1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 KENT CRAIG, Case No. 19-cv-05661-EMC
8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 9 v. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 10 CDCR, Docket No. 29 11 Defendant.
12 13 14 I. INTRODUCTION 15 In this pro se prisoner’s civil rights action, Kent Craig complains about his relocation from 16 a lower to an upper bunk at the Correctional Training Facility (“CTF”). See generally, Docket No. 17 9 (“First Amended Complaint” or FAC). Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment, 18 which Mr. Craig has opposed. See Docket Nos. 29, 32. 19 For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary 20 judgment without prejudice to renewal accompanied by additional evidence and/or explanation. 21 II. BACKGROUND 22 The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. 23 Since 2007, the Department of Veteran Affairs has provided Mr. Craig with disability 24 compensation, for “intervertebral disc syndrome.” Freeman Decl., Ex. C. 25 On January 19, 2018, Mr. Craig submitted a request for a lower bunk accommodation, 26 complaining of lower back pain. See Docket No. 29-2 (“Freeman Declaration”), Ex. B. CTF’s 27 Reasonable Accommodations Panel (“RAP”) reviewed Mr. Craig’s request. See id., Ex. C. The 1 medical appointment for him. See id. The RAP granted Mr. Craig a lower bunk accommodation 2 “[i]n the interim,” which was to be “temporar[y] . . . pending medical evaluation.” Id. 3 Mr. Craig was seen by a nurse on January 30, 2018, and by a physician on March 1, 2018. 4 See id., Exs. D-E. The physician offered Mr. Craig medication, which he declined. See id., Ex. E. 5 The physician prescribed acetaminophen. See id. The physician did not assign Mr. Craig to a 6 lower bunk. See id. 7 Defendants contend that Mr. Craig’s lower bunk accommodation expired on March 1, 8 2018, when he was seen by the physician and not assessed any housing restrictions. See MSJ at 6. 9 Nevertheless, CTF had sufficient lower bunks available that Mr. Craig was permitted to remain in 10 a lower bunk for another year. See id. 11 On April 26, 2019, Mr. Craig was required to give up his lower bunk. See FAC at 2. 12 III. VENUE AND JURISDICTION 13 Venue is proper in the Northern District of California because the events or omissions 14 giving rise to the complaint occurred at a prison in Monterey County, which is located within the 15 Northern District. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 1391(b). The Court has federal question jurisdiction over 16 this action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 17 IV. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 18 Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that there 19 is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that] the moving party is entitled to judgment as 20 a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A court will grant summary judgment “against a party 21 who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 22 party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial . . . since a complete 23 failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders 24 all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). A fact is 25 material if it might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law, and a dispute about 26 such a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict 27 for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 1 on the merits of his claim. In such a situation, the moving party bears the initial burden of 2 identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of 3 material fact. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings, and by 4 his own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file,’ 5 designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. 6 A verified complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit under Rule 56, as long as it is 7 based on personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence. See Schroeder 8 v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995) (treating plaintiff’s verified complaint 9 as opposing affidavit where, even though verification not in conformity with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, 10 plaintiff stated under penalty of perjury that contents were true and correct, and allegations were 11 not based purely on his belief but on his personal knowledge). Mr. Craig’s complaint is made 12 under penalty of perjury, see FAC at 6, and therefore is considered as evidence. 13 The court’s function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility 14 determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. See T.W. 15 Elec. Serv. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). The evidence must 16 be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and inferences to be drawn from the 17 facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See id. at 631. 18 V. DISCUSSION 19 The Court screened Mr. Craig’s First Amended Complaint and concluded that he had 20 stated cognizable claims that Defendants violated Mr. Craig’s rights under the Americans with 21 Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”) when they relocated him from a 22 lower to an upper bunk. See generally, Docket No. 10. The Court found none of Mr. Craig’s 23 other claims to be cognizable. See id. 24 Defendants argue that Mr. Craig’s claims fail because “the undisputed facts show that 25 Plaintiff is not a qualified individual with a disability, nor is he handicapped within the meaning of 26 the RA.” MSJ at 6. They also argue that he has “raise[d]” only “conclusory allegations 27 concerning his alleged disability and need for a lower-bunk accommodation.” Id. at 7. However, 1 sufficiently disabled to receive compensation since at least 2007. See Freeman Decl., Ex. C. 2 Moreover, Defendants were aware of the VA’s conclusion, because the VA’s letter describing Mr. 3 Craig’s disability is included in the documents reviewed by the RAP. See id. Defendants do not 4 explain how Mr. Craig may be sufficiently disabled to be entitled to disability compensation from 5 the VA, without being disabled within the meaning of the ADA or handicapped within the 6 meaning of the RA. See generally, MSJ. For example, may a condition qualify for compensation 7 under the VA’s standards, without coming under the ADA or RA? Does the VA employ a 8 different test, with a lower standard than that employed by the ADA and RA? Or is Mr. Craig not 9 entitled to a disability accommodation, regardless of whether he is disabled within the meaning or 10 the ADA or handicapped within the meaning of the RA, until a physician employed by CDCR has 11 determined he is entitled to an accommodation? 12 Defendants also make much of the fact that Mr.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 KENT CRAIG, Case No. 19-cv-05661-EMC
8 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 9 v. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 10 CDCR, Docket No. 29 11 Defendant.
