ON PETITION TO TRANSFER
SULLIVAN, Justice.
This case is one of a number of Indiana lawsuits raising issues related to the ownership and use of parcels of land formerly constituting railroad rights-of-way. Here we agree with the trial court and Court of Appeals that the parcels in question are now owned by the owners of the land adjacent to the former right-of-way.
Background
We will briefly explain the background of this ease; for a fuller discussion of the facts, see the Court of Appeals opinion in
Consolidated Rail Corporation, Inc. v. Lewellen,
666 N.E.2d 958 (Ind.Ct.App.1996).
Landowners Pam Lewellen, Jerry Howard, Dale Remley and Cynthia and David Den-man brought a class action lawsuit against Consolidated Rail Corporation, Inc. (“Conrail”), to quiet title in segments of land of an abandoned railway corridor and to recover for slander of title, criminal conversion, and criminal trespass. Each landowner owns property adjacent to a former railroad corridor extending a distance of approximately twenty-nine miles from the western banks of the Wabash River to the west side of Craw-fordsville. Handwritten deeds more than 100 years old evidence the conveyance of the property to the original railroad. Many of the deeds state:
[Grantor], for consideration, “... hereby Conveys and Warrants to the [Railroad] the Land, Right of way and Right of Drainage for its Railway ...”
As activity over the rail line decreased, Conrail elected to discontinue rail service over this corridor. The Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”) issued Conrail a certificate of abandonment on February 24, 1982, authorizing Conrail to discontinue common carrier rail service on the line. By 1985, Conrail had removed the tracks and other materials but left in place structures such as bridges, culverts and drainage tiles. Between 1982 and 1994, Conrail continued to pay the real estate taxes on the land.
West Central Indiana Rails to Trails, Inc. (“West Central”), a public interest group concerned with preserving railway corridors, purchased Conrail’s interest in the corridor as evidenced by a quitclaim deed recorded July 6, 1994. Landowners filed the present class action lawsuit against Conrail and West Central claiming that Conrail acquired mere easements which upon abandonment of the rail line were extinguished. The trial court granted Landowners’ preliminary injunction enjoining West Central from altering the corridor, opening the corridor to the public, or advertising the corridor as a recreational trail. After motions for summary judgment by all parties, the trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Landowners and in effect quieted title in Landowners by determining that the deeds conveyed right-of-way easements which were extinguished upon abandonment. One question was properly certified for interlocutory appeal before the Court of Appeals:
Whether the trial court erred in construing certain 19th century deeds in favor of the landowners, determining that they conveyed mere easements to the Railroad which were extinguished upon abandonment, rather than fee simple interests.
The Court of Appeals affirmed and Conrail and West Central petitioned this Court to transfer.
Discussion
Issues related to the ownership and use of parcels of land formerly constituting railroad rights-of-way have become the subject of regular consideration by Indiana courts. In addition to those addressed in this opinion, we confront others today in
Calumet Nat’l Bank as Trustee v. Am. Tel. & Tel., a N.Y. Corp.,
682 N.E.2d 785 (Ind.1997).
In order to resolve the question presented here— whether the trial court properly granted partial summary judgment for the Landowners — we must consider whether ConraiTs predecessors-in-interest held fee simple title to or only easements over the parcels in question and, if only easements, whether those easements were abandoned. If the railroads held fee simple title to the parcels, there can be no question that West Central owns the right-of-way and summary judgment in favor of the Landowners was erroneous. But the summary judgment was proper if (i) the railroads’ interests consisted of easements and (ii) those easements were abandoned.
I
Appellants Conrail and West Central argue that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the deeds in question conveyed an easement rather than fee simple interest. In support of this argument, appellants point to the statute in place at the time the deeds were executed (still in place today) which provides that any conveyance worded as “A.B. conveys and warrants to C.D.” [here describe the premises] “for the sum of’ [here insert consideration] “shall be deemed and held to be a conveyance in fee simple to the grantee_”
With regard to this argument, we adopt the Court of Appeal’s reasoning that the use of the . term “right of way” in the deeds in issue in this case conveyed to the railroad only an easement. We emphasize that the language of the deeds in question in this case does not trace the cited property statutes. Rather, the majority of the deeds states that the grantor “conveys and warrants” to the railroad “Land, Right of way, and Right of drainage for its Railway.”
In our opinion in
Hefty,
we discussed at some length the methodology this Court enunciated in
Brown v. Penn Central Corp.,
510 N.E.2d 641 (Ind.1987) to construe the meaning of deeds conveying a strip of land to a railroad.
Hefty,
680 N.E.2d at 853-55. In
Hefty
and
Brotan,
we reaffirmed that the object of deed construction is to ascertain the intent of the parties and where there is no ambiguity in the deed, the intention of the parties must be determined from the language of the deed alone.
