Opinion by
Mb. Justice Eagen,
Six of the appellants, citizens of the State of California, stand indicted in the Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia County, charged with the violation of, or conspiracy to violate, Section 524 of the Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, as amended by the Act of July 17, 1957, P. L. 972, 18 PS §4524. Specifically, the indictment containing two counts charges that the defendants “feloniously did distribute, exhibit and give away a quantity and quantities of certain obscene literature consisting of writing, printed matter, pictures, images, drawings, figures, photographs and other pictorial representations, which are unrelated to science, art and scientific studies, and which when taken as a whole are indecent, lewd, lascivious and have the effect of inciting to lewdness or sexual crime, and certain lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent and disgusting pamphlets, story papers, papers, writings, drawings, photographs, figures and images, and certain written and printed matter of an indecent character”, and that the defendants “feloniously did write, print, publish and utter, or did cause to be printed, published and uttered a quantity [162]*162of .advertisements and notices giving information, directly or indirectly, stating or purporting to do so, where, how, of whom, or by what means certain, or what purported to be, a quantity and quantities of obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, disgusting and indecent pictures, writings, papers, figures, images, matter, articles, and other obscene literature could be purchased, obtained or had.”- This statute in substance renders it a crime feloniously to write, print, publish, distribute or exhibit, etc., obscene literature of the printed, picture or photograph type, which is unrelated to science, art or scientific study and which, when taken as whole, is indecent, lewd, lascivious and has the effect of inciting to lewdness or sexual crime.
Pursuant to the indictments and at the request of the District Attorney of Philadelphia County, the Governor of Pennsylvania issued warrants of extradition commanding that the defendants be taken into custody and returned to Philadelphia County for the purposes of trial.
This appeal involves three separate complaints in equity (in two actions the six individuals charged with the criminal violations involved are plaintiffs and in the other action three taxpayers, residents and citizens of the City of Philadelphia, appear as plaintiffs), which seek to enjoin the defendant, the Chief of County Detectives in the office of the District Attorney of Philadelphia County, from taking any action in furtherance of the execution of the extradition warrants.
It is charged that the statute of 1939, supra, upon which the criminal charges are based is vague and on its face unconstitutional and. is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and of Article I, Sections 7 and 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. It is also argued that the act of the Governor of Pennsylvania in authorizing extradition is void, arbitrary, unreasonable and without [163]*163legal warrant and that a waste of' tax. funds will -result if further prosecution ensues. .
" All actions were consolidated ■ for the purposes - of disposition and the court below denied injunctive relief and dismissed the request for a preliminary injunction. An appeal to this Court followed.
Equity has no jurisdiction under the circumstances presented. As a general-rule, the office and jurisdiction of a court of equity, unless enlarged by statute, are limited to the protection of the rights of property .and do not invade the domain of the courts of the common law. Equity’s jurisdiction does not .involve control of the prosecution,, punishment and pardon of crimes or misdemeanors: In re Sawyer et al., 124 U. S. 200 (1888) ; Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157 (1943). These important functions, for most compelling reasons and sound public policy, are performed exclusively in courts exercising criminal jurisdiction: Meadville Park Theatre Corporation v. Mook et al., 337 Pa. 21, 10 A. 2d 437 (1940). As stated in that opinion, page 24: “Only confusion and frustration in the enforcement of these' laws would result if a person arrésted or about to be arrested for their violation could by transforming himself into a complainant and a district attorney into a defendant, in civil proceedings, have his guilt or innocence adjudicated by a court of equity.” ' '
While there have been rare and unusual instances wherein courts of equity have enjoined public officers from proceeding with the enforcement of penal statutes, in those cases the validity of the statutes under which the proceedings had begun was seriously and substantially challénged and, in addition, it was clearly apparent that irreparable damage and harm would be'done to property by a continuation of the prosecution. Both of these elements are indispensable: Martin v. Baldy, 249 Pa. 253, 94 A. 1091 (1915); M. & S. Ry. and L. Co. [164]*164v. New Castle, 233 Pa. 413, 82 A. 501 (1912); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197 (1923) ; Truax and the Attorney General of Arizona v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915). As stated in Cavanaugh et al. v. Looney, Attorney General of Texas, 248 U. S. 453, 456 (1919) : “No such injunction ‘ought to be granted unless in a case reasonably free from doubt;’ and when necessary to prevent great and irreparable injury.”
In this instance the only resulting harm to the individuals under indictment will be the inconvenience, nersonal expense and embarrassment incident to the extradition and prosecution. This follows from and is entirely due to acts of their own making and is in no way attributable to any act or wish of the Commonwealth or the people it represents. Such vexation will not cause equity to intervene: Long et al. v. Metzger et al., 301 Pa. 449, 152 A. 572 (1930).
These defendants are free to litigate the question of the unconstitutionality of the statute through orderly methods of criminal procedure and thereby to enjoy a complete and adequate remedy at law.
As to the complaining taxpayers, the harm feared is infinitesimal and is not the “irreparable injury” to a property right that the law contemplates as worthy of equitable intervention in criminal prosecutions by duly constituted public officials. If courts were to adopt the policy advocated by these appellants, the cost of criminal enforcement would be greatly increased to all taxpayers.
Appellants also contend that the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act adopted in Pennsylvania July 8, 1941, P. L. 288 (19 PS §191.1 et seq.) and adopted in the State of California August 8, 1937, P. L. 1582, is the exclusive legal authority for the issuance of the extradition warrants and that such action is legally warranted only when the one charged has fled from justice and is [165]*165found in another state. We read no such intention on the part of the Legislature in this statute.
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Opinion by
Mb. Justice Eagen,
Six of the appellants, citizens of the State of California, stand indicted in the Court of Quarter Sessions of Philadelphia County, charged with the violation of, or conspiracy to violate, Section 524 of the Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 872, as amended by the Act of July 17, 1957, P. L. 972, 18 PS §4524. Specifically, the indictment containing two counts charges that the defendants “feloniously did distribute, exhibit and give away a quantity and quantities of certain obscene literature consisting of writing, printed matter, pictures, images, drawings, figures, photographs and other pictorial representations, which are unrelated to science, art and scientific studies, and which when taken as a whole are indecent, lewd, lascivious and have the effect of inciting to lewdness or sexual crime, and certain lewd, lascivious, filthy, indecent and disgusting pamphlets, story papers, papers, writings, drawings, photographs, figures and images, and certain written and printed matter of an indecent character”, and that the defendants “feloniously did write, print, publish and utter, or did cause to be printed, published and uttered a quantity [162]*162of .advertisements and notices giving information, directly or indirectly, stating or purporting to do so, where, how, of whom, or by what means certain, or what purported to be, a quantity and quantities of obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, disgusting and indecent pictures, writings, papers, figures, images, matter, articles, and other obscene literature could be purchased, obtained or had.”- This statute in substance renders it a crime feloniously to write, print, publish, distribute or exhibit, etc., obscene literature of the printed, picture or photograph type, which is unrelated to science, art or scientific study and which, when taken as whole, is indecent, lewd, lascivious and has the effect of inciting to lewdness or sexual crime.
Pursuant to the indictments and at the request of the District Attorney of Philadelphia County, the Governor of Pennsylvania issued warrants of extradition commanding that the defendants be taken into custody and returned to Philadelphia County for the purposes of trial.
This appeal involves three separate complaints in equity (in two actions the six individuals charged with the criminal violations involved are plaintiffs and in the other action three taxpayers, residents and citizens of the City of Philadelphia, appear as plaintiffs), which seek to enjoin the defendant, the Chief of County Detectives in the office of the District Attorney of Philadelphia County, from taking any action in furtherance of the execution of the extradition warrants.
It is charged that the statute of 1939, supra, upon which the criminal charges are based is vague and on its face unconstitutional and. is in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and of Article I, Sections 7 and 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. It is also argued that the act of the Governor of Pennsylvania in authorizing extradition is void, arbitrary, unreasonable and without [163]*163legal warrant and that a waste of' tax. funds will -result if further prosecution ensues. .
" All actions were consolidated ■ for the purposes - of disposition and the court below denied injunctive relief and dismissed the request for a preliminary injunction. An appeal to this Court followed.
Equity has no jurisdiction under the circumstances presented. As a general-rule, the office and jurisdiction of a court of equity, unless enlarged by statute, are limited to the protection of the rights of property .and do not invade the domain of the courts of the common law. Equity’s jurisdiction does not .involve control of the prosecution,, punishment and pardon of crimes or misdemeanors: In re Sawyer et al., 124 U. S. 200 (1888) ; Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U. S. 157 (1943). These important functions, for most compelling reasons and sound public policy, are performed exclusively in courts exercising criminal jurisdiction: Meadville Park Theatre Corporation v. Mook et al., 337 Pa. 21, 10 A. 2d 437 (1940). As stated in that opinion, page 24: “Only confusion and frustration in the enforcement of these' laws would result if a person arrésted or about to be arrested for their violation could by transforming himself into a complainant and a district attorney into a defendant, in civil proceedings, have his guilt or innocence adjudicated by a court of equity.” ' '
While there have been rare and unusual instances wherein courts of equity have enjoined public officers from proceeding with the enforcement of penal statutes, in those cases the validity of the statutes under which the proceedings had begun was seriously and substantially challénged and, in addition, it was clearly apparent that irreparable damage and harm would be'done to property by a continuation of the prosecution. Both of these elements are indispensable: Martin v. Baldy, 249 Pa. 253, 94 A. 1091 (1915); M. & S. Ry. and L. Co. [164]*164v. New Castle, 233 Pa. 413, 82 A. 501 (1912); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U. S. 197 (1923) ; Truax and the Attorney General of Arizona v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915). As stated in Cavanaugh et al. v. Looney, Attorney General of Texas, 248 U. S. 453, 456 (1919) : “No such injunction ‘ought to be granted unless in a case reasonably free from doubt;’ and when necessary to prevent great and irreparable injury.”
In this instance the only resulting harm to the individuals under indictment will be the inconvenience, nersonal expense and embarrassment incident to the extradition and prosecution. This follows from and is entirely due to acts of their own making and is in no way attributable to any act or wish of the Commonwealth or the people it represents. Such vexation will not cause equity to intervene: Long et al. v. Metzger et al., 301 Pa. 449, 152 A. 572 (1930).
These defendants are free to litigate the question of the unconstitutionality of the statute through orderly methods of criminal procedure and thereby to enjoy a complete and adequate remedy at law.
As to the complaining taxpayers, the harm feared is infinitesimal and is not the “irreparable injury” to a property right that the law contemplates as worthy of equitable intervention in criminal prosecutions by duly constituted public officials. If courts were to adopt the policy advocated by these appellants, the cost of criminal enforcement would be greatly increased to all taxpayers.
Appellants also contend that the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act adopted in Pennsylvania July 8, 1941, P. L. 288 (19 PS §191.1 et seq.) and adopted in the State of California August 8, 1937, P. L. 1582, is the exclusive legal authority for the issuance of the extradition warrants and that such action is legally warranted only when the one charged has fled from justice and is [165]*165found in another state. We read no such intention on the part of the Legislature in this statute. Sections 6 and 23 would seem clearly to indicate the contrary and to provide for extradition of persons whose acts in the asylum state result in the commission of crimes in the demanding state. If the defendants are fugitives, the extradition is mandatory; if they are not fugitives the extradition is discretionary. In Ex Parte Morgan, 86 Cal. App. 2d 217, 194 P. 2d 800 (1948), the court quoting from Cassis v. Fair, 126 W. Va. 557, 29 S.E. 2d 245 (1944), at page 248 stated: “ ‘No reason in law, expediency or comity has been suggested why extradition should be limited to those who were physically in the state at the time the crime was committed. Many crimes may be committed in a state while the culprit remains without its borders. This is particularly true where such offender acts through an agent or a conspirator.’ ”
It is to be noted also that both in Ex Parte Morgan and in Cassis v. Fair, supra, it was strongly urged that the provisions of the Uniform Extradition. Act in regard to the extradition of those accused of crime, who were not in the demanding state at the time of its commission and who, therefore, had not fled therefrom, are unconstitutional and in violation of the laws of the United States. This contention was rejected therein, as it has been consistently so when raised in other jurisdictions : Ennist v. Baden, 158 Fla. 141, 28 So. 2d 160; English v. Matowitz, 148 Ohio St. 39, 72 N.E. 2d 898; In Re Campbell v. Murray, 147 Neb. 820, 25 N.W. 2d 419; and, Culbertson v. Sweeney, 70 Ohio App. 344, 44 N.E. 2d 807.
The order of the lower court is affirmed at the appellants’ costs.
Mr. Justice Bok dissents.