Cox v. DeMatteis

• Court: District Court, D. Delaware
• Decided: September 19, 2019
• Docket: 1:16-cv-00837
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE

NICOLE COX, : Petitioner, : v. : Civ. Act. No. 16-837-RGA CLAIRE DEMATTEIS, Commissioner, BRIAN : EMIG, Warden, and ATTORNEYGENERAL : GENERAL OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE, ~ : Respondents.! :

MEMORANDUM OPINION

J. Brendan O’Neill, Office of Defense Services for the State of Delaware, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Petitioner. Brian L. Arban, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Respondents.

September | 4 _, 2019 Wilmington, Detaware

‘Commissioner Claire DeMatteis and Warden Brian Emig have replaced former Commissioner Robert M. Coupe and former Warden Wendi Caple, who were original parties in this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(d).

Kuan d wdc ANDREWS, UNI ED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE: Pending before the Court is an Application For A Writ Of Habeas Corpus Pursuant To 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (“Petition”) filed by Petitioner Nicole Cox. (D.I. 2) The State filed an Answer in opposition, to which Petitioner filed a Reply. (D.I. 9; D.I. 13) For the reasons discussed, the Court will dismiss Petitioner’s § 2254 Petition as time-barred by the one-year period of limitations prescribed in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). I. BACKGROUND On October 29, 2013, Petitioner pled guilty to drug dealing, second degree escape, and second degree conspiracy. (D.I. 9 at 1) On that same day, the Superior Court sentenced Petitioner as follows: (1) for drug dealing, to eight years of Level V incarceration, suspended after ninety days for one year of Level III probation; (2) for second degree conspiracy, to two years of Level V incarceration, suspended for one year of Level II probation; and (3) for second degree escape, to two years at Level V incarceration, suspended for one year of Level II probation. (D.I. 9 at 2) Petitioner did not file a direct appeal. On June 20, 2014, 2014, Delaware’s Office of Defense Services (“OPD”) filed a motion for post-conviction relief pursuant to Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61 motion”) on Petitioner’s behalf, which the Superior Court dismissed on April 20, 2015. (D.I. 9 at 2) The Superior Court denied her motion for reargument on June 17, 2015. The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of Petitioner’s Rule 61 motion on December 2015. (DL. 9 at 2) On September 21, 2016, the OPD filed a § 2254 Petition on Petitioner’s behalf, asserting that Petitioner’s lack of knowledge of an evidence scandal at the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (““OCME”) was material to her decision to plead guilty and, therefore, her guilty plea

was involuntary pursuant to Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). (D.I. 2) Petitioner also argues that the Delaware Supreme Court made unreasonable findings of fact during her post-conviction appeal regarding OCME misconduct. The State filed an Answer asserting that the Petition should be dismissed as time-barred or, alternatively, because the claim is meritless. (D.I. 9) Petitioner filed a Reply, asserting that the Petition should be deemed timely filed after applying § 2244(d)(1)(D) and the doctrine of equitable tolling. (D.I. 13 at 6-8) A. OCME CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION The relevant information regarding the OCME evidence mishandling is set forth below: In February 2014, the Delaware State Police (“DSP”) and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) began an investigation into criminal misconduct occurring in the Controlled Substances Unit of the OCME. The investigation revealed that some drug evidence sent to the OCME for testing had been stolen by OCME employees in some cases and was unaccounted for in other cases. Oversight of the lab had been lacking, and security procedures had not been followed. One employee was accused of “dry labbing” (or declaring a test result without actually conducting a test of the evidence) in several cases. Although the investigation remains ongoing, to date, three OCME employees have been suspended (two of those employees have been criminally indicted), and the Chief Medical Examiner has been fired. There is no evidence to suggest that OCME employees tampered with drug evidence by adding known controlled substances to the evidence they received for testing in order to achieve positive results and secure convictions. That is, there is no evidence that the OCME staff “planted” evidence to wrongly obtain convictions. Rather, the employees who stole the evidence did so because it in fact consisted of illegal narcotics that they could resell or take for personal use. Brown vy. State, 108 A.3d 1201, 1204-05 (Del. 2015).

I. TIMELINESS The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) prescribes a one- year period of limitations for the filing of habeas petitions by state prisoners, which begins to run from the latest of: (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). AEDPA’s limitations period is subject to statutory and equitable tolling. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010) (equitable tolling); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (statutory tolling). Petitioner’s § 2254 Petition, filed in 2016, is subject to the one-year limitations period contained in § 2244(d)(1). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). The State contends that the starting date for the limitations period is December 2, 2013, the date on which Petitioner’s conviction became final. (D.I. 9 at 6) Petitioner, however, appears to assert that she is entitled to a later starting date for AEDPA’s limitations period — April 15, 2014 — under § 2244(d)(1)(D), because that is the date on which the State began to notify defendants in certain active cases about the OCME evidence misconduct. (D.I. 13 at 6-7)

