrial detainee, and his injuries were

caused by another pretrial detainee. Thus, section 844.6(a) precludes a negligence

claim against the Regents for Plaintiff’s injuries. While it is true that claims brought

under Government Code section 845.6 are an exception to this immunity provision,

id. § 844.6(a), as held in Section I.D supra, Plaintiff has failed to plead a cause of action

under section 845.6 against the Regents.

Thus, Plaintiff’s claim for negligence will be dismissed against the Regents with

leave to amend. //// //// //// II. The County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss

A. Relevant Factual Allegations

Plaintiff alleges he was discharged from the JPS unit to general population

outpatient psychiatric (“OPP”) housing on December 11, 2020. (TAC ¶ 58.) On

February 5, 2021, Defendant Sturgis, a classification deputy, conducted a review of

Plaintiff’s security and housing assignment in general population OPP housing, and

failed to reclassify Plaintiff or consider any factors other than that OPP housing was

appropriate because the housing had been “without issue” up to that point. (Id.

¶¶ 10, 67–69.) On July 26, 2021, Defendant Albright-Mundy, a classification deputy,

also conducted a classification review of Plaintiff’s security and housing assignment

and failed to reclassify Plaintiff or consider any factors other than that Plaintiff’s current

housing assignment in general population OPP housing was appropriate because the

housing had been “without issue” up to that point. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 81–83.)

On September 23, 2021, Defendant Rollon, a records officer, and Defendants

Whiting, Blevins, and Singh, law enforcement officers, assigned Plaintiff and Burleson

to cell #203. (Id. ¶¶ 13–16, 95–98.) In so doing, Plaintiff alleges the Defendants “failed

to consider or review” either Plaintiff or Burleson’s history or potential for compatibility

as cellmates. (Id. ¶ 99.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants “could and should” have learned

that housing Plaintiff and Burleson together created a security and safety risk because,

for example, jail records identified Plaintiff as “White” and Burleson as “Black,” and

records demonstrated that Burleson was assaultive, including: “noted at intake that

patient said he wanted to kill white people”; “Extreme psych issue// says will assault

any cellmates he has”; “Threats to assault anyone he is celled with”; “Burleson is [in

total separation] because he has threatened to assault any inmate he is housed with”;

and “Inmate has extreme psych issues, said he would assault any inmate he gets.” (Id. ¶¶ 99–100.) Plaintiff was assaulted by Burleson in cell #203 on September 26, 2021. (Id. ¶ 106.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Paredes, McLean, and Higley, law enforcement officers, and Defendant Noda, a records officer, were the jail staff

responsible for the inmates in the general area of the jail where Plaintiff and Burleson

were housed that day, including monitoring inmates via a closed-circuit television

(“CCTV”) surveillance system and conducting direct visual checks of cells and inmates.

(Id. ¶¶ 19–22, 108.) Plaintiff alleges those Defendants were under the supervision of

Defendant Haynes, another law enforcement officer. (Id. ¶¶ 18, 108.)

Plaintiff alleges that, about 30 minutes prior to Burleson’s assault, Defendant

Paredes walked by cell #203 to conduct a direct-view check. (Id. ¶ 109.) However,

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Paredes failed to conduct a sufficient check of cell #203

because he was preoccupied with talking with an inmate-trustee at the time. (Id.

¶ 110.) Plaintiff also alleges Defendant Paredes generally failed to conduct direct-

view checks of cell #203 at random or varied intervals, instead consistently conducting

checks of cell #203 at approximately the same time every hour. (Id. ¶ 111.)

After Plaintiff was assaulted, he alleges he was on the ground of his cell

bleeding from a headwound and struggling to breathe for about 30 minutes with his

blood leaking underneath the cell door. (Id. ¶¶ 114, 116.) Plaintiff alleges his blood

was visible on at least two different CCTV surveillance cameras (id. ¶¶ 115–16),

although it is unclear who of the Defendants were watching the surveillance cameras.

