Cook v. Quattrocchi

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedFebruary 5, 2020
Docket1:19-cv-11659
StatusUnknown

This text of Cook v. Quattrocchi (Cook v. Quattrocchi) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cook v. Quattrocchi, (S.D.N.Y. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK KEVIN COOK, Plaintiff, -against- 19-CV-11659 (CM) C. QUATTROCCHI OFFICER #435; ORDER TO AMEND SUTERLAND OFFICER #404; CARL DUBOIS SHERIFF, Defendants. COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge: Plaintiff, currently incarcerated at the Orange County Jail, brings this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. By order dated January 21, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order. STANDARD OF REVIEW The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires that federal courts screen complaints brought by prisoners who seek relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The court must dismiss a prisoner’s in forma pauperis complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b); see Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d

1 Prisoners are not exempt from paying the full filing fee even when they have been granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007). The court must also dismiss a complaint if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits – to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing

the complaint, the court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the court must determine whether those facts make it plausible – not merely possible – that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. BACKGROUND Plaintiff alleges that the events giving rise to this complaint occurred between August 2019, and December 7, 2019. Named as Defendants are Correction Officers Quattrocchi and Suterland, and Sheriff Carl Dubois. Plaintiff asserts that because he filed a sexual harassment complaint against Suterland,2 Suterland is retaliating against him by talking to other prisoners about him. Plaintiff is “concerned,” because he believes that Suterland is “soliciting to cause me harm.” Plaintiff told Sgt. McCord about Suterland’s conduct, but Sgt. McCord said that “he didn’t see any harm in his action, stating, ‘oh that guy talks about me!!’” Plaintiff told a “mental

health worker about it, and “she acted like it wasn’t nothing [sic] so I left it alone.” On December 6, 2019, Plaintiff and another prisoner, Kennard Blount, were called to medical, and Blount told Plaintiff that Officer Quattrocchi told him on “a prior day” that Plaintiff had “called her a bitch for no reason.” On October 23, 2019, Quattrocchi “wrote [Plaintiff] up for” cursing at her. Plaintiff denies having done so, but he “got seven days locked in and 25.00 fine.” According to Plaintiff, Quattrocchi and Suterland are “attempt[ing] to get another inmate to cause me harm.” Plaintiff seeks $2 million in damages. DISCUSSION “[A] prison inmate has no general constitutional right to be free from being falsely accused in a misbehavior report.” Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 862 (2d Cir. 1997); Willey v. Kirkpatrick, 801 F.3d 51, 63 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[A] prison inmate [generally] has no

constitutionally guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly accused of conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected liberty interest.”). Exceptions apply “when an inmate is able to show either (1) that he was disciplined without adequate due process as a result of the report; or (2) that the report was issued in retaliation for exercising a constitutionally protected right.” Riddick v. Semple, 731 F. App’x 11, 14 (2d Cir. 2018).

2 Plaintiff has a case pending in this Court against Suterland. See Cook v. Suterland, 7:19- CV-2780, 2 (NSR) (filed Mar. 26, 2019); see also Cook v. Dubois, 7:19-CV-8317, 1 (CS) (filed Sept. 6, 2019) (pending). To prevail on a prisoner’s First Amendment retaliation claim, a prisoner must establish “(1) that the speech or conduct at issue was protected, (2) that the defendant took adverse action against the plaintiff, and (3) that there was a causal connection between the protected [conduct] and the adverse action.” Espinal v. Goord, 558 F.3d 119, 128 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation

marks omitted). The filing of lawsuits or prison grievances is a constitutionally protected activity. Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1996). The prisoner bears the burden of showing that “the protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor” in the prison official’s disciplinary decision. See Holland v. Goord, 758 F.3d 215, 225-26 (2d Cir. 2014). It is not clear that Plaintiff can state a retaliation claim. He alleges that Officer Quattrocchi filed a false misbehavior report against him, but he does not allege any facts suggesting that she did so to retaliate against him for exercising his First Amendment rights. And Plaintiff does not assert facts suggesting that he was denied due process in connection with a disciplinary hearing.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Graham v. Henderson
89 F.3d 75 (Second Circuit, 1996)
Espinal v. Goord
558 F.3d 119 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Harris v. Mills
572 F.3d 66 (Second Circuit, 2009)
Holland v. Goord
758 F.3d 215 (Second Circuit, 2014)
Willey v. Kirkpatrick
801 F.3d 51 (Second Circuit, 2015)

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Bluebook (online)
Cook v. Quattrocchi, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cook-v-quattrocchi-nysd-2020.