Hefty,
680 N.E.2d at 853-54;
Brown,
510 N.E.2d at 643 (citations omitted). We stressed that a.railroad is responsible for the printed words when the railroad prepares a conveyance form; thus, we will construe the form in a light most favorable to the grantors.
Hefty,
680 N.E.2d at 853-54;
Brown,
510 N.E.2d at 643 (both citing
Richard S. Brunt Trust v. Plantz,
458 N.E.2d 251, 252 (Ind.Ct.App.1983)). Helpful to our analysis here, we set forth the settled rule on conveyances of strips of land to railroads:
A deed that conveys a
right
generally conveys only an easement.
Brunt Trust,
458 N.E.2d at 253.
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ON PETITION TO TRANSFER
SULLIVAN, Justice.
This case is one of a number of Indiana lawsuits raising issues related to the ownership and use of parcels of land formerly constituting railroad rights-of-way. Here we agree with the trial court and Court of Appeals that the parcels in question are now owned by the owners of the land adjacent to the former right-of-way.
Background
We will briefly explain the background of this ease; for a fuller discussion of the facts, see the Court of Appeals opinion in
Consolidated Rail Corporation, Inc. v. Lewellen,
666 N.E.2d 958 (Ind.Ct.App.1996).
Landowners Pam Lewellen, Jerry Howard, Dale Remley and Cynthia and David Den-man brought a class action lawsuit against Consolidated Rail Corporation, Inc. (“Conrail”), to quiet title in segments of land of an abandoned railway corridor and to recover for slander of title, criminal conversion, and criminal trespass. Each landowner owns property adjacent to a former railroad corridor extending a distance of approximately twenty-nine miles from the western banks of the Wabash River to the west side of Craw-fordsville. Handwritten deeds more than 100 years old evidence the conveyance of the property to the original railroad. Many of the deeds state:
[Grantor], for consideration, “... hereby Conveys and Warrants to the [Railroad] the Land, Right of way and Right of Drainage for its Railway ...”
As activity over the rail line decreased, Conrail elected to discontinue rail service over this corridor. The Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”) issued Conrail a certificate of abandonment on February 24, 1982, authorizing Conrail to discontinue common carrier rail service on the line. By 1985, Conrail had removed the tracks and other materials but left in place structures such as bridges, culverts and drainage tiles. Between 1982 and 1994, Conrail continued to pay the real estate taxes on the land.
West Central Indiana Rails to Trails, Inc. (“West Central”), a public interest group concerned with preserving railway corridors, purchased Conrail’s interest in the corridor as evidenced by a quitclaim deed recorded July 6, 1994. Landowners filed the present class action lawsuit against Conrail and West Central claiming that Conrail acquired mere easements which upon abandonment of the rail line were extinguished. The trial court granted Landowners’ preliminary injunction enjoining West Central from altering the corridor, opening the corridor to the public, or advertising the corridor as a recreational trail. After motions for summary judgment by all parties, the trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Landowners and in effect quieted title in Landowners by determining that the deeds conveyed right-of-way easements which were extinguished upon abandonment. One question was properly certified for interlocutory appeal before the Court of Appeals:
Whether the trial court erred in construing certain 19th century deeds in favor of the landowners, determining that they conveyed mere easements to the Railroad which were extinguished upon abandonment, rather than fee simple interests.
The Court of Appeals affirmed and Conrail and West Central petitioned this Court to transfer.
Discussion
Issues related to the ownership and use of parcels of land formerly constituting railroad rights-of-way have become the subject of regular consideration by Indiana courts. In addition to those addressed in this opinion, we confront others today in
Calumet Nat’l Bank as Trustee v. Am. Tel. & Tel., a N.Y. Corp.,
682 N.E.2d 785 (Ind.1997).
In order to resolve the question presented here— whether the trial court properly granted partial summary judgment for the Landowners — we must consider whether ConraiTs predecessors-in-interest held fee simple title to or only easements over the parcels in question and, if only easements, whether those easements were abandoned. If the railroads held fee simple title to the parcels, there can be no question that West Central owns the right-of-way and summary judgment in favor of the Landowners was erroneous. But the summary judgment was proper if (i) the railroads’ interests consisted of easements and (ii) those easements were abandoned.
