Council for Opportunity in Education v. U.S. Department of Education

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: January 16, 2026
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-3514
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

COUNCIL FOR OPPORTUNITY IN EDUCATION

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 25-cv-03491 (TSC) Civil Action No. 25-cv-03514 (TSC) v. (Consolidated Cases) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, et al.

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In passing the Higher Education Act of 1965 (“HEA”) and its subsequent amendments,

Congress recognized the need to overcome barriers to postsecondary education faced by students

from disadvantaged backgrounds. See 20 U.S.C. § 1070. Congress therefore established a series

of grant programs to identify, prepare, motivate, and support those students in their pursuit of

higher education. See 20 U.S.C. § 1070a-11(a). The resulting programs, commonly referred to as

federal “TRIO” programs, are administered by the Department of Education and subject to

procedural and substantive requirements laid out in the HEA, the General Education Provisions

Act, applicable federal civil rights laws, and accompanying federal regulations. Plaintiff Council

for Opportunity in Education (“COE”) is a nonprofit organization whose members are comprised

of more than 1,000 colleges, universities, and nonprofit community-based agencies that participate

in one or more federal TRIO grant programs. COE focuses on furthering the expansion of

educational opportunities for disabled, low-income, and first-generation college students in the

1 United States who are served by TRIO programs, including the Student Support Services (“SSS”)

program.

These consolidated cases deal with Department of Education’s recent decisions denying

certain COE members’ applications for new SSS grants, Case No. 25-cv-3491 (“SSS Case”), and

discontinuing other members’ TRIO grant funding, Case No. 25-cv-3514 (“TRIO Case”), all

allegedly on the grounds that the proposed or funded activities conflicted with the Trump

Administration’s anti-DEI policies and interpretations of federal civil rights law. COE filed two

separate lawsuits against the Department of Education and Secretary McMahon (collectively, “the

Department”), both alleging, inter alia, violations of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”),

constitutional violations, and ultra vires claims. SSS Case Compl., ECF No. 1; TRIO Case

Compl., ECF No. 1. COE simultaneously moved for preliminary injunctions in both cases. SSS

Case Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (“PI Mot.”), ECF No. 2; TRIO Case Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (“PI Mot.”),

ECF No. 2. The Department opposed the motions and moved to dismiss the actions. SSS Case

Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mot.”), ECF Nos. 15/16; TRIO Case Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mot.”),

ECF Nos. 14/15. For the reasons below, COE’s motions for preliminary injunctions will be

GRANTED, though more limited in scope than COE requests.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework

In establishing a series of education grant programs to combat barriers to higher education

faced by students from disadvantaged backgrounds, Congress explicitly tasked the Department of

Education with administering “a program of making grants and contracts” designed to “identify

qualified individuals from disadvantaged backgrounds,” “prepare them for a program of

postsecondary education,” “provide support services for such students who are pursuing programs

2 of postsecondary education,” “motivate and prepare students for doctoral programs,” and “train

individuals serving or preparing for service in programs and projects so designed.” 20 U.S.C.

§ 1070a-11. The TRIO programs have expanded over time to eight: Upward Bound, Upward

Bound Math-Science, Veterans Upward Bound, Educational Opportunity Centers, Talent Search,

Student Support Services, Ronald E. McNair Postbaccalaureate Achievement, and the Training

Program for Federal TRIO Programs Staff. These programs are all authorized under Title IV, Part

A of the HEA, as amended, see 20 U.S.C. §§ 1070a-11–1070a-18, and administered through

program-specific regulations, see 34 C.F.R. Parts 642–47.

TRIO grants are awarded through a peer-review process for project periods of two or five

years, 20 U.S.C. § 1070a-11(b)(2), (c), with five years for the SSS grants, see 34 C.F.R. § 646.5.

The SSS grant application and award process is outlined in the authorizing statutes, see 20 U.S.C.

§§ 1070a-11, 1070a-14, and is implemented by the Department’s SSS program regulations, see 34

C.F.R. pt. 646, in addition to general administrative grantmaking regulations, id. pt. 75; id.

§ 75.1(a)(1). Funds for all TRIO grants are awarded for an initial twelve-month budget period and

continued thereafter in subsequent twelve-month budget periods if the recipient maintains

eligibility, submits the requisite reports, and satisfies certain performance criteria. 34 C.F.R.

§§ 75.251(a), 75.253(a). Continuation awards also require a finding by the Secretary that “the

project is in the best interest of the Federal Government.” Id. § 75.253(a)(5). 1

TRIO programs are also considered “applicable program[s] of the Department” under the

General Education Provisions Act (“GEPA”), over which the Department of Education has

1 “In determining whether the grantee has met the requirements[,] . . . the Secretary may consider any relevant information regarding grantee performance. This includes considering reports required by § 75.118, performance measures established under § 75.110, financial information required by 2 CFR part 200, and any other relevant information.” 34 C.F.R. § 75.253(b).

3 “administrative responsibility.” See 20 U.S.C. § 1221(b)(1), (c)(1). TRIO grant applicants must

therefore satisfy GEPA’s requirement to address “equitable access” and “equitable participation”

by students facing “barriers based on gender, race, color, national origin, disability, and age.” Id.

§ 1228a(b). This requirement is commonly referred to as the GEPA Equity Directive. According

to COE, GEPA also requires the Department to follow the APA’s notice-and-comment process in

creating or amending legally binding TRIO grant competition and selection procedures. See id.

§§ 1221e-4, 1232(a)(2), (d); 5 U.S.C. § 553; see also 34 C.F.R. § 75.105(b).

As programs receiving federal funds, TRIO programs are also subject to Title VI of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VI”) and Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title

IX”), which prohibit discrimination on the basis of race and gender, respectively. See 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000d; 20 U.S.C. § 1681. These statutes require the Department to (1) notify applicants and

awardees of any non-compliance issues, (2) make an express finding on the record after

opportunity for a hearing, and (3) allow the applicant or awardee to voluntarily cure any such non-

compliance, prior to denying or discontinuing grant funding. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1; 20 U.S.C.

§ 1682; see also 34 C.F.R. §§ 100.6, 100.8(c), 100.9.

B. Factual Background

a. SSS Grant Application Rejections

The Department solicited new applications for FY 2025 SSS grants in spring 2024. See

Applications for New Awards; Student Support Services Program (“2024 Notice Inviting SSS

Applications”), 89 Fed. Reg. 35,080 (May 1, 2024). The 2024 Notice Inviting SSS Applications

incorporated two competitive preference priorities from 2021 for addressing the needs of

underserved students, which, by definition, included “student[s] of color,” and sponsoring

activities designed to make college more affordable and accessible to said students as well as

4 supporting them. See id. at 35,080–81; Final Priorities and Definitions-Secretary’s Supplemental

Priorities and Definitions for Discretionary Grants Programs (“2021 Final Priorities”), 86 Fed.

Reg. 70,612 (Dec. 10, 2021). Competitive preference priorities allow applicants to gain a specified

number of bonus points in the selection process and must be published through a notice on the

Federal Register, and subject to public comment. See 34 C.F.R. § 75.105(b)(1)–(2), (c)(2). The

application period for new SSS grants closed in July 2024 during the Biden Administration. See

2024 Notice Inviting SSS Applications, 89 Fed. Reg. 35,080. According to the Complaint, the

impacted COE members timely submitted their applications, all of which contained the mandatory

GEPA Equity Directive, and many of which addressed the two competitive preference priorities.

SSS Case Compl. ¶¶ 135–36.

In May 2025, the Department published a proposed rule in the Federal Register intended

to replace the 2021 Final Priorities and other supplemental priorities issued under the prior

Administration, see Proposed Priorities and Definitions-Secretary’s Supplemental Priorities and

Definitions on Evidence-Based Literacy, Education Choice, and Returning Education to the States

(“2025 Proposed Priorities”), 90 Fed. Reg. 21,710 (May 21, 2025), because those priorities

“encourage[d] recipients to violate Federal civil rights law” “by using race-based preferences and

stereotypes, and racial exclusion in their programs.” Final Priorities and Definitions-Secretary’s

Supplemental Priorities and Definitions on Evidence-Based Literacy, Education Choice, and

Returning Education to the States (“2025 Final Priorities”), 90 Fed. Reg. 43,514 (Sept. 9, 2025).

The proposed rule nonetheless specified that the 2021 Priorities, as adopted in the 2024 Notice

inviting new SSS applications, would remain in effect for notices soliciting applications that were

published before the new priorities were finalized. See 2025 Proposed Priorities, 90 Fed. Reg.

21,710.

5 In July 2025, the Department sent out virtually identical denial letters to certain COE

members, informing them that their programs had “not been selected based on the Department’s

review for potential conflicts with applicable nondiscrimination requirements.” SSS Case Compl.

