IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
CORY COFFIN, No. 88153-1-I Appellant, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT,
Respondent.
BUI, J. — The State of Washington Employment Security Department
(Department) denied Cory Coffin’s claim for unemployment benefits, finding he
quit his employment without good cause. An administrative law judge upheld the
Department’s decision. The Commissioner’s Review Office also affirmed the
Department’s decision. The superior court reviewed and affirmed the
Commissioner’s decision. On appeal, Coffin argues the Commissioner erred
because he was not given the opportunity to develop a full record of the
circumstances of the job separation. Because Coffin’s arguments either fail or
are abandoned due to inadequate briefing, we affirm.
FACTS
Cory Coffin worked full-time as a maintenance technician for Invitation
Homes, a company that rents single-family homes. As part of his job, he
conducted home repairs and facilitated move-in inspections with new residents. No. 88153-1-I/2
In January and February 2023, Coffin’s regional manager, Mary Craig, e-
mailed him expressing concerns Coffin was frequently not busy with work, took
his lunch breaks too close to the end of his shift, and worked unapproved or
excessive overtime. Coffin disagreed with Craig’s statements and stated Craig
was using the statements as a “cudgel” to affect him. He believed Craig’s
statements were malicious because they were made shortly before his annual
review. Coffin forwarded Craig’s e-mails to Human Resources and complained
that Craig was harassing him.
In June 2023, Invitation Homes organized for employees to attend a
baseball game together. Coffin responded he could attend but later informed his
supervisor and Craig that he could not finish his assigned task in time, so he took
a lunch break instead. Craig sent Coffin an e-mail, expressing her dissatisfaction
with his untimely communication for missing the baseball game. Coffin expressed
he felt Craig acted maliciously.
Following Craig’s e-mail about the alleged poor communication, Invitation
Homes attempted to schedule a meeting to discuss Coffin’s concerns. Coffin
expressed he believed the meeting was an attempt to discipline him or terminate
his employment; he refused to attend unless Invitation Homes agreed to allow
him to record the meeting and bring an advocate. Invitation Homes denied his
requests.
On June 24, 2023, Coffin refused to conduct any further maintenance on
homes until Invitation Homes agreed to his previous demands or agreed to
discipline Craig for her statements. Coffin requested paid administrative leave
2 No. 88153-1-I/3
and that the leave not be deducted from his paid time off. Invitation Homes
declined his requests but allowed him to use paid leave or unpaid administrative
leave.
Invitation Homes made several attempts to resolve Coffin’s concerns. For
example, Craig offered to do a ride along, but Coffin perceived the offer as a
threat and refused. Invitation Homes tried to schedule a time to discuss a path
toward Coffin returning to work; and Erica Wicke, a representative from human
resources, called Coffin to assure him the phone conversation would not include
a discussion of any disciplinary action. Still, Coffin refused to meet, unless his
demands were met.
In an e-mail to Coffin on July 21, 2023, Wicke summarized their
communication and reiterated that she investigated Coffin’s accusations but
found them unsubstantiated. She also affirmed Invitation Homes was unable to
meet his demands. Coffin accused the employer of committing age-based
discrimination and stated, “If such resolution cannot be realized, principle
demands that I issue formal complaint with the appropriate institution and
separate my employment in a manner that will preserve my interests.”
Wicke asked Coffin to clarify whether or not he was resigning, to which
Coffin responded he hoped it would not come to that, but it was a possibility he
would do so. Wicke responded the company could not agree to his demands, but
Coffin could remain on leave.
On September 8, 2023, Coffin e-mailed Wicke and others at Invitation
Homes stating, due to the impasse, he would be seeking unemployment benefits.
3 No. 88153-1-I/4
In the e-mail, he inquired about offboarding information related to his benefits
and asked the company to retrieve its property from his residence.
Wicke responded by advising that they removed Coffin from leave of
absence status and “are processing [his] separation of employment effective
today, Tuesday, September 12, 2023.” She also informed Coffin of his benefit
amounts. Coffin responded, clarifying he did not request to be removed from
administrative leave status. Coffin deemed Invitation Home’s actions amounted
to a “soft severance or quiet termination.”
Thereafter, Coffin applied for unemployment benefits. The Department
sent Coffin a questionnaire inquiring why he was no longer employed, and Coffin
responded he was fired for unknown reasons. The Department determined he
quit due to job dissatisfaction. The Department denied Coffin’s claim for
unemployment benefits because it found he quit without statutory good cause.
