UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
COUNCIL FOR OPPORTUNITY IN EDUCATION
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 25-cv-03491 (TSC) Civil Action No. 25-cv-03514 (TSC) v. (Consolidated Cases) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
These consolidated cases deal with Department of Education’s decisions to deny certain
Council for Opportunity in Education’s (“COE”) members’ applications for new Student Support
Services (“SSS”) grants, Case No. 25-cv-3491 (“SSS Case”), and discontinue other members’
TRIO grant funding, Case No. 25-cv-3514 (“TRIO Case”), all allegedly on the grounds that the
proposed or funded activities conflicted with the Administration’s anti-DEI policies and
interpretations of federal civil rights law. On September 30, 2025, COE filed two separate lawsuits
against the Department of Education and Secretary McMahon, asserting violations of the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), constitutional violations, as well as ultra vires and
mandamus claims. SSS Case Compl., ECF No. 1; TRIO Case Compl., ECF No. 1. The court
issued a preliminary injunction in January 2026. See SSS Case Mem. Op. at 39, ECF No. 28.
Pending before the court are Defendants’ motions to dismiss each case, SSS Case Mot. to Dismiss
(“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 15; TRIO Case Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF No. 14, COE’s
motion to modify the scope of the court’s preliminary injunction, SSS Case Mot. to Modify Ord.
1 (“Pl.’s Mot. to Modify”), ECF No. 33, and COE’s motion to file declarations in support of its
modification motion under seal, SSS Case Mot. for Leave to File Under Seal (“Pl.’s Seal Mot.”),
ECF No. 32.
For the reasons below, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part, COE’s Motion for Leave to File Under Seal is GRANTED, and the unresolved
portion of COE’s Motion to Modify the Preliminary Injunction Order is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background 1
Beginning in the 1960s, Congress established a series of education grant programs to
combat barriers to post-secondary education faced by students from disadvantaged backgrounds.
See 20 U.S.C. § 1070a-11(a). These programs, commonly referred to as federal TRIO programs,
are administered by the Department of Education and subject to program-specific regulations, 34
C.F.R. pts. 642–47, as well as various statutory mandates under the Higher Education Act of 1965,
20 U.S.C. §§ 1070a-11–1070a-18, the General Education Provisions Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1221(b)(1),
(c)(1), Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, and Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681. TRIO grants are selected through a peer-review process
for project durations of two or five years, 20 U.S.C. § 1070a-11(b)(2), (c), but only receive funding
for an initial twelve-month budget period, 34 C.F.R. §§ 75.251(a), 75.253(a). Thereafter, the
Department continues funding in twelve-month increments so long as the grantee maintains
eligibility, submits the requisite reports, meets certain performance criteria, and satisfies the
Department that continuation “is in the best interest of the Federal Government.” Id. § 75.253(a).
1 A more fulsome factual and statutory background is set forth in the court’s Memorandum Opinion granting preliminary injunctive relief. See SSS Case Mem. Op. at 2–8.
2 Defendants solicited new applications for FY 2025 SSS grants in spring 2024. 2 See
Applications for New Awards; Student Support Services Program, 89 Fed. Reg. 35,080 (May 1,
2024). In July 2025, Defendants sent out virtually identical denial letters to certain COE members,
informing them that their programs had “not been selected based on the Department’s review for
potential conflicts with applicable nondiscrimination requirements.” SSS Case Compl. ¶¶ 157,
158. Specifically, the letters stated that “staff” had reviewed their applications and “identified
information indicating that the proposed activities take account of race in ways that conflict with
the Department’s policy of prioritizing merit, fairness, and excellence in education and the
Department’s commitment to upholding the letter and purpose of Federal civil rights law.” Id.
¶ 159. Such applications were “therefore inconsistent with applicable nondiscrimination statutes,
regulations, policies, and other requirements applicable to the program. 34 C.F.R. § 75.500; see
also 2 C.F.R. § 200.211(c).” Id.
In summer 2025, Defendants also issued notices of grant non-continuation to various other
COE members who had received grant awards between 2021-2024 and otherwise remained in
compliance with all applicable requirements. TRIO Case Compl. ¶¶ 116, 119–23, 139. Using
virtually identical language, Defendants’ notices of non-continuation stated:
The Department has undertaken a review of grants and determined that the grant specified above provides funding for programs that reflect the prior Administration’s priorities and policy preferences and conflict with those of the current Administration, in that the programs: violate the letter or purpose of Federal civil rights law; conflict with the Department’s policy of prioritizing merit, fairness, and excellence in education; undermine the well-being of the students these programs are intended to help; or constitute an inappropriate use of federal funds.
