An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-155 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 1 July 2014
CRYSTAL GAIL COTTEN, Plaintiff,
v. Johnston County No. 13 CVD 2741 JEFFREY GENE WORRELLS, Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from order entered 13 September 2013 by
Judge R.W. Bryant, Jr. in Johnston County District Court. Heard
in the Court of Appeals 5 June 2014.
No brief filed on behalf of plaintiff-appellee.
Michael J. Reece for defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.
Jeffrey Gene Worrells (“Defendant”) appeals from a domestic
violence protection order (“DVPO”) that, inter alia, prevents
him from having contact with Crystal Gail Cotten (“Plaintiff”)
and her son for one year. Defendant contends (1) that there is
no competent evidence to support the trial court’s finding that
Defendant committed an act of domestic violence against
Plaintiff; and (2) that the trial court exceeded its statutory -2- authority by ordering that Defendant cease having contact with
Plaintiff’s son. For the following reasons, we disagree and
affirm the trial court’s DVPO.
I. Factual & Procedural History
On 4 September 2013, Plaintiff filed a complaint and motion
for the issuance of a DVPO in Johnston County District Court
alleging that Defendant had threatened to take her life on three
different occasions if she attempted to leave him. That same
day, the trial court entered an ex parte DVPO ordering Defendant
to cease having contact with Plaintiff pending a hearing on
Plaintiff’s motion. On 7 September 2013, Defendant was served
with the complaint, the ex parte order, and a notice of hearing.
On 13 September 2013, the matter came on for a hearing.
Evidence presented at the hearing tended to show the following.
Prior to initiating the instant action, Plaintiff and
Defendant were in a dating relationship and lived together.
Plaintiff has one son from a previous marriage who stayed with
Plaintiff and Defendant during Plaintiff’s custodial time.
Plaintiff testified that during the last months of her
relationship with Defendant, Defendant threatened to take her
life on three different occasions if she left him and took her
son away. According to Plaintiff, Defendant told her that “he -3- knew plenty of swamps and areas that he could hide [her] body
[so that] no one would find it” and that “he didn’t mind
spending ten years of his life in prison for doing it.”
Plaintiff testified that Defendant’s actions were limited
to oral threats and did not involve physical violence.
Plaintiff indicated that the last threat occurred on 18 August
2013. On that date, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Defendant “got
very loud” with Plaintiff in bed and threatened to kill her.
Plaintiff testified that she put her arm around Defendant to
calm him down so that he would not hurt her. Plaintiff
indicated that the incident made her scared for her life.
In his defense, Defendant presented evidence showing that
he and Plaintiff continued a normal relationship for a brief
period of time after the 18 August 2013 incident. Testimony
revealed that Plaintiff continued to stay with Defendant
overnight, bring her son into the home with Defendant, and share
meals with Defendant for approximately ten days after the 18
August 2013 incident. Plaintiff testified that she continued
their normal routine because she wanted to wait until her son
went to stay with his father before she left Defendant.
Following the hearing, the trial court entered a DVPO
ordering Defendant to, inter alia, cease all contact with -4- Plaintiff and her son for one year. Defendant filed a timely
notice of appeal.
II. Jurisdiction
Defendant’s appeal from the district court’s DVPO lies of
right to this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(2)
(2013).
III. Analysis
Defendant’s appeal to this Court presents two questions for
our review: (1) whether there is competent evidence supporting
the trial court’s conclusion that Defendant committed an act of
domestic violence against Plaintiff; and (2) whether the trial
court exceeded its statutory authority under N.C. Gen. Stat. §
50B-3 (2013) when it ordered Defendant to cease having contact
with Plaintiff’s son. We address each in turn.
A. Evidence Supporting the Trial Court’s Conclusion of Law
Defendant’s first argument on appeal concerns the
evidentiary support for the trial court’s conclusion that
Plaintiff.
“When the trial court sits without a jury, the standard of
review on appeal is whether there was competent evidence to
support the trial court’s findings of fact and whether its -5- conclusions of law were proper in light of such facts.” Burress
v. Burress, 195 N.C. App. 447, 449, 672 S.E.2d 732, 734 (2009)
(quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). “Competent
evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support the finding.” In re Adams, 204 N.C. App.
318, 321, 693 S.E.2d 705, 708 (2010) (quotation marks and
citation omitted). “Where there is competent evidence to
support the trial court’s findings of fact, those findings are
binding on appeal.” Burress, 195 N.C. App. at 449–50, 672
S.E.2d at 734.
Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3(a), “[i]f the
court . . . finds that an act of domestic violence has occurred,
the court shall grant a protective order restraining the
defendant from further acts of domestic violence.” Pertinent
here, an act of domestic violence includes, inter alia, actions
by “a person with whom the aggrieved party has or has had a
personal relationship” that places “the aggrieved party or a
member of the aggrieved party’s family or household in fear of
imminent serious bodily injury.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-1(a)
Here, the trial court’s DVPO concludes as a matter of law
that “[t]he defendant has committed acts of domestic violence -6- against the plaintiff” and that “[t]here is danger of serious
and immediate injury to the plaintiff.” To support its
conclusions, the trial court found as fact that on 18 August
2013, Defendant placed Plaintiff in fear of an imminent serious
bodily injury by “threating to kill plaintiff several times.”
Defendant contends that Plaintiff failed to present
competent evidence that an act of domestic violence occurred or
that Plaintiff was “scared for her life.” In making this
argument, Defendant does not challenge the trial court’s
findings of fact concerning Defendant’s threat on 18 August
2013. Rather, Defendant argues that the totality of the
evidence presented at trial, which includes evidence concerning
Defendant and Plaintiff’s continued relationship after the 18
August 2013 incident, belies the truth of Plaintiff’s testimony.
Defendant’s argument is misplaced. As the trier of fact in this
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An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA14-155 NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 1 July 2014
CRYSTAL GAIL COTTEN, Plaintiff,
v. Johnston County No. 13 CVD 2741 JEFFREY GENE WORRELLS, Defendant.
Appeal by defendant from order entered 13 September 2013 by
Judge R.W. Bryant, Jr. in Johnston County District Court. Heard
in the Court of Appeals 5 June 2014.
No brief filed on behalf of plaintiff-appellee.
Michael J. Reece for defendant-appellant.
HUNTER, JR., Robert N., Judge.
Jeffrey Gene Worrells (“Defendant”) appeals from a domestic
violence protection order (“DVPO”) that, inter alia, prevents
him from having contact with Crystal Gail Cotten (“Plaintiff”)
and her son for one year. Defendant contends (1) that there is
no competent evidence to support the trial court’s finding that
Defendant committed an act of domestic violence against
Plaintiff; and (2) that the trial court exceeded its statutory -2- authority by ordering that Defendant cease having contact with
Plaintiff’s son. For the following reasons, we disagree and
affirm the trial court’s DVPO.
I. Factual & Procedural History
On 4 September 2013, Plaintiff filed a complaint and motion
for the issuance of a DVPO in Johnston County District Court
alleging that Defendant had threatened to take her life on three
different occasions if she attempted to leave him. That same
day, the trial court entered an ex parte DVPO ordering Defendant
to cease having contact with Plaintiff pending a hearing on
Plaintiff’s motion. On 7 September 2013, Defendant was served
with the complaint, the ex parte order, and a notice of hearing.
On 13 September 2013, the matter came on for a hearing.
Evidence presented at the hearing tended to show the following.
Prior to initiating the instant action, Plaintiff and
Defendant were in a dating relationship and lived together.
Plaintiff has one son from a previous marriage who stayed with
Plaintiff and Defendant during Plaintiff’s custodial time.
Plaintiff testified that during the last months of her
relationship with Defendant, Defendant threatened to take her
life on three different occasions if she left him and took her
son away. According to Plaintiff, Defendant told her that “he -3- knew plenty of swamps and areas that he could hide [her] body
[so that] no one would find it” and that “he didn’t mind
spending ten years of his life in prison for doing it.”
Plaintiff testified that Defendant’s actions were limited
to oral threats and did not involve physical violence.
Plaintiff indicated that the last threat occurred on 18 August
2013. On that date, at approximately 2:00 a.m., Defendant “got
very loud” with Plaintiff in bed and threatened to kill her.
Plaintiff testified that she put her arm around Defendant to
calm him down so that he would not hurt her. Plaintiff
indicated that the incident made her scared for her life.
In his defense, Defendant presented evidence showing that
he and Plaintiff continued a normal relationship for a brief
period of time after the 18 August 2013 incident. Testimony
revealed that Plaintiff continued to stay with Defendant
overnight, bring her son into the home with Defendant, and share
meals with Defendant for approximately ten days after the 18
August 2013 incident. Plaintiff testified that she continued
their normal routine because she wanted to wait until her son
went to stay with his father before she left Defendant.
Following the hearing, the trial court entered a DVPO
ordering Defendant to, inter alia, cease all contact with -4- Plaintiff and her son for one year. Defendant filed a timely
notice of appeal.
II. Jurisdiction
Defendant’s appeal from the district court’s DVPO lies of
right to this Court pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(b)(2)
(2013).
