Conrad v. Hamrick

2025 Ohio 1773

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 19, 2025
• Docket: 10-24-07
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Conrad v. Hamrick, 2025-Ohio-1773.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT MERCER COUNTY

TRAVIS J. CONRAD, CASE NO. 10-24-07

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

V.

GARY L. HAMRICK, ET AL., OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

Appeal from Mercer County Common Pleas Court Trial Court No. 21-CV-067

Judgment Affirmed

Date of Decision: May 19, 2025

APPEARANCES:

Michael J. Tremoulis and Matthew H. Huffman for Appellant

J. Mark Trimble for Appellees Case No. 10-24-07

ZIMMERMAN, J.

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, Travis J. Conrad (“Conrad”), appeals the judgments

of the Mercer County Court of Common Pleas granting defendants-appellees, Gary

Hamrick (“Hamrick”) and H.H. Hamrick Farms, Inc. (“H.H. Farms”) (collectively,

“defendants”), motion for leave to file an answer instanter and denying his motion

for default judgment. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

{¶2} This case stems from a motor vehicle collision that occurred on October

5, 2019 on State Route 49 in Mercer County, Ohio. The collision involved a 2016

Ram pickup truck, operated by Hamrick while in the course of his employment with

H.H. Farms, which was towing a trailer carrying a bean header, and a 1988 Harley

Davidson motorcycle operated by Conrad. Hamrick was proceeding northbound on

State Route 49 and initiated a left turn onto Rockford West Road. Simultaneously,

Conrad, also traveling northbound on State Route 49, attempted to overtake

Hamrick’s vehicle on the left, entering the southbound lane, as Hamrick executed

the turn. Conrad sustained serious injuries as a result of the collision. The parties

disputed the allocation of liability for the collision.

{¶3} Consequently, on October 1, 2021, Conrad filed a complaint, alleging

claims for negligence and respondeat superior against the defendants and a claim

for negligence against the Ohio Department of Transportation. The defendants were

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served on October 4, 2021. On November 3, 2021, Conrad dismissed his claim

against the Ohio Department of Transportation.

{¶4} Because the defendants did not file a timely response, Conrad filed a

motion for default judgment on November 4, 2021 the day after the defendants’

responsive pleading was due.

{¶5} On November 8, 2021, the defendants submitted a motion for leave to

file their answer instanter, arguing that their failure to file a timely answer was due

to excusable neglect, not a willful disregard of the court or legal process. 1 They

attributed their failure to inadvertent oversight resulting from counsel’s schedule,

workload, and initial uncertainty regarding the scope of their representation—i.e.,

whether counsel was representing Hamrick and H.H. Farms—after receiving the

case file from Hamrick’s insurance carrier. The defendants further contended that

granting leave would not prejudice Conrad, as the motion for default judgment was

still pending and no trial or pretrial dates had been scheduled. Conrad filed a

memorandum in opposition to the defendants’ motion for leave to file an answer on

November 9, 2021, asserting that the reasons provided by the defendants did not

constitute excusable neglect under the applicable legal standard, and that the failure

to file a timely answer was preventable.

1 The trial court’s October 21, 2024 entry indicates the while defendants’ motion for leave was submitted on November 8, 2021, it was not recorded on the court’s docket until November 12, 2021.

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{¶6} On November 12, 2021, the trial court granted the defendants’ motion

for leave to file their answer and filed their answer instanter, explicitly stating that

it had considered the motion despite the file stamp discrepancy. That same day, the

trial court denied Conrad’s motion for default judgment.

{¶7} Conrad filed a notice of appeal on December 13, 2021, challenging the

trial court’s denial of his motion for default judgment, but later voluntarily

dismissed the appeal on January 21, 2022, after determining that the order was not

a final appealable order.

