County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles

61 Cal. App. 3d 91, 132 Cal. Rptr. 167, 6 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20758, 1976 Cal. App. LEXIS 1799
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedAugust 17, 1976
DocketCiv. 13886
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 61 Cal. App. 3d 91 (County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
County of Inyo v. City of Los Angeles, 61 Cal. App. 3d 91, 132 Cal. Rptr. 167, 6 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20758, 1976 Cal. App. LEXIS 1799 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976).

Opinion

Opinion

FRIEDMAN, Acting P. J.

We have before us the appeal of the County of Inyo from the second interim pumping rate order directed to the City of Los Angeles by the Sacramento Superior Court.

This litigation focuses primarily on the obligation of the City of Los Angeles to comply with the California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”) as a prerequisite to increasing its extraction of subsurface water from the Owens Valley. Basin. By our decision of June 5, 1973 (sub nom. County of Inyo v. Yorty, 32 Cal.App.3d 795 [108 Cal.Rptr. 377]), we held that the proposed increase of extraction was a “project” within the *94 purview of CEQA. In the exercise of our original jurisdiction to issue prerogative writs (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 10), we ordered issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate directing the City of Los Angeles to prepare an environmental impact report (“EIR”) and to complete proceedings required by CEQA.

Secondarily, the litigation requires the establishment of an interim rate of groundwater extraction pending the lawsuit’s ultimate resolution. Because the' computation of an interim extraction rate required an evidentiary inquiry, we referred the matter to the Sacramento Superior Court for the purpose of taking evidence and establishing a rate measured by an averaging formula described in our decision.

In that decision we adopted the thesis that the city’s need for groundwater would vary inversely to the amount of natural precipitation; that it would face augmented need for groundwater in a dry year, diminished need in a wet year. (County of Inyo v. Yorty, supra, 32 Cal.App.3d at pp. 815-816.) We envisioned an interim pumping allowance based upon average extractions prevailing during the wettest and driest years during the period from July 1, 1970, by which time the second Los Angeles aqueduct was in operation, and the date of our decision, June 5, 1973. This span lent itself to division into three 12-month spans, each beginning on July 1.

The superior court took evidence-and on October 12, 1973, fixed a pumping rate averaging 221.4 cubic feet per second (“cfs”) per 12-month cycle commencing each July 1. The county then appealed. We set aside the order of October 12, 1973, conceding that the formula we had evolved for the superior court’s guidance had been “factually inaccurate and inapplicable to the case at hand.” We described what we believed to be a more appropriate formula and returned the matter to the superior court for further proceedings. (County of Inyo v. Yorty, 3 Civ. 14441, unpublished opinion dated Sept. 4, 1974.)

By orders dated May 12, 1975, and May 13, 1975, the superior court then fixed an interim pumping rate not to exceed an avérage of 178.5 cfs per 12-month cycle commencing each July 1. Once more Inyo County appeals, protesting that the superior court’s order is overly generous, damaging to the environment and out of compliance with the averaging formula directed by this court. Again wé confess to inadequate communication between the superior court and ourselves. In our September 4, 1974, decision, we recognized that the availability of groundwater could *95 not be segregated into neat, twelve-month periods; that an average withdrawal over the entire three-year period would form a starting point, but only a starting point. We intended the superior court to place equitable considerations on the scale; that court viewed our opinion as a directive for flat mathematical averaging based upon a three-year history of pumping. Therefore we now vacate the superior court’s interim orders of May 12 and May 13, 1975.

In the meantime the City of Los Angeles responded to this court’s peremptoiy writ of mandate by filing an EIR dated May 1976. We are informed that on July 15, 1976, the city’s board of water and power commissioners certified completion of the EIR and approved the project of increased groundwater pumping from the Owens Valley Basin. The county has indicated objections to the legal sufficiency of the EIR.

This lawsuit represents a dispute of major importance, socially, economically and environmentally. It poses competition between two legitimate and weighty public needs—preservation of the environmental quality of the Owens Valley against the burgeoning water requirements of California’s largest population center. The public interest requires early resolution of the dispute. Having accepted original jurisdiction, we shall forego further references to the superior court. Following oral argument on July 21, 1976, we issued an order directing the City of Los Angeles to file a return to the peremptory writ of mandate and fixing time limits for objections by the county and a replication by the city. We have continuing jurisdiction to enforce the peremptory writ of mandate. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1097; see Gonzales v. Internat. Assn. of Machinists (1963) 213 Cal.App.2d 817, 820 [29 Cal.Rptr. 190].) The writ directing an EIR will not be satisfied until there has been a final judicial determination of the EIR’s validity. 1 That determination will be made initially by this court whether it involves questions of law or fact or both.

There remains the necessity of establishing an interim pumping rate to hold sway pending resolution of the primary issue. The proceedings before the superior court have resulted in the accumulation of an *96 evidentiary record which now permits us to establish an interim rate of groundwater extraction without further reference to that court.

In the establishment of a groundwater pumping rate, dual problems emerge: first, the formulation of an equitably conceived base for future maxima; second, the delineation of a time span to which these maxima shall be applied.

Inyo County now asks us to restrict the city’s extraction rate to an average of 89 cfs, which represents the withdrawal rate on November 23, 1970, the effective date of CEQA. The City of Los Angeles asks for affirmance of the 178.5 cfs rate fixed by the superior court, that figure representing an average rate computed over the three-year period.

Neither rate is appropriate, for neither takes account of equitable factors. Mandate proceedings, although not of equitable origin, are governed by equitable principles. (San Diego County Dept. of Public Welfare v. Superior Court (1972) 7 Cal.3d 1, 9 [101 Cal.Rptr. 541, 496 P.2d 453].) Equity molds its decree by the configurations of substantial justice as perceived by the chancellor. (Bechtel v. Wier (1907) 152 Cal. 443, 446 [93 P. 75].) The 89 cfs rate prevailing on November 23, 1970, represents a happenstance. The fact that CEQA became effective on that date has no actual relationship to the ecological welfare of the Owens Valley or to the city’s good, faith need for water. The city is not extracting water owned by others; it seeks to utilize water rights belonging to it as overlying or appropriative owner. We reject the 89 cfs limitation sought by Inyo County.

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Bluebook (online)
61 Cal. App. 3d 91, 132 Cal. Rptr. 167, 6 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law Inst.) 20758, 1976 Cal. App. LEXIS 1799, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/county-of-inyo-v-city-of-los-angeles-calctapp-1976.