Plaintiff alleges that, more than 22 minutes after the blood was visible on the jail’s

CCTV cameras, and about 55 minutes after Defendant Paredes’s last cell check, Josh

Soules, an inmate-trustee, noticed the stream of blood leaking from cell #203 and

approached the cell for inspection. (Id. ¶ 120.) Plaintiff alleges that Burleson

observed that Soules had discovered his assault, used the emergency button to

activate the intercom inside of the jail, and informed Defendant Noda, who was

located in the control area, that he had attacked and “might have killed” Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 121–22.) Defendant Noda relayed Burleson’s message to Defendants Haynes, Paredes, McLean, and Higley. (Id. ¶ 123.) Defendants Paredes and McLean walked to cell #203, observed Plaintiff lying on the ground in a pool of blood, and then left the scene, returning a minute later with Defendant Haynes. (Id. ¶¶ 124–27.) Defendant

Higley arrived shortly after. (Id. ¶ 129.) Defendants Paredes and McLean escorted

Burleson out of the cell, while Defendants Haynes and Higley remained. (Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that, instead of responding to Plaintiff’s medical needs by, for

example, placing Plaintiff in a recovery position to aid breathing, or staunching the

bleeding from Plaintiff’s headwound, Defendants Haynes and Higley stared down at

Plaintiff for approximately one minute and 40 seconds, after which Defendant Higley

dragged Plaintiff’s body out of the cell. (Id. ¶¶ 130–37.) At that point, medical

personnel arrived on the scene and began to give Plaintiff medical aid. (Id. ¶ 138.)

Eventually, Plaintiff was transported to the hospital where he was placed in a medically

induced coma. (Id. ¶ 140.)

B. First Cause of Action for Deliberate Indifference

Plaintiff brings deliberate indifference claims against Defendants Sturgis,

Albright-Mundy, Rollon, Whiting, Blevins, and Singh based on their failure to

sufficiently classify and house Plaintiff; against Defendants Haynes, Paredes, McLean,

Higley, and Noda for insufficiently monitoring Plaintiff; and against Defendants Haynes

and Higley for providing insufficient medical care. (TAC ¶ 174.) As discussed below,

the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims against Defendants

Sturgis, Albright-Mundy, Paredes, McLean, and Noda. However, the Court declines to

dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Rollon, Whiting, Blevins, Singh, Haynes,

and Higley.

1. Defendants Sturgis and Albright-Mundy

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Sturgis and Albright-Mundy were deliberately

indifferent to his medical needs because they conducted insufficient classification

reviews of his security and housing assignment on February 5, 2021, and July 26, 2021, when they failed to consider anything other than Plaintiff’s housing in general population OPP housing had been without issue up to that point. (TAC ¶¶ 67–69, 81– 83, 174.) As explained in Section I.B supra, to state a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant did not take reasonably available measures to

abate a substantial risk to the plaintiff, even though a reasonable official in those

circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved. Gordon, 888

F.3d at 1124–25.

Here, the Court does not find Plaintiff’s allegations sufficient to demonstrate

Defendant Sturgis could have reasonably appreciated a high degree of risk in keeping

Plaintiff in general population OPP housing when he conducted the classification

review on February 5. At most, Plaintiff alleges that, between his discharge from the

JPS unit into OPP housing on December 11, 2020, and February 5, 2021, he had two

mental health appointments, during which mental health professionals documented

he appeared delusional but was taking his medication, and noted he “stated that

someone is hitting him inside his cell, however, upon further explanation, [he] stated ‘I

get an electric shock.’” (TAC ¶¶ 62, 66.) These notes demonstrate that, while Plaintiff

was mentally unwell, he was receiving mental health treatment and medication while

in OPP housing. In addition, Plaintiff’s vague statements about receiving an electric

shock do not plausibly establish he was at clear risk of physical harm. Thus, because

Plaintiff has not sufficiently pled he was at risk from remaining in general population

OPP housing, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against

Defendants Sturgis.

The Court will similarly dismiss Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Albright-

Mundy. In between February 5, 2021, and July 26, 2021, Plaintiff was found

incompetent to stand trial and was ordered to be placed at a state hospital pending

restoration of his competency.1 (Id. ¶¶ 70, 74.) During that period—in which the

Plaintiff remained in Sacramento County Main Jail—Plaintiff had several mental health

appointments, during which mental health workers documented that a different cellmate had allegedly attacked him at the end of February or beginning of March, 1 The Third Amended Complaint contains little detail about the state court proceedings that led to this determination. but that he had not been attacked since. (Id. ¶ 73.) The workers also documented

Plaintiff sometimes missed meals because he believed people were trying to hit him

but confirmed that he was not being hit physically by his cellmate or anyone else. (Id.