I
Appellants Conrail and West Central argue that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the deeds in question conveyed an easement rather than fee simple interest. In support of this argument, appellants point to the statute in place at the time the deeds were executed (still in place today) which provides that any conveyance worded as “A.B. conveys and warrants to C.D.” [here describe the premises] “for the sum of’ [here insert consideration] “shall be deemed and held to be a conveyance in fee simple to the grantee_”
With regard to this argument, we adopt the Court of Appeal’s reasoning that the use of the . term “right of way” in the deeds in issue in this case conveyed to the railroad only an easement. We emphasize that the language of the deeds in question in this case does not trace the cited property statutes. Rather, the majority of the deeds states that the grantor “conveys and warrants” to the railroad “Land, Right of way, and Right of drainage for its Railway.”
In our opinion in
Hefty,
we discussed at some length the methodology this Court enunciated in
Brown v. Penn Central Corp.,
510 N.E.2d 641 (Ind.1987) to construe the meaning of deeds conveying a strip of land to a railroad.
Hefty,
680 N.E.2d at 853-55. In
Hefty
and
Brotan,
we reaffirmed that the object of deed construction is to ascertain the intent of the parties and where there is no ambiguity in the deed, the intention of the parties must be determined from the language of the deed alone.
Hefty,
680 N.E.2d at 853-54;
Brown,
510 N.E.2d at 643 (citations omitted). We stressed that a.railroad is responsible for the printed words when the railroad prepares a conveyance form; thus, we will construe the form in a light most favorable to the grantors.
Hefty,
680 N.E.2d at 853-54;
Brown,
510 N.E.2d at 643 (both citing
Richard S. Brunt Trust v. Plantz,
458 N.E.2d 251, 252 (Ind.Ct.App.1983)). Helpful to our analysis here, we set forth the settled rule on conveyances of strips of land to railroads:
A deed that conveys a
right
generally conveys only an easement.
Brunt Trust,
458 N.E.2d at 253. The general rule is that conveyance to a railroad of a strip, piece, or parcel of land, without additional language as to the use or purpose to which the land is to be put or in other ways limiting the estate conveyed, is to be construed as passing an estate in fee, but reference to a right-of-way in such conveyance generally leads to its construction as conveying only an easement.
L. & G. Realty & Construction Co. v. Indianapolis,
(1957), 127 Ind.App. 315, 322, 139 N.E.2d 580, 585.
Brown,
510 N.E.2d at 644.
In
Brown,
the deed conveyed to the railroad “the Right of Way for the use of the Railroad ...” and “a strip Two hundred feet in width ... for Depot and Rail Road purposes.”
Id.
The dispute was over whether the 200 foot strip used for the depot was an easement. We found that the deed, clearly falling within the general rule articulated above, conveyed only an easement. Here, as in
Brown,
the handwritten conveyance forms contain, along with the term “right of way,” additional language indicating the purpose for which the land was to be used: “Land, Right of way and Right of drainage
for its Railway”
(emphasis added and differences in capitalization in various deeds ignored). We conclude that the conveyances were merely easements.
Conrail and West Central argue that should this Court determine that the deeds eonveyed only a right of way easement, we should hold that the deeds in question are ambiguous. We think that the grantors’ intent to convey an easement to the railroad is clearly expressed in the handwritten deeds and we find the deeds to be unambiguous.
II
Property law in Indiana provides that, upon abandonment by the railroad, a railroad easement terminates and the fee simple interest in the land reverts to the grantor, or the grantor’s heirs, assigns or devisees. More precisely, the title of the grantor no longer is subject to the burden of the easement.
Lake County Trust Co. v. Lane,
478 N.E.2d 684, 688 (Ind.Ct.App.1985)(where railroad held only an easement “upon abandonment of the railroad, the property passed to the adjoining landowners”),
trans. denied; Richard S. Brunt Trust v. Plantz,
458 N.E.2d 251, 255 (Ind.Ct.App.1983)(“abandonment of railroad operations extinguished the easements and permitted the adjoining landowners as titleholders in fee simple to reclaim the easements” (citing cases)); L.
& G. Realty & Construction Co. v. City of Indianapolis,
127 Ind.App. 315, 330, 139 N.E.2d 580, 588 (1957)(where easement granted for railroad purposes, upon abandonment the easement automatically reverts to the heirs and devi-sees of the grantors).
We look to Indiana common law and Indiana statutes in order to determine what constitutes abandonment for purposes of extinguishing a railroad’s right-of-way easement. Under the common law of this state, the intent to abandon was a necessary element of abandonment of an easement created by express grant.
Seymour Water Company v. Lebline,
195 Ind. 481, 489, 144 N.E. 30, 33 (1924). The question of abandonment was a question of intention to be determined from the facts of the case.
Perry v. Carey,
68 Ind.App. 56, 60, 119 N.E. 1010, 1011 (1918). Although an easement acquired by actual grant was not extinguished by mere nonuse, nonuse plus an act indicating an intent to abandon may have had the effect of extinguishing the easement.
