24CA1542 Coronado-Arrascue v Golka 06-05-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1542 El Paso County District Court No. 24CV30702 Honorable David S. Prince, Judge
Monsignor Ricardo Coronado-Arrascue, J.C.D.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Bishop James R. Golka and Monsignor Robert E. Jaeger, Vicar General,
Defendants-Appellees.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE HAWTHORNE* Lipinsky and Pawar, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 5, 2025
Baker Law Group, LLC, Joseph A. O’Keefe, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Richard F. Bednarski, John T. Melcon, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 Plaintiff, Monsignor Ricardo Coronado-Arrascue, appeals the
district court’s order granting the motion to dismiss filed by
defendants, Bishop James R. Golka and Monsignor Robert E.
Jaeger. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In 2020, Coronado-Arrascue began serving as the Judicial
Vicar and Chancellor of the Diocese of Colorado Springs (Diocese).
Defendants Golka and Jaeger served as Bishop and Vicar General
of the Diocese, respectively.
¶3 In 2022, Coronado-Arrascue resigned from his positions at the
Diocese pursuant to a settlement agreement between him and the
Diocese. The agreement provided that Coronado-Arrascue would
remain a priest in good standing with the Diocese and would be
permitted to perform public masses if and when he returned to the
Colorado Springs area.
¶4 About eighteen months later, Jaeger issued a “Precept”1 on the
Diocese’s behalf suspending Coronado-Arrascue’s authority to act,
1 A “precept” is a “command or principle intended . . . as a . . . rule
of action.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/P6KQ- B7BF.
1 or present himself, as a priest within the Diocese due to a “serious
allegation” lodged against him. The announcement letter
accompanying the Precept stated that Coronado-Arrascue was “no
longer considered a priest in good standing within the Diocese” and
was “to refrain from the public celebration of the sacraments
whenever he is within the territory of th[e] Diocese.”
¶5 In November 2023, Coronado-Arrascue sued the Diocese (El
Paso County Case No. 23CV32252), alleging breach of contract,
libel, intentional interference with contractual obligations, and
extreme and outrageous conduct. The district court dismissed the
case under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), determining that the church
autonomy doctrine, based on the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S.
Constitution’s First Amendment, barred the causes of action
asserted in Coronado-Arrascue’s complaint. Coronado-Arrascue
did not appeal the court’s order.
¶6 In 2024, Coronado-Arrascue filed the lawsuit underlying this
appeal (El Paso County Case No. 24CV30702) against Golka and
Jaeger, asserting fraudulent inducement and civil conspiracy
claims. Golka and Jaeger jointly filed a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to
2 dismiss Coronado-Arrascue’s complaint, which the district court
granted.
¶7 Coronado-Arrascue appeals the district’s court order granting
Golka and Jaeger’s motion to dismiss.
II. C.R.C.P. 9(b)
¶8 The court noted in its order dismissing the present case, “[T]he
claims in [this] lawsuit are that [Golka and Jaeger] fraudulently
induced [Coronado-Arrascue] to enter the settlement agreement at
issue.” After analyzing Coronado-Arrascue’s complaint, the court
concluded, “In context, . . . [Coronado-Arrascue] has not satisfied
the requirement [under C.R.C.P. 9(b)] that fraud be pled with
particularity. The [c]omplaint in its current form is dismissed on
these grounds alone.”
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶9 Appellate courts review de novo a district court’s dismissal for
failure to plead fraud with particularity. Schaden v. DIA Brewing
Co., 2021 CO 4M, ¶ 34.
¶ 10 C.R.C.P. 9(b) says, “In all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with
particularity.” “Thus, a complaint alleging fraud must specify the
3 statements that the plaintiff claims were false or misleading,
provide particulars regarding the respect in which the statements
were fraudulent, allege when and where the statements were made,
and identify who made such statements.” Schaden, ¶ 57.
¶ 11 While the plaintiff is not required to plead all evidence
pertaining to the fraud claim, “the complaint must at least state the
main facts or incidents which constitute the fraud so that the
defendant is provided with sufficient information to frame a
responsive pleading and defend against the claim.” Id. at ¶ 58
(quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Parrish, 899 P.2d 285, 289
(Colo. App. 1994)).
¶ 12 Even if the district court’s ruling was incorrect, when the
appellant does not challenge the court’s grounds for its ruling, the
appellate court is required to conclude that the ruling was correct.
See People v. Archer, 2022 COA 71, ¶ 42 (“[W]hen a trial court gives
several reasons for a decision, an appellant must challenge all of
those reasons; failure to do so requires affirmance.” (citing IBC
Denver II, LLC v. City of Wheat Ridge, 183 P.3d 714, 717-18 (Colo.
App. 2008))).
4 ¶ 13 This court declines to address contentions that are
unsupported by substantial argument. See Taylor v. Taylor, 2016
COA 100, ¶ 13 (citing People v. Wallin, 167 P.3d 183, 187 (Colo.
App. 2007)) (refusing to address perfunctory or conclusory
arguments); see also United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956
(7th Cir. 1991) (“A skeletal ‘argument’, really nothing more than an
assertion, does not preserve a claim.”); Topco, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of
Highways, 912 P.2d 805, 812 (Mont. 1996) (“It is not the function of
this Court on appeal to advocate a party’s position, to develop
arguments or to locate and cite supporting or opposing authority.”).
B. Analysis
¶ 14 Coronado-Arrascue’s contention regarding the district court’s
ruling dismissing his complaint for failure to meet C.R.C.P. 9(b)’s
particularity requirements is one paragraph in length and consists
of three sentences that are either statements of law or conclusory
and skeletal. The paragraph’s first sentence is a statement of law
citing a case, without any explanation of or argument regarding the
case. It provides no detail of how Coronado-Arrascue’s complaint
provided “sufficient particularity” per C.R.C.P. 9(b). Schaden, ¶ 57.
5 ¶ 15 The second sentence states in conclusory fashion that
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24CA1542 Coronado-Arrascue v Golka 06-05-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1542 El Paso County District Court No. 24CV30702 Honorable David S. Prince, Judge
Monsignor Ricardo Coronado-Arrascue, J.C.D.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Bishop James R. Golka and Monsignor Robert E. Jaeger, Vicar General,
Defendants-Appellees.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division VII Opinion by JUDGE HAWTHORNE* Lipinsky and Pawar, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced June 5, 2025
Baker Law Group, LLC, Joseph A. O’Keefe, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, Richard F. Bednarski, John T. Melcon, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 Plaintiff, Monsignor Ricardo Coronado-Arrascue, appeals the
district court’s order granting the motion to dismiss filed by
defendants, Bishop James R. Golka and Monsignor Robert E.
Jaeger. We affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In 2020, Coronado-Arrascue began serving as the Judicial
Vicar and Chancellor of the Diocese of Colorado Springs (Diocese).
Defendants Golka and Jaeger served as Bishop and Vicar General
of the Diocese, respectively.
¶3 In 2022, Coronado-Arrascue resigned from his positions at the
Diocese pursuant to a settlement agreement between him and the
Diocese. The agreement provided that Coronado-Arrascue would
remain a priest in good standing with the Diocese and would be
permitted to perform public masses if and when he returned to the
Colorado Springs area.
¶4 About eighteen months later, Jaeger issued a “Precept”1 on the
Diocese’s behalf suspending Coronado-Arrascue’s authority to act,
1 A “precept” is a “command or principle intended . . . as a . . . rule
of action.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/P6KQ- B7BF.
1 or present himself, as a priest within the Diocese due to a “serious
allegation” lodged against him. The announcement letter
accompanying the Precept stated that Coronado-Arrascue was “no
longer considered a priest in good standing within the Diocese” and
was “to refrain from the public celebration of the sacraments
whenever he is within the territory of th[e] Diocese.”
¶5 In November 2023, Coronado-Arrascue sued the Diocese (El
Paso County Case No. 23CV32252), alleging breach of contract,
libel, intentional interference with contractual obligations, and
extreme and outrageous conduct. The district court dismissed the
case under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), determining that the church
autonomy doctrine, based on the Free Exercise Clause of the U.S.
Constitution’s First Amendment, barred the causes of action
asserted in Coronado-Arrascue’s complaint. Coronado-Arrascue
did not appeal the court’s order.
¶6 In 2024, Coronado-Arrascue filed the lawsuit underlying this
appeal (El Paso County Case No. 24CV30702) against Golka and
Jaeger, asserting fraudulent inducement and civil conspiracy
claims. Golka and Jaeger jointly filed a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to
2 dismiss Coronado-Arrascue’s complaint, which the district court
granted.
¶7 Coronado-Arrascue appeals the district’s court order granting
Golka and Jaeger’s motion to dismiss.
II. C.R.C.P. 9(b)
¶8 The court noted in its order dismissing the present case, “[T]he
claims in [this] lawsuit are that [Golka and Jaeger] fraudulently
induced [Coronado-Arrascue] to enter the settlement agreement at
issue.” After analyzing Coronado-Arrascue’s complaint, the court
concluded, “In context, . . . [Coronado-Arrascue] has not satisfied
the requirement [under C.R.C.P. 9(b)] that fraud be pled with
particularity. The [c]omplaint in its current form is dismissed on
these grounds alone.”
A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶9 Appellate courts review de novo a district court’s dismissal for
failure to plead fraud with particularity. Schaden v. DIA Brewing
Co., 2021 CO 4M, ¶ 34.
¶ 10 C.R.C.P. 9(b) says, “In all averments of fraud or mistake, the
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with
particularity.” “Thus, a complaint alleging fraud must specify the
3 statements that the plaintiff claims were false or misleading,
provide particulars regarding the respect in which the statements
were fraudulent, allege when and where the statements were made,
and identify who made such statements.” Schaden, ¶ 57.
¶ 11 While the plaintiff is not required to plead all evidence
pertaining to the fraud claim, “the complaint must at least state the
main facts or incidents which constitute the fraud so that the
defendant is provided with sufficient information to frame a
responsive pleading and defend against the claim.” Id. at ¶ 58
(quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Parrish, 899 P.2d 285, 289
(Colo. App. 1994)).
¶ 12 Even if the district court’s ruling was incorrect, when the
appellant does not challenge the court’s grounds for its ruling, the
appellate court is required to conclude that the ruling was correct.
See People v. Archer, 2022 COA 71, ¶ 42 (“[W]hen a trial court gives
several reasons for a decision, an appellant must challenge all of
those reasons; failure to do so requires affirmance.” (citing IBC
Denver II, LLC v. City of Wheat Ridge, 183 P.3d 714, 717-18 (Colo.
App. 2008))).
4 ¶ 13 This court declines to address contentions that are
unsupported by substantial argument. See Taylor v. Taylor, 2016
COA 100, ¶ 13 (citing People v. Wallin, 167 P.3d 183, 187 (Colo.
App. 2007)) (refusing to address perfunctory or conclusory
arguments); see also United States v. Dunkel, 927 F.2d 955, 956
(7th Cir. 1991) (“A skeletal ‘argument’, really nothing more than an
assertion, does not preserve a claim.”); Topco, Inc. v. State, Dep’t of
Highways, 912 P.2d 805, 812 (Mont. 1996) (“It is not the function of
this Court on appeal to advocate a party’s position, to develop
arguments or to locate and cite supporting or opposing authority.”).
B. Analysis
¶ 14 Coronado-Arrascue’s contention regarding the district court’s
ruling dismissing his complaint for failure to meet C.R.C.P. 9(b)’s
particularity requirements is one paragraph in length and consists
of three sentences that are either statements of law or conclusory
and skeletal. The paragraph’s first sentence is a statement of law
citing a case, without any explanation of or argument regarding the
case. It provides no detail of how Coronado-Arrascue’s complaint
provided “sufficient particularity” per C.R.C.P. 9(b). Schaden, ¶ 57.
5 ¶ 15 The second sentence states in conclusory fashion that
Coronado-Arrascue’s complaint is “clear as to the alleged false
representations made by Appellees.” It fails to explain which
allegations Coronado-Arrascue deems to be “clear” and why.
¶ 16 And finally, the third sentence is another statement of law
citing a case followed by the conclusory assertion that “[i]t is not
necessary ‘to allege . . . precise dates’ as long as the fraud alleged is
otherwise pled with sufficient particularity.” (Quoting Coon v. Dist.
Ct., 420 P.2d 827, 829 (Colo. 1966).) This sentence, too, lacks any
specificity about the complaint’s fraud allegations and begs the
question by asserting that it is not necessary to allege precise dates
as long as the fraud is pleaded with sufficient particularity.
¶ 17 Because Coronado-Arrascue’s argument is “skeletal and
conclusory, we do not address it” further. Trudgian v. LM Gen. Ins.
Co., 2024 COA 87, ¶ 31. We therefore affirm the district court’s
ruling dismissing Coronado-Arrascue’s complaint under C.R.C.P.
9(b). And because we affirm the court’s dismissal ruling on the
grounds discussed above, we need not address Coronado-
Arrascue’s other contentions raised in this appeal. See W. Colo.
Motors, LLC v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 2019 COA 77, ¶ 39.
6 III. Disposition
¶ 18 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE PAWAR concur.