2 Student Support Services (“SSS”) grants are a specific type of grant within the TRIO grant program.
3 Id. ¶¶ 143, 145. In light of those determinations, Defendants concluded that continuation of these
members’ programs was “inconsistent with, and no longer effectuates, the best interest of the
Federal Government.” Id. ¶ 145.
B. Procedural History
On September 30, 2025, COE filed two separate lawsuits against the Department of
Education and Secretary McMahon challenging these funding determinations and seeking
declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus relief. SSS Case Compl.; TRIO Case Compl. In the first
action, COE brings claims under the APA, an ultra vires claim, and, in the alternative, requests a
writ of mandamus. SSS Case Compl. ¶¶ 252–324. In the second, COE asserts similar claims
under the APA, an ultra vires claim, requests a writ of mandamus, and adds several claims alleging
constitutional violations under the Fifth Amendment, separation of powers and the non-delegation
doctrine, as well as the Take Care Clause. TRIO Case Compl. ¶¶ 206–85. COE also moved for
preliminary injunctions in both cases. SSS Case Mot. for Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 2; TRIO Case
Mot. for Prelim. Inj., ECF No. 2. In response, Defendants filed combined motions to dismiss and
oppositions to COE’s preliminary injunction motions. SSS Case Def.’s Mot. at 1; TRIO Case
Def.’s Mot. at 1.
The court consolidated the actions at a hearing on December 15, 2025. See SSS Case Min.
Entry (Dec. 15, 2025). On January 16, 2026, the court granted COE’s motions for preliminary
injunctions, thereby vacating the Department’s grant denial and discontinuation decisions with
regard to the members that COE identified and ordering reconsideration in accordance with
applicable laws and regulations. See SSS Case Ord. at 1–3, ECF No. 29. In its Order, the court
also granted COE leave to file a motion to modify the scope of the court’s preliminary injunction
and, if COE did so, instructed it to attach documentation regarding any additional members’ harm.
4 Id. at 3. COE has done so, submitting declarations from 46 additional members, while also
requesting the court extend the scope of the preliminary injunction to cover 33 unidentified
members who did not submit declarations. See SSS Case Pl.’s Mot. to Modify at 4. COE also
seeks leave to file unredacted versions of the attached declarations—which detail the individual
members’ harms—under seal. See SSS Case Pl.’s Seal Mot. Defendants oppose COE’s motion to
seal as well as its request to extend the scope of the court’s preliminary injunction, but only to the
extent it seeks to include members beyond the 46 it identified. See SSS Case Defs.’ Opp’n to Pl.’s
Mots. at 1, 10–12 (“Defs.’ Opp’n”), ECF No. 35. Given the partial nature of Defendants’
opposition to the motion to modify, the court directed the parties to submit a joint proposed order
to extend preliminary relief to those 46 members, which the court adopted on April 13, 2026. See
SSS Case Modification Ord. at 1, ECF No. 41.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Dismiss
Defendants move to dismiss both of COE’s actions under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6).
See SSS Case Defs.’ Mot. at 7–28; TRIO Case Defs.’ Mot. at 9–38. In evaluating a motion to
dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), “the plaintiff bears the burden of
establishing that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction.” Jones v. United States, 949 F. Supp. 2d
50, 52 (D.D.C. 2013). If the plaintiff is unable to do so, the court must dismiss the action. See
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998). Under Rule 12(b)(6), a “complaint
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must
“accept all the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint as true and draw all reasonable
5 inferences from those allegations in the plaintiff's favor.” Banneker Ventures, LLC v. Graham, 798
F.3d 1119, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
At the outset, for the reasons articulated in its Memorandum Opinion granting COE’s
motions for preliminary injunctions, the court rejects Defendants’ assertions that COE lacks
standing to bring either action, SSS Case Defs.’ Mot. at 9–15; TRIO Case Defs.’ Mot. at 11–16,
that this court’s jurisdiction is precluded by the Tucker Act, SSS Case Defs.’ Mot. at 15–19; TRIO
Case Defs.’ Mot. at 16–23, and that COE’s APA claims are unreviewable under the statute, SSS
Case Defs.’ Mot. at 19–22; TRIO Case Defs.’ Mot. at 23–27. See SSS Case Mem. Op. at 9–22.
