Cotton v. Broad River Realty, Inc.

Court of Appeals of Georgia

Cotton v. Broad River Realty, Inc.

454 S.E.2d 183, 216 Ga. App. 306, 95 Fulton County D. Rep. 568, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 98

CourtCourt of Appeals of Georgia

DecidedFebruary 14, 1995

DocketA94A2415

StatusPublished

This text of 454 S.E.2d 183 (Cotton v. Broad River Realty, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Georgia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Cotton v. Broad River Realty, Inc., 454 S.E.2d 183, 216 Ga. App. 306, 95 Fulton County D. Rep. 568, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 98 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995).

Pincite

Opinion

Ruffin, Judge.

Thomas E. Cotton filed a complaint against Broad River Realty, Inc. and others, to which Wayne Colston, one of the named defendants, filed a counterclaim for a writ of possession. After the hearing on Colston’s demand for possession, Cotton filed a motion requesting the right to purchase a copy of the hearing transcript. Cotton filed this direct appeal from the trial court’s order denying that motion.

As the complaint and counterclaim are still pending, the trial court’s order “ ‘cannot be considered a final judgment within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), and it follows that we are without jurisdiction to entertain a direct appeal from it.’ [Cit.]” Chatham County Hosp. Auth. v. Mack, 185 Ga. App. 13, 14 (363 SE2d 264) (1987). Further, we do not agree with Cotton that OCGA § 9-11-60 (g) is applicable in this case. Cotton has pointed to no portion of the limited record that would support his argument that a clerical mistake was made and we cannot find any.

Appeal dismissed.

Birdsong, P. J., and Blackburn, J., concur.

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Ruffin, Judge.

Thomas E. Cotton filed a complaint against Broad River Realty, Inc. and others, to which Wayne Colston, one of the named defendants, filed a counterclaim for a writ of possession. After the hearing on Colston’s demand for possession, Cotton filed a motion requesting the right to purchase a copy of the hearing transcript. Cotton filed this direct appeal from the trial court’s order denying that motion.

As the complaint and counterclaim are still pending, the trial court’s order “ ‘cannot be considered a final judgment within the meaning of OCGA § 5-6-34 (a) (1), and it follows that we are without jurisdiction to entertain a direct appeal from it.’ [Cit.]” Chatham County Hosp. Auth. v. Mack, 185 Ga. App. 13, 14 (363 SE2d 264) (1987). Further, we do not agree with Cotton that OCGA § 9-11-60 (g) is applicable in this case. Cotton has pointed to no portion of the limited record that would support his argument that a clerical mistake was made and we cannot find any.

Appeal dismissed.

Birdsong, P. J., and Blackburn, J., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

454 S.E.2d 183, 216 Ga. App. 306, 95 Fulton County D. Rep. 568, 1995 Ga. App. LEXIS 98, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cotton-v-broad-river-realty-inc-gactapp-1995.

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