¶ 76.) These allegations are insufficient to demonstrate Defendant Albright-Mundy

could have reasonably appreciated a high degree of risk in keeping Plaintiff in general

population OPP housing as Plaintiff was still receiving mental health treatment and

had not reported any ongoing or imminent safety threats.

Thus, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims against

Defendants Sturgis and Albright-Mundy with leave to amend.

2. Defendants Rollon, Whiting, Blevins, and Singh

Plaintiff alleges Defendants Rollon, Whiting, Blevins, and Singh were

deliberately indifferent in housing him with Burleson because they failed to consider

Burleson’s assaultive history, mental illness, and avowed dislike of white people

before assigning Burleson to Plaintiff’s cell. (See TAC ¶¶ 95–101, 174.)

The Court declines to dismiss these claims. The County Defendants argue that,

at the time Plaintiff and Burleson were housed together, there was no history of

physical confrontation between them; thus, they argue Defendants could not have

known Plaintiff was at risk of imminent harm. (County Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at 7.)

However, Plaintiff alleges Defendants Rollon, Whiting, Blevins, and Singh made an

intentional decision to house Plaintiff with Burleson without considering Burleson’s

documented mental illness and previous threats to other cellmates. The Defendants

also failed to consider Plaintiff’s own mental health history. Those decisions plausibly

put Plaintiff at risk of assault, and the Court finds these allegations sufficient to support

Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim. See, e.g., Estate of Michael McCormack v.

Cnty. of San Bernardino, No. EDCV 21-148 JGB (SHKx), 2023 WL 3407141, at *2–5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2023) (denying motion to dismiss claims that defendants improperly housed plaintiff with his cellmate when the cellmate was mentally ill, had a history of violent and assaultive conduct, and plaintiff was also mentally ill and

vulnerable to violent inmates).

Thus, the Court will not dismiss Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims against

Defendants Rollon, Whiting, Blevins, and Singh.

3. Defendants Haynes, Paredes, McLean, Higley, and Noda

Finally, Plaintiff brings deliberate indifference claims against Defendants

Haynes, Paredes, McLean, Higley, and Noda for inadequately monitoring Plaintiff in

his cell during and after the assault, and against Defendants Haynes and Higley for

providing insufficient medical care when they arrived at his cell after the assault. (TAC

¶¶ 106–139, 174.)

The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant McLean. As

explained in Section I.B supra, to state a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must

allege the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions

under which the plaintiff was confined and that those conditions put the plaintiff at

substantial risk of serious harm. Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1124–25. The Court previously

dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Paredes and McLean because Plaintiff

failed to allege that either Defendant intentionally failed to monitor his cell, i.e., that

they were “due to check his cell at some point during the 30-minute interval [when the

assault occurred], but failed to do so, or did check his cell during the 30-minute

interval but failed to detect that an assault had occurred.” (See Mot. Dismiss Order at

11.) In his Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff generally alleges that Defendant

McLean failed to adequately monitor cell #203 and failed to detect Plaintiff’s assault.

However, Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendant McLean was due to check Plaintiff’s

cell and did not, checked the cell inadequately, or was assigned to monitor CCTV

footage and failed to do so. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege Defendant McLean acted intentionally with respect to Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement. The Court will also dismiss Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Paredes. Plaintiff

alleges Defendant Paredes was scheduled to check his cell approximately half an hour

before the attack occurred but failed to conduct an adequate check. However, this is

insufficient to establish deliberate indifference. Plaintiff does not plausibly allege

Defendant Paredes’s failure to adequately check his cell heightened his risk of assault

as neither he nor Burleson were allegedly exhibiting any signs of distress at that point.

Cf. Castro, 833 F.3d at 1073 (sustaining verdict in plaintiff’s favor on deliberate

indifference claim when he had pounded on his cell window for a full minute to get a

nearby officer’s attention, to no avail). Plaintiff also does not allege Defendant

Paredes was scheduled to check his cell in the 30 minutes between when the assault

occurred and was detected, or that he failed to do so. Thus, the Court will dismiss

Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Paredes.