In order to determine if the April 15, 2014 revelation of the OCME misconduct constitutes a newly discovered factual predicate warranting a later starting date for the limitations period under §2244(d)(1)(D), the Court must first distill Petitioner’s argument to its core. The argument appears to be two-fold. First, Petitioner contends that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) by failing to disclose that there was ongoing misconduct at the OCME during the time he was considering whether to enter a plea. Second, she contends that the Delaware state courts should have deemed her guilty plea involuntary under Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) due to the State’s failure to disclose the Brady v. Maryland evidence, i.e., the OCME misconduct. In short, Petitioner asserts that her lack of knowledge about the OCME misconduct is vital to her habeas claim because that lack of knowledge rendered her guilty plea involuntary and unknowing under Brady v. United States. Pursuant to Brady v. United States, a guilty plea is considered involuntary if it is “induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e.g. bribes).” Brady, 397 USS. at 755. A violation of Brady v. Maryland occurs when the government fails to disclose evidence materially favorable to the accused, including both impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence.” See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). For purposes of the inquiry under § 2244(d)(1)(D), whether or not the OCME misconduct affected, or could have

7 petitioner establishes a Brady v. Maryland violation by showing that: (1) the evidence at issue was favorable to the accused, either because it was exculpatory or it had impeachment value: (2) the prosecution suppressed the evidence, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence was material. See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82 (1999); Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 252 (3d Cir. 2004).

affected, Petitioner’s decision to plead guilty depends on whether the drugs in her case were tested by the OCME and the results were provided to her prior to entering a plea. Therefore, in order to trigger a later starting date under § 2244(d)(1)(D) for this involuntary plea/Brady v. Maryland Claim, Petitioner must show that (1) the drug evidence in her case was tested by the OCME and she received the results of the test before entering a plea; and (2) exercising due diligence, she could not have learned that the evidence in her case may have been part of the compromised drug evidence involved in the OCME scandal until April 15, 2014. Petitioner has not met this burden, because she has not satisfied the first prong of this test. The State contends that the drugs in Petitioner’s case were not tested before her plea. (D.I. 9 at 6) While Petitioner does not explicitly state whether drugs in her case were sent to the OCME for testing or not, she does states that she was “unable to locate a copy of the OCME lab report” in this case. (D.I. 2 at 19) Given these circumstances, Petitioner has not demonstrated that the test results —if any — were provided to her prior to her entering a plea. Consequently, it cannot be said that the test results — if any — played a factor in Petitioner’s decision to plead guilty. Thus, the Court need not address the second prong of the aforementioned test, and concludes that Petitioner has not established a factual predicate triggering a later starting date for the limitations period under § 2244(d)(1)(D). Accordingly, the one-year limitations period began to run when Petitioner’s conviction became final under § 2244(d)(1)(A). Pursuant to § 2244(d)(1)(A), if a state prisoner does not appeal a state court judgment, the judgment of conviction becomes final, and the one-year period begins to run, upon expiration of the time period allowed for seeking direct review. See Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 575, 578 (3d Cir. 1999); Jones v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153, 158 (3d Cir. 1999). Here, the Delaware Superior Court sentenced Petitioner on October 29, 2013, and she did not appeal that judgment.

Therefore, Petitioner’s conviction became final on December 2, 2013.7 See Del. Supr. Ct. R. 6(a)(ii) (establishing a thirty day period for timely filing of notice of appeal). Applying the one- year limitations period to that date, Petitioner had until December 2, 2014 to timely file her Petition. See Wilson v. Beard, 426 F.3d 653 (3d Cir. 2005)(holding that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(a) and (e) applies to federal habeas petitions); Phlipot v. Johnson, 2015 WL 1906127, at *3 n. 3 (D. Del. Apr. 27, 2015)(AEDPA’s one-year limitations period is calculated according to the anniversary method, i.e., the limitations period expires on the anniversary of the triggering event, which is usually the date on which the judgment of conviction became final). Petitioner did not file the instant § 2254 petition until September 21, 2016, almost two full years after the expiration of AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Therefore, the Petition is time- barred, unless the limitations period can be statutorily or equitably tolled. See Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010)(equitable tolling); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (statutory tolling). The Court will discuss each doctrine in turn. A. Statutory Tolling Pursuant to § 2244(d)(2), a properly filed application for state collateral review tolls AEDPA’s limitations period during the time the application is pending in the state courts, including any post-conviction appeals, provided that the application is filed during AEDPA’s one-year limitations period. Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 424-25 (3d Cir. 2000). However, the limitations period is not tolled during the ninety days a petitioner has to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court regarding a judgment denying a state post-

3The last day to file an appeal actually fell on a holiday, so the time to appeal extended through the end of the day on Monday December 2, 2013. See Del. Sup. Ct. R. 11(a).