¶¶ 157, 158. Specifically, the letters stated that “staff” had reviewed their applications and

“identified information indicating that the proposed activities take account of race in ways that

conflict with the Department’s policy of prioritizing merit, fairness, and excellence in education

and the Department’s commitment to upholding the letter and purpose of Federal civil rights law.”

Id. ¶ 159. According to the Department, such applications were “therefore inconsistent with

applicable nondiscrimination statutes, regulations, policies, and other requirements applicable to

the program. 34 C.F.R. § 75.500; see also 2 C.F.R. § 200.211(c).” Id.

b. TRIO Grant Discontinuations

In summer 2025, the Department also issued notices of grant non-continuation to various

COE members who had received awards between 2021-2024 and who remained in compliance

with applicable requirements. TRIO Case Compl. ¶¶ 116, 119–23, 139. Using virtually identical

language, the Department gave the following reasons for discontinuing the awards:

The Department has undertaken a review of grants and determined that the grant specified above provides funding for programs that reflect the prior Administration’s priorities and policy preferences and conflict with those of the current Administration, in that the programs: violate the letter or purpose of Federal civil rights law; conflict with the Department’s policy of prioritizing merit, fairness, and excellence in education; undermine the well-being of the students these programs are intended to help; or constitute an inappropriate use of federal funds.

Id. ¶¶ 143, 145. The notices went on to state that “staff” had reviewed the members’ applications

for funding and identified information in their previously selected applications “that may conflict

with the Department’s policy of prioritizing merit, fairness, and excellence in education; or violate

the letter or purpose of Federal civil rights law.” See TRIO Case Decl. of Christopher McCaghren

6 (“McCaghren Decl.”), Ex. C, ECF No. 14-4. Consequently, it concluded that the continuation of

these members’ programs was “inconsistent with, and no longer effectuates, the best interest of the

Federal Government.” TRIO Case Compl. ¶ 145.

The letters advised the discontinued grantees that they could request reconsideration, but

when COE members did so, the Department did not respond. Id. ¶ 148. The Department, however,

submitted as exhibits the responses it sent to the affected members on the day COE filed suit,

which generally restated the grounds the Department relied on in making its initial discontinuation

decisions. See McCaghren Decl., Ex. D, ECF No. 14-5.

The Department finalized its new priorities in September 2025, which went into effect

October 9, 2025. See 2025 Final Priorities, 90 Fed. Reg. 43,514.

C. Procedural History

On September 30, 2025, COE sued the Department of Education and Secretary of

Education, Linda McMahon, in two separate actions, each seeking declaratory, injunctive, and

mandamus relief. In the first action, the SSS Case, COE asserts claims under the APA, Counts I–

V, an ultra vires claim, Count VI, and, in the alternative, requests a writ of mandamus, Count VII.

SSS Case Compl. at 56–69. In the second action, the TRIO Case, COE asserts similar claims

under the APA, Counts I–IV, an ultra vires claim, Count VIII, requests a writ of mandamus, Count

IX, with the addition of several claims independently asserting constitutional violations under the

Fifth Amendment, 2 Count V, Separation of Powers and the Non-Delegation Doctrine, Count VI,

and the Take Care Clause, Count VII. TRIO Case Compl. at 49–62.

2 COE voluntarily withdrew this claim at the court’s hearing on its preliminary injunction motions. See SSS Case Dec. 15, 2025 Hr’g Tr. at 45 (“Dec. 15 Tr.”), ECF No. 24.

7 On the same day COE filed its Complaints, it also moved for preliminary injunctions in

both cases. SSS Case PI Mot.; TRIO Case PI Mot. Across those motions, COE generally requests

that the court (1) vacate Defendants’ denial and discontinuation decisions as to its affected

members, (2) order Defendants to immediately reconsider those decisions and abide by operative

statutes and regulations in so doing, (3) enjoin Defendants from obligating and disbursing its

remaining FY 2025 funds from the Higher Education budget as well as from terminating or

discontinuing grants for asserted civil rights violations without completing the procedures required

by those laws, and (4) order Defendants to restore the affected programs’ eligibility for prior

experience points and higher base funding for future grant competitions. See SSS Case PI Mot.

Ex. 10 at 1–2; SSS Case Pl.’s Reply at 2, ECF Nos. 18/19; TRIO Case PI Mot. Ex. 9 at 1–2; TRIO

Case Pl.’s Reply at 2–3, ECF Nos. 17/18.

Defendants filed joint motions to dismiss and responses to COE’s preliminary injunction

motions on November 10, 2025. SSS Case Def.’s Mot.; TRIO Case Def.’s Mot. On November

24, 2025, COE filed combined replies in support of its preliminary injunction motions and

oppositions to Defendant’s motions to dismiss. SSS Case Pl.’s Reply; TRIO Case Pl.’s Reply.

Defendants then filed their replies in support of its motions to dismiss on December 5, 2025, SSS

Case Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 22; TRIO Case Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 21, and the court held a hearing

on the motions for preliminary injunctions on December 15, 2025. See Min. Entry (Dec. 15, 2025).

At that hearing, the court consolidated the cases. Id.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter

v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). A preliminary injunction is nonetheless

8 warranted where the moving party establishes that (1) it is likely to succeed on the merits, 3 (2)

irreparable harm is likely in the absence of preliminary relief, (3) the balance of equities tips in the

movant’s favor, and (4) an injunction is in the public interest. Id. at 20. “The moving party bears

the burden of persuasion and must demonstrate, ‘by a clear showing,’ that the requested relief is

warranted.” Hosp. Staffing Sols., LLC v. Reyes, 736 F. Supp. 2d 192, 197 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting

Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). “The

purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until

a trial on the merits can be held,” Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981), and “to

balance the equities as the litigation moves forward,” Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project,

582 U.S. 571, 580 (2017) (per curiam). “The status quo is the last uncontested status which

preceded the pending controversy.” Huisha-Huisha v. Mayorkas, 27 F.4th 718, 733 (D.C. Cir.

2022) (quoting District 50, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of

Am., 412 F.2d 165, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1969)).

III. ANALYSIS

A. COE Has Established Article III Standing 4

3 In the D.C. Circuit, it “remains an open question whether the ‘likelihood of success’ factor is ‘an independent, free-standing requirement,’ or whether, in cases where the other three factors strongly favor issuing an injunction, a plaintiff need only raise a ‘serious legal question’ on the merits.” Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1043 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 393, 398 (D.C. Cir. 2011)). 4 Defendants initially argued that COE’s claims were mooted by prior obligations of FY 2025 funds and the September 30, 2025, lapse in appropriations, SSS Case Def.’s Mot. at 7–9; TRIO Case Def.’s Mot. at 9–10, but they withdrew this argument in their December 5, 2025, Replies based on new information regarding the lapse date for multi-year program funds within the Department’s Higher Education account, see SSS Case Def.’s Reply at 1; TRIO Case Def.’s Reply at 1.

9 It is an “essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement” that a

plaintiff must establish Article III standing to sue in federal court. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504

U.S. 555, 560 (1992). To do so, a party must show that: (1) they have suffered an injury in fact,

(2) the injury is fairly traceable to defendant’s action, and (3) it is likely that the injury will be

redressed by a favorable decision. Id. at 560–61. A party seeking a preliminary injunction “must

show a substantial likelihood of standing.” Green v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 54 F.4th 738, 744 (D.C.

Cir. 2022) (quoting Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2015))

(internal quotation marks omitted). As an organization, COE can demonstrate standing in two

ways. See Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 600 U.S.

181, 199 (2023). The first is a type of organizational standing that allows an organization to sue

on its own behalf. See Abigail All. for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Eschenbach, 469

F.3d 129, 132 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The second is associational standing, which allows an

organization to sue on behalf of its members. Id. COE asserts that it has standing in both cases

under either theory, see SSS Case PI Mot. at 14–19; TRIO Case PI Mot. at 16–19, and the court is

inclined to agree. In light of the Department’s concession in their briefing that COE demonstrated

associational standing as to the members it identified, however, the court will only address COE’s

associational standing theory since COE need only satisfy Article III’s standing requirement in

one of the two ways. See Cath. Legal Immigr. Network, Inc. v. Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev., 513 F.

Supp. 3d 154, 169 (D.D.C. 2021).

To show associational standing, an organization must demonstrate that: “(1) at least one of

its members would have standing to sue in his own right, (2) the interests the association seeks to

protect are germane to its purpose, and (3) neither the claim asserted, nor the relief requested,

requires that an individual member of the association participate in the lawsuit.” Sierra Club v.

10 EPA, 292 F.3d 895, 898 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432

U.S. 333, 342–43 (1977)).

