County of Orange v. Fuji Securities, Inc.

31 F. Supp. 2d 768, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19693, 1998 WL 886886
CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedDecember 16, 1998
DocketSA CV 96-1010-GLT [SF], Bankruptcy SA 94-22272-JR
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 31 F. Supp. 2d 768 (County of Orange v. Fuji Securities, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
County of Orange v. Fuji Securities, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 768, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19693, 1998 WL 886886 (C.D. Cal. 1998).

Opinion

AMENDED SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF ULTRA VIRES ISSUES

TAYLOR, District Judge.

The Court holds that, although they may have been unwise, speculative, or unduly risky, the reverse repurchase transactions made by the Orange County Treasurer in this case were not, on the theories presented here, ultra vires and thereby void under pre-1995 law. There was authority to act. Errors in the exercise of that authority, even grave errors, were not ultra vires.

I. BACKGROUND

Faced with over a billion dollars in investment losses, the County of Orange has sued its former broker, Fuji Securities Inc., and numerous others, for liability on its losses. The County now moves for summary adjudication against Fuji on various ultra vires theories, claiming the reverse repurchase transactions entered into by its former Treasurer were ultra vires, and therefore void. Fuji opposes the County’s motion, and files its own cross-motion to adjudicate the ultra vires issues in its favor. The cross-motions squarely present the ultra vires issues, 1 those issues have been fully briefed and argued, 2 and the matter is ready for summary adjudication. 3

Repurchase agreements, commonly called “repos” in the financial community, refer to both repurchase and reverse repurchase transactions. A repo transaction is “a purchase of securities by the local agency pursuant to an agreement by which the counter- *772 party seller will repurchase the securities on or before a specified date and for a specified amount.” 4 Cal. Gov’t Code § 53601(i)(6). A reverse repo transaction is “a sale of securities by the local agency pursuant to an agreement by which the local agency will repurchase the securities on or before a specified date and includes other comparable agreements.” 5 Id.

The profitability of a reverse repo transaction arises from a positive spread (positive arbitrage) between cost of the repo transaction and the expected yield from reinvesting the repo proceeds. To realize positive arbitrage some risk must be taken. The positive arbitrage is a “credit risk” — the positive spread between the repo rate and the expected higher yield on a riskier instrument. The profits represent the risk that the less secure issuer may default. A seller wanting exposure only to “interest-rate risk” would sell an instrument on a reverse repo, and reinvest the proceeds in a longer-term security having a similar credit rating. The positive arbitrage under this circumstance represents the positive spread between the repo rate (shorter term interest rate) and the expected yield on the longer term security. The profits represent the risk that the longer term instrument will continue to earn higher interest than the shorter term instrument.

The reverse repo transactions at issue here were vulnerable to interest rate risk, or, as labeled by the County, they were “mismatched.” The County defines a “matched position” as a transaction where the repo proceeds buy an investment which matures on or before the repurchase date, and has a yield slightly higher than the repo interest expense. The County argues that, had the Treasurer reinvested reverse repo proceeds in a “matched” position, he likely would have earned a small supplemental income for the County portfolio while exposing the County only to credit risk, i.e., the risk of issuer default.

Here, however, the Treasurer engaged in significantly “mismatched” and speculative positions. 6 The proceeds of the repos were used to purchase investments which matured well after the repurchase date, but with a markedly higher yield. In exchange for the high yield, the County was exposed to great interest rate risk. The Treasurer had to speculate whether the transactions would remain profitable through the duration of the repo.

A. California’s Authorization of Reverse Repo Investments

In 1975 the State of California began studying the suitability of repos as an investment device. In a report commissioned by the California Legislature, the Auditor General concluded public entities could safely use reverse repo transactions to make small incremental increases in yield, without incurring substantial risk. See Report to Joint Legislative Audit Committee, Evaluation of General Proposals to Allow State and, Local Investment Authorities in California to Increase Investment Income by Temporarily Lending Investment Securities Through Security Loans and Reverse Repurchase Agreements, at 19-20 (1975). The recommendation to the California Legislature was *773 that any legislation authorizing investment in repos:

Limit[ ] the purpose of a reverse repurchase agreement ... to prudently supplementing the net additional interest income normally received from such securities.

Id. at 20. When properly used, the report suggests, reverse repo agreements could earn approximately a I of 1 percent spread between cost of the repo transaction and the interest earned on the investments acquired with the proceeds. Id. This assessment assumes, however, the transactions would be closely matched, i.e., proceeds would be used in investments having a maturity at or almost at the repurchase date.

Despite this guarded assessment, in 1976 the California legislature gave the State of California unconditional authorization to enter into reverse repo agreements:

The State Treasurer may enter into repurchase agreements or reverse repurchase agreements of any securities described in Section 16430.

Cal. Gov’t Code § 16480.4. In 1979 the California legislature extended the same unconditional powers to local agencies. Cal. Gov’t Code § 53601© (1979). These grants of authority seemingly omit the cautionary concern of the Auditor General Report.

B. Orange County’s Investment Strategy

The investment pools managed by the Treasurer consisted of public funds deposited by various local governments or districts (the “Participants”). As of December 1994 the pools held approximately $7.6 billion in Participant deposits. Through reverse repos, the Treasurer ultimately leveraged the investment portfolio to a book value of more than $20.6 billion.

The Treasurer’s investment strategy involved two basic steps: (1) obtaining funds by selling securities through reverse repo transactions and contemporaneously agreeing to repurchase the underlying securities in less than 180 days; and (2) reinvesting the proceeds of the reverse repos in long-term debt instruments, with a maturity of two to five years. Any difference between the lower short term interest rates and the higher long term interest rates would be profit for the County’s portfolio.

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Bluebook (online)
31 F. Supp. 2d 768, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19693, 1998 WL 886886, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/county-of-orange-v-fuji-securities-inc-cacd-1998.