Marilyn Kelly, P.J.
Defendants appeal as of right from a circuit court decision finding 1993 PA 362 unconstitutional on its face and enjoining public funding of academy schools. We affirm.
The first academy schools act* 1 became effective December 28, 1993. For reasons not explained by the parties, on January 14, 1994, the Legislature repealed [129]*129it and passed a second academy schools act,2 giving it immediate effect.
Plaintiffs brought the instant lawsuit on August 30, 1994, before the disbursal of any funds under the act. The parties filed cross-motions for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). The circuit court expedited the case in order to reach a decision before the first date when payments would be made to academy schools under the act.
In an opinion dated November 1, 1994, the circuit court found that the second act, 1993 PA 362, violated the Michigan Constitution. Const 1963, art 8, § 2. The court used the definition of “public school” set forth in an attorney general’s opinion, OAG, 1989-1990, No 6581, p 105 (May 8, 1989). It found that academy schools were not public schools according to art 8, § 2 of the constitution, because they were not under the exclusive control of the state. Traverse City School Dist v Attorney General, 384 Mich 390; 185 NW2d 9 (1971).
The second academy schools act allowed a school academy to be run by a private board of directors. 1993 PA 362, § 502. It provided the authorizing body no means for selecting members of the board. Section 503. Therefore, the court concluded that academy schools were not public schools.
The circuit court also found that the second academy schools act violated the Michigan Constitution at Const 1963, art 8, § 3 by divesting the state board of education of its authority to supervise public education. The court employed principles of statutory con[130]*130struction. It concluded that the differences between the second act and the first indicated a legislative intent to divest the state board of education of its authority to supervise academy schools.
We find that the circuit court correctly ruled that academy schools did not meet the requirements of the Michigan Constitution, art 8, § 2, to be considered public schools.
Article 8, § 2 provides:
The legislature shall maintain and support a system of free public elementary and secondary schools as defined by law. Every school district shall provide for the education of its pupils without discrimination as to religion, creed, race, color or national origin.
No public monies or property shall be appropriated or paid or any public credit utilized, by the legislature or any other political subdivision or agency of the state directly or indirectly to aid or maintain any private, denominational or other nonpublic, preelementary, elementary, or secondary school. No payment, credit, tax benefit, exemption or deductions, tuition voucher, subsidy, grant or loan of public monies or property shall be provided, directly or indirectly, to support the attendance of any student or the employment of any person at any such nonpublic school or at any location or institution where instruction is offered in whole or in part to such nonpublic school students. The legislature may provide for the transportation of students to and from any school.
Technical rules of statutory construction do not apply to the construction of a constitution. McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US 316, 407; 4 L Ed 579 (1819). The primary rule is the rule of common understanding. Traverse City, supra at 405. A provision should be given the interpretation that the great mass of people [131]*131would give it. The intent to be arrived at is that of the people. Id.
To clarify meaning, the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the constitutional provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished may be considered. Whenever possible an interpretation that does not create constitutional invalidity is preferred to one that does. Id. at 406. The Court is not bound by the legislative interpretation of constitutional provisions, but must determine independently the meaning of constitutional terms. Richardson v Secretary of State, 381 Mich 304, 311; 160 NW2d 883 (1968). Decisions concerning the validity of legislation do not in all cases depend upon matters of fact. No substantial factual issues are involved where the validity of a statute depends only on the authoritative answer to a controverted question of constitutional construction. 1 Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction (5th ed), § 2.06, p 32.
Traverse City, supra, interpreted the provision which is at issue here. The Court discussed the history leading to the amendment, which arose out of a reaction to legislation providing aid for private schools. In discussing shared time arrangements, the Court indicated that the performance of services must be under the immediate and ultimate control of public authorities to satisfy art 8, § 2:
Shared time can be provided by a public school system only under conditions appropriate for a public school. This means that the ultimate and immediate control of the subject matter, the personnel and premises must be under the public school system authorities, and the courses open to all eligible to attend a public school. [384 Mich 415.]
[132]*132The parties in this case have agreed with the attorney general’s conclusion: a public school must be one which is under the exclusive control of the state and open to all children in the district. OAG, 1989-1990, No 6581, p 103 (May 8, 1989). They also agree that a public school must be free of sectarian instruction. In formulating this conclusion, the attorney general looked to the guiding principles of Traverse City, supra, and decisions of other states. The key issue presented here is whether academy schools axe under the exclusive control of the state.
We agree with the circuit court’s conclusion that the academy schools act does not place charter schools under the exclusive control of the state.