Coffin retained legal counsel and appealed the Department’s
determination. The matter was scheduled for an administrative hearing before an
administrative law judge (ALJ). The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) sent
a Notice of Hearing and information on “how to prepare for your unemployment
hearing” to Coffin, his attorney, and the employer. Specifically, the parties were
advised “[y]ou are responsible for making your case to the judge. You will need
to prepare.” The parties were also informed on the submission of additional
documents to “immediately” send them to OAH and other parties; and the parties
were instructed, “[i]f your documents are not submitted to OAH and the other
parties in advance, your documents may not be considered.” The employer did
4 No. 88153-1-I/5
not appear at the hearing, and neither Coffin nor his counsel addressed the
employer’s absence.
At the beginning of the hearing, the ALJ asked whether Coffin had any
exhibits to supplement the ones attached to the notice of hearing previously sent
to the parties. Coffin stated he had some things he would like to refer to but
explained, “it got down to the wire.” Coffin’s counsel stated they did not submit
any supplemental exhibits or intend to submit any in the future. The ALJ
proceeded to identify the 30 pages of exhibits previously marked, and they were
admitted without objection.
In its written order, the ALJ concluded that the only possible good cause
reason to quit his employment was “illegal activities at the worksite.” The ALJ
found Coffin did not establish a prima facie hostile work environment claim
because he did not submit any evidence establishing Craig or Invitation Homes
created a hostile work environment or that he suffered any harassment, and thus,
Coffin did not have good cause to quit work. The ALJ entered an initial order
affirming the Department’s determination.
Coffin represented himself and appealed the ALJ’s decision to the
Commissioner’s Review Office. The Commissioner found Coffin “was afforded a
full and fair opportunity to present his case before the [OAH]” and that there was
“substantial evidence in support of the [ALJ’s] findings” and affirmed the ALJ’s
decision.
Coffin appealed the Commissioner’s decision to Pierce County Superior
Court. Prior to the scheduled hearing in superior court, Coffin filed a motion to
5 No. 88153-1-I/6
supplement the record with 79 pages of additional exhibits, all e-mails between
Coffin and Invitation Homes and one visual graph about his work performance.
Also, he requested the superior court remand the matter to the Department for
additional fact-finding because he believed the administrative record was
incomplete due to the employer’s non-appearance at the hearing and the ALJ did
not proactively develop the record.
The superior court denied Coffin’s motion. Applying RCW 34.04.562, the
court explained:
[N]othing mandates the ALJ to call a witness or to demand documents. That is never the judge’s job. It would be impossible . . . for a judge to have any ability to know what’s out there in any given case. And when you multiply that by the hundreds of cases that come before every ALJ and municipal court judge and district court judge and tribal judge and superior court judge and appellate judge and supreme court judge in this state and then across the nation, if you put the burden on the judges to know what discovery and what witnesses were necessary for the fair and just adjudication of any case, we would be in utter chaos . . . .
On March 7, 2025, the superior court affirmed the Commissioner’s
decision. Coffin timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
Coffin contends his due process rights to a fair hearing were denied
because he was not given the opportunity to develop a full record of the
circumstances of the job separation when his matter was heard at the
administrative level and before the superior court. Even if we reach the merits of
Coffin’s argument, we agree with the Commissioner’s decisions.
The Washington Administrative Procedure Act (APA), ch. 34.05 RCW,
governs judicial review of an agency’s action. Under the APA, we review only the
6 No. 88153-1-I/7
final agency decision, here, the Commissioner’s final order. Woldemicael v. Dep’t
of Soc. & Health Servs., 19 Wn. App. 2d 178, 184, 494 P.3d 1100 (2021)
(published in part). As the party challenging the agency action, Coffin bears the
burden of demonstrating the invalidity of the agency’s decision. Woldemicael, 19
Wn. App. 2d at 184 (citing RCW 34.05.570(1)(a)). Additionally, “ ‘[t]he
challenging party must show that [they have] been substantially prejudiced by the
agency action.’ ” Woldemicael, 19 Wn. App. 2d at 184 (quoting Beatty v. Fish &
Wildlife Comm’n, 185 Wn. App. 426, 443, 341 P.3d 291 (2015) (citing RCW
34.05.570(1)(d))).
Under the APA, “we may grant relief . . . for any one of nine reasons set
forth in RCW 34.05.570(3)(a)-(i).” Am. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 1950 v. Pub.
Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 18 Wn. App. 2d 914, 921, 493 P.3d 1212 (2021).
Coffin does not specifically cite subsections of RCW 34.05.570 to request relief
from an agency order. However, Coffin’s claims that the Commissioner’s order is
“in violation of constitutional provisions,” that the Commissioner “has erroneously
interpreted or applied the law,” and that the Commissioner’s order is “not
supported by evidence that is substantial when viewed in light of the whole
record” are sufficiently clear such that there are no compelling reasons for this
court not to consider the merits or the issues concerning these claims. State v.
Olson, 126 Wn.2d 315, 323, 893 P.2d 629 (1995). Accordingly, our review is
limited to subsections (3)(a), (d), and (e) to determine whether to grant Coffin
relief on those bases.