Finally, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Noda. Plaintiff

alleges Defendant Noda was responsible for monitoring his cell, including via direct

cell checks and CCTV footage, but failed to do so, including by ignoring or failing to

detect the blood leaking from underneath Plaintiff’s cell door for approximately 22

minutes. (TAC ¶¶ 108, 117–23, 174.) However, Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege how

Defendant Noda intentionally failed to monitor his cell. At most, Plaintiff substantively

alleges that Defendant Noda was in the control area when Burleson reported the

assault and relayed the reported assault to other jail staff. (Id. ¶¶ 122–23.) These

allegations are insufficient to establish Defendant Noda made an intentional decision

with respect to Plaintiff’s conditions of confinement.

However, the Court finds that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged deliberate

indifference claims against Defendants Haynes and Higley based on their failure to

adequately respond to Plaintiff’s medical emergency. The Court previously ruled that Plaintiff failed to state a deliberate indifference claim against either Defendant because Plaintiff failed to allege that “Defendants were trained in and could have reasonably provided CPR or other life-saving measures” and that “his injury could have been alleviated had CPR or other life-saving measures been administered

swiftly.” (Mot. Dismiss Order at 12.) Plaintiff has amended his pleadings to allege

Defendants Haynes and Higley received training related to first aid and CPR, that

Defendants could have, but failed to, respond to Plaintiff’s medical emergency by

placing Plaintiff into a recovery position to aid his breathing or staunching bleeding

from his headwound, and that this failure to render medical aid “caused serious harm,

including prolonged bleeding and struggle to breathe.” (TAC ¶ 130–34.)

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not pled their delay in care exacerbated his

brain injury. (County Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at 16, 20.) However, Plaintiff points out that

his brain injury is not the only injury for which he can recover damages, as he could

also recover for the psychological and physiological distress he suffered as a result of

blood and oxygen loss. (Opp’n County Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss (ECF No. 108) at 14.) A

delay in providing medical treatment can sustain a deliberate indifference claim

where the delay has exacerbated the prisoner’s injury or unnecessarily prolonged the

inmate’s pain. See, e.g., Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (noting indifference may appear when

prison officials deny, delay, or intentionally interfere with medical treatment); Clement

v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002) (on a claim of prolonged exposure to

pepper-spray fumes found a serious medical need is present whenever the failure to

treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary

and wanton infliction of pain). The Court finds that a jury could reasonably conclude

Defendants Haynes and Higley prolonged Plaintiff’s suffering by failing to promptly

address his medical needs.

In sum, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Paredes,

McLean, and Noda only. This is the Court’s second order dismissing Plaintiff’s

deliberate indifference claims against Defendants Paredes and McLean. (See Mot. Dismiss Order at 35.) There is nothing in the briefing that suggests the Plaintiffs could plead additional facts that would cure the defects in the claims against these Defendants, and the Court will dismiss these claims with prejudice. See Intri-Plex Techs., Inc., 499 F. 3d at 1056. However, Plaintiff is granted leave to amend his claim

against Defendant Noda.

C. Fourth Cause of Action for Failure to Summon Medical Care

Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Haynes, Paredes, McLean, Higley, and Noda

knew or had reason to know that Plaintiff was in need of immediate medical care and

failed to summon such care in violation of Government Code section 845.6. (TAC

¶ 192.) Plaintiff alleges that the County, Sheriff’s Department, and Defendant Jones

are liable under theories of municipal/supervisory and vicarious liability. (Id. ¶¶ 193–

94.)

The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Haynes, Paredes,

McLean, Higley, and Noda for the reasons set forth in the Court’s prior Order: Plaintiff

has not sufficiently alleged any of these Defendants knew, or had reason to know, that

Plaintiff was in need of immediate medical care during the 30-minute period between

when Plaintiff was attacked and the attack was reported. (Mot. Dismiss Order at 23–

25;) see also Section II.B supra. Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged the Defendants

failed to conduct a scheduled safety check or insufficiently conducted a safety check

during that 30-minute period, or that they could have or were monitoring the CCTV

footage during that period. Further, Plaintiff’s allegations support the conclusion that

once the Defendants were made aware of the attack, medical care was promptly

summoned. (See TAC ¶¶ 122–140.) Thus, Plaintiff’s claims will be dismissed. As this

Court has previously dismissed this claim against Defendants Haynes, Paredes,

McLean, and Higley, Plaintiff’s claims against those Defendants are dismissed without

leave to amend. Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Noda will be dismissed with leave

to amend.