In the TRIO Case, Plaintiff identified seven affected member programs, with each member

submitting a declaration detailing their grant histories, the Department’s discontinuation decisions,

and the harms they are suffering or will imminently suffer because of those decisions, along with

documentation. See TRIO Case Decl. of Augsburg University (“Augsburg Decl.”), ECF No. 2-2;

TRIO Case Decl. of Marcus Arrington (“Marquette Decl.”), ECF No. 2-3; TRIO Case Decl. of

Abraham Pena (“Suffolk Decl.”), ECF No. 2-4; TRIO Case Decl. of South Seattle College (“South

Seattle Decl.”), ECF No. 2-5; TRIO Case Decl. of Brian Post (“SUNY Plattsburgh Decl.”), ECF

No. 2-6; TRIO Case Decl. of Rebecca Barbour (“UNH Decl. McNair”), ECF No. 2-7; TRIO Case

Decl. of Melissa Goyait-Heikkinen (“UNH Decl. Talent Search”), ECF No. 2-8 .

In the SSS Case, COE identified at least three members that applied for and were denied

grant funding, with attached declarations detailing the programmatic cuts and layoffs that have or

will occur for those affected programs. See SSS Case Decl. of Sarah Postel (“Green River Decl.”),

ECF No. 2-2; SSS Case Decl. of Veronica Guadarrama (“Big Bend Decl. STEM”), ECF No. 2-7;

SSS Case Decl. of Veronica Guadarrama (“Big Bend Decl. Classic”), ECF No. 2-8; SSS Case

Decl. of Renada Greer (“SIU Carbondale Decl.”), ECF No. 2-9. The Department’s sole response

is that COE has not “identified all specific members who have been allegedly harmed by

Defendants’ actions” and therefore lacks associational standing to bring suit on behalf of any

unnamed member. See TRIO Case Def.’s Mot. at 13. But, as noted above, a plaintiff organization

need not identify all impacted members; as long as one member has standing to sue, the

requirement is met. Sierra Club, 292 F.3d at 898.

11 It is clear from COE’s Complaints and the attached declarations to its preliminary

injunction motions that its impacted members can readily demonstrate “concrete” injuries through

their lost funding and subsequent adverse programmatic impacts, see Glob. Health Council v.

Trump, 153 F.4th 1, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (explaining that “a plaintiff may be harmed by denial of

the opportunity to compete for a pool of funds for which they are able and willing to compete”),

that are “fairly traceable” to the Department’s grant discontinuations and denials, Lujan, 504 U.S.

at 560–61, and are redressable by the requested relief—vacatur of the Department’s decisions and

an order directing it reconsider those decisions in accordance with the law—even if such later

funding is not guaranteed, see N. Am.’s Bldg. Trades Unions v. Dep’t of Def., 783 F. Supp. 3d 290,

306 (D.D.C. 2025) (noting that “redressability does not require plaintiffs to demonstrate certainty

or eliminate all hypothetical alternatives”); Glob. Health, 153 F.4th at 12 (standing satisfied where

“even the prospect of competing for funds months later would partially redress the injuries to the

grantees’ finances”).

It is also clear that COE’s purpose in supporting its members’ ability to participate in the

TRIO grant programs renders its claims in both cases “germane” to its purpose. See TRIO Case

Compl. ¶¶ 6–7 (explaining that COE is a nonprofit “dedicated to furthering the expansion of

educational opportunities for low-income students, first-generation college students, students with

disabilities, and veteran students who are served by the TRIO programs”); TRIO Case Decl. of

Kimberly Jones (“Jones Decl.”) ¶¶ 9–15, ECF No 2-1. And, as COE points out, SSS Case Pl.’s

Reply at 18, its allegations, as supported by attached declarations, also reveal a “discrete pattern

of conduct” that the Department “applied equally” to members whose grants were discontinued or

denied for purported noncompliance with antidiscrimination laws and anti-DEI policies and

priorities, resulting in asserted “systemic violation[s]” of the law. Robertson v. District of

12 Columbia, 762 F. Supp. 3d 34, 62 (D.D.C. 2025). Moreover, the remedies that COE seeks will

“inure to the benefit” of all its affected members. Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agr.

Implement Workers of Am. v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274, 288 (1986) (internal quotations and citation

omitted) (finding associational standing even though the state authority would have to consider

the unique facts of members’ claims). Consequently, individual participation is not necessary. See

Robertson, 762 F. Supp. 3d at 62; Harris Cnty., Texas v. Kennedy, 786 F. Supp. 3d 194, 204

(D.D.C. 2025) (recognizing that individual participation is typically unnecessary where “an

association seeks prospective or injunctive relief for its members”).

Insofar as the Department suggests that individual participation is required because “some

of these institutions may have alternate programs that serve the same functions as the TRIO

Programs,” TRIO Case Def.’s Reply at 5, their argument ignores the general rule that minor,

identifiable impacts can satisfy standing, see Carpenters Indus. Council v. Zinke, 854 F.3d 1, 5

(D.C. Cir. 2017) (“A dollar of economic harm is still an injury-in-fact for standing purposes.”);

Mass. Credit Union Share Ins. Corp. v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 693 F. Supp. 1225, 1228

(D.D.C. 1988) (“[A] minor but identifiable harm will suffice.”). Further, a “minimal degree of

individual participation by members” will not defeat the individual participation prong, which, in

the end, is merely a prudential consideration, not a constitutional one. Robertson, 762 F. Supp. 3d

at 61.

Given the identified programmatic and procedural harms suffered by COE’s named

members, COE has demonstrated associational standing.

B. This Court Has Jurisdiction Over COE’s Claims

13 The Department also argues that the court lacks jurisdiction over COE’s claims 5 because

they are, in essence, contract claims that belong in the Court of Federal Claims. See SSS Case

Def.’s Mot. at 15–19; TRIO Case Def.’s Mot. at 16–23. Under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491,

the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over claims founded “upon any express or

implied contract with the United States” for over $10,000. As a result, federal district courts lack

jurisdiction under the APA “to enforce a contractual obligation to pay money.” California, 604

U.S. at 651. Even if they are not expressly identified as such, claims that are “essentially

contractual” cannot “avoid the jurisdictional (and hence remedial) restrictions of the Tucker Act

by simply asking for injunctive relief in district court.” Climate United, 154 F.4th at 820 (quoting

Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, 672 F.2d 959, 967 (D.C. Cir. 1982)).

As a threshold matter, COE suggests that TRIO grants are not contracts at all, and therefore

not subject to the Tucker Act, because the operative statutes differentiate between grants and

contracts and there is no consideration. See TRIO Case Pl.’s Reply at 24–26; SSS Case Pl.’s Reply

at 24–26. These arguments are foreclosed by precedent. Recently, the Supreme Court identified

instances in which the Tucker Act’s vesting of exclusive jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims

5 While the Department does not appear to differentiate among COE’s claims in making this argument, the theory upon which precedent has developed in this area generally relates to jurisdictional limits on APA review. See Dep’t of Educ. v. California, 604 U.S. 650, 651 (2025) (per curiam); Nat’l Insts. of Health (“NIH”) v. Am. Pub. Health Ass’n, 606 U.S. ---, 145 S. Ct. 2658 (2025) (mem.). Therefore, insofar as the Department challenges COE’s Fifth Amendment, Separation of Powers, Take Care Clause, and ultra vires claims under this theory, its argument is misplaced. See Climate United Fund v. Citibank, N.A., 154 F.4th 809, 826–29 (D.C. Cir. 2025), reh’g en banc granted and judgment vacated, No. 25-5122, 2025 WL 3663661, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 17, 2025) (per curiam) (addressing plaintiff’s ultra vires and constitutional claim separately from its Tucker Act jurisdiction analysis); see also Harris Cnty., 786 F. Supp. 3d at 207; Amica Ctr. for Immigrant Rts. v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 25-cv-298, 2025 WL 1852762, at *15 (D.D.C. July 6, 2025).

14 barred APA challenges to prior grant terminations in federal district courts. See NIH, 145 S. Ct. at

2661 (Barrett, J., concurring); California, 604 U.S. at 651.

This general bar applies even where the challenge is based on the APA and does not turn

on the specific terms of the terminated grants. See NIH, 145 S. Ct. at 2664 (Gorsuch, J., concurring

in part and dissenting in part); see also Climate United, 154 F.4th at 823–26. Nonetheless, the

Court did not go so far as to suggest that the Tucker Act precludes federal district court jurisdiction

over all claims relating to grant terminations. As Justice Barrett explained in her controlling

concurrence, courts can still prospectively enjoin agencies from exercising unlawful authority over

the termination of grants. See NIH, 145 S. Ct. at 2661 (Barrett, J., concurring). In a partial dissent,

Chief Justice Roberts went further, suggesting that district courts’ authority to vacate unlawful

policies “falls well within the scope of the District Court’s jurisdiction under the Administrative

Procedure Act,” which, in turn provides jurisdiction to vacate resulting grant terminations. Id. at

2662–63 (Roberts, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 2671 (Jackson,

J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

It appears, then, that it remains an open question as to whether federal district courts are

precluded from entertaining any APA claims relating to prior grant determinations that seek to

vacate or enjoin enforcement of those past decisions. For instance, the Supreme Court previously

denied the Government’s emergency request to administratively stay a district court’s order

temporarily enjoining the Government from enforcing its suspension of foreign aid grants. See

Dep’t of State v. AIDS Vaccine Advoc. Coal., 606 U.S. ---, 145 S. Ct. 753 (2025) (mem.). Other

judges in this Circuit have made the same observation, albeit prior to the Court’s decision in NIH.