The principle impediment is that the act allows entities with a privately selected board of directors to control academy schools. In construing the constitutionality of a statute, we must look to the statute’s requirements rather than the method by which the individual schools administer their programs. Rassner v Federal Collateral Society, Inc, 299 Mich 206, 217-218; 300 NW 45 (1941). A valid statute is not rendered unconstitutional based on its improper administration. People v Kirby, 440 Mich 485, 493; 487 NW2d 404 (1992). Similarly, an invalid statute is not saved by compensating actions on the part of its administrators. Rassner, supra. The constitutionality of a law must be tested by what may be done under it without offending any express provision of the constitution. Cummings v Garner, 213 Mich 408, 435; 182 NW 9 (1921). The Court must look through forms and behind labels into the substance of the law. The people have a right to have the limitations in a state constitution respected and given the fair and legitimate [133]*133force which its terms require. Lockwood v Comm’r of Revenue, 357 Mich 517, 557-558; 98 NW2d 753 (1959).
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Marilyn Kelly, P.J.
Defendants appeal as of right from a circuit court decision finding 1993 PA 362 unconstitutional on its face and enjoining public funding of academy schools. We affirm.
The first academy schools act* 1 became effective December 28, 1993. For reasons not explained by the parties, on January 14, 1994, the Legislature repealed [129]*129it and passed a second academy schools act,2 giving it immediate effect.
Plaintiffs brought the instant lawsuit on August 30, 1994, before the disbursal of any funds under the act. The parties filed cross-motions for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(8). The circuit court expedited the case in order to reach a decision before the first date when payments would be made to academy schools under the act.
In an opinion dated November 1, 1994, the circuit court found that the second act, 1993 PA 362, violated the Michigan Constitution. Const 1963, art 8, § 2. The court used the definition of “public school” set forth in an attorney general’s opinion, OAG, 1989-1990, No 6581, p 105 (May 8, 1989). It found that academy schools were not public schools according to art 8, § 2 of the constitution, because they were not under the exclusive control of the state. Traverse City School Dist v Attorney General, 384 Mich 390; 185 NW2d 9 (1971).
The second academy schools act allowed a school academy to be run by a private board of directors. 1993 PA 362, § 502. It provided the authorizing body no means for selecting members of the board. Section 503. Therefore, the court concluded that academy schools were not public schools.
The circuit court also found that the second academy schools act violated the Michigan Constitution at Const 1963, art 8, § 3 by divesting the state board of education of its authority to supervise public education. The court employed principles of statutory con[130]*130struction. It concluded that the differences between the second act and the first indicated a legislative intent to divest the state board of education of its authority to supervise academy schools.
We find that the circuit court correctly ruled that academy schools did not meet the requirements of the Michigan Constitution, art 8, § 2, to be considered public schools.
Article 8, § 2 provides:
The legislature shall maintain and support a system of free public elementary and secondary schools as defined by law. Every school district shall provide for the education of its pupils without discrimination as to religion, creed, race, color or national origin.
No public monies or property shall be appropriated or paid or any public credit utilized, by the legislature or any other political subdivision or agency of the state directly or indirectly to aid or maintain any private, denominational or other nonpublic, preelementary, elementary, or secondary school. No payment, credit, tax benefit, exemption or deductions, tuition voucher, subsidy, grant or loan of public monies or property shall be provided, directly or indirectly, to support the attendance of any student or the employment of any person at any such nonpublic school or at any location or institution where instruction is offered in whole or in part to such nonpublic school students. The legislature may provide for the transportation of students to and from any school.
Technical rules of statutory construction do not apply to the construction of a constitution. McCulloch v Maryland, 17 US 316, 407; 4 L Ed 579 (1819). The primary rule is the rule of common understanding. Traverse City, supra at 405. A provision should be given the interpretation that the great mass of people [131]*131would give it. The intent to be arrived at is that of the people. Id.
To clarify meaning, the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the constitutional provision and the purpose sought to be accomplished may be considered. Whenever possible an interpretation that does not create constitutional invalidity is preferred to one that does. Id. at 406. The Court is not bound by the legislative interpretation of constitutional provisions, but must determine independently the meaning of constitutional terms. Richardson v Secretary of State, 381 Mich 304, 311; 160 NW2d 883 (1968). Decisions concerning the validity of legislation do not in all cases depend upon matters of fact. No substantial factual issues are involved where the validity of a statute depends only on the authoritative answer to a controverted question of constitutional construction. 1 Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction (5th ed), § 2.06, p 32.