{¶8} On July 19, 2023, Conrad filed a motion for reconsideration, requesting

that the trial court reconsider its November 12, 2021 decision granting the

defendants’ motion for leave to file their answer instanter and denying his motion

for default judgment. In his motion, Conrad argued that the defendants should not

have been granted leave to file their answer under Civ.R. 6(B)(2) because they did

not provide sufficient facts to establish excusable neglect for their failure to file a

timely answer. The defendants filed a memorandum in opposition to Conrad’s

motion for reconsideration on August 1, 2023. After a hearing on August 28, 2023,

the trial court denied Conrad’s motion for reconsideration on October 25, 2023 after

determining that it had properly considered all the facts and issues in its original

decision and agreeing with the previous decision to grant the defendants leave to

file their answer and to deny Conrad’s motion for default judgment. Specifically,

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the trial court concluded that the defendants’ failure to file a timely answer was due

to excusable neglect and did not warrant a default judgment.

{¶9} Prior to trial, the parties filed a motion to bifurcate the trial, seeking to

first determine negligence, because they had agreed to resolve the case based on the

jury’s finding of negligence. The case proceeded to a jury trial on September 11-

12, 2024, and on September 12, 2024, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the

defendants. Consequently, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the

defendants on September 16, 2024.

{¶10} Conrad filed his notice of appeal on October 11, 2024. On November

1, 2024, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss Conrad’s appeal, asserting that a

pre-trial high-low agreement entered into by the parties precluded Conrad from

appealing. Following Conrad’s opposition to the defendants’ motion to dismiss,

this court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss, explaining that the parties’ high-

low agreement applied only to the issue of damages. Conrad raises one assignment

of error for our review.

Assignment of Error

The Trial Court Erred In Granting Defendants’ Motion For Leave To File Defendants-Appellees’ Answer, Instanter And, In Turn, Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion For Default Judgment.

{¶11} In his sole assignment of error, Conrad argues that the trial court erred

by granting the defendants leave to file a late answer and by denying his motion for

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default judgment. Specifically, Conrad challenges the trial court’s findings

regarding the defendants’ excusable neglect for failing to file a timely answer.

Standard of Review

{¶12} A trial court’s decision to grant a default judgment or to grant leave to

file a late answer under Civ.R. 6(B) upon a finding of excusable neglect will not be

reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Watts v. Fledderman, 2018-Ohio-2732, ¶ 36

(1st Dist.). An abuse of discretion suggests the trial court’s decision is

unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d

217, 219 (1983).

Analysis

{¶13} Civ.R. 55 permits a trial court to “enter a default judgment ‘“against a

defendant who has failed to timely plead in response to an affirmative pleading.”’”

Chapman v. O’Shaughnessy, 2024-Ohio-2926, ¶ 46 (10th Dist.), quoting Asamoah

v. Sygma Network, Inc., 2022-Ohio-1868, ¶ 10 (10th Dist.), quoting Ohio Valley

Radiology Assoc., Inc. v. Ohio Valley Hosp. Assn., 28 Ohio St.3d 118, 121 (1986).

“Only when a defendant ‘“fails to contest the opposing party’s allegations” by either

pleading or otherwise defending does a default arise.’” Id., quoting Hillman v.

Edwards, 2009-Ohio-5087, ¶ 6 (10th Dist.), quoting Ohio Valley at 121.

{¶14} “In general, courts disfavor default judgments.” Id. “‘Granting a

default judgment, analogous to granting a dismissal, is a harsh remedy that should

be imposed only when the actions of the defaulting party create a presumption of

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willfulness or bad faith.’” Id., quoting Hillman at ¶ 6. Thus, notwithstanding this

court’s “deferential standard of review [for default judgment], courts of appeals and

trial courts, alike, must be mindful that ‘[g]enerally, the law disfavors default

judgments’ and ‘[t]he general policy in Ohio is to decide cases on their merits

whenever possible.’” U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v. Maxfield, 2016-Ohio-3396, ¶ 10

(12th Dist.), quoting Baines v. Harwood, 87 Ohio App.3d 345, 347 (12th Dist.

1993).

{¶15} “To militate against the harshness of a default judgment, Civ.R. 6(B)

permits a trial court to grant a party additional time to file a pleading or response.”

Chapman at ¶ 47, quoting Asamoah at ¶ 15. When “a defendant moves for leave to

answer after the date the answer is due, Civ.R. 6(B)(2) permits the trial court to

grant the defendant’s motion upon a showing of excusable neglect.” Brooks v.

Progressive Ins. Co., 1994 WL 376768, *2 (9th Dist. July 20, 1994). “Although the

term ‘excusable neglect’ is an elusive concept that courts often find difficult to

define and to apply, the cases discussing excusable neglect reveal some general

principles.” Lester v. Chivington, 2015-Ohio-5446, ¶ 19 (3d Dist.).

{¶16} “Indicators of whether neglect was excusable in a particular

circumstance include whether the opposing party was prejudiced by the delay, the

relative length of the delay, and whether the opposing party filed its own materials

in a timely manner.” Chapman at ¶ 47. “Examples of instances where a court might

find excusable neglect include the following: the party had neither knowledge nor

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notice of the pending legal action; counsel of record suffers from personal or family

illness; and counsel of record fails to appear for trial because he has not received

notice of a rescheduled trial date.” Lester at ¶ 19. “A majority of the cases finding

excusable neglect also have found unusual or special circumstances that justified

the neglect of the party or attorney.” Id.

{¶17} “‘Neglect is inexcusable, pursuant to Civ.R. 6(B), when a party’s

inaction can be classified as a “complete disregard for the judicial system.”’” Id. at

¶ 20, quoting Reimund v. Reimund, 2005-Ohio-2775, ¶ 16 (3d Dist.), quoting GTE

Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146, 153 (1976).

“Likewise, conduct falling ‘substantially below what is reasonable under the

circumstances’ constitutes inexcusable neglect.” Id., quoting GTE at 152. “Further,

if the party could have prevented the circumstances from occurring, neglect will not

be considered excusable.” McKinley v. Rhee, 2002 WL 596113, *1 (3d Dist. Apr.

17, 2002).

{¶18} When “‘determining whether neglect is excusable or inexcusable, this

Court must take into consideration the surrounding facts and circumstances, and

must be mindful of the admonition that cases should be decided on their merits,

where possible, rather than procedural grounds.’” Lester at ¶ 18, quoting Univ. of

Akron v. Mangan, 2008-Ohio-4844, ¶ 10 (9th Dist.). “When considering these

circumstances and the preference for settling cases on their merits, we are also

mindful that ‘the test for excusable neglect under Civ.R. 6(B)(2) is less stringent

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than that applied under Civ.R. 60(B).’” Id., quoting State ex rel. Lindenschmidt v.

Bd. of Commrs. of Butler Cty., 72 Ohio St.3d 464, 466 (1995). See also Chapman

at ¶ 47 (“The Civ.R. 6(B) excusable neglect standard is notably forgiving.”), quoting

Asamoah, 2022-Ohio-1868, at ¶ 16 (10th Dist.).

{¶19} In this case, Conrad contends that the trial court abused its discretion

by denying his motion for default judgment and by granting the defendants leave to

file a late answer. He argues that the trial court misapplied the legal standard for

excusable neglect under Civ.R. 6(B)(2), asserting that the defendants’ conduct did

not meet this standard because their reasons for failing to file a timely answer were

events that the defendants could have controlled or avoided. Disputing Conrad’s

arguments, the defendants contend that the trial court properly exercised its

discretion by finding excusable neglect. They maintain that their failure to file a

timely answer was indeed due to excusable neglect, citing the receipt of the case file

on October 12, 2021 from Hamrick’s insurance carrier, uncertainty about

representing both parties until November 5, 2021, office workload, and

inadvertently overlooking the answer date.

