Connolly-Pacific Co. v. United States

358 F.2d 995, 175 Ct. Cl. 134
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedApril 15, 1966
DocketNo. 349-61
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 358 F.2d 995 (Connolly-Pacific Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Connolly-Pacific Co. v. United States, 358 F.2d 995, 175 Ct. Cl. 134 (cc 1966).

Opinion

Dueebe, Judge,

delivered the opinion of tlie court:

This is a suit by plaintiffs, a joint venture, to recover delay damages under two separate causes of action arising out of a contract which, plaintiffs had with the Department of the Navy for the renovation and reconstruction of Pier and Dry Dock No. 1 at the Long Beach Naval Shipyard, Long Beach, California. The case has been submitted to the court without oral argument.

Plaintiffs, corporations engaged in the general construction business, were awarded the contract on March 21, 1957 in the sum of $3,877,71)1.00. The purpose of the contract was to overcome the effect of past subsidence (i.e., sinking of the ground) and to provide for future subsidence by elevating the entire dock structure around Dry Dock No. 1. The dry dock was constructed in the shape of an elongated horseshoe, its position in the shipyard lying north and south with the south end seaward. The contract called for the removal of the existing dike wall aroimd the dry dock, and the construction of a new dock structure atop the old dock structure, such as to raise the height of the dry dock walls by the height of the new structure. The contract also called for the construction of a parapet wall, — a small section of wall about four feet in height — rising from the top of the inner wall of the new dock structure. The contract contained the standard changes, changed conditions, and disputes clauses. The original completion date was to be November 18,1958. During performance, the contract was modified by 62 change orders under which plaintiffs’ time for performance was extended 517 days to April 19, 1960, and the contract price increased to $7,050,626.31. Plaintiffs’ men and equipment completed all work on the contract by early December, 1959; therefore, the extension of time granted by the change orders for the period subsequent thereto of some 120 days was unnecessary insofar as plaintiffs’ own men and equipment were concerned. However, subcontractors were performing very minor work until mid-April, 1960.

[136]*136Plaintiffs allege in their two canses of action in the present suit that certain activities of defendant caused plaintiffs unreasonable delay in completion of the contract, with resulting damages. In order to treat these matters chronologically, this opinion will deal with the second cause of action, and then the first cause of action.

Second Cause of Action

This claim is concerned with the installation of concrete piles along the east side of the dry dock. The applicable specifications provided that the piles should consist of a 16-inch minimum outside diameter reinforced concrete casing 50-feet in length filled with concrete after driving. The piles were to meet a certain bearing capacity, and the specifications provided that if the required bearing capacity was not obtained with the lengths of piling specified, the Officer-in-Charge could direct that longer length piles be used. An equitable adjustment in price and/or time was contemplated for any such changes.

On June 14, 1957 the first load of concrete piles was delivered to the work site on the east side of the dry dock. Between then and July 1, 1957 progress on the pile-driving work was impeded by obstructions, and by the failure of the first six 50-foot piles to achieve the required bearing capacity. Obstructions had been encountered which caused the piles to shear off line, and in some instances, to crack or break. Subsequently, the Navy directed plaintiffs to stop work on the concrete pile driving since the piles were not obtaining the required bearing capacity. Tests were thereafter made of the ground conditions on the east side of the dry dock, and it was determined that longer piles were needed. There was no pattern associated with the bearing capacity of the piles along the east side and, therefore, it was necessary in the period from July, 1957-October, 1957, to establish bearing capacity almost on a pile-by-pile basis. (See finding 17.) During this period, therefore, plaintiffs were unable to drive piles at its normal rate of operation (14 — 16 piles in an 8-hour shift), and in fact, in August alone, plaintiffs were only allowed to drive four test piles. It was not until October 7, [137]*1371957 that plaintiffs finished driving all the piles along the line on the east side of the dock structure.

No satisfactory explanation could be offered for the unusual subsurface conditions which produced the great variations in the bearing capacity of the piles along the east side of the dry dock. A possible reason therefor was the difference brought about by a change in the water-table level caused by the earlier subsidence. Our trial commissioner has found, and we agree, that considering the subsidence that had taken place in the area, it would seem that reasonable prudence would have required the consulting engineers’ firm that prepared the specifications and drawings for the Navy to have made prior tests of the subsurface conditions.

As a result of various directives issued by the Navy covering tests, engineering services and the driving of 112 longer piles during the period in question, three change orders were issued to compensate plaintiffs for the additional work entailed thereby. (See finding 23.) Thereafter, plaintiffs asked for delay damages, which claim was denied.

It is clear from the record that plaintiffs were delayed in the construction of the east dock structure by reason of the directives issued by the Navy in connection with the driving of piles in that area. No work could be done by plaintiffs above the ground level on the east dock structure until the piles were driven. However, the trial commissioner found that examination of plaintiffs’ job record and the Government inspector’s reports do not indicate that plaintiffs were damaged in any way, or suffered increased costs because of the delays in driving piles in the east dock area. (See finding 27(b).) The commissioner further found (finding 27 (c)) that based on the job record, inspector’s reports, and testimony (1) the overall performance of work under the contract was not delayed or disrupted as a result of the pile driving problems, (2) plaintiffs’ men and equipment were fully utilized during the July-October 1957 period performing construction work that had to be done on other parts of the job, and (3) plaintiffs’ utilization of their men and equipment during the July-October period was similar to such utilization subsequent to that period.

[138]*138Under our Rule 66, the findings of the commissioner are presumptively correct. “To overcome this presumption, plaintiff must make a strong, affirmative showing to the contrary.” (Dodge Street Building Corporation v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 496, 501, 341 F. 2d, 641, 644 (1965). See also Commerce International Company, Inc. v. United States, 167 Ct. Cl. 529, 537, 338 F. 2d, 81, 86 (1964). Upon examination of plaintiffs’ exceptions to the commissioner’s findings, it is evident that plaintiffs have come nowhere near making the strong affirmative showing needed to upset these findings. Accordingly, the court adopts them, and as a matter of law, finds that plaintiffs are not entitled to recover on the second cause of action.

First Cause of Action

By October 14, 1958 plaintiffs had completed the driving of piles under the west side dock structure except for a cluster of four piles at the south end. They then commenced working on forms for the structure.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

McCarthy v. United States
1 Cl. Ct. 446 (Court of Claims, 1983)
J. Robert Bonnar v. The United States
438 F.2d 540 (Court of Claims, 1971)
Wertheimer Construction Corp. v. United States
406 F.2d 1071 (Court of Claims, 1969)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
358 F.2d 995, 175 Ct. Cl. 134, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/connolly-pacific-co-v-united-states-cc-1966.