Id. See also Brock v. B & M Moster Farms, Inc.,
481 N.E.2d 1106 (Ind.Ct.App.1985)(easement created by grant generally not lost through mere nonuse);
Bauer v. Harris,
617 N.E.2d 923 (Ind.Ct.App.1993)(abandonment of prescriptive easement requires nonuse and intent to abandon).
West Central explicitly and Conrail impliedly argued to the trial court that abandonment had not occurred as evidenced by Conrail’s having continued to pay real estate taxes for the property and Conrail’s having left in place the bridges, culverts and drainage tiles.
Brief in Support of Defendant’s [West Central] Motion for Summary Judgment.
On the other hand, the facts are undisputed that the Interstate Commerce Commission issued Conrail a certificate of abandonment on February 24,1982, authorizing Conrail to discontinue common carrier rail service on the line. By 1985, Conrail had removed the tracks and other materials but left in place structures such as bridges, culverts and drainage tiles. Between 1982 and 1994 Conrail continued to pay the real estate taxes on the land.
If Indiana common law controlled the outcome of whether or not Conrail intended to abandon its right of way easement, we believe that the foregoing demonstrates genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. However, we conclude that the common law on whether abandonment has occurred was superseded by the General Assembly. In a statute enacted in 1987, the legislature determined that a railroad abandons its right of way when (1) the ICC issues a certificate relieving the railroad of its common carrier obligation on the right of way and (2) “rails, switches, ties, and other facilities” have been removed from the right of way. Ind.Code § 8-4-35-4 (1993) (repealed 1995) (current version at Ind.Code § 32-5-12-6(a)(2) (Supp.1996)).
The legislature of this state decided that issuance of a certificate of abandonment and removal of railroad “facilities” sufficiently evidence a railroad’s intent to abandon. If both of these statutory elements of abandonment were met, then, as a matter of law, abandonment occurred, at least as of the effective date of the statute, July 1,1987.
West Central argues that under this statute, no abandonment occurred where Conrail did not remove such “other facilities” as trestles, bridges, culverts, drainage tiles and subsurface ballast. When construing the meaning of the terms “other facilities,” we apply the principle of
ejusdem generis,
which
maintains that “where words of specific and limited signification in a statute are followed by general words of more comprehensive import, the general words shall be construed as embracing only such persons, places, and things as are of like kind or class to those designated by the specific words, unless a contrary intention is clearly shown by the statute.
Thompson v. Thompson
(1972), 259 Ind. 266, 275-76, 286 N.E.2d 657, 662-63.”
Drake v. Mitchell Community Schools,
649 N.E.2d 1027, 1030 (Ind.1995).
Following this rule of statutory construction, the phrase “other facilities” includes only the railroad materials consistent with the materials listed in the statute: rails, ties and switches. Trestles, bridges, culverts, drainage tiles and subsurface ballast are not the same type of railroad materials as rails, ties and switches. Therefore, pursuant to Ind.Code § 8-4-35-4 (1993)(repealed 1995), we conclude that Conrail, having received the ICC’s authorization to abandon and having removed the rails and ties, as a matter of law, abandoned the railroad right of way no later than July 1,1987.
Ill
Conrail and West Central characterize their argument as one promoting the public policy favoring the preservation of railway corridors as recreational trails. In support of its motion for summary judgment before the trial court, Conrail points to the United States National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1241
et seq.
(Trails System Act),
and Ind.Code § 8-3-1-21.1 (1993)
as evidence of the national and state public policy of preserving railroad rights-of-way.
Defendant, Consolidated Rail Corporation’s, Motion for Summary Judgment.
We do not disagree that Congress and the Indiana Legislature may have the authority to preserve the right of the public in existing rail corridors.
See Preseault v. I.C.C.,
494 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 914, 108 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990)(holding the Trails System Act, as amended in 1983, to be a valid exercise of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause).
Cf. Preseault v. United States,
100 F.3d 1525 (Fed.Cir.1996)(in banc)(plurality opinion of Plager, J.)(holding exercise of government authority under Trails System Act to be a compensable taking on facts presented). However, West
Central and Conrail do not rely upon any action taken pursuant to such legislative enactments to support the argument urging this Court to reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. In the absence of any such action, we believe the disposition of this case is governed by the common law set forth in part I and the statutory law set forth in part II of this opinion
Conclusion
Having found that the deeds unambiguously convey to the railroad a mere right-of-way easement, we grant transfer, adopt the judgment and opinion of the Court of Appeals pursuant to App. R. 11(B)(3), and affirm the trial court.
SHEPARD, C.J., and DICKSON and SELBY, JJ., concur.
BOEHM, J., not participating.