See Harris Cnty., 786 F. Supp. 3d at 215–17; Widakuswara v. Lake, No. 25-5144, 2025 WL

1288817, at *13–14 (D.C. Cir. May 3, 2025) (Pillard, J., dissenting) (noting distinctions between

15 the claims at issue in California and Aids Vaccine Advocacy Coalition). The claims here appear

to fall within this gray area. Nonetheless, with the Supreme Court’s direction and concerns in

mind, the court finds that COE is likely to succeed in establishing this court’s jurisdiction.

a. SSS Case

Relying on the “longstanding test” established in Megapulse, Inc. v. Lewis, courts in this

Circuit look to the source of the rights upon which the plaintiff bases its claim as well as the type

of relief sought to determine whether the claim sounds in contract. 672 F.2d at 968. As COE

points out, SSS Case Pl.’s Reply at 22, however, the Department’s decisions denying COE

members’ SSS grant applications cannot be rooted in any “rights” to funding because there is no

express or implied “contract within the meaning of the Tucker Act.” Maryland Dep’t of Hum. Res.

v. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 763 F.2d 1441, 1449 (D.C. Cir. 1985). The members’ prior

grants have expired, and COE does not seek to revive them. Rather, its challenge is focused solely

on the procedures that the Department was required to observe in the FY 2025 SSS grant funding

cycle, in which it has no claim of right. Thus, the only available “source of the rights” at issue in

COE’s APA claims are those contained in the operative regulations and statutes. Cf. Climate

United, 154 F.4th at 823–26.

The fact that COE sued after its members’ grant applications were rejected does not “define

the source or nature of their [claims].” See Harris Cnty, 786 F. Supp. 3d at 206. Moreover, the

Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he fact that a judicial remedy may require one party to pay

money to another is not a sufficient reason to characterize the relief as ‘money damages.’” Bowen

v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 893 (1988). While it is true that the consequence of the relief

COE seeks—vacatur of the denial decisions and reconsideration in accordance with the law—may

lead to funding in the future, that possibility is not sufficient to transform COE’s claims into ones

16 seeking money damages. And because there is no operative grant agreement that entitles COE or

its members to funding, there can be no specific performance of that agreement. Cf. Ingersoll-

Rand Co. v. United States, 780 F.2d 74, 80 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Nor does COE seek as much. The

court therefore concludes that COE’s APA claims in this case are not “in essence” contract claims,

and the court retains jurisdiction to adjudicate them.

b. TRIO Case

As for the TRIO Case and challenges to the Department’s assertedly unlawful and arbitrary

discontinuation of grants, the question is somewhat closer, but an analogous case arising in the

Western District of Washington and effectively affirmed, in relevant part, by the Ninth Circuit

provides persuasive guidance. See Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 25-7157, 2025 WL

3486895, at *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 2025) (per curiam). In that case, sixteen plaintiff states sued for

declaratory and injunctive relief, including for vacatur of discontinuation decisions, following the

Department’s discontinuation of certain TRIO grants. Id. The plaintiffs also sought a preliminary

injunction, which the district court granted. Id. The court’s Order enjoined the Department from

“implementing or enforcing through any means the discontinuation decisions as to affected

Grantees, including recompeting Program funds” and “reinstituting the discontinuation decisions

based on the same or similar reasons.” Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 25-cv-1228, 2025

WL 3004675, at *13 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 27, 2025).

On emergency appeal, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Department’s request for an

administrative stay. Washington, 2025 WL 3486895, at *1–3. The Court held that the Government

was not likely to prevail on its claim that the Tucker Act precluded the district court’s jurisdiction

to issue its preliminary injunction because the TRIO grant discontinuations at issue were

sufficiently dissimilar from the grant terminations in California and NIH. Id. at *2. In its analysis,

17 the Ninth Circuit highlighted that the plaintiffs “make no claim that they are automatically entitled

to grant continuances,” “unless the Secretary of Education affirmatively decides to continue their

grants.” Id. at *1. Moreover, the relief sought—“vacatur of the allegedly unlawful discontinuation

decisions so the Secretary can make new decisions in accordance with Plaintiff States’ theory of

the law”—did “not cause any grant to be renewed because grant continuances are not automatic.”

Id. at *2 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 75.253). In contrast, the Court noted, the plaintiffs in NIH and

California “explicitly sought, and the district courts ordered, the immediate payment of past-due

grant obligations and the continued payment of ongoing obligations based on midyear grant

terminations.” Id. at *2. “Because Plaintiff States’ claims seek purely prospective relief regarding

multiyear grant discontinuations that do not take effect until December 31, 2025 . . . and vacatur

would not result in the automatic reinstatement or continuance of those grants or the payment of

any money to grantees,” the Ninth Circuit concluded the Department was unlikely to succeed on

its Tucker Act challenge. Id. at *2.

Here, as in Washington, COE does not argue that it is entitled to the discontinued funds,

meaning that the source of their rights cannot be rooted in any implied and express contract or

grant terms. See generally, TRIO Case PI Mot. at 23–24 (explaining how prior grant awards

“expressly disclaim” any guarantee of future funding). Moreover, like the plaintiff states in

Washington, COE does not seek money damages on behalf of any affected members’ programs,

reinstatement of their prior awards, or an order directing the Department to issue new

determinations continuing their funding. Rather, it seeks another opportunity to be evaluated,

which “would not result in the automatic reinstatement or continuance of those grants or the

payment of any money to grantees.” Washington, 2025 WL 3486895, at *2.

18 Any order by the court vacating the discontinuation decisions is therefore not an order for

the Department to pay money from its budget or the Treasury, which would be subject to Tucker

Act restrictions, because, in the absence of the discontinuation decisions, COE’s members are not

entitled to any funds. Cf. Ingersoll-Rand, 780 F.2d at 80 (explaining that “where [the] practical

result of granting [a] plaintiff’s request for declaratory and injunctive relief would be reinstatement

of terminated contracts,” that relief amounts to “specific performance” (citation omitted)

(emphasis added)); NIH, 145 S. Ct. at 2661 (Barrett, J., concurring) (differentiating the court’s

authority to vacate grant termination guidance on grounds that it “does not reinstate terminated

grants” and “does not necessarily void decisions made under it,” which would similarly reinstate

those grants). And, as noted above, “[t]he fact that a judicial remedy may require one party to pay

money to another is not a sufficient reason to characterize the relief as ‘money damages.’” Bowen,

487 U.S. at 893.

The court is of course aware that “it is important on the one hand to preserve the Tucker

Act’s limited and conditioned waiver of sovereign immunity in contract actions . . . .” Megapulse,

672 F.2d at 968. On the other hand, however, the court “must not do so in terms so broad as to

deny a court jurisdiction to consider a claim that is validly based on grounds other than a

contractual relationship with the government.” Id. After weighing these considerations, the court

concludes that it retains jurisdiction over COE’s APA claims in the TRIO case as well.

C. COE Is Entitled to a Preliminary Injunction

a. This court can review COE’s claims under the APA

In addition to its Tucker Act argument, the Department challenges COE’s ability to assert,

and this court’s jurisdiction over, the APA claims on the grounds that the Department’s grant denial

and discontinuation determinations are (1) subject to adequate alternative remedies, and (2)

19 constitute unreviewable actions committed to agency discretion. See SSS Case Def.’s Mot. at 19–

22; TRIO Case Def.’s Mot. at 23–27; see 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a)(2), 704. Both arguments are

unavailing. For one, the Department merely repackages its Tucker Act challenge as the basis for

why alternative remedies exist. See SSS Case Def.’s Mot. at 20; TRIO Case Def.’s Mot. at 24.

For the same reasons as previously stated, however, this theory fails. Second, the APA’s bar on

judicial review over agency decisions “committed to agency discretion by law,” 5 U.S.C.

§ 701(a)(2), is not applicable in instances, such as here, where a body of statutory and regulatory

requirements provide for meaningful standards to apply on judicial review.

An action is committed to agency discretion, and therefore unreviewable, where “a court

would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.”

Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985). In determining whether a matter has been committed

to agency discretion, the court must “consider both the nature of the administrative action at issue

and the language and structure of the statute that supplies the applicable legal standards for

reviewing that action.” Sierra Club v. Jackson, 648 F.3d 848, 855 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal

quotations and citation omitted). Here, the HEA sets forth the TRIO grant selection process,

including, among other things, application requirements, the considerations the Department may

rely on in making its determination, the order of awards, the peer review process by which

applications are scored, notice requirements, and procedures for review of any denial

determinations. 20 U.S.C. § 1070a-11(c)(1)–(4), (8)(C).

In addition to the HEA’s above requirements, GEPA, Title VI, and Title IX also mandate

certain procedures in the context of education grantmaking, offering an even broader statutory

backdrop against which the court can measure the Department’s APA compliance. See id.

§§ 1221e-4, 1232(a)(2), (d) (requiring the Department engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking

20 before instituting a legally binding “regulation affecting any institution of higher education”); id.

§ 1228a(b) (establishing the GEPA Equity Directive); 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (establishing

procedures required to deny or discontinue funding for noncompliance with Title VI); 20 U.S.C.

§ 1682 (establishing procedures required to deny or discontinue funding for noncompliance with

Title IX). It is clear from these statutory restrictions that “Congress limited the [Department’s]

authority to disburse funds.” Milk Train, Inc. v. Veneman, 310 F.3d 747, 752 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

These limitations provide ample “statutory reference point[s] by which the court is able to review”

the Department’s decisions. Id. (cleaned up). Moreover, the Department’s own regulatory

schemes governing grant selection and discontinuation, see 34 C.F.R. pt. 646 (SSS grant

application process); 34 C.F.R. § 75.253 (TRIO grant continuation process), offer yet another set

of standards by which to judge its actions. See Accrediting Council for Indep. Colleges & Schs. v.

DeVos, 303 F. Supp. 3d 77, 103 (D.D.C. 2018) (“[I]t is a fundamental principle of administrative

law that an agency is [also] bound to adhere to its own regulations[.]” (quoting Fuller v. Winter,

538 F. Supp. 2d 179, 186 (D.D.C. 2008)).

The Department invokes Lincoln v. Vigil for the proposition that agency determinations on

how to allocate lump-sum funds are excluded from judicial review. See 508 U.S. 182, 193 (1993)

(“[A]s long as the agency allocates funds from a lump-sum appropriation to meet permissible

statutory objectives, § 701(a)(2) gives the courts no leave to intrude.”). But the determinations at

issue in Lincoln were not tied to any statutory or regulatory procedural requirements directing how

the Department may carry out specific programs, as is the case here. See id. (explaining that “an

agency is not free simply to disregard statutory responsibilities: Congress may always

circumscribe agency discretion to allocate resources by putting restrictions in the operative

statutes”). Given the regulatory and statutory schemes governing the Department’s TRIO grant

21 selection and continuation processes, the issue with judicial review in the committed-to-agency-

discretion line of cases—that there would be no “meaningful standards” by which to judge COE’s

APA claims—is simply not present here. See id. at 191; Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600 (1988);

Heckler, 470 U.S. at 830. “That 34 C.F.R. § 75.253(a)(5) requires ‘a determination from the

Secretary that continuation of the project is in the best interest of the Federal government’ does

not preclude judicial review because [courts] routinely treat discretion-laden standards as

providing law to apply.” Washington, 2025 WL 3486895, at *2 (cleaned up).

b. COE is likely to succeed on the merits of at least one of its APA claims

Having “satisf[ied] itself of its own jurisdiction” to consider COE’s challenges to the

Department’s grant denial and discontinuation decisions, Dominguez v. UAL Corp., 666 F.3d

1359, 1362 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (cleaned up), the court turns to the merits of COE claims.

Section 706 of the APA provides that “[t]he reviewing court shall . . . hold unlawful and

set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be— (A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse

of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power,

privilege, or immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of

statutory right; (D) without observance of procedure required by law . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2).

Though review under the APA is highly deferential, agencies still “must operate within the legal

authority conferred by Congress, and when those limits are transgressed, an individual may seek

recourse in the Article III courts.” Med. Imaging & Tech. All. v. Libr. of Cong., 103 F.4th 830,

838 (D.C. Cir. 2024). Nonetheless, “the court presumes the validity of agency action and must

affirm unless the [agency] failed to consider relevant factors or made a clear error in judgment.”

Nat’l Lifeline Ass’n v. FCC, 983 F.3d 498, 507 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (internal quotations and citation

omitted).

22 Beyond its invocation of the APA’s statutory limitations, as addressed above, the

Department does not challenge the merits of COE’s non-constitutional APA claims in either case.

See SSS Case Def.’s Mot at 19–24, 28–29; TRIO Case Def.’s Mot. at 23–27, 38–39. The

Department also does not contest that the SSS grant denial and TRIO grant discontinuation

decisions are “final agency actions,” subject to APA review. See 5 U.S.C. § 704. Nor does the

Department contest that COE’s claims fall within the relevant statutes’ “zone of interest.” See

Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Espy, 23 F.3d 496, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“To secure judicial

review under the APA, [plaintiffs] must show that the injuries they assert fall within the ‘zone of

interests’ of the relevant statute.”). Notably, COE need only demonstrate a likelihood of success

on the merits of one of their claims in each case to satisfy the first Winter factor for a preliminary

injunction. See, e.g., Mid-Atl. Equity Consortium v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 793 F. Supp. 3d 166, 189

n.6 (D.D.C. 2025); Media Matters for Am. v. Paxton, 732 F. Supp. 3d 1, 27 (D.D.C. 2024). COE

has done so here.

i. SSS Case

COE has demonstrated a likelihood of success that the Department’s decisions denying

SSS grant funding were arbitrary, capricious, and otherwise not in accordance with the law. 5

U.S.C. § 706(2).

1. The Department’s denial decisions are impermissibly vague and conclusory (Count II)

A “fundamental” requirement of administrative law is that an agency “set forth its reasons”

for its decision; failure to do so constitutes arbitrary and capricious agency action. Tourus Recs.,

Inc. v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 259 F.3d 731, 737 (D.C. Cir. 2001). At a minimum, an agency “must

examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a

‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n

23 of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington

Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).

COE asserts, and provides supporting documentation, that the Department’s denial letters

all stated that unnamed staff had “identified information indicating that the proposed activities take

account of race in ways that conflict with the Department’s policy of prioritizing merit, fairness,

and excellence in education and the Department’s commitment to upholding the letter and purpose

of Federal civil rights law.” SSS Case Compl. ¶ 159. According to COE, these “virtually

identical” denial letters all offered this same reasoning, except for a single citation to a page

number from each of the members’ application. Id. ¶ 158. Yet, some of these page numbers

apparently did not correlate to any page in the applications, see Big Bend Decl. STEM, Exs. B, C;

Big Bend Decl. Classic, Exs. B, C, while others did not reference any language that stated race

would be used as a factor in the selection process for the programs, see SIU Carbondale Decl. ¶ 31;

Green River Decl., Exs. F, G. Though repeatedly asked, the Department has refused to offer any

rational explanation for why it denied these members’ SSS grant applications beyond “the

Department’s review for potential conflicts with applicable nondiscrimination requirements.”

McCaghren Decl. ¶ 14; see also Dec. 15 Tr. at 29–32. When pressed at the hearing on what

policies and priorities the Department relied on, counsel simply stated they were not prepared to

discuss the merits of the cases. Dec. 15 Tr. at 30–31. 6

6 Notably, the Department agreed to provide a supplemental declaration by December 22, 2025, detailing its reasoning behind the denial decisions. Consequently, the court allowed it to proceed without submitting an Administrative Record under Local Rule 7(n). See Dec. 15 Tr. at 32–33, 62–63. But the three-page supplemental declaration the Department submitted did not address the court’s question regarding the agency’s reasoning. See SSS Case Supp. Decl. of Christopher McCaghren ¶¶ 1–9, ECF No. 25-1.

24 Even under the court’s deferential standard of review, the Department’s failure to articulate

anything beyond conclusory statements regarding applicants’ noncompliance with “federal civil

rights laws” and the Administration’s policies does not pass muster under the APA’s reasonable

explanation requirement. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196–97 (1947) (finding agency

action arbitrary and capricious where a party is “compelled to guess at the theory underlying the

agency’s action”). Indeed, “[t]he letters strongly suggest that defendants identified grants for the

chopping block via a blunt keyword search, without much, if any, further inquiry.” Urb.

Sustainability Dirs. Network v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., No. 25-cv-1775, 2025 WL 2374528, at *35

(D.D.C. Aug. 14, 2025). But even if the denial letters were not impermissibly vague, the

Department was not permitted to rely on any of the letters’ stated grounds.