As Plaintiff’s claims against the individual County Defendants are dismissed, the Court also finds Plaintiff’s allegations insufficient to sustain his claims against Defendant Jones, the County, and the Sheriff’s Department based on supervisory liability or vicarious liability. Accordingly, those claims will also be dismissed with

leave to amend.

D. Fifth Cause of Action under the Bane Act

Plaintiff pleads his Bane Act claims against Defendants Sturgis, Albright-Mundy,

Rollon, Whiting, Blevins, Singh, Haynes, Paredes, McLean, Higley, and Noda based on

their deliberate indifference to his medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment and Article I, Section 7(a) of the California Constitution, and failure to

summon medical care in violation of Government Code section 845.6. (TAC ¶¶ 199,

203.) Plaintiff also pleads his Bane Act claim against Defendants Haynes, Paredes,

McLean, Higley, and Noda based on their failure to provide adequate monitoring and

safety checks in violation of Code of Regulations title 15 section 1027.5, and against

Defendants Sturgis, Albright-Mundy, Rollon, Whiting, Blevins, and Singh based on

their failure to provide adequate classification and housing to Plaintiff in violation of

Code of Regulations title 15 section 1050. (Id. ¶¶ 208, 210.)

As this Court has previously explained, a Bane Act claim may be based on

deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. See Section I.E supra. As held in

Section II.B supra, Plaintiff has adequately pled claims for deliberate indifference

against Defendants Rollon, Whiting, Blevins, Singh, Haynes, and Higley. Thus, Plaintiff

declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action against those Defendants.

As to the remaining Defendants Sturgis, Albright-Mundy, Paredes, McLean, and

Noda, the Court finds that Plaintiff has inadequately pled any failure to summon

medical care in violation of Government Code section 845.6. See Section II.C supra.

Thus, those allegations cannot support his Bane Act claim here. However, Defendants

do not challenge Plaintiff’s Bane Act claims based on violations of sections 1027.5 and

1050. (See Opp’n County Defs.’ Mot. Dismiss at 14.) As Defendants have failed to explain why dismissal of those claims is warranted, the Court will not grant dismissal as to the remaining Defendants. //// Thus, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action against

Defendants Sturgis, Albright-Mundy, Rollon, Whiting, Blevins, Singh, Haynes, Paredes,

McLean, Higley, and Noda.

E. Sixth Cause of Action for Negligence

Finally, Plaintiff brings negligence claims against Defendants Sturgis, Albright-

Mundy, Rollon, Whiting, Blevins, Singh, Haynes, Higley, McLean, Paredes, and Noda.

(TAC ¶¶ 215–20.) In California, a cause of action for negligence requires (1) a legal

duty to use reasonable care; (2) breach of that duty; and (3) proximate cause between

the breach and (4) the plaintiff’s injury. Mendoza v. City of Los Angeles, 66 Cal. App.

4th 1333, 1339 (1998). This standard requires a much lower level of culpability than

deliberate indifference. See Castro, 833 F.3d at 1071.

Here, Plaintiff has adequately pled deliberate indifference claims against

Defendants Rollon, Whiting, Blevins, Singh, Haynes, and Higley. Thus, he has

sufficiently pled negligence claims against these Defendants. See, e.g., Guy v. Bick,

No. 2:21-CV-00823-WBS-JDP, 2022 WL 1271374, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2022),

report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 3358116 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 15, 2022)

(“Where a plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to state a § 1983 claim of deliberate

indifference, it follows that they have also sufficiently pled a negligence cause of

action.”).

However, the Court finds Plaintiff has inadequately pled negligence claims

against Defendants Sturgis, Albright-Mundy, McLean, Paredes, and Noda. “In

California, prison officials owe detainees a duty to protect them from foreseeable

harm.” Cotta v. Cnty. of Kings, 686 F. App’x 467, 469 (9th Cir. 2017); Edison v. United

States, 822 F.3d 510, 521 (9th Cir. 2016); Giraldo v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 168

Cal. App. 4th 231, 252–53 (2008). Plaintiff alleges Defendants Sturgis and Albright- Mundy breached their duties when they insufficiently classified and housed Plaintiff, and that Defendants McLean, Paredes, and Noda breached their duties when they insufficiently monitored Plaintiff. (TAC ¶ 217.) However, as discussed in Section II.B supra, Plaintiff’s claims are insufficient to conclude Defendants breached any duties.