Traverse City, supra, interpreted the provision which is at issue here. The Court discussed the history leading to the amendment, which arose out of a reaction to legislation providing aid for private schools. In discussing shared time arrangements, the Court indicated that the performance of services must be under the immediate and ultimate control of public authorities to satisfy art 8, § 2:
Shared time can be provided by a public school system only under conditions appropriate for a public school. This means that the ultimate and immediate control of the subject matter, the personnel and premises must be under the public school system authorities, and the courses open to all eligible to attend a public school. [384 Mich 415.]
[132]*132The parties in this case have agreed with the attorney general’s conclusion: a public school must be one which is under the exclusive control of the state and open to all children in the district. OAG, 1989-1990, No 6581, p 103 (May 8, 1989). They also agree that a public school must be free of sectarian instruction. In formulating this conclusion, the attorney general looked to the guiding principles of Traverse City, supra, and decisions of other states. The key issue presented here is whether academy schools axe under the exclusive control of the state.
We agree with the circuit court’s conclusion that the academy schools act does not place charter schools under the exclusive control of the state.
The principle impediment is that the act allows entities with a privately selected board of directors to control academy schools. In construing the constitutionality of a statute, we must look to the statute’s requirements rather than the method by which the individual schools administer their programs. Rassner v Federal Collateral Society, Inc, 299 Mich 206, 217-218; 300 NW 45 (1941). A valid statute is not rendered unconstitutional based on its improper administration. People v Kirby, 440 Mich 485, 493; 487 NW2d 404 (1992). Similarly, an invalid statute is not saved by compensating actions on the part of its administrators. Rassner, supra. The constitutionality of a law must be tested by what may be done under it without offending any express provision of the constitution. Cummings v Garner, 213 Mich 408, 435; 182 NW 9 (1921). The Court must look through forms and behind labels into the substance of the law. The people have a right to have the limitations in a state constitution respected and given the fair and legitimate [133]*133force which its terms require. Lockwood v Comm’r of Revenue, 357 Mich 517, 557-558; 98 NW2d 753 (1959).
The second academy schools act is silent as to the initial method of selecting a board of directors. There is no provision requiring the public authorizing body to appoint the directors or monitor their election. We recognize that, through its charter contracts, intervening defendant Central Michigan University may retain the power to select the directors of the academy schools which it authorizes. However, nothing in the statute requires an authorizing body to implement such a requirement. We must determine the constitutionality of a statute based upon the things it affirmatively permits. Rassner, supra. We cannot assume that all authorizing bodies will take additional steps which the statute does not require. Contrary to the assertion of the dissent, it is the construction of the statute which is at issue, not the possible factual scenarios which different authorizing bodies may present.
Under the act, an academy school is organized by a board of directors following the nonprofit corporation act.3 Section 502(1). This self-selected private board of directors then applies to an authorizing body, fisting the proposed board members or a description of qualifications and a method for selection of the board. Section 502(3)(b). Only then does the authorizing body adopt a resolution establishing the method of selection, length of term and number of the board of directors of the academy school. Section 503(3).
An academy school is organized and administered by its board of directors. Although the authorizing [134]*134body adopts the method of selecting the board, there is no requirement that the authorizing body select or approve the initial board of directors. Therefore an academy school may be run by an essentially private entity, outside the realm of public control. Because this conflicts with article 8, § 2 of the 1963 Michigan Constitution, the circuit court properly enjoined funding of academy schools under the second academy schools act.
The dissent places inordinate emphasis on technical rules of construction. The proper focus is on what the people meant by the term “public school.” Defendants’ argument that the framers of the constitution intended the Legislature to have free reign to define the system of public schools is negated by the adoption of the parochiaid amendment. When the people of our state added it, they placed a restriction on the Legislature’s power.
Constitutions do not change with the varying tides of public opinion and desire; the will of the people therein recorded is the same inflexible law until changed by their own deliberative action; and it cannot be permissible to the courts that in order to aid evasions and circumventions, they shall subject these instruments, which in main only undertake to lay down broad general principles, to a literal and technical construction. [People ex rel Bay City v State Treasurer, 23 Mich 499, 506 (1871).]
When unencumbered by inappropriate use of technical rules of construction, the task of this Court is clear. It is to decide whether the people, when adopting the parochiaid amendment, contemplated that a school organized by a private group of citizens could be considered a public school. In this case, the statute lacks a mechanism which mandates that a public [135]*135body select the board of directors for the school.4 Thus, 1993 PA 362 does not meet the constitutional standard of Const 1963, art 8, § 2, limiting public funding to public schools within the common understanding of that term.
Having found that the circuit court properly entered its injunction on this ground, we need not reach the remaining issues.
Affirmed.
D. A. Teeple, J., concurred.