Brown v. Scalise

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Indiana
DecidedMay 15, 2025
Docket3:20-cv-00680
StatusUnknown

This text of Brown v. Scalise (Brown v. Scalise) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Brown v. Scalise, (N.D. Ind. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA HAMMOND DIVISION AT SOUTH BEND

DEBORAH SULLIVAN BROWN, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs / Counter Defendants, ) ) v. ) ) Cause No. 3:20-CV-680-PPS ROSARIO SCALISE, ) ) Defendant / Counter Claimant. ) ) OPINION AND ORDER

At its core, this case concerns what it means to be a good neighbor. It is a cautionary tale of the extreme breakdown of the relationship between owners of neighboring beachfront properties in Michigan City, Indiana. The Plaintiffs are Deborah and Gerry Brown and David Broitman who was the Successor Trustee of his father’s trust. The Browns bought the home that lies at the center of this dispute from the Broitman trust. For ease of reference, I will refer to the Broitman trust as simply “Broitman.” The property at issue is located at 208 Louisiana Avenue, Michigan City, Indiana (the “208 Property”). Defendant Rosario Scalise is the owner of two neighboring properties located at 206 and 204 Louisiana Avenue (the “206 Property” and the “204 Property”).1 The 206 Property borders the west side, and the 204 Property borders the south side of the 208 Property, respectively.

1 Scalise contested diversity jurisdiction, but Judge Miller, who was previously assigned the case, denied Scalise’s motion to dismiss for lack for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and held that diversity jurisdiction exists. [DE 20.] This case involves two principal issues: the validity of an easement on the 208 Property and whether Scalise caused property damage to his neighbor’s home during

the construction activity on his properties. In July 2023, Judge Miller granted in part Scalise’s motion for summary judgment that pared down the Browns’ and Broitman’s claims, including by limiting the Plaintiffs’ property damage claims to the respective periods that they owned the 208 Property. [DE 71.] Beginning on January 6 and concluding on January 13, 2025, the Parties proceeded to a five-day bench trial on three issues: (1) The Browns’ request for a

declaratory judgment that Scalise abandoned an ingress/egress easement on the 208 Property or, conversely, Scalise’s request for a declaratory judgment that the easement is still enforceable; (2) Broitman’s property damage claim; and (3) the Browns’ property damage claim. [DE 102; DE 103; DE 104; DE 105; DE 106.] The Parties submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law as well as trial briefs prior to trial. [DE

92; DE 94; DE 96; DE 97.] They subsequently filed supplemental proposed findings of fact and law, and responses to the same, after trial. [DE 109; DE 110; DE 111; DE 112.] Having considered the Parties’ arguments and the evidence submitted, I now make the following findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. To the extent that any finding of fact is deemed to be a

conclusion of law, it is incorporated as such, and vice versa. Findings of Fact In order to make the following facts more comprehensible, and because a picture is worth a thousand words, here is a photograph showing the three pertinent lots: Deiat Lira al > eit! al ‘a eats ; □ - □

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[DE 59 at 2.] (For further orientation, north is at the top of this photo.) In 1969, the then owners of the 206 and 208 Properties entered into an express easement agreement (the “Easement Agreement”). [DE 1-3; DE 71 at 3.] The easement in question runs between the 208 and 204 Properties (but is contained entirely on the 208 Property) and provides access to the 206 Property. At the time the easement was drafted, the 206 Property was landlocked because the 208 Property sat in between the 206 Property and Louisiana Avenue to the east. Here is how the easement is described in the Easement Agreement: itis a “concrete walkway [located on the south 11.5’ feet of the 208 Property] approximately thirty-six inches (36) wide by fifty feet (50) long (more or less) used as ingress to and egress from Louisiana Avenue and [the 206 Property].” [DE 1-3 at 1.] The Easement Agreement further provides that the concrete walkway “be perpetually used

as an easement for ingress and egress.” [Id. at 2.] In addition, the Easement Agreement required that the concrete walkway “shall, at all times, be unobstructed” and granted to

the 206 Property a “right to keep the concrete walk repaired and useable.” [Id.] Broitman bought the 208 Property in the 1970s. [DE 71 at 3.] Thereafter, in 2018, Scalise began to evaluate a potential purchase of both the 206 and 204 Properties. [DE 94 at ¶¶3–10.] Scalise learned that a deck located on the northwest corner and a landing for a western-facing door of the 208 Property encroached on the 206 Property. [Id. at ¶4.] The deck in the northwestern corner of the 208 Property appears to have been built in

approximately 1985. [See Pltfs. Exh. 26.]2 Scalise approached Broitman about these encroachments, and the two sides on December 14, 2018, entered into a written agreement that (1) permitted the deck and landing to remain where they were in exchange for waiver of a claim of adverse possession; and (2) acknowledged that if the deck or landing were damaged or destroyed, they could not be reconstructed. [DE 55-6

at 91–94.] Scalise subsequently completed his purchase of the 206 and 204 Properties. [DE 94 at ¶10.] Around 2015, Broitman began to rent the 208 Property to summer beachgoers and later employed the rental management service Beachwalk Properties to do so. No evidence was presented at trial about the rental history of the 208 Property. In other

words, there was no evidence as to how often the 208 Property was actually rented from 2015 through 2018 or what the amount of any rental income was, if any. Sometime after

2 In referencing exhibits tendered Error! Main Document Only.by the Parties, I will uniformly cite to Plaintiffs’ admitted exhibits as “Pltfs. Exh. #,” and Defendant’s admitted exhibits as “Def. Exh. #,” as these documents have not been electronically filed on the docket. buying the adjacent properties, Scalise became aware that Broitman occasionally used the 208 Property for short term rentals.

In the spring of 2019, Scalise hired a contractor to demolish and clear the existing house on the 206 Property. [DE 94 at ¶14.] Scalise then began construction of a new house on the property. [Id. at ¶16.] And it was an inauspicious start. In late May or early June 2019, Scalise began trenching activities to the west of the 208 Property along the eastern edge of his 206 Property. In the process, while using a piece of heavy equipment, Scalise inadvertently knocked down the western landing and stairs of the

208 Property. Broitman testified that Scalise did not ask for permission to remove this landing and did not offer to reimburse Broitman for its destruction. Scalise also admits that he trespassed on his neighbor’s property by nailing shut the westward facing door on the 208 Property, which had previously opened onto the landing that Scalise had knocked down. [See Pltfs. Exh. 19 at Bates 25, Bates 27.]3 Scalise claims he nailed the

door shut to guard against anyone opening the door and injuring themselves because of the several foot drop that now existed due to the destruction of the landing and the steps. Of note, at trial neither Broitman nor Scalise presented evidence of Broitman renting the 208 Property to short-term renters after the destruction of the landing until August 2019 (which I will get to in a minute).

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Brown v. Scalise, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/brown-v-scalise-innd-2025.