2. The Department was not permitted to deny applicants funding for noncompliance with Title VI without first satisfying its procedural requirements (Count III)

First, insofar as the Department rejected COE members’ SSS grant applications for

violations of Title VI, it failed to observe procedures required under the statute and its

implementing regulations, codified at 34 C.F.R. Part 100. According to COE, its members’ denial

letters all stated that they had not been selected for funding based on the Department’s review for

potential conflicts with applicable nondiscrimination requirements, each citing 34 C.F.R. § 75.500.

See SSS Case Compl. ¶¶ 157, 201. The denials went on to state that unnamed staff identified

information indicating that “the proposed activities take account of race in ways that conflict with

the Department’s policy of prioritizing merit, fairness, and excellence in education and the

Department’s commitment to upholding the letter and purpose of Federal civil rights law.” SSS

Case Compl. ¶¶ 157, 201; see also Green River Decl., Ex. F; Big Bend Decl. STEM, Ex. B; Big

Bend Decl. Classic, Ex. B; SIU Carbondale Decl., Ex. B. Under Title VI and the Department’s

25 own regulations, however, the Department was not permitted to deny the applications for asserted

noncompliance with Title VI without first advising the applicants of any noncompliance issues,

making an express finding of noncompliance on the record after an opportunity for a hearing, and

attempting to secure voluntary compliance. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1; 34 C.F.R. § 100.8(c).

COE’s declarations state, and the Department does not contest, that the Department did not follow

any of these procedures. See SSS Case Compl. ¶¶ 208–10; Green River Decl. ¶¶ 28–29; Big Bend

Decl. STEM ¶ 26; Big Bend Decl. Classic ¶ 26; SIU Carbondale Decl. ¶ 25. Thus, to the extent

the Department relied on Title VI noncompliance to deny COE members’ applications for SSS

grant funding, COE is likely to succeed on its claim that the Department violated the APA by

failing to follow the requisite procedures. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D).

3. Any reliance on the 2025 Final Priorities was not permitted (Counts I, II, and IV)

Agency action is also generally unlawful if the agency “relied on factors which Congress

has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,

offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so

implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”

Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43. As noted in the factual background above, see supra Part

I.B.a., the applicable priorities for the FY 2025 SSS grant selection cycle required the Department

to award bonus points based on the extent to which proposed projects assisted underserved

students—who, by definition, included students of color—and activities designed to make college

more affordable and accessible to these students. See 2024 Notice Inviting SSS Applications, 89

Fed. Reg. 35,080–81. 7 Similarly, under GEPA, all SSS grant applicants were required to explain

7 The priorities specifically identified “[p]rojects that are designed to improve students’ social, emotional, academic, and career development needs, with a focus on underserved students, by

26 how their proposed programs will address “equitable access” and “equitable participation” by

students who face barriers based on, inter alia, race. See 20 U.S.C. § 1228a(b).

According to COE, however, the language used in certain members’ denial letters—that

the proposals “conflict with the Department’s policy of prioritizing merit, fairness, and excellence

in education and the Department’s commitment to upholding the letter and purpose of Federal civil

rights law”—suggests that the Department rejected applications because of the language that

applicants used to satisfy the applicable priorities and requirements under GEPA. See Compl.

¶ 260, see also Green River Decl., Ex. F; Big Bend Decl. STEM, Ex. B; Big Bend Decl. Classic,

Ex. B; SIU Carbondale Decl., Ex. B. If this inference was not sufficiently clear from the context

and the Department’s failure to contest the allegation, the court notes that the Department’s

wording is also the exact language used in the 2025 Final Priorities as a basis for why it rescinded

the prior priorities, 2025 Final Priorities, 90 Fed. Reg. 43,514 (“[T]he 2021 priorities are not

consistent with this Administration’s focus on merit, fairness, and excellence.”), which the

Department explicitly stated would not be applied to the relevant application cycle in the proposed

rule, see 2025 Proposed Priorities, 90 Fed. Reg. 21,710. To the extent the Department refused to

credit applicants with the bonus points they should have received under the operative priorities or

otherwise rejected applications on the basis of language mandated by GEPA, the Department’s

actions were arbitrary and capricious.

Moreover, under GEPA, the Department was required to follow the APA’s notice-and-

comment rulemaking procedure when setting generally applicable rules, regulations, or guidance

creating education and work-based settings that are supportive, positive, identity-safe and inclusive, including with regard to race, ethnicity, culture, language, and disability status, through” various listed activities, and “[p]rojects that are designed to increase postsecondary access, affordability, completion, and success for underserved students,” including “student[s] of color.” 2024 Notice Inviting SSS Applications, 89 Fed. Reg. 35,080–81.

27 with legally binding effects for TRIO grant administration. Specifically, GEPA mandates, with

few exceptions not applicable here, that “regulation[s]” affecting “any institution of higher

education,” 20 U.S.C. § 1221e-4, including any “generally applicable rule, regulation, guideline,

interpretation, or other requirement” that “has legally binding effect in connection with, or

affecting, the provision of financial assistance under any applicable program,” id. § 1232(a)(2), go

through notice-and-comment rulemaking, id. §§ 1221e-4, 1232(d). This includes any priorities

and other generally applicable criteria utilized in the TRIO grant selection process. See Am. Ass’n

of Colleges for Tchr. Educ. v. McMahon, 770 F. Supp. 3d 822, 854 (D. Md. 2025) (“All [non-

exempt] Department regulations, including its ‘agency priorities,’ are subject to 5 U.S.C. § 553

notice and comment rule making.”); Washington v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., No. 25-cv-1228, 2025

WL 3690779, at *14–15 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 19, 2025) (concluding that the Department acted

contrary to law by relying on unpublished criteria in making its TRIO grant continuation

determinations). 8

Because the 2025 Priorities did not take effect until after the Department denied COE

members’ SSS grant applications, the Department was not entitled to reject applications based on

those priorities. See Heartland Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 566 F.3d 193, 199 (D.C. Cir. 2009)

(“Failure to provide the required notice and to invite public comment . . . is a fundamental flaw

that ‘normally’ requires vacatur of the rule.”). 9

8 When asked whether the Department was entitled to rely on priorities that did not go through notice-and-comment, counsel for the Department stated she was not prepared to respond. See Dec. 15 Tr. at 31. The Department has, however, “insist[ed]” that grant priorities issued at the beginning of a contest must be published in other cases challenging its TRIO determinations. See Washington, 2025 WL 3690779, at *14 n.11. 9 Because the court concludes that COE has satisfied its burden to demonstrate a likelihood of success as to the above APA claims, it need not reach the other claims contained in its SSS Case Complaint. See TikTok Inc. v. Trump, 507 F. Supp. 3d 92, 112 n.6 (D.D.C. 2020). The same is true of the claims raised in the TRIO case beyond those addressed by the court below. Id.

28 ii. TRIO Case

COE has also demonstrated a likelihood of success on its claims that the Department’s

decisions to discontinue members’ TRIO grants were arbitrary, capricious, and otherwise not in

accordance with the law.

1. The Department’s Notices of Discontinuation are impermissibly vague (Count III).

As in the SSS Case, the reasons the Department offered in its discontinuation notices to

COE members were nearly identical. Compl. ¶¶ 143, 145. Following a paragraph of stock

language laying out the various grounds that may have led it to discontinue the grants, the letters

stated that unnamed “staff” had reviewed the members’ applications for funding and identified

information “that may conflict with the Department’s policy of prioritizing merit, fairness, and

excellence in education; or violate the letter or purpose of Federal civil rights law.” Id. ¶ 146. The

notices went on to reference a sentence or two of the members’ application materials, then simply

concluded that funding was not in the government’s “best interest.” See, e.g., Augsburg Decl., Ex.

E (citing Augsburg’s requirement that “[a]ll faculty involved in the Project are expected to

complete[] the Diversity and Inclusion Certificate Program & annual Anti-Racism Training”);

Marquette Decl., Ex. F (citing Marquette’s inclusion of “professional and leadership development

presentations that centralize issues on diversity, equity and inclusion,” in its programmatic

offerings); Suffolk Decl., Ex. G (citing Suffolk’s proposal to include “res[t]orative social justice

activities” in its proposed activities).

Despite these citations, however, the court is left to guess how the excerpted sentences

conflict with the Administration’s policies, priorities, or violate civil rights law. See Chenery

Corp., 332 U.S. at 196–97. The court is similarly left to guess whether and how the Department

analyzed the relevant data relating to grantee performance, as required under 34 C.F.R.

29 § 75.253(b). The Department’s vague and conclusory language does not suggest that it “examined

‘the relevant data,’” nor do its discontinuation letters offer “‘a satisfactory explanation’ for [the]

decision, ‘including a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’” Dep’t

of Com. v. New York, 588 U.S. 752, 773 (2019) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs., 463 U.S. at 43).

Rather, the application statements the Department identified strongly suggest that continuation

determinations were made based on a keyword search for terms relating to diversity, equity, and

inclusion, as opposed to any information regarding the discontinued grantees’ actual performance.