12 13 14 I. INTRODUCTION 15 In this pro se prisoner’s civil rights action, Kent Craig complains about his relocation from 16 a lower to an upper bunk at the Correctional Training Facility (“CTF”). See generally, Docket No. 17 9 (“First Amended Complaint” or FAC). Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment, 18 which Mr. Craig has opposed. See Docket Nos. 29, 32. 19 For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES Defendants’ motion for summary 20 judgment without prejudice to renewal accompanied by additional evidence and/or explanation. 21 II. BACKGROUND 22 The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. 23 Since 2007, the Department of Veteran Affairs has provided Mr. Craig with disability 24 compensation, for “intervertebral disc syndrome.” Freeman Decl., Ex. C. 25 On January 19, 2018, Mr. Craig submitted a request for a lower bunk accommodation, 26 complaining of lower back pain. See Docket No. 29-2 (“Freeman Declaration”), Ex. B. CTF’s 27 Reasonable Accommodations Panel (“RAP”) reviewed Mr. Craig’s request. See id., Ex. C. The 1 medical appointment for him. See id. The RAP granted Mr. Craig a lower bunk accommodation 2 “[i]n the interim,” which was to be “temporar[y] . . . pending medical evaluation.” Id. 3 Mr. Craig was seen by a nurse on January 30, 2018, and by a physician on March 1, 2018. 4 See id., Exs. D-E. The physician offered Mr. Craig medication, which he declined. See id., Ex. E. 5 The physician prescribed acetaminophen. See id. The physician did not assign Mr. Craig to a 6 lower bunk. See id. 7 Defendants contend that Mr. Craig’s lower bunk accommodation expired on March 1, 8 2018, when he was seen by the physician and not assessed any housing restrictions. See MSJ at 6. 9 Nevertheless, CTF had sufficient lower bunks available that Mr. Craig was permitted to remain in 10 a lower bunk for another year. See id. 11 On April 26, 2019, Mr. Craig was required to give up his lower bunk. See FAC at 2. 12 III. VENUE AND JURISDICTION 13 Venue is proper in the Northern District of California because the events or omissions 14 giving rise to the complaint occurred at a prison in Monterey County, which is located within the 15 Northern District. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 84, 1391(b). The Court has federal question jurisdiction over 16 this action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 17 IV. LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 18 Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, discovery and affidavits show that there 19 is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and [that] the moving party is entitled to judgment as 20 a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A court will grant summary judgment “against a party 21 who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that 22 party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial . . . since a complete 23 failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders 24 all other facts immaterial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). A fact is 25 material if it might affect the outcome of the lawsuit under governing law, and a dispute about 26 such a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict 27 for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). 1 on the merits of his claim. In such a situation, the moving party bears the initial burden of 2 identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of 3 material fact. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings, and by 4 his own affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, or admissions on file,’ 5 designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. 6 A verified complaint may be used as an opposing affidavit under Rule 56, as long as it is 7 based on personal knowledge and sets forth specific facts admissible in evidence. See Schroeder 8 v. McDonald, 55 F.3d 454, 460 & nn.10-11 (9th Cir. 1995) (treating plaintiff’s verified complaint 9 as opposing affidavit where, even though verification not in conformity with 28 U.S.C. § 1746, 10 plaintiff stated under penalty of perjury that contents were true and correct, and allegations were 11 not based purely on his belief but on his personal knowledge). Mr. Craig’s complaint is made 12 under penalty of perjury, see FAC at 6, and therefore is considered as evidence. 13 The court’s function on a summary judgment motion is not to make credibility 14 determinations or weigh conflicting evidence with respect to a disputed material fact. See T.W. 15 Elec. Serv. v. Pac. Elec. Contractors Ass’n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). The evidence must 16 be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and inferences to be drawn from the 17 facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See id. at 631. 18 V. DISCUSSION 19 The Court screened Mr. Craig’s First Amended Complaint and concluded that he had 20 stated cognizable claims that Defendants violated Mr. Craig’s rights under the Americans with 21 Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”) when they relocated him from a 22 lower to an upper bunk. See generally, Docket No. 10. The Court found none of Mr. Craig’s 23 other claims to be cognizable. See id. 24 Defendants argue that Mr. Craig’s claims fail because “the undisputed facts show that 25 Plaintiff is not a qualified individual with a disability, nor is he handicapped within the meaning of 26 the RA.” MSJ at 6. They also argue that he has “raise[d]” only “conclusory allegations 27 concerning his alleged disability and need for a lower-bunk accommodation.” Id. at 7. However, 1 sufficiently disabled to receive compensation since at least 2007. See Freeman Decl., Ex. C. 2 