7 No. 88153-1-I/8
We review an alleged constitutional violation de novo. See State v.
Warner, 125 Wn.2d 876, 882-83, 889 P.2d 479 (1995); State ex rel. Washington
State Pub. Disclosure Comm’n v. Permanent Offense, 136 Wn. App. 277, 293,
150 P.3d 568 (2006), as modified on denial of reconsideration (Dec. 20, 2006).
Otherwise, our APA review of an agency decision “is limited to deciding if
the decision is based on an error of law, the order is not supported by substantial
evidence, or the order is arbitrary and capricious.” Campbell v. Emp’t Sec. Dep’t,
180 Wn.2d 566, 571, 326 P.3d 713 (2014); RCW 34.05.570(3)(a)-(i).
Under RCW 34.05.570(3)(c), this court may grant relief from an agency
order where “[t]he agency has engaged in unlawful procedure or decision-making
process.” We review allegations that an agency has engaged in unlawful
procedure or failed to follow a prescribed procedure de novo. K.P. McNamara
Nw., Inc., v. Dep’t of Ecology, 173 Wn. App. 104, 121, 292 P.3d 812 (2013)
(quoting Stevens County v. Loon Lake Prop. Owners Ass’n, 146 Wn. App. 124,
129, 187 P.3d 846 (2008)).
The agency’s findings of fact are reviewed under the substantial evidence
standard. RCW 34.05.570(3)(e). This standard is highly deferential to the
administrative fact finder. King County v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt.
Hearings Bd., 142 Wn.2d 543, 553, 14 P.3d 133 (2000). The same deference
should be afforded to an agency’s factual findings as an appellate court would
afford a superior court’s findings. Snohomish County v. Hinds, 61 Wn. App. 371,
378–79, 810 P.2d 84 (1991). This court engages in de novo review of the
8 No. 88153-1-I/9
agency’s legal conclusions. In re the License to Practice Pharmacy of Farina, 94
Wn. App. 441, 450, 972 P.2d 531 (1999).
Coffin contends the Commissioner erred by committing “procedural
irregularity” both statutorily and constitutionally by denying his motion to
supplement the administrative record with additional evidence. He also contends
the Commissioner’s findings of fact were unsupported by substantial evidence.
We address the issues Coffin cites with supporting authority; we decline to
address issues inadequately briefed and insufficiently argued. Norcon Builders,
LLC v. GMP Homes VG, LLC, 161 Wn. App. 474, 486, 254 P.3d 835 (2011);
State v. Elliott, 114 Wn.2d 6, 15, 785 P.2d 440 (1990).
To support his claim of procedural irregularity, Coffin cites RCW
34.05.449(5), arguing that the ALJ failed to develop a full and fair record “that will
ascertain the substantial rights of the parties.”
Coffin’s reliance is misplaced. Of relevance is subsection (2), which
directs the presiding officer to give all parties the opportunity to develop the
record by “present[ing] evidence and argument, conduct cross-examination, and
submit rebuttal evidence.” RCW 34.05.449(2). Subsection (5), cited by Coffin,
provides how the hearing officer should conduct the hearing, that it be open to
public observation unless closure exceptions apply, that witnesses may be
excluded for good cause, and that the hearing may be conducted by telephone
and if so, that the hearing transcript or other agency record is available for public
inspection. RCW 34.05.440(5).
9 No. 88153-1-I/10
Given Coffin’s general assertion about the procedural and constitutional
irregularity of being denied the opportunity to supplement the administrative
record, we will address subsection (2) of that same statute. That subsection
directs the hearing officer to “afford all parties the opportunity to respond, present
evidence and argument, conduct cross-examination, and submit rebuttal
evidence.” RCW 34.05.449
There was substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s conclusion
that Coffin was given a full and fair opportunity to present his case before the
ALJ. The parties, including Coffin, were advised about the procedures and rules
on the submission of evidence when the Department sent hearing materials prior
to the scheduled hearing. The materials included documents such as the
Department’s determination letter, a fact-finding questionnaire from the
Department, a summary of the weekly benefits paid to Coffin, and notes made by
a Department employee. Coffin’s counsel confirmed he reviewed the exhibits,
had no objections to their admission, and had no further exhibits to present.
Coffin did not object or correct his attorney. Coffin was afforded “the opportunity
to respond, present evidence, and argument.” RCW 34.05.449(2). Therefore, his
argument fails.
Coffin relies on Lenca v. Employment Sec. Dep’t, 148 Wn. App. 565, 200
P.3d 281 (2009), the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and article I, section 3 of the Washington State Constitution, to argue the
Commissioner’s decision should be reversed because “procedural irregularity”
occurred. Coffin fails to explain in his briefing how Lenca supports his case. Nor
10 No. 88153-1-I/11
does it support his argument. Lenca does not stand for the proposition that due
process is violated when a Commissioner refuses to remand a case to the ALJ to
take additional evidence. The Commissioner erred in Lenca because it failed to
consider additional evidence that controverted the employer’s key testimony to
the ALJ. Lenca,148 Wn. App at 576.