When Defendants Sturgis and Albright-Mundy conducted their classification reviews

of Plaintiff, Plaintiff had been housed in general population OPP housing without any

notable incidents. (See id. ¶¶ 58–83.) Thus, there was no foreseeable harm in

keeping Plaintiff in OPP housing at that time. As for Defendants McLean, Paredes, and

Noda, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged they failed to conduct scheduled direct-view

safety checks during the assault in question, conducted insufficient safety checks

during that time, or failed to monitor CCTV footage of Plaintiff’s cell. See Section II.B

supra. Thus, as held in this Court’s prior order, Plaintiff has failed to state negligence

claims on that basis. (Mot. Dismiss Order at 31–33.)

The Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s negligence claims against Defendants Sturgis,

Albright-Mundy, McLean, Paredes, and Noda only. As this Court has previously

dismissed this claim against Defendants Paredes and McLean on the same grounds,

Plaintiff’s claims against those Defendants are dismissed without leave to amend.

However, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Sturgis, Albright-Mundy, and Noda will

be dismissed with leave to amend.

III. Defendant Saesee’s Motion to Dismiss

A. Relevant Factual Allegations

Plaintiff alleges that, on September 20, 2021, Defendant Saesee, a classification

deputy, reviewed Burleson’s security and housing classification, reclassified his

security assignment as “Medium,” and housed him in the jail’s general population with

an OPP designation. (TAC ¶¶ 91–93.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Saesee

reclassified Burleson without considering factors necessary to adequately and safely

classify and assign Burleson, including Burleson’s jail records which reflected Burleson

suffered from mental illness, including schizophrenia and schizoaffective disorder, and was frequently subject to criminal charges and convictions, including for robbery. (Id. ¶¶ 89, 91.) Burleson’s records also demonstrated he had previously been housed by jail staff in total separation housing, where he was frequently documented as being assaultive towards inmates and cellmates and expressed a desire to “kill white

people.” (Id. ¶ 90.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Saesee’s failure to adequately

classify Burleson caused harm to Plaintiff because Burleson was housed in an

inappropriate area of the jail, leading to a heightened security and safety risk, and

Burleson was later assigned to share a cell with Plaintiff, where he then assaulted

Plaintiff. (Id. ¶¶ 93, 95–97, 106.)

B. Plaintiff’s Standing to Bring Claims Against Defendant Saesee

Defendant Saesee alleges Plaintiff lacks Article III standing to bring claims

against him because Plaintiff’s injury is not fairly traceable to Defendant Saesee’s

conduct. (Saesee Mot. Dismiss at 4.) Defendant Saesee argues that “the connection

between Deputy Saesee’s September 20, 2021, classification of Lemar Burleson and

the September 26, 2021, attack is far too speculative and attenuated to establish

causation,” as the Third Amended Complaint “does not allege that defendant Deputy

Saesee was involved in the cell assignment for [Plaintiff] or for Burleson.” (Id. at 5.)

The Court finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged standing. Article III requires

only that a plaintiff’s injury be fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct. See Maya v.

Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2011). To established standing, plaintiffs

“do not bear so heavy a burden,” and do not need to “demonstrate that defendants’

actions are the ‘proximate cause’ of plaintiffs’ injuries.” Id. Rather, all that is required

is “a ‘line of causation’ between defendants’ action and their alleged harm that is more

than ‘attenuated.’” Id. (citation omitted). “A causal chain does not fail simply because

it has several ‘links,’” id., and a plaintiff need not allege that the defendant was “the

sole source of” injury nor “eliminate any other contributing causes,” Barnum Timber

Co. v. EPA, 633 F.3d 894, 901 (9th Cir. 2011). The Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations

sufficient to meet the Article III standard, as Plaintiff has plausibly pled a line of causation between Defendant Saesee’s classification of Burleson, and Burleson’s later assault on Plaintiff, as Burleson would not have been in general population, and therefore able to be housed with Plaintiff, without Defendant Saesee’s action. Thus, Plaintiff has standing to sue Defendant Saesee.