2. The Department was not permitted to rely on any of the potential grounds it invoked (Counts I and II).

As set forth above, the Department was not permitted to rely on Title VI as the basis for its

discontinuation decisions without having satisfied the requisite procedures under the statute and

its implementing regulations. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1; 34 C.F.R. § 100.8(c). The same is true of

any reliance on purported Title IX noncompliance. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682. COE has alleged, with

supporting evidence, that the Department failed to (1) notify any members of their purported non-

compliance with Title VI or Title IX, (2) seek their voluntary compliance, (3) provide an

opportunity for a hearing, or (4) make any findings of non-compliance on the record, before

sending the notices of non-continuation, see TRIO Case Compl. ¶¶ 183–84; Marquette Decl. ¶ 27;

Suffolk Decl. ¶ 37, and the Department does not contest these assertions. Additionally, to the

extent that the Department relied on the 2025 Final Priorities in its discontinuation decisions, such

reliance was also impermissible for the same reason as in the SSS Case—the Department’s failure

to satisfy GEPA’s mandate that any “generally applicable rule, regulation, guideline,

interpretation, or other requirement” with “legally binding effect” affecting “the provision of

financial assistance” under the TRIO program go through notice-and-comment rulemaking. 20

U.S.C. §§ 1221e-4, 1232(a)(2), (d); see also Washington, 2025 WL 3690779, at *14–15.

30 3. Even if the Department relied on its general discretion as to what constitutes the “best interest of the Federal Government,” it provided no reasonable explanation for its change in position (Count III)

Finally, despite the apparent discretion afforded to the Department to discontinue funding

for programs that are not in “the best interest of the Federal Government,” 34 C.F.R.

§ 75.253(a)(5), COE is likely to succeed on its claim that the Department’s unexplained decision

to shift its inquiry from grantee performance metrics to compliance with the Department’s new

policies was arbitrary and capricious under the change-in-position doctrine. Under this doctrine,

when agencies materially change existing policies, they must “provide a reasoned explanation for

the change, display awareness that they are changing position, and consider serious reliance

interests.” FDA v. Wages & White Lion Invs., 604 U.S. 542, 568 (2025) (cleaned up). The

Department’s lack of notice to affected COE members, who were already operating TRIO-funded

programs, that their previously selected applications would be subject to new policy considerations

in the funding continuation process suggests it did not consider those members’ reliance interests.

Notably, the declarations from COE members identify their efforts to meet performance-

related continuation criteria. See TRIO Case Jones Decl. ¶ 31; Augsburg Decl. ¶¶ 19, 24;

Marquette Decl. ¶¶ 19, 24; Suffolk Decl. ¶¶ 21, 26; South Seattle Decl. ¶¶ 18, 22; SUNY Decl.

¶¶ 19, 23; UNH Decl. McNair ¶¶ 19, 23; UNH Decl. Talent Search ¶¶ 19, 24. This is consistent

with 34 C.F.R. § 75.253(b), which states that the Department “may consider any relevant

information regarding grantee performance.” There is no indication that the Department took the

discontinued grantees’ reliance on performance metrics into account before basing its decisions

on their compliance with new policies and priorities. And the Department’s departure from prior

practice seems particularly salient where, as here, to ensure continuity, the TRIO program’s

31 authorizing statute mandates eight-month’s advanced notice of the status of a continuation

application from the expiration of the existing grant. 20 U.S.C. § 1070a-11(c)(7).

In the end, the court is left to wonder what considerations, if any, led to the change in

continuation criteria because the Department has yet to explain itself. See Washington, 2025 WL

3004675, at *8; Commc’ns & Control v. FCC, 374 F.3d 1329, 1335–36 (D.C. Cir. 2004)

(“[D]eparture from [past] practice, with no explanation, renders its void ab initio rationale

arbitrary and capricious.”). And as other judges on this court have explained, the APA, “which

prohibits arbitrary and capricious agency action and requires agencies to explain themselves

when they change course, may separately limit the government’s ability to impose retroactive

conditions on grant awards.” Harris Cnty., 786 F. Supp. 3d at 212 n.7.

Given the procedural defects identified above, COE has sufficiently demonstrated a

likelihood of success on its APA claims in the TRIO case as well.

c. COE has made a sufficient showing of irreparable harm

In order to succeed on the irreparable harm factor, a movant must show that their injury in

the absence of a preliminary injunction is “both certain and great” as well as “actual and not

theoretical,” meaning that “there is a clear and present need for equitable relief to prevent” the

claimed harm. Wis. Gas Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669, 674 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (cleaned up). The

movant must also “substantiate [its] claim that irreparable injury is ‘likely’ to occur.” Id. COE

claims that it will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, citing various injuries

to the organization’s mission as well as programmatic harms to its members and the students they

serve. See TRIO Case PI Mot. at 40–45. Specifically, COE alleges that its affected members’

TRIO programs are shutting down, that staff and faculty are being laid off, and that students are

32 losing resources designed to help them pursue their higher education. TRIO Case Compl. ¶ 149;

TRIO Case PI Mot. at 41–45; SSS Case PI Mot. at 36–41; SSS Case Compl. ¶¶ 225–47.

While these harms suffice for standing purposes, they are generally rooted in and tied to

monetary harms resulting from a lack of federal funding. And, as the Department correctly points

out, TRIO Case Def.’s Mot. at 40, “[r]ecoverable monetary loss may constitute irreparable harm

only where the loss threatens the very existence of the movant’s business.” Wis. Gas, 758 F.2d at

674. Still, judges in this district have found that “economic loss may constitute ‘irreparable harm’

where a plaintiff’s alleged damages are unrecoverable.” Clarke v. Off. of Fed. Hous. Enter.

Oversight, 355 F. Supp. 2d 56, 65 (D.D.C.2004) (citations omitted); see also Philip Morris USA

Inc. v. Scott, 561 U.S. 1301, 1304 (2010) (Scalia, J., in chambers) (“If expenditures cannot be

recouped, the resulting loss may be irreparable.”). “This issue often arises in suits against

government defendants, where sovereign immunity or other laws or doctrines may preclude

monetary relief.” Save Jobs USA v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 105 F. Supp. 3d 108, 114

(D.D.C. 2015). Because the APA does not provide for monetary relief, and, as set forth above, the

Tucker Act’s vesting of jurisdiction in the Court of Federal Claims and concomitant waiver of

sovereign immunity does not apply, COE and its members lack any avenue to receive funding

from the United States through litigation. Cf. Fredericks v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 20-cv-2458,

2021 WL 2778575, at *18 (D.D.C. July 2, 2021).

As for future funding cycles, see Glob. Health, 153 F.4th at 21 (“if the later opportunity

to compete for additional grants could fix the harm, it would not be irreparable”), the court

agrees with the district court in Washington that, “although Defendants emphasize that Grantees

may file new applications and could be awarded similar grants in the future, new funding could

not remedy all of the harms flowing from the discontinuation decisions.” 2025 WL 3004675, at

33 *10. Future funding “cannot remedy the lack of such services for this school year, and schools

and graduate programs will be harmed by a loss of expertise in staff members, even if they could

eventually rehire staff for those positions.” Id.; see also Ambach v. Bell, 686 F.2d 974, 987

(D.C. Cir. 1982) (recognizing that later funding for educationally disadvantaged students would

be a “Pyrrhic victory” because delays in the distribution of funds “cannot help but disrupt the

efforts of educators and [hinder] the education of the disadvantaged children sought to be aided

by the federal grants”). Moreover, COE avers, SSS Case Jones Decl. ¶ 48; TRIO Case Jones

Decl. ¶ 43, that its members will face disadvantages in upcoming selection cycles for SSS and

other TRIO grants based on their ineligibility for prior experience points under program-specific

regulations, see 34 C.F.R. §§ 646.20(a)(2)(i), 645.30(a)(2)(i), 643.20(a)(2)(i), 647.20(a)(2)(i),

644.20(a)(2)(i), and, even if selected, may be subject to lower funding caps, see SSS Case Jones

Decl. ¶ 48; TRIO Case Jones Decl. ¶ 43.

That COE’s alleged injuries are unrecoverable does not, however, “absolve the movant

from its considerable burden of proving that those losses are certain, great and actual.” Save Jobs

USA, 105 F. Supp. 3d at 114 (internal quotations and citation omitted). According to the

Department, the harms COE has identified are “vague” and “speculative,” TRIO Case Def.’s Mot.

at 40; SSS Case Def.’s Mot. at 30, yet evidence submitted with COE’s motions demonstrate that,

while largely economically derived, the injuries its members will suffer are both certain and great.

For instance, in the SSS Case, COE identified at least three members that applied for and were

denied SSS grant funding, with attached declarations detailing the programmatic cuts those

programs will suffer. Those members aver that, because of the Department’s denial decisions,

their programs will be discontinued due to their reliance on federal funding. See Green River Decl.