Coffin’s presentation of his case is unlike Lenca. Coffin does not explain
how his e-mail communications with Invitation Homes provided relevant
information not previously presented to the ALJ. Failure to provide sufficient
argument and citation to authority in an opening brief waives the issue. See,
e.g., Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d
549 (1992); RAP 10.3(a), (c); DeHeer v. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 60 Wn.2d
122, 126, 372 P.2d 193 (1962). Neither the ALJ nor the Commissioner has an
obligation to develop a record, and Coffin’s briefing does not explain otherwise. 1
Therefore, Coffin’s procedural irregularity arguments fail.
For the remainder of Coffin’s assertions, Coffin did not cite legal authority.
For example, Coffin claimed the findings and decisions of the ALJ affirmed by the
Commissioner were not supported by substantial evidence. We need not
consider arguments that are not developed or for which the appellant has not
cited authority. State v. Dennison, 115 Wn.2d 609, 629, 801 P.2d 193 (1990).
The crux of his argument is based on his belief that the “incomplete” record
1 Failure to provide sufficient argument and citation to authority in an opening brief waives
the issue. See, e.g., Bosley, 118 Wn.2d at 809; RAP 10.3(a), (c); Deheer, 60 Wn.2d at 126 (“Where no authorities are cited in support of a proposition, the court is not required to search out authorities, but may assume that counsel, after diligent search, has found none.”).
11 No. 88153-1-I/12
would necessarily render any decision erroneous. However, as discussed supra,
his opportunity to present his own evidence and object and respond to the
Department’s materials that were provided to him and his attorney were at the
administrative level, and he failed to do so. See, e.g., RCW 34.05.449(2).
Coffin also misunderstands the application of the “substantial evidence”
standard on appeal. Substantial evidence is “sufficient to persuade a rational,
fair-minded person of the truth of the finding.” In re Est. of Jones, 152 Wn.2d 1, 8,
93 P.3d147 (2004). Evidence may be substantial even if conflicting or susceptible
to other reasonable interpretations. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Ctr. v. Holman, 107
Wn.2d 693, 713-14, 732 P.2d 974 (1987). Coffin misinterprets the substantial
evidence review standard as requiring the ALJ or Commissioner to proactively
develop the record. As such, he does not provide any argument on why the
record developed at the administrative level does not meet the substantial
evidence review standard.
A review of the ALJ’s factual findings adopted by the Commissioner shows
there was substantial evidence to support the conclusion that Coffin did not quit
for “good cause.” Coffin’s actions indicated he chose not to return to work. Per
the e-mail exchange between him and Craig, he stated that due to Invitation
Homes not meeting his demands for a recorded meeting where he had
representation to discuss his concerns about Craig, he would be seeking
unemployment benefits, requesting the company retrieve its property from his
residence, and inquiring about offboarding information.
Although Coffin perceived Craig’s e-mails to be malicious and harassing,
12 No. 88153-1-I/13
the e-mail content was about his work performance, none of which indicated
discrimination. Invitation Homes also investigated Coffin’s complaints about the
alleged harassment from Craig, did not discipline Coffin following the e-mail
exchange between him and Craig about his communication issues , and
attempted to schedule meetings to discuss his concerns about Craig, but Coffin
refused to meet.
Based on this record, there was substantial evidence to support the
Commissioner’s adopted finding that “[Coffin] quit his job primarily because of
personal dissatisfaction with the job including conflict with other employees.”
Coffin’s characterization of Craig’s conduct as harassing does not mean the
record lacked substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s finding.
Finally, Coffin requested an award of attorney fees, but he provides no
argument to support the awarding of fees and is not the prevailing party. 2 We
deny his request for attorney fees.
We affirm the Commissioner’s decision and, accordingly, affirm the
superior court’s decision on judicial review.
2 A party must “devote a section of its opening brief to the request for the fees or expenses.” RAP 18.1(b). “Argument and citation to authority are required under the rule to advise us of the appropriate grounds for an award of attorney fees as costs.” Wilson Ct. Ltd. P’ship v. Tony Maroni’s, Inc., 134 Wn.2d 692, 710 n.4, 952 P.2d 590 (1998)). Requests that fail to comply with these requirements are properly denied. Thompson v. Lennox, 151 Wn. App. 479, 485, 151 P.3d 597 (2009). Even if Coffin complied with RAP 18.1(b), he is not the prevailing party, thus fees would still be denied. RAP 18.1(a).
13 No. 88153-1-I/14
WE CONCUR: