Coronado-Arrascue v. Golka

Opinion

24CA1972 Coronado-Arrascue v Golka 11-26-2025

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1972 El Paso County District Court No. 24CV30702 Honorable David Prince, Judge

Monsignor Ricardo Coronado-Arrascue,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

Bishop James R. Golka and Monsignor Robert E. Jaeger, Vicar General,

Defendants-Appellees.

ORDER AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division V Opinion by JUDGE FREYRE Pawar and Yun, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 26, 2025

J. O’Keefe Law, PLLC, Joseph A. O’Keefe, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Taft Stettinius & Hollister, Richard F. Bednarski, John T. Melcon, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees ¶1 Plaintiff, Monsignor Ricardo Coronado-Arrascue, appeals the

district court’s order awarding attorney fees and costs to

defendants, Bishop James R. Golka and Monsignor Robert E.

Jaeger (collectively Defendants). We affirm the order and remand

for a determination of Defendants’ reasonable appellate attorney

fees.

I. Background

¶2 In 2020, Coronado-Arrascue began serving as the Judicial

Vicar and Chancellor of the Diocese of Colorado Springs (Diocese).

Golka and Jaeger served as Bishop and Vicar General of the

Diocese, respectively.

¶3 In 2022, Coronado-Arrascue resigned from his positions at the

Diocese as part of an agreement with the Diocese (Settlement

Agreement). The Settlement Agreement provided that

Coronado-Arrascue would remain a priest in good standing with the

Diocese and would be permitted to perform public masses if and

when he returned to the Colorado Springs area.

¶4 About eighteen months later, Jaeger issued a “Precept” on the

Diocese’s behalf suspending Coronado-Arrascue’s authority to act,

or present himself, as a priest within the Diocese due to a “serious

1 allegation” lodged against him. The announcement letter

accompanying the Precept stated that Coronado-Arrascue was “no

longer considered a priest in good standing with the Diocese” and

was “to refrain from the public celebration of the sacraments

whenever he is within the territory of th[e] Diocese.”

¶5 In November 2023, Coronado-Arrascue sued the Diocese (El

Paso County Case No. 23CV32252), claiming breach of contract,

libel, intentional interference with contractual obligations, and

extreme and outrageous conduct. The district court dismissed the

case under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), determining that the church

autonomy doctrine, based on the Free Exercise Clause of the First

Amendment, barred the causes of action asserted in

Coronado-Arrascue’s complaint. Coronado-Arrascue did not appeal

the court’s order.

¶6 Then in 2024, Coronado-Arrascue filed another suit against

Defendants, asserting fraudulent inducement and civil conspiracy.

Defendants filed a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss

Coronado-Arrascue’s complaint, which the district court granted for

2 failure to meet C.R.C.P. 9(b)’s particularity requirement.1

Coronado-Arrascue appealed the district court’s order. In an

unpublished opinion, a division of this court affirmed the district

court’s order, finding Coronado-Arrascue’s argument “skeletal and

conclusory.”2 Coronado-Arrascue v. Golka, slip op. at ¶¶ 17-18

(Colo. App. No. 24CA1542, June 5, 2025) (not published pursuant

to C.A.R. 35(e)).

¶7 While the prior appeal was pending, Defendants moved for

their reasonable attorney fees and costs under sections 13-17-201

and 13-17-102, C.R.S. 2025, as well as other theories. In his

response, Coronado-Arrascue argued that his claims were not tort

claims but, instead, related to the “entry into and enforcement or

nonenforcement of the contract.”

¶8 The district court granted Defendants’ motion, finding that

they were entitled to attorney fees under section 13-17-201 because

fraudulent inducement and civil conspiracy claims sounded in tort.

1 While the district court also analyzed claim and issue preclusion,

the district court dismissed Coronado-Arrascue’s complaint based on C.R.C.P. 9(b) alone. 2 We can take judicial notice of the contents of court records in a

related proceeding. People v. Sa’ra, 117 P.3d 51, 56 (Colo. App. 2004).

3 In rejecting Coronado-Arrascue’s argument that his claims did not

fit the definition of “tort” as used in the statute, the district court

found:

[Coronado-Arrascue] appears to accept that fraudulent inducement and a derivative conspiracy claim can be considered “torts” in some circumstances such as analysis under the economic loss rule as in McWhinney. However, [Coronado-Arrascue] argues, a different definition of “tort” should be adopted when the cited statute is applied. [Coronado-Arrascue] cites no legal authorities in support of this premise and provides no meaningful analysis based on legal principles in support either.

¶9 On appeal, Coronado-Arrascue contends that the district court

erred by awarding Defendants attorney fees under sections

13-17-201, 13-17-102, and 13-17-103, C.R.S. 2025. Specifically,

he claims the court “improperly applied” the statutes. Because we

conclude that the district court properly awarded Defendants their

attorney fees under section 13-17-201, we need not address

Coronado-Arrascue’s remaining contentions.

4 II. Section 13-17-201

¶ 10 Coronado-Arrascue contends that the district court improperly

awarded Defendants attorney fees under section 13-17-201. We

disagree.

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

¶ 11 We review de novo whether a statute such as section

13-17-201 mandates an award of attorney fees. Schulz v. Laszlo &

Assocs., LLC, 2025 COA 24, ¶ 27. When interpreting a statute, our

primary goal is to discern and give effect to the General Assembly’s

intent. Hassler v. Acct. Brokers of Larimer Cnty., Inc., 2012 CO 24,

¶15; L & R Exploration Venture v. Grynberg, 271 P.3d 530, 533

(Colo. App. 2011). We look first to the statutory language, giving

the words and phrases used therein their plain and ordinary

meanings. Hassler, ¶ 15.

¶ 12 Section 13-17-201(1) states that, “[i]n all actions brought as a

result of . . . an injury to person . . . occasioned by the tort of any

other persons,” a defendant “shall have judgment for his reasonable

attorney fees in defending the action,” if the action is dismissed on

any ground pursuant to a defendant’s C.R.C.P. 12(b) motion. An

award of fees under the statute is mandatory. Colo. Special Dists.

5 Prop. & Liab. Pool v. Lyons, 2012 COA 18, ¶ 59. In determining

whether section 13-17-201 applies, the district court should focus

on the manner in which the claims are pleaded. Castro v. Lintz,

2014 COA 91, ¶ 16.

B. Analysis

¶ 13 Coronado-Arrascue asserts that the district court erred when

it awarded Defendants attorney fees under section 13-17-201

because (1) section 13-17-201 does not “categorically extend to all

claims because they are pled as torts” but instead applies to

“actions which fit a more classical definition of tort,” and (2)

fraudulent inducement and civil conspiracy are not properly

characterized as “traditional torts” because they are rooted in

contractual disputes. We are unpersuaded for three reasons.

¶ 14 First, section 13-17-201 mandates an award of attorney fees

to a defendant who successfully moves to dismiss “all actions

brought as a result of . . . an injury to [a] person . . . occasioned by

the tort of any other persons.” (Emphasis added.) While

Coronado-Arrascue argues that the statute does not apply to all

claims just because they are pled as torts and only applies to a

“more classical definition of tort,” he does not provide any authority,

6 nor did we identify any, supporting this assertion. Moreover, the

plain language of the statute mandates an award of fees for “all

actions.” We are not at liberty to read additional terms into, or to

modify, the plain language of a statute. See Nat’l Farmers Union

Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Est. of Mosher, 22 P.3d 531, 534 (Colo. App.

2000).

¶ 15 Second, claims for fraudulent inducement and civil conspiracy

sound in tort. McWhinney Centerra Lifestyle Ctr. LLC v. Poag &

McEwen Lifestyle Ctrs.-Centerra LLC, 2021 COA 2, ¶ 75

(characterizing fraudulent inducement claims as tort claims); Ingold

v. AIMCO/Bluffs, L.L.C. Apartments, 159 P.3d 116, 122 (Colo. 2007)

(characterizing civil conspiracy claim as a tort claim).

¶ 16 Third, in determining whether section 13-17-201 applies, the

controlling issue is how the plaintiff has characterized the claim in

the complaint. Robinson v. Colo. State Lottery Div., 179 P.3d 998,

1010 (Colo. 2008). Here, Coronado-Arrascue framed his claims as

tort claims. Both his fraudulent inducement and civil conspiracy

claims were based on alleged misrepresentations made prior to the

execution of the contract. In his complaint, Coronado-Arrascue

asserted:

7 • Defendants, through their direct and personal

involvement in negotiating, agreeing to, and executing the

Settlement Agreement, represented to Coronado-Arrascue

that he would remain in good standing with the Diocese,

that the Diocese would refrain from making any

disparaging or defamatory statements about

Coronado-Arrascue, and that any violations of or

disputes concerning the terms of the Settlement

Agreement would be subject to Colorado law and

actionable in Colorado courts.

• “[Defendants] made such representations with the intent

of inducing [Coronado-Arrascue] to sign the Settlement

Agreement in reliance on said representations.”

• “Based upon information and belief, [Defendants] agreed,

by words and/or conduct to induce [Coronado-Arrascue]

to sign the Settlement Agreement through unlawful

means including false representations and fraudulent

inducement.”

• “As a result of these unlawful acts of fraudulent

inducement by [Defendants], [Coronado-Arrascue]

8 entered into the Settlement Agreement, ignorant of the

fact that the Diocese had no intention of abiding by its

terms or permitting it to be subject to Colorado Law.”

¶ 17 Thus, while Coronado-Arrascue’s claims are related to a

contract, they implicate an independent, pre-contractual tort duty.

See Van Rees v. Unleaded Software, Inc., 2016 CO 51, ¶ 19 (where a

person wrongfully induces another to enter a contract knowing it

would not be performed, a tort duty that exists independently of the

contract is violated); cf. Sweeney v. United Artists Theater Cir., Inc.,

119 P.3d 538, 541 (Colo. App. 2005) (where a plaintiff’s claim is

framed as a contract claim, section 13-17-201 is inapplicable).

¶ 18 To the extent that Coronado-Arrascue argues that the district

court applied the church autonomy doctrine to this case and

awarded Defendants a “broad grant of immunity,” we disagree. Our

review of the record shows that the district court found that

Coronado-Arrascue failed to plead his claim of fraud with

particularity as required by C.R.C.P. 9(b) in dismissing

Coronado-Arrascue’s claims. And that ruling was affirmed in the

prior appeal.

9 ¶ 19 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court properly

awarded Defendants attorney fees and costs under section

13-17-201.

III. Appellate Attorney Fees

¶ 20 Defendants request appellate attorney fees. “A party who

successfully defends . . . a dismissal order [subject to section

13-17-201] is also entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees

incurred on appeal.” Wark v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 47 P.3d 711,

717 (Colo. App. 2002).

¶ 21 We exercise our discretion under C.A.R. 39.1 to remand the

case to the district court to determine and award reasonable

appellate attorney fees and costs incurred by Defendants in

litigating this appeal. See Payan v. Nash Finch Co., 2012 COA

135M, ¶ 63.

IV. Disposition

¶ 22 The order is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the district

court to determine Defendants’ reasonable appellate attorney fees

and costs.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE YUN concur.