Conoco, Inc. v. Fortune Production Co.

35 S.W.3d 23, 152 Oil & Gas Rep. 131, 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 6777, 1998 WL 752034
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedOctober 29, 1998
DocketNo. 01-97-00547-CV
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 35 S.W.3d 23 (Conoco, Inc. v. Fortune Production Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Conoco, Inc. v. Fortune Production Co., 35 S.W.3d 23, 152 Oil & Gas Rep. 131, 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 6777, 1998 WL 752034 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998).

Opinion

OPINION

TAFT, Justice.

This appeal arises from a dispute about natural gas contracts. Appellees, Fortune Production Co. (Fortune), Tucker Drilling Co., Inc. (Tucker), Curtis Hankamer Corp. (Hankamer), and John L. Cox sued appellant, Conoco Inc. (Conoco), for breach of contract, fraud in the inducement, reformation, conversion, and unjust enrichment. In accordance with the jury’s verdict, judgment was rendered against Conoco for $894,673 in unjust enrichment damages plus prejudgment interest. We address whether: (1) the trial court erred in allowing appellees to recover for unjust enrichment; (2) the trial court abused its discretion in permitting appellees to amend their petition to allege unjust enrichment after the parties had rested and the evidence was closed; (3) the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to prove that Cono-co unjustly received benefits; (4) the trial court erred in refusing to disregard the jury’s answer to the question on ratification and in rendering judgment that the appellees take nothing on their fraud claim; and (5) the trial court erred in refusing to disregard the jury’s finding of fraud damages. We affirm.

Facts

Appellees, who are oil and gas producers, brought this suit as representatives for the interest owners in certain West Texas gas wells. Since 1975, those wells have been under contract to supply gas to the Concho Valley Gas System. This system was initially formed by the efforts of appellees and one of Conoco’s predecessors, Farmland, to maximize the advantages of the unregulated intrastate gas market. For the system to be worth building, Farmland required (1) a gas supply and (2) a long-term customer. Appel-lees committed their gas, and Lone Star Gas Company (Lone Star) became the [26]*26principal customer. Appellees’ gas was dedicated to the Lone Star/Farmland contract under its terms of dedication, and appellees entered into gas purchase contracts with Farmland entitling them to a percentage of the Lone Star contract price.1 The price was paid “at the wellhead,” which means it was determined according to the MMBtu (the heating value) of the gas at the point it was extracted from the ground. The contracts varied in the length of their primary term, but continued in effect during the entire time Farmland operated the system.

In the late 1980’s, Enerfin purchased the system from Farmland. No changes were made in the method or manner of payment to appellees. In 1989, Tucker entered into two contracts with Enerfin which entitled Tucker to payment based upon the Lone Star contract. In August 1989, Conoco purchased the system from Enerfin and succeeded to the benefits and obligations of the Enerfin contracts. The market for gas had decreased significantly below the price Lone Star was committed to paying. Immediately upon its takeover, Conoco gave notice of termination of all of appel-lees’ contracts except the two Enerfin contracts.

At the same time, Conoco began negotiations with appellees for renewal contracts. David Lugar, Conoco’s gas buyer, proposed that the new contracts be made “to facilitate efficient contract administration and accounting.” He also advised ap-pellees in his letter that Conoco wished to change to a “percent of proceeds” type of contract. A percent of proceeds contract is one under which a gas supplier, rather than being paid at the wellhead, is paid a share of the price paid by the ultimate consumer for the two finished products: hydrocarbon liquids and residue gas.2 Consistent with Lugar’s representations that Fortune would receive a share of the price for which it sold the liquids and residue gas “attributable” to Fortune’s gas, the proposed contract attached to his letter contained two pricing provisions: one for gas and one for liquids. The residue gas pricing provision included language indicating the gas would be sold on the spot market3 and paid at market price.

Appellees were upset with the new contracts proposed by Conoco, which appeared to deprive them of any share of the Lone Star contract price. Appellees believed that Lugar’s representations that appellees would be paid a percent of the proceeds Conoco received for the sale of their gas entitled them to the higher Lone Star contract price. Appellees contend that when they inquired about the lack of any reference to the Lone Star contract price they were told their gas could no longer be sold to Lone Star and it would be sold on the spot market. Conoco admitted that it did not intend to pay appel-lees a share of the Lone Star Contract Price, as opposed to market price, but denied that it lied to appellees about whether the gas would be sold to Lone Star. Believing they would receive a percentage of the price Conoco obtained for their gas, and understanding the gas could only be sold at market price, appellees either signed written agreements (Fortune and Tucker) or continued to supply their gas to the system without benefit of a written contract (Hankamer and Cox).

The written contracts became effective in October of 1990.4 Beginning that date, [27]*27Conoco took appellees’ production and sold the residue gas to Lone Star. Conoco paid appellees a share of the market price rather than the actual price it received from Lone Star. Although Tucker’s Enerfin contracts contained language that undis-putedly entitled it to be paid based on the Lone Star contract price, Conoco paid Tucker only a percentage of market price even on those contracts.5 The 1990 contracts were replaced in 1992 with substantially similar contracts.

With respect to the liquids, Conoco initially paid appellees a share of the proceeds received for the sale of all liquids compressed and processed out of th,eir gas. In January of 1991, Conoco began keeping all of the profits from liquids compressed out of the gas stream in the field, and only paid appellees a share of the revenue from liquids obtained within the processing plants themselves. Appellees indicated that Conoco never advised them of this change. Conoco discussed the change internally for months after it was made. Eventually, Conoco established a new accounting code to which it attributed all of the field liquid volumes. Appellees contend that the new accounting code was established to hide the discrepancy between the total liquid volumes reported on Conoco’s plant production reports and the lesser volumes being reported to appellees on their payment statements. Conoco contends that the contract did not include any component for field liquids and, therefore, they were entitled to keep them.

In 1992, Wes Green of Fortune noted discrepancies in Fortune’s liquids payments. When he attempted to audit Cono-co’s supporting data, he met some resistance. In particular, Conoco would not allow Fortune’s consultant to participate in the review. Eventually, after reviewing the plant production statement, Green learned there was an underallocation of liquids. He ultimately determined that Conoco was producing between 30,000 to 90,000 barrels of liquids per month that it was not allocating system-wide. In 1992 or the early part of 1993, Gary Howard, a Lone Star employee, visited Wes Green’s office at Fortune. Howard told Green that Conoco had been selling Fortune’s gas to Lone Star all along. Howard gave Green dedication reports showing that Fortune gas had always remained dedicated to the Lone Star contract price.

Appellees then filed suit alleging claims for both the residue gas and the field liquids. The case was tried to a jury.

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Related

Estate of Willard Wallace
Court of Appeals of Texas, 2006
Fortune Production Co. v. Conoco, Inc.
52 S.W.3d 671 (Texas Supreme Court, 2000)

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Bluebook (online)
35 S.W.3d 23, 152 Oil & Gas Rep. 131, 1998 Tex. App. LEXIS 6777, 1998 WL 752034, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/conoco-inc-v-fortune-production-co-texapp-1998.