As a result, the only remaining arguments are Defendants’ challenges to COE’s constitutional
claims, ultra vires claims, and mandamus claims, SSS Case Defs.’ Mot. at 23–28; TRIO Case
Defs.’ Mot. at 27–37. The court will take each argument in turn.
Turning first to the ultra vires and mandamus claims, the court will grant Defendants’
motion to dismiss. It is well established that ultra vires review is only available where “there is no
alternative procedure for review of the statutory claim.” Changji Esquel Textile Co. v. Raimondo,
40 F.4th 716, 722 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (internal quotations and citation omitted). Similarly, a plaintiff
seeking mandamus relief must show “that ‘no adequate alternative remedy exists.’” CREW v.
Trump, 924 F.3d 602, 606 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (quoting Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183,
189 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). COE’s ultra vires claims are based on the same allegations that undergird
its APA claims—that Defendants acted in excess of and contrary to their statutory duties in denying
and discontinuing the affected COE members’ grant funding. SSS Case Compl. ¶¶ 315–19; TRIO
Case Compl. ¶¶ 278–80. The same is true of its mandamus claims, which COE presents as an
alternative theory for the same relief it requests under the APA. See SSS Case Compl. ¶¶ 320–
324; TRIO Case Compl. ¶¶ 281–85. As the court has already determined, however, the APA
6 provides both an avenue for review of COE’s claims as well as the remedies it seeks. Thus, COE’s
ultra vires and mandamus claims fail. See Jafarzadeh v. Duke, 270 F. Supp. 3d 296, 311–12
(D.D.C. 2017) (dismissing mandamus claim “because plaintiffs are able to assert the same claim
through the APA”); Lewis v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 743 F. Supp. 3d 181, 201 (D.D.C. 2024) (“[I]f
a plaintiff advances both a well-pleaded APA claim and a duplicative ultra vires claim, the ultra
vires claim must be dismissed.”).
As to the constitutional claims, COE presses numerous theories. In the TRIO Case, COE
brings standalone constitutional challenges under the Fifth Amendment’s void-for-vagueness
doctrine, 3 separation of powers and the non-delegation doctrine, and the Take Care Clause. See
TRIO Case Compl. ¶¶ 247–254, 255–65, 266–77. But the Supreme Court’s decision in Dalton v.
Specter precludes standalone constitutional challenges that merely repackage statutory claims,
holding that “claims simply alleging that the President has exceeded his statutory authority are not
‘constitutional’ claims, subject to judicial review.” 511 U.S. 462, 473 (1994); see also Glob.
Health Council v. Trump, 153 F.4th 1, 14–17 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (amended) (concluding that plaintiffs
could not pursue their separation of powers claim because the “alleged statutory violations” were
“the predicate acts for the constitutional claims” and “statutory claims c[ould not] be transformed
into constitutional ones”). COE has failed to meaningfully address Defendants’ assertion that its
constitutional claims are “purely statutory.” TRIO Case Defs.’ Mot. at 27; TRIO Case Pl.’s Opp’n
to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 33–37 (“Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 18. The court will therefore treat this
argument as conceded, and COE’s remaining standalone constitutional claims in the TRIO case
will be dismissed.
3 COE voluntarily withdrew this claim at the court’s hearing on its preliminary injunction motions. See SSS Case Dec. 15, 2025 Hr’g Tr. at 45 (“Hr’g Tr.”), ECF No. 24.
7 In the SSS case, by contrast, COE brings its constitutional claims under the APA, see 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(B), asserting that Defendants violated the Take Care and Spending Clauses by
failing to “obligate[] and expend[] $1.19 billion towards all TRIO programs,” and not “obligat[ing]
and expend[ing] the funds allocated to the SSS program in the manner required under law.” SSS
Case Compl. ¶ 308. Defendants do not suggest that these claims are precluded under Dalton, see
SSS Case Hr’g Tr. at 34, but rather argue that the earmarked funds have been obligated and that
the Take Care Clause provides no basis to review the actions of “subordinate Executive Branch
officials,” just the President’s. SSS Case Defs.’ Mot. at 23–24. It is well established, however,
that the court must take all well-pleaded factual allegations as true at the motion to dismiss stage.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, Defendant’s counterfactual is insufficient grounds to dismiss
COE’s constitutional APA claim.