III. Analysis
Defendant’s appeal to this Court presents two questions for
our review: (1) whether there is competent evidence supporting
the trial court’s conclusion that Defendant committed an act of
domestic violence against Plaintiff; and (2) whether the trial
court exceeded its statutory authority under N.C. Gen. Stat. §
50B-3 (2013) when it ordered Defendant to cease having contact
with Plaintiff’s son. We address each in turn.
A. Evidence Supporting the Trial Court’s Conclusion of Law
Defendant’s first argument on appeal concerns the
evidentiary support for the trial court’s conclusion that
Plaintiff.
“When the trial court sits without a jury, the standard of
review on appeal is whether there was competent evidence to
support the trial court’s findings of fact and whether its -5- conclusions of law were proper in light of such facts.” Burress
v. Burress, 195 N.C. App. 447, 449, 672 S.E.2d 732, 734 (2009)
(quotation marks, citation, and brackets omitted). “Competent
evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support the finding.” In re Adams, 204 N.C. App.
318, 321, 693 S.E.2d 705, 708 (2010) (quotation marks and
citation omitted). “Where there is competent evidence to
support the trial court’s findings of fact, those findings are
binding on appeal.” Burress, 195 N.C. App. at 449–50, 672
S.E.2d at 734.
Pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-3(a), “[i]f the
court . . . finds that an act of domestic violence has occurred,
the court shall grant a protective order restraining the
defendant from further acts of domestic violence.” Pertinent
here, an act of domestic violence includes, inter alia, actions
by “a person with whom the aggrieved party has or has had a
personal relationship” that places “the aggrieved party or a
member of the aggrieved party’s family or household in fear of
imminent serious bodily injury.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50B-1(a)
Here, the trial court’s DVPO concludes as a matter of law
that “[t]he defendant has committed acts of domestic violence -6- against the plaintiff” and that “[t]here is danger of serious
and immediate injury to the plaintiff.” To support its
conclusions, the trial court found as fact that on 18 August
2013, Defendant placed Plaintiff in fear of an imminent serious
bodily injury by “threating to kill plaintiff several times.”
Defendant contends that Plaintiff failed to present
competent evidence that an act of domestic violence occurred or
that Plaintiff was “scared for her life.” In making this
argument, Defendant does not challenge the trial court’s
findings of fact concerning Defendant’s threat on 18 August
2013. Rather, Defendant argues that the totality of the
evidence presented at trial, which includes evidence concerning
Defendant and Plaintiff’s continued relationship after the 18
August 2013 incident, belies the truth of Plaintiff’s testimony.
Defendant’s argument is misplaced. As the trier of fact in this
case, it is the province of the trial court “to determine the
credibility of witnesses and the weight of their testimony and
the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Beasley-Kelso
Assocs., Inc. v. Tenney, 30 N.C. App. 708, 711, 228 S.E.2d 620,
622 (1976). Accordingly, we decline to re-weigh the evidence
presented at the DVPO hearing and instead limit our review to
determining whether competent evidence supports the trial -7- court’s finding that Defendant “threatened to kill plaintiff
several times.” At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that on 18
August 2013, Defendant threatened to kill her for the third time
and that Defendant’s threat made her scared for her life. We
hold that this testimony is sufficient to support the conclusion
that Defendant committed an act of domestic violence against
Plaintiff. Defendant’s first argument on appeal is therefore
without merit.
B. The Trial Court’s Statutory Authority Under Section 50B-3
Defendant’s second argument on appeal is that the trial
court exceeded its statutory authority under N.C. Gen. Stat. §
50B-3 by ordering Defendant to cease having contact with
Plaintiff’s son, even when Plaintiff is absent and the boy is
with his father. Specifically, Defendant contends that there was
“no evidence whatsoever that [Plaintiff’s son] needed protection
from [Defendant]” and that “there was no basis for infringing on
[Plaintiff’s ex-husband’s] custodial time by restricting his
ability to allow [Plaintiff’s son] around [Defendant].” Again,
Defendant’s argument is misplaced.
Setting aside the fact that Defendant appears to be
asserting a right purporting to belong to Plaintiff’s ex-
husband, who is not a party to the instant action, N.C. Gen. -8- Stat. § 50B-3(a)(13) explicitly provides that a DVPO may
“[i]nclude any additional prohibitions or requirements the court
deems necessary to protect any party or any minor child.” Given
Plaintiff’s testimony that Defendant threatened to kill her if
she took her son away from him, the fact that she was scared for
her life, and the fact that she did not want to leave Defendant
until her son returned to his father’s custody, we hold that the
trial court acted within its authority under N.C. Gen. Stat. §
50B-3(a)(13) in ordering Defendant to cease having contact with
Plaintiff’s son. Defendant’s second argument on appeal is
therefore without merit.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s DVPO is
affirmed.
Judges ERVIN and DAVIS concur
Report per rule 30(e).