{¶20} We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying

Conrad’s motion for default judgment after granting the defendants leave to file a

late answer. Accord Citizens Natl. Bank of SW Ohio v. Harrison, 2016-Ohio-2746,

¶ 22 (emphasizing that “whether a party’s action or inaction constitutes excusable

neglect is commended to the discretion of the trial court, which means that an

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appellate court must accord the trial court a certain decisional latitude in

determining whether its ruling is an abuse of discretion” and that a “trial court’s

determination of whether certain action or inaction constitutes excusable neglect

may be upheld on appeal, regardless of what the trial court determines”), quoting

Brown v. Household Realty Corp., 2003-Ohio-5414, ¶ 18 (2d Dist.). Importantly,

the surrounding facts and circumstances of this case reflect that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion by determining that the defendants demonstrated excusable

neglect. Indeed, the trial court’s decision properly reflects that, when determining

excusable neglect here, it considered all of the surrounding facts and circumstances,

as it was required to do, rather than limiting its analysis solely to the defendants’

reasons for filing their answer late.

{¶21} Specifically, the defendants’ failure to file a timely answer in this case

was attributed to factors such as counsel’s schedule, workload, and confusion

regarding the scope of representation. While these reasons might not always

constitute excusable neglect, the trial court considered the totality of the

circumstances presented this case and determined that they amounted to excusable

neglect in this instance.

{¶22} Importantly, the defendants delay in filing their motion for leave to

file their answer was relatively short. Compare Chapman, 2024-Ohio-2926, at ¶ 48

(10th Dist.); Wilson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 2009-Ohio-16, ¶ 29 (5th Dist.)

(reviewing that the “[a]ppellee filed its motion within a few days of the answer date

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and six days after appellants’ Motion for Default Judgment was filed”). In

particular, Conrad filed his complaint on October 1, 2021 (and the defendants were

served on October 4, 2021), rendering the answer due on November 3, 2021. See

Harrison at ¶ 17 (“Civ.R. 12(A)(1) provides that a defendant shall serve his answer

within twenty-eight days after service of the complaint.”). Conrad filed his motion

for default judgment the next day. Despite a discrepancy in the record as to the

exact filing date, the record reflects that the defendants submitted their motion for

leave to file their answer on November 8, 2021—five days (three business days)

after the deadline. In other words, the defendants took reasonably prompt action to

rectify the oversight by filing a motion for leave to file an answer, articulating their

reasons for their tardiness.

{¶23} Furthermore, while Conrad was briefly delayed in obtaining a

resolution in this case, there is no indication that the delay impaired his ability to

present his case, default had not yet been entered by the trial court, and Conrad did

not suffer significant prejudice beyond the ordinary requirements of litigation. See

Chapman at ¶ 49. Consequently, considering the high degree of discretion afforded

to trial courts in decisions regarding excusable neglect, the preference for deciding

cases on their merits, the relatively short delay in this case, and the lack of

significant prejudice to Conrad, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by

granting the defendants leave to file their answer and or by denying Conrad’s motion

for default judgment.

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{¶24} Conrad’s assignment of error is overruled.

{¶25} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

WALDICK, P.J. and WILLAMOWSKI, J., concur.

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JUDGMENT ENTRY

For the reasons stated in the opinion of this Court, the assignment of error is

overruled and it is the judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the trial

court is affirmed with costs assessed to Appellant for which judgment is hereby

rendered. The cause is hereby remanded to the trial court for execution of the

judgment for costs.

It is further ordered that the Clerk of this Court certify a copy of this Court’s

judgment entry and opinion to the trial court as the mandate prescribed by App.R.

27; and serve a copy of this Court’s judgment entry and opinion on each party to the

proceedings and note the date of service in the docket. See App.R. 30.

William R. Zimmerman, Judge

Juergen A. Waldick, Judge

John R. Willamowski, Judge

DATED: /hls

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