¶ 36; Big Bend Decl. STEM ¶ 32; Big Bend Decl. Classic ¶ 32; SIU-Carbondale Decl. ¶ 34. The

34 schools claim that without these programs, roles will be reduced or cut, and they will be unable to

offer various support services to hundreds of underserved students, including tutoring, career

guidance, and financial aid assistance, leading to increased risk of attrition. See Green River Decl.

¶¶ 37–39; Big Bend Decl. Classic ¶¶ 33–35; Big Bend Decl. STEM ¶¶ 33–35; SIU-Carbondale

Decl. ¶¶ 35–39. COE has also identified seven affected member programs in the TRIO Case, with

each member similarly declaring that they are temporarily unable to continue their grant-funded

programs for students, see Augsburg Decl. ¶¶ 35, 37; Marquette Decl. ¶¶ 35, 37–38; Suffolk Decl.

¶¶ 41, 44; South Seattle College Decl. ¶¶ 28, 31; SUNY Plattsburgh Decl. ¶¶ 32, 35; UNH Decl.

McNair ¶¶ 24, 34, 37; UNH Decl. Talent Search ¶¶ 24, 34, 37, and reporting subsequent staff

terminations, Augsburg Decl. ¶ 36; Marquette Decl. ¶ 36; Suffolk Decl. ¶ 42; South Seattle

College Decl. ¶ 29; SUNY Plattsburgh Decl. ¶ 33; UNH Decl. McNair ¶ 35; UNH Decl. Talent

Search ¶ 36.

Lastly, COE claims that the organization and its members will suffer irreparable

reputational harm because of the Department’s conclusions that they discriminate “on account of

race” against the students they are designed to serve. SSS Case PI Mot. at 39–40; SSS Case Jones

Decl. ¶¶ 46–47; TRIO Case PI Mot. at 43, TRIO Case Jones Decl. ¶¶ 41–42. Taken with the

programmatic impacts listed above, the court finds that the totality of injuries identified by COE

and its members demonstrate a likelihood of imminent, irreparable harm in the absence of

injunctive relief. See S. Educ. Found. v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 784 F. Supp. 3d 50, 72 (D.D.C. 2025)

(irreparable harm where the defendants’ actions threatened “the livelihoods of [plaintiff’s]

employees, its professional reputation, and the very existence of its programs”); Nat’l Council of

Nonprofits v. OMB, 763 F. Supp. 3d 36, 56–57 (D.D.C. 2025) (plaintiff organizations would have

to shutter programs, causing “existential injuries”); Urb. Sustainability Dirs. Network , 2025 WL

35 2374528, at *36–37 (listing program shutdowns, damages to plaintiffs’ reputations and

relationships, and staff layoffs as evidence of irreparable harm). Accordingly, the court concludes

that COE has satisfied this Winter factor in each case.

d. The balance of the equities and public interest favor preliminary injunctive relief

When assessing the equities and public interest factors, courts “balance the competing

claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the

requested relief.” Ramirez v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enft., 310 F. Supp. 3d 7, 32 (D.D.C. 2018).

If the movant seeks to enjoin the government, the final two factors merge “because the

government’s interest is the public interest.” Pursuing Am.’s Greatness v. Fed. Election Comm.,

831 F.3d 500, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

As the D.C. Circuit has explained, there is “generally no public interest in the perpetuation

of unlawful agency action.” League of Women Voters of U. S. v. Newby, 838 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C. Cir.

2016) (citations omitted). To the contrary, there is a “substantial public interest in having

governmental agencies abide by the federal laws that govern their existence and operations.” Id.

(internal quotations and citation omitted); N. Mariana Islands v. United States, 686 F. Supp. 2d 7,

21 (D.D.C. 2009) (“The public interest is served when administrative agencies comply with their

obligations under the APA.”). Here, the public interest is served by ensuring that the Department

complies with its operative statutory and regulatory frameworks governing the TRIO grant

programs, particularly in light of Congress’ stated goal for these programs to support students from

disadvantaged backgrounds in their pursuit of higher education. See 20 U.S.C. § 1070a-11(a).

Moreover, the State Amici have identified several critical services that TRIO-funded programs

provide to their citizens and economies as well as the harms they will face in the absence of

36 injunctive relief, including the abrupt cessation of essential avenues for educating state workforces.

See TRIO Case States Amicus Br. 6–12, ECF No. 12.

The Department nonetheless claims that these factors favor it because, inter alia, it will

suffer harm from providing COE “unfettered access to any remaining funding” since COE seeks

to “hamstring the Government from lawfully effectuating policy decisions” and has not stated that

its members will return the funds should the Department succeed in this litigation, meaning the

funds will be irrevocably expended. See TRIO Case Def.’s Mot. at 42–44; SSS Case Def.’s Mot

at 32–35. But COE does not request any money in either action. Rather, it seeks another

opportunity for consideration of members’ grant applications and performance metrics in

accordance with the operative regulatory framework. See TRIO Case PI Mot., Ex. 9; SSS Case PI

Mot., Ex. 10. That the Department may have to expend limited time and resources in complying

with its procedural mandates on reconsideration of its denial and discontinuation decisions does

not outweigh the harms COE has identified. The Department’s arguments therefore fail, and COE

will succeed on this factor as well.

D. Scope of Relief

A preliminary injunction must be both “limited to the inadequacy that produced the injury

in fact that the plaintiff has established,” Gill v. Whitford, 585 U.S. 48, 68 (2018) (quoting Lewis

v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996)), and not be “more burdensome to the defendant than necessary

to provide complete relief” to the plaintiff, Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979); see

also Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. 831, 861 (2025) (holding that injunctive relief can be no

“broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue”). As set

forth above, the court agrees with COE that it has established associational standing to sue and

seek relief on behalf of its members without naming each injured party. The theory upon which

37 the court has determined that COE satisfies the irreparable harm factor set out in Winter, 555 U.S.

at 20, however, relies, in substantial part, on the evidence submitted by COE, including the

declarations submitted by its named members. Consequently, the court cannot conclude that a

preliminary injunction as to all of COE’s named and unnamed affected members is as narrow as

“necessary to provide complete relief.” CASA, 606 U.S. at 861.

Although a court may “engage in inductive reasoning to reach the conclusion that every

plaintiff suffered the threat of irreparable harm” where evidence demonstrates that other plaintiffs

are similarly situated in terms of that harm, LaForest v. Former Clean Air Holding Co., Inc., 376

F.3d 48, 57–58 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted), this court declines to infer that all of COE’s

members whose grant funding was denied or discontinued for the reasons at issue in this litigation

face the level of harm that the court deems sufficient to warrant preliminary injunctive relief. See

Washington, 2025 WL 3004675, at *12 (limiting the scope of a preliminary injunction to only

those discontinued TRIO grantees for which the court had evidence of irreparable harm); see also

Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (“Issuing a preliminary injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable

harm is inconsistent with our characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that

may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.”).

The scope of the court’s preliminary injunction is therefore tailored to include only COE

and the members it has identified.

E. The Court Will Not Require a Bond

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c), the court may issue a preliminary injunction

“only if the movant gives security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs

and damages sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 65(c). But Rule 65(c) gives this court “broad discretion” to determine the appropriate

38 amount of an injunction bond. DSE, Inc. v. United States, 169 F.3d 21, 33 (D.C. Cir. 1999). This

includes “the discretion to require no bond at all.” P.J.E.S. ex rel. Escobar Francisco v. Wolf, 502

F. Supp. 3d 492, 520 (D.D.C. 2020) (quoting Simms v. District of Columbia, 872 F. Supp. 2d 90,

107 (D.D.C. 2012)).

The Department requests that the court require a bond in the sum of the funds that COE’s

identified members would have received in the event their SSS programs were selected—

$1,317,628, SSS Case Def.’s Mot. at 37, and their TRIO programs continued—$2,930,308, TRIO

Case Def.’s Mot. at 45. Yet, as noted above, COE is not seeking monetary relief or specific

performance on their denied and discontinued grants, thereby eliminating the need for a security

pending the duration of litigation on the merits. See N. Am.’s Bldg. Trades Unions v. Dep’t of

Def., 783 F. Supp. 3d 290, 315 (D.D.C. 2025) (“In cases where the government is the enjoined

party and no concrete economic injury is established, as is the case here, courts routinely waive

the bond requirement.”). Moreover, requiring a bond in the requested amount would “unduly

burden” COE and its identified members by essentially doubling the losses their programs have

sustained from the Department’s decisions, albeit temporarily. Id. The court declines to do so and

finds that no bond is necessary under the circumstances of the instant actions.

IV. CONCLUSION

For these reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motions for Preliminary

Injunctions are GRANTED. An Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.

Date: January 16, 2026 Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge