Continental Casualty Co. v. United States

164 Ct. Cl. 160, 1964 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 40, 1964 WL 8559
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJanuary 24, 1964
DocketNo. 63-57
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 164 Ct. Cl. 160 (Continental Casualty Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Continental Casualty Co. v. United States, 164 Ct. Cl. 160, 1964 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 40, 1964 WL 8559 (cc 1964).

Opinion

Whitakee, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Both plaintiff, a surety company, and the trustees in bankruptcy of Pennsylvania Drydock and Shipbuilding Co., Inc., are claiming a fund in the hands of defendant which was owed to the bankrupt for the reconditioning of two of defendant’s vessels. The bankrupt completed the reconditioning and turned the vessels over to defendant, but before it [162]*162had paid the laborers and materialmen it was declared a bankrupt.

Afterwards, the surety company, which had executed both the performance and the payment bonds, paid the laborers and materialmen to the full extent of its bond on one of the ships. When it appeared that the claims on the other bond, written on the S.S. William Tyler, exceeded $45,000, the amount of the bond, the surety instituted an interpleader action against the claimants. All the claimants, except the largest creditor, were willing to and did release the surety in exchange for payment of their pro rata shares. Since the surety disputed the validity of the remaining creditor’s claim, the suit went forward as to it. After the court made findings in favor of the creditor on the issue of liability, the parties agreed on a settlement of the claim for $11,733.50. Since this sum was less than the amount previously asserted by this creditor, which was used in computing the pro rata share of each creditor, the total amount paid on the Tyler payment bond was $41,079.08 on a total liability on the bond of $45,000.

Where a surety pays the claims of laborers and material-men, it has been held, under a variety of circumstances, that the surety has a prior right to the funds which were owing to the contractor at the time of his default. But the trustees in bankruptcy say that the surety in this case does not have a prior right to the funds because it has not paid all laborers and materialmen in full. We think the surety in this case does have a prior right to them.

In United Pacific Insurance Company v. United States, et al., 162 Ct. Cl. 361, 319 F. 2d 893 (1963), we held that the failure to pay the claim of one materialman or laborer did not defeat the surety’s right to priority, because the material-man had no right to the moneys in the hands of the United States, his sole remedy being on the payment bond. The United States had the right to use the money in its hands to pay laborers and materialmen (Pearlman v. Reliance Insurance Company, 371 U.S. 132 (1962) ; National Surety Corp. v. United States, 132 Ct. Cl. 724, 133 F. Supp. 381 (1955)), but the laborers and materialmen could not force it to do so. [163]*163United States v. Munsey Trust Company, 332 U.S. 234 (1947); Continental Casualty Ins. Co. v. United States, 145 Ct. Cl. 99, 169 F. Supp. 945 (1959).

But this is said to differ from United Pacific Insurance Company v. United States, supra, in that all the creditors still have a claim against the bankrupt to the extent of the unpaid balance on their claims. However, in the United Pacific Insurance Company case the sole unpaid creditor also had a claim against the bankrupt, but we held he was not entitled to priority over the surety. This was because laborers have no lien on a vessel belonging to the United States, as they would have if the vessel were privately owned, and, hence, they have no prior right to the funds owing for work done and materials furnished for use in reconditioning the vessel. Because they had no lien against the vessel to insure payment of their claims, the Miller Act (49 Stat. 793 (1935), 40 U.S.C. § 270a (1958)) was passed, requiring the contractor to secure a bond conditioned upon paying them. The surety has now paid to each creditor an agreed amount in full settlement of his rights on the bond. The amount of $41,079.08 so paid exceeds the amount of $26,904.37 in the hands of the United States. The surety has thus discharged the moral obligation of the United States, to protect laborers and materialmen, in an amount in excess of the amount in the hands of the United States, which the United States might have used to pay them, except for the bond, and it is, therefore, entitled to be reimbursed to the extent of these funds. This right must be satisfied prior to the claims of laborers and materialmen. Prairie State Bank v. United States, 164 U.S. 227 (1896); Henningsen v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 208 U.S. 404 (1908) ; Pearlman v. Reliance Insurance Company, supra; United States v. Munsey Trust Company, supra.

Judgment will be entered in favor of plaintiff Continental Casualty Company in the amount of $26,904.37.

The claim of Edward J. Breen, et al., trustees in bankruptcy of the Pennsylvania Drydock and Shipbuilding Co., Inc., is dismissed.

[164]*164FINDINGS OF FACT

The court, having considered the evidence, the report of Trial Commissioner Mastín G. White, and the briefs and argument of counsel, makes findings of fact as follows:

1. The original plaintiff, Continental Casualty Company (referred to hereinafter as “Continental”), is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Illinois, with a place of business at 310 S. Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

2. The third-party plaintiffs, Edward J. Breen, Paul F. Harron, and Mitchell W. Miller, are the trustees in bankruptcy (and they will be referred to hereinafter as “the trustees”) of Pennsylvania Drydock & Shipbuilding Company, Inc. (referred to hereinafter as “Pennsylvania Dry-dock”) .

3. Under the date of January 2, 1951, Pennsylvania Dry-dock entered into a written contract with the defendant. The contract was numbered MCc-62693 and was described as a “Master Lump Sum Contract.” It provided in pertinent part as follows:

WHEREAS, the parties now desire to agree upon this contract which will by reference be incorporated into and become a part of lump sum job orders for work on or for named merchant vessels, or portions thereof, hereafter from time to time to be executed by the parties hereto;
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and of the mutual covenants and agreements hereinafter contained, the parties agree as follows:
*****
3. Payment.
* * * * *
(e) Moneys ascertained to be or become due or claimed by any person for work performed or materials or services furnished in connection with the work, together with probable expenses to be incurred in connection therewith, may be withheld by the Contracting Officer until all such persons’ claims and demands shall have been settled.
■* * * # *
4. No Liens.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
164 Ct. Cl. 160, 1964 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 40, 1964 WL 8559, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/continental-casualty-co-v-united-states-cc-1964.