Moreover, Defendants were aware of the VA’s conclusion, because the VA’s letter describing Mr. 3 Craig’s disability is included in the documents reviewed by the RAP. See id. Defendants do not 4 explain how Mr. Craig may be sufficiently disabled to be entitled to disability compensation from 5 the VA, without being disabled within the meaning of the ADA or handicapped within the 6 meaning of the RA. See generally, MSJ. For example, may a condition qualify for compensation 7 under the VA’s standards, without coming under the ADA or RA? Does the VA employ a 8 different test, with a lower standard than that employed by the ADA and RA? Or is Mr. Craig not 9 entitled to a disability accommodation, regardless of whether he is disabled within the meaning or 10 the ADA or handicapped within the meaning of the RA, until a physician employed by CDCR has 11 determined he is entitled to an accommodation? 12 Defendants also make much of the fact that Mr. Craig was not given a permanent 13 accommodation by the RAP, and that his temporary accommodation had expired by the time he 14 was relocated from a lower to an upper bunk. However, if Mr. Craig is indeed protected by the 15 ADA and/or RA, Defendants do not explain why the temporary nature of his accommodation 16 matters. See MSJ at 6-7. For example, if Mr. Craig is in fact disabled within the meaning of the 17 ADA and/or RA, why was it not error for the RAP not to grant him a permanent accommodation? 18 If the RAP erred, are Defendants allowed to rely on this error without inquiry? If so, why are 19 Defendants not liable for the RAP’s error?1 20 Although Defendants have not carried their summary judgment burden, this appears to be 21 due to the sparse nature of the summary judgment motion, which contains only two pages of 22 argument. See MSJ at 6-7. With a more robust motion, it is possible that Defendants would be 23 able to show an absence of disputed facts and/or that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of 24 law. The Court therefore concludes that this case is not ripe for trial, and that it would be 25 premature to refer it to mediation. Instead, Defendants may file a second, and more complete, 26 summary judgment motion, to which Mr. Craig may respond. 27 1 VI. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is DENIED. 3 Docket No. 29. 4 In order to expedite the resolution of this case, the following briefing schedule is set: 5 a. No later than September 2, 2022, Defendants must file and serve their 6 second motion for summary judgment or other dispositive motion. If Defendants are of the 7 opinion that this case cannot be resolved by summary judgment, Defendants must so inform the 8 Court prior to the date the motion is due. If Defendants file a second motion for summary 9 judgment, Defendants must provide to Plaintiff a new Rand notice regarding summary judgment 10 procedures at the time they file such a motion. See Woods v. Carey, 684 F.3d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 11 2012). 12 b. Plaintiff’s opposition to the second summary judgment or other dispositive 13 motion must be filed with the Court and served upon Defendants no later than September 30, 14 2022. Plaintiff must bear in mind the notice and warning regarding summary judgment provided 15 later in this order as he prepares his opposition to any motion for summary judgment. 16 c. If Defendants wish to file a reply brief, the reply brief must be filed and 17 served no later than October 14, 2022. 18 Plaintiff is provided the following notices and warnings about the procedures for motions 19 for summary judgment:
20 The defendants may make a motion for summary judgment by which they seek to have your case dismissed. A motion for 21 summary judgment under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will, if granted, end your case. . . . Rule 56 tells you what 22 you must do in order to oppose a motion for summary judgment. Generally, summary judgment must be granted when there is no 23 genuine issue of material fact -- that is, if there is no real dispute about any fact that would affect the result of your case, the party 24 who asked for summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, which will end your case. When a party you are suing 25 makes a motion for summary judgment that is properly supported by declarations (or other sworn testimony), you cannot simply rely on 26 what your complaint says. Instead, you must set out specific facts in declarations, depositions, answers to interrogatories, or 27 authenticated documents, as provided in Rule 56(e), that contradict not submit your own evidence in opposition, summary judgment, if 1 appropriate, may be entered against you. If summary judgment is granted, your case will be dismissed and there will be no trial. Rand 2 v. Rowland, 154 F.3d 952, 962-63 (9th Cir. 1998). 3 If Defendants file a motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, 4 they are seeking to have the case dismissed. As with other defense summary judgment motions, if 5 a motion for summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies is granted, 6 Plaintiff’s case may be subject to dismissal without prejudice to returning to court after his claim 7 is properly exhausted. 8 Discovery may be taken in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. No 9 further court order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(a)(2) or Local Rule 16 is required 10 before the parties may conduct discovery. 11 This order disposes of Docket No. 29. 12 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14 15 Dated: August 4, 2022 16 17 ______________________________________ EDWARD M. CHEN 18 United States District Judge 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27