As for their challenge to COE’s Take Care Clause argument, Defendants’ cited authorities
do not support their assertion that such a claim cannot be leveled against agency actions, see SSS
Case Defs.’ Mot. at 24 (collecting cases), and the court is not aware of any binding precedent
suggesting as much. Cf. Medina v. Planned Parenthood S. Atl., 606 U.S. 357, 367 (2025) (“The
Constitution charges the Executive Branch with enforcing federal law.”). Indeed, in just the past
year, numerous courts in this district have analyzed Take Care Clause claims challenging
purportedly unlawful agency actions, and none have rejected them on the ground that Defendants
now proffer. See, e.g., Widakuswara v. Lake, 779 F. Supp. 3d 10, 36 (D.D.C. 2025); Vera Inst. of
Just. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 805 F. Supp. 3d 12, 35–37 (D.D.C. 2025); Ass’n for Educ. Fin. & Pol’y,
Inc. v. McMahon, 786 F. Supp. 3d 13, 32 (D.D.C. 2025). Because Defendants’ arguments in favor
of dismissal are unpersuasive, the court will deny their motion to dismiss COE’s constitutional
APA claims in the SSS case.
8 B. Motion to File Under Seal
There is a “strong presumption in favor of public access to judicial proceedings.” Metlife,
Inc. v. Fin. Stability Oversight Council, 865 F.3d 661, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (internal quotations
and citation omitted). This presumption is even greater where the Government is a party. See
Hyatt v. Lee, 251 F. Supp. 3d 181, 184 (D.D.C. 2017). Nonetheless, the “presumption may be
outweighed by competing interests.” In re Leopold to Unseal Certain Elec. Surveillance
Applications & Ords., 964 F.3d 1121, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 2020). Thus, in determining whether to seal
records, courts weigh “(1) the need for public access to the documents at issue; (2) the extent of
previous public access to the documents; (3) the fact that someone has objected to disclosure, and
the identity of that person; (4) the strength of any property and privacy interests asserted; (5) the
possibility of prejudice to those opposing disclosure; and (6) the purposes for which the documents
were introduced during the judicial proceedings.” Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted);
see also United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 317–22 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
COE seeks to seal the names of the member institutions, the declarants’ names, 4 their
Unique Entity Identifier numbers, and the PR/Award numbers of the 46 newly identified members
on the public docket. SSS Case Pl.’s Seal Mot. at 7. According to COE, “all six factors weigh in
favor of COE’s limited sealing request.” Id. at 6. The court largely agrees.
For one, the “need for public access” factor weighs in favor of sealing since COE has filed
redacted versions of the documents on the public docket that disclose the substance of the
declarations and merely obscure members’ identifying information, see SSS Case Mot. to Modify,
Exs. 1–52, ECF Nos. 33-1–33-52, which, as explained below, is immaterial to resolving COE’s
4 Defendants do not challenge COE’s request as it relates to the declarants’ names. See SSS Case Defs.’ Opp’n at 1 n.2.
9 modification motion. See Doe v. McHenry, No. 25-cv-286, 2025 WL 596650, at *2 (D.D.C. Jan.
31, 2025) (determining this factor weighed slightly in favor of sealing where plaintiff filed redacted
versions removing identifying information, and redacted information was not “critical in aiding
the public’s understanding of the allegations made”). These redacted versions therefore alleviate
any concerns regarding “the public’s ability to understand the issues in the case.” Ohana v. Acad.
Express, LLC, No. 18-cv-2127, 2022 WL 2952400, at *22 (D.D.C. July 26, 2022); see also Factor2
Multimedia Sys. v. TikTok, No. 24-cv-133, 2025 WL 1713257, at *6 (D.D.C. June 18, 2025)
(granting motion to seal where the “sealing request is narrowly tailored ‘to afford the public the
greatest scope of access’”).
The second factor similarly counsels in favor of sealing. In assessing this factor, the court
“should consider the public’s previous access to the sealed information, not its previous access to
the information available in the overall lawsuit.” CNN v. FBI, 984 F.3d 114, 119 (D.C. Cir. 2021).
COE points out that “[t]he public has not had previous access to the additional programs’ identities
and their status as COE members.” SSS Case Pl.’s Seal Mot. at 7. And although Defendants
suggest that “grant information and decisions, such as the information at issue here, are publicly
available including reasoning and the names of the schools,” SSS Case Defs.’ Opp’n at 6, they do
not point to any source outside of the Department of Education’s TRIO grant homepage that
purportedly discloses the redacted information at issue, see id. (citing https://www.ed.gov/grants-
and-programs/grants-higher-education/trio-home-page). Defendants also suggest that “at least one
of the institutions requesting that their information be sealed has publicly admitted the fact they
are supporting Plaintiff’s in this action,” and one member “has publicly acknowledged their
membership with COE.” Id. Because Defendants’ memorandum redacts these portions of its text,
see id. at 6–7, however, the court cannot itself substantiate nor credit Defendants’ claims.