conviction motion. See Stokes v. Dist. Attorney of Philadelphia, 247 F.3d 539, 542 (3d Cir. 2001). When Petitioner filed her Rule 61 motion on June 20, 2014, 199 days of AEDPA’s limitations period had expired. The Rule 61 motion tolled the limitations period from June 20, 2014 through December 9, 2015, the date on which the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s denial. The limitations clock started to run again on December 10, 2015, and ran the remaining 166 days without interruption until the limitations period expired on May 24, 2016. Thus, the Petition is time-barred, unless equitable tolling applies. B. Equitable Tolling Pursuant to the equitable tolling doctrine, the one-year limitations period may be tolled in very rare circumstances for equitable reasons when the petitioner demonstrates “(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.” Holland, 560 U.S. at 649 (emphasis added). Equitable tolling is not available where the late filing is due to the petitioner’s excusable neglect. Jd; Miller v. New Jersey State Dept. of Corr., 145 F.3d 616, 618-19 (3d Cir. 1998). A petitioner's obligation to act diligently applies to both the filing of the federal habeas application and to the filing of state post-conviction applications. See LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 277 (3d Cir.2005). In turn, the Third Circuit has explained that equitable tolling of AEDPA’s limitations period may be appropriate in the following circumstances: (1) where the defendant (or the court) actively misled the plaintiff; (2) where the plaintiff was in some extraordinary way prevented from asserting his rights; or (3) where the plaintiff timely asserted his rights mistakenly in the wrong forum. Jones, 195 F.3d at 159; Thomas v. Snyder, 2001 WL 1555239, at *3-4 (D. Del. Nov. 28, 2001).

Here, Petitioner contends that equitable tolling is warranted because, “through no fault of her own,” she was unable to file her Rule 61 motion in the Delaware Superior Court before June 20, 2014. (D.I. 13 at 8) She asserts that the “delay” in filing the instant Petition “ was caused by extraordinary circumstances created by a deceptive member of the prosecution team —i.e., OCME,” and contends: It would be inequitable to prevent her from seeking relief when several similarly situated petitioners will have their claims heard even though they discovered the misconduct at the same time as she did, filed their petitions at the same time or after she did and exhausted their state remedies around the same time as she did. It is unfair to penalize her because her counsel’s state resources were significantly strained due to the hundreds of motions they filed upon discovery of the misconduct. Also, since her claim arises from systemic government misconduct, the interest of justice requires her claim be heard. (D.I. 13 at 7-8) Petitioner’s equitable tolling argument is unavailing. Since Petitioner was aware of enough facts concerning the OCME evidence scandal to file a Rule 61 motion in June 2014, she has failed to demonstrate that she was prevented from filing a basic timely protective petition’ in this Court before AEDPA’s limitations period expired on May 24, 2016. See Ross v. Varano, 712 F.3d 784, 803 (3" Cir. 2013)(“[FJor a petitioner to obtain relief [via equitable tolling] there must be a causal connection, or nexus, between the extraordinary circumstances he faced and the petitioner’s failure to file a timely federal petition.”). Similarly, Petitioner’s significant 166 day delay in filing the Petition after the Delaware Supreme Court issued its post-conviction appellate

‘In Pace v. DiGuglielmo, the Supreme Court explained that a “petitioner’s reasonable confusion about whether a state filing would be timely” when attempting to exhaust state remedies may constitute good cause for him to file a “protective petition in federal court and ask[] the federal court to stay and abey the federal habeas proceedings until state remedies are exhausted.” 544 US. 408, 416 (2005).

decision also precludes a finding that Petitioner exercised the requisite “due diligence” to warrant equitably tolling the limitations period. See, e.g., Valverde v. Stinson, 224 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2000)(once the extraordinary circumstance ends, petitioner must exercise reasonable diligence in filing his petition). Finally, to the extent the delayed filing was due to a miscalculation or mistake on the part of the attorney(s) representing Petitioner, “attorney error, miscalculation, inadequate research, or other mistakes” do not amount to extraordinary circumstances for equitable tolling purposes. See Hendricks v. Johnson, 62 F. Supp. 3d 406, 411 (D. Del. 2014). In short, Petitioner cannot demonstrate that the OCME scandal, and/or the timing of the State’s disclosure about the OCME scandal, actually prevented him from timely filing a petition seeking federal habeas relief. For all of these reasons, the Court concludes that the doctrine of equitable tolling is not available to Petitioner on the facts she has presented. Accordingly, the Court will deny the instant Petition as time-barred.° I. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY A district court issuing a final order denying a § 2254 petition must also decide whether to issue a certificate of appealability. See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 22.2 (2011). A certificate of appealability is appropriate when a petitioner makes a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” by demonstrating “that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). When a district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the underlying constitutional claims, the court is not

Having concluded that it must deny the Petition as time-barred, the Court will not address the State’s alternate reason for denying the Petition.

required to issue a certificate of appealability unless the petitioner demonstrates that jurists of reason would find it debatable: (1) whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right; and (2) whether the court was correct in its procedural ruling. See Slack, 529 USS. at 484. The Court has concluded that the instant Petition is time-barred. Reasonable jurists would not find this conclusion to be debatable. Accordingly, the Court will not issue a certificate of appealability. IV. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed, Petitioner’s Application For A Writ Of Habeas Corpus Pursuant To 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is DENIED. An appropriate Order will be entered.