C. First Cause of Action for Deliberate Indifference

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Saesee was deliberately indifferent in his

classification and housing of Plaintiff. (TAC ¶ 174.) The Court will not dismiss this

claim. While Plaintiff’s claim should more accurately read Defendant Saesee

insufficiently classified Burleson, not Plaintiff, the Court finds Plaintiff has plausibly

alleged Defendant Saesee reclassified Burleson without considering Burleson’s

concerning jail records, thereby placing Plaintiff, as well as other inmates in general

population housing, at risk of harm. While Defendant Saesee’s classification decision

may ultimately prove to be too far removed from Plaintiff’s harm to meet the causation

requirements for a section 1983 claim,2 the Court notes that causation is ordinarily a

factual question ill-suited for considering at the motion to dismiss stage. See, e.g.,

Christensen v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 279 F.3d 807, 815–16 (9th Cir. 2001) (“proximate

cause is usually a factual decision that should be decided at trial”).

Thus, the Court finds Plaintiff’s allegations minimally sufficient to state a

deliberate indifference claim against Defendant Saesee. See, e.g., Estate of Gonzales

v. Hickman, No. ED CV 05-00660 MMM (RCx), 2006 WL 4959780, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Jan.

23, 2006) (refusing to dismiss deliberate indifference claim in a case where a

correctional officer was fatally stabbed by a prisoner where defendants “created or

increased the risk of danger to [the officer]” by “improperly assign[ing] [the prisoner]

to a general population,” where “[the prisoner]’s misclassification and improper

placement created a dangerous condition.”).

D. Fifth Cause of Action under the Bane Act

Plaintiff also pleads a Bane Act claim against Defendant Saesee based on his

deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s medical needs. (TAC ¶ 199.) As explained in

2 To prevail on a section 1983 claim under a deliberate indifference theory, the plaintiff must show defendant’s actions were both the actual and proximate cause of his injuries. See Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1074, 1080–81 (9th Cir. 2013). Section I.E supra, a Bane Act claim may be based on deliberate indifference to serious

medical needs. Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a deliberate indifference claim against

Defendant Saesee. Thus, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s fifth cause of action

against Defendant Saesee.

E. Sixth Cause of Action for Negligence

Finally, Plaintiff pleads a negligence claim against Defendant Saesee based on

his insufficient classification and housing of Plaintiff. (TAC ¶ 217.) Negligence

requires a much lower level of culpability than deliberate indifference such that a

deliberate indifference claim will typically sustain a negligence claim. See, e.g., Guy,

2022 WL 1271374, at *3. As Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a deliberate indifference

claim against Defendant Saesee, the Court declines to dismiss Plaintiff’s negligence

claim.

In accordance with the above, it is hereby ordered the Regent Defendants’

Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 102) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. It is further

ordered that the County Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 103) is GRANTED in

part and DENIED in part. Finally, Defendant Saesee’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 114)

is DENIED.

Specifically, the Court GRANTS dismissal as to the:

• First cause of action against Defendants Garces-Barrella, Oran, DeCarlo,

Turner, Sturgis, Albright-Mundy, and Noda with leave to amend;

• First cause of action against Defendants Paredes and McLean without

leave to amend;

• Second and third causes of action against the Regents with leave to

amend; • Fourth cause of action against Defendants Garces-Barrella, Oran, DeCarlo, Turner, the Regents, Noda, Jones, the County, and the Sheriff’s Department with leave to amend; e Fourth cause of action against Defendants Paredes, McLean, Haynes, and Higley without leave to amend; e Fifth cause of action against Defendants Garces-Barrella, Oran, DeCarlo, Turner, and the Regents with leave to amend; e Sixth cause of action against Defendants Sturgis, Albright-Mundy, Noda, and the Regents with leave to amend; and e Sixth cause of action against Defendants Paredes and McLean without leave to amend. The Court DENIES dismissal as to Plaintiff's remaining claims. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint within 30 days of this order. If Plaintiff wishes to add any additional claims or defendants to his amended complaint aside from those specifically contemplated by this Order, Plaintiff must seek the Court's leave to do so pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Dated: February 25, 2025 “Darel A CDbnetto Hon. Daniel alabretta v7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE pica - Cravotta22cv167.SecondMTD 29