10 “The third, fourth, and fifth Hubbard factors are interrelated, and require courts to look at
the strength of the property and privacy interests involved, and to take into account whether anyone
has objected to public disclosure and the possibility of prejudice to that person.” Upshaw v. United
States, 754 F. Supp. 2d 24, 29 (D.D.C. 2010). COE’s President avers that “[m]any of these
additional members have informed COE that they wish for their identity and status as COE
members to remain confidential because they are concerned about negative public attention and
potential repercussions to their institutions and organizations if they are publicly revealed as
having supported COE’s efforts to seek and obtain relief from the Department.” SSS Case Jones
Decl. ¶ 10, ECF No. 33-1; EEOC v. Nat’l Child.’s Ctr., 98 F.3d 1406, 1410 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(determining that this factor favored sealing a court document when one party objected to
disclosure of the information); Hubbard, 650 F.2d at 319 (“[W]here a third party’s property and
privacy rights are at issue the need for minimizing intrusion is especially great.”).
Moreover, the court agrees with Plaintiff that “COE’s additional members have legitimate
privacy interests in keeping their identities and status as COE members private.” SSS Case Pl.’s
Mot. to Seal at 8. Indeed, courts have long recognized individuals’ privacy interests regarding
their membership status in an association. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)
(“This Court has recognized the vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in
one’s associations.”); see also Ams. for Prosperity Found. v. Bonta, 594 U.S. 595 (2021). Given
this privacy interest, disclosure of the redacted information would certainly prejudice COE’s
declarants and respective member institutions.
Defendants counter that granting the motion to seal would prevent them from disclosing
updates regarding “the progress and outcomes of this litigation as to these specific grants.” SSS
Case Defs.’ Opp’n at 9. But Defendants have not explained why they need to identify COE
11 members by name to do so in either their Opposition or their notice of Congress’ recent reporting
requirement, see id.; SSS Case Defs.’ Notice of Suppl. Auth. at 1–2, ECF No. 38. And, as COE
points out, “[s]ealing these members’ identities would not prevent the Department from disclosing
their names and the status of their grants to other branches of the federal government and federal
agencies as needed for purposes of administering the TRIO programs.” SSS Case Pl.’s Consol.
Reply at 7, ECF No. 36. Indeed, Defendants’ concerns regarding their congressional mandate have
already been alleviated through the joint proposed order that the court adopted. See SSS Case
Modification Ord. at 3 (“[T]o the extent that Defendants must identify Plaintiff’s additional
identified members, such required Congressional notification will not violate any order of this
Court pertaining to the sealing of the identities of Plaintiff’s additional members, or otherwise the
members that are the subject of Plaintiff’s motion to seal.”).
Regarding the sixth factor—the purposes for which the documents were introduced—this
factor weighs in COE’s favor as well. As instructed, COE supplemented its motion to modify the
scope of the preliminary injunction with declarations from additional members that detail the
harms they have experienced from Defendants’ denial or discontinuation of their grants. As noted
above, those harms are publicly available on the docket. See SSS Case Mot. to Modify, Exs. 1–
52. COE seeks to redact only certain portions of information that directly or indirectly attribute
such harms to the member institutions. Yet, neither the court nor the public require knowledge of
the members’ identities to analyze the merits of COE’s request. It is sufficient that these
institutions exist and face the averred harms. See Advocs. for Highway & Auto Safety v. Fed. Motor
Carrier Safety Admin., 41 F.4th 586, 594 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (rejecting the government’s contention
that the plaintiff association needed to identify affected members by name for standing purposes
where it submitted their survey responses regarding their injuries with direct quotations).
12 The court’s prior directive that COE supplement its motion relates solely to the court’s need
to assure itself that any relief is “‘carefully circumscribed and tailored to remedy the harm shown’
by the facts.” N. Am.’s Bldg. Trades Unions v. Dep’t of Def., 783 F. Supp. 3d 290, 301 (D.D.C.
