County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles

124 Cal. App. 3d 1, 177 Cal. Rptr. 479, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 21093, 1981 Cal. App. LEXIS 2193
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedSeptember 30, 1981
DocketCiv. 13886
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 124 Cal. App. 3d 1 (County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, 124 Cal. App. 3d 1, 177 Cal. Rptr. 479, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 21093, 1981 Cal. App. LEXIS 2193 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).

Opinions

[3]*3Opinion

BLEASE, J.

We are called upon a second time to determine whether the City of Los Angeles and its department of water and power have complied with the California Environmental Quality Act and the writ of mandate issued by this court in 1973 (County of Inyo v. Yorty (1973) 32 Cal.App.3d 795, 814-816 [108 Cal.Rptr. 377]) directing them to prepare an environmental impact report (EIR) covering their extraction of subsurface water in the Owens Valley. In 1977 this court said that the city’s EIR, submitted in its return to the writ, did not comply with the writ because it failed to provide an accurate, stable and finite project description in accordance with the 1973 decision and also failed to describe reasonable alternatives to the project. (County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 185 [139 Cal.Rptr. 396].) The city has submitted a second EIR by way of a return to the writ, to which the county objects inter alia on grounds paralleling those advanced by this court in rejecting the legal sufficiency of the first EIR. We shall sustain the county’s objection on the grounds set forth below.

I

These protracted proceeedings are chronicled in County of Inyo v. Yorty, supra, 32 Cal.App.3d 795; County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 91 [132 Cal.Rptr. 167]; County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 71 Cal.App.3d 185; and County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 82 [144 Cal.Rptr. 71], to which readers must repair for a complete understanding of this decision. We emphasize here those portions of the opinions necessary to this decision.

Beginning in 1900 the city acquired land and water rights in the Owens Valley which “at the present time [aggregate] 300,000 acres in Inyo and Mono Counties, comprising roughly 97 percent of the available privately held land.” (32 Cal.App.3d at p. 799.)

In 1913 the city completed a surface aqueduct, the first aqueduct, between the Owens Valley and the city and began receiving Owens Valley water. The capacity of the aqueduct is a constant average flow of 430 cubic feet per second (cfs).

[4]*4At a relatively early date, as an auxiliary to the natural precipitation in the area, the city commenced the drilling of a large number of wells to tap the subsurface pools of underground water in Owens Valley. These wells were heavily used during dry years to assure, as a supplementary source, a continuous and adequate flow through the first aqueduct. (32 Cal.App.3d at p. 799.)

In 1959 the city proposed “the construction of a second aqueduct to carry water from Owens Valley to the City for the purpose of completing ‘the development of our Inyo-Mono supply that began over fifty years ago’ and to insure that City would not lose certain water rights on which it had filed primarily in the Mono Basin development. [H] Historically, the first aqueduct conveyed most of the available surface runoff from Owens Valley. It was planned that the second aqueduct would be filled largely from three sources: increased surface diversion from Mono Basin, reduced irrigation of City-owned lands in the affected counties and increased pumping of groundwater reservoirs in Owens Valley.” (32 Cal.App.3d at p. 800.)

The design capacity of the two aqueducts is a constant average flow of 666 cfs, amounting to an increase in capacity occasioned by the second aqueduct of 236 cfs.

This action began in 1972 when the county sought injunction against the extraction of subsurface water for export from the Owens Valley, against the utilization of subsurface water in place of surface water within Inyo County and to require an EIR. “At that stage of the litigation, the city insisted that exportation of increased groundwater was an inseparable part of its second aqueduct, an ‘ongoing project’ completed prior to the effective date of CEQA and thus immune from the demands of CEQA.” (71 Cal.App.3d at p. 193.)

We rejected the argument concluding, in sum, that “‘while the capacity of the second aqueduct was fixed and known for a number of years before CEQA, the effect of its construction on subsurface water extraction has been a variable but steady escalation, dependent in large part, no doubt, upon the extent of seasonal rain and snowfall from year to year. Thus the ecological impact of the second aqueduct, viewed in conjunction with the underground pumping and measured by the quantity of extraction, has not been fixed but has substantially increased in severity in the period before, during and after its construction.... [IT] We conclude from the foregoing that the legislative intent so strongly ex[5]*5pressed in CEQA can be met only by considering the expanded groundwater extraction as a “project” separate and divisible from the second aqueduct, and we so treat it.’ (32 Cal.App.3d at p. 806.)” (71 Cal.App.3d at pp. 194-195.)

In its first EIR (May 1976) the city seized upon the “last quoted statement” to excise the part of the increased pumping rate, which it claimed was destined for export to the city (89 cfs) from “the CEQAsubject side of the line and place[d] it on the exempt side of the line” thus creating a CEQA-subject project of pumping which, “by a process of verbal transmutation, will now be devoted to in-valley use and not exported at all.” (71 Cal.App.3d at p. 195.) We said that “the impermissibly truncated” project definition severely distorted not only the actual project but the alternatives to the project. (71 Cal.App.3d at p. 201.)

We also said that the first EIR impermissibly created a no-project baseline for measurement of alternatives to the project different than the conditions preexisting the project. We concluded that “[bjecause the final EIR does not include a genuine ‘no project’ alternative, because its list of alternatives is not tied to a reasonably conceived or consistently viewed project, the Los Angeles EIR does not comply with CEQA’s demand for meaningful alternatives. This lack results in an EIR which does not meet CEQA’s goal of ensuring that ‘the long-term protection of the environment shall be the guiding criterion in public decisions.’ (§ 21001, subd. (d).)” (71 Cal.App.3d at p. 203.)

II

The Writ

This litigation began as pleadings, unaltered following the 1973 decision of this court, which define the scope of the action as the continued extraction of subsurface waters from the Owens Valley. (County of Inyo, supra, 71 Cal.App.3d at pp. 190, fn. 4, 193.) The scope of this court’s 1973 mandate was fashioned in view of the issues tendered.

This court has labored to make clear the requirements of its 1973 writ of mandate. In 1977 we explicated the 1973 decision in these words: “In any objective view the outlines of the ‘project’ conceived by our 1973 decision were quite clear. They were clear in 1973 and they [6]*6are clear now. Unfortunately there is a limit to the precision of words. Judicial opinion writers cannot always armor their language against wishful misinterpretation.

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Bluebook (online)
124 Cal. App. 3d 1, 177 Cal. Rptr. 479, 11 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 21093, 1981 Cal. App. LEXIS 2193, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/county-of-inyo-v-city-of-los-angeles-calctapp-1981.