2025) (citation omitted). And Defendants did not oppose COE’s motion to the extent it sought to
include the declarants’ institutions in the scope of the court’s preliminary injunction. SSS Case
Defs.’ Opp’n at 10–12. Accordingly, the court already granted the modification request with regard
to these members, SSS Case Modification Ord. at 1, thereby fulfilling the purpose for introduction.
In sum, the above factors favor COE’s request to seal its members’ unredacted declarations.
The court will therefore grant COE’s motion to file under seal.
C. Motion to Modify the Scope of the Preliminary Injunction
As articulated above, the court has already granted COE’s motion to modify the scope of
the court’s preliminary injunction in extending coverage to COE’s 46 addition members that
submitted documentation of their injuries. See id. at 1. Thus, the only remaining issue for
resolution is whether COE is entitled to preliminary relief for 33 other members for which the
court lacks any direct evidence of harm. For the reasons stated below and in the court’s
Memorandum Opinion granting COE’s initial motion for a preliminary injunction, see SSS Case
Mem. Op. at 37–38, the court concludes that it is not.
It is well established that a party seeking a preliminary injunction bears the burden of
substantiating, with evidence, that the claimed injury is certain, imminent, great, and beyond
remediation, Wis. Gas Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985), and any injunction “must
be narrowly tailored to remedy the specific harm shown,” Neb. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.
v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 435 F.3d 326, 330 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (cleaned up). That an
organization proceeds on a theory of associational standing, which does not require individual
13 participation, does not alter these requirements because the standing inquiry is distinct, albeit
related, from that of fashioning any preliminary relief. See, e.g., Taylor v. Resolution Trust Corp.,
56 F.3d 1497, 1508 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (concluding that the plaintiff “adequately pled facts
supporting its standing to bring suit” before noting that “to establish the grounds for a preliminary
injunction [the plaintiff] must show more,” including “demonstrat[ing] . . . an irreparable injury
that the proposed injunction would avert”), amended on reh’g, 66 F.3d 1226 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
While the court credits COE’s observation that the additional 46 declarations provide
greater insight into the scope of Defendants’ conduct and COE’s members’ alleged injuries, SSS
Case Pl.’s Mot. to Modify at 7–8, and recognizes that it retains authority to grant broad relief under
the APA, see Trump v. CASA, 606 U.S. 831, 847 n.10 (2025) (declining to address “the distinct
question [of] whether the Administrative Procedure Act authorizes federal courts to vacate federal
agency action”), the issue with extending the preliminary injunction to these unnamed members is
not one of numbers but of the nature of the claimed harm.
In particular, COE largely based its preliminary injunction request on injuries derived from
the denial or discontinuation of its members’ federal grant funding. See SSS Case Mem. Op. at
32–36. Yet, recoverable monetary harms are generally not irreparable. See Wis. Gas, 758 F.2d at
674. Critically, however, COE’s members submitted declarations detailing their shuttering
programs, employee layoffs, and cuts to student services, all due to their substantial reliance on
federal funding. SSS Case Mem. Op. at 34–35. And, when taken with the additional harms that
COE identified, that is enough to show that “there is a clear and present need for equitable relief
to prevent” the claimed harm. Wis. Gas, 758 F.2d at 674 (cleaned up). But the mere fact that
Defendants allegedly denied or discontinued any number of COE members’ funding is not, without
more, sufficient grounds for preliminary relief. See Glob. Health Council, 153 F.4th at 21 (“[I]f
14 the later opportunity to compete for additional grants could fix the harm, it would not be
irreparable.”).
And without evidence that those funding cuts adversely affect a given members’ ability to
continue its program, employ its staff, provide student services, or similar results, it cannot be said
that the economic injuries are “of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for
equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.” Wis. Gas, 758 F.2d at 674 (cleaned up); see also 5
U.S.C. § 705 (permitting preliminary relief under the APA “to the extent necessary to prevent
irreparable injury”). Accordingly, the court cannot conclude, at this stage of litigation, that
extending relief to those members would satisfy its obligation to “narrowly tailor[]” the
preliminary injunction to only the specific harm shown. Neb. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
435 F.3d at 330. Thus, COE’s motion to modify the preliminary injunction will be denied to the
extent it seeks to extend the scope of preliminary relief to members who have not submitted any
evidence of harm.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are granted in part and denied
in part, COE’s Motion for Leave to File Under Seal is granted, and the unresolved portion of
COE’s Motion to Modify the Preliminary Injunction Order is denied. A separate order will follow.
Date: May 27, 2026 Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge