Conner v. State

626 N.E.2d 803, 1993 Ind. LEXIS 213, 1994 WL 1100
CourtIndiana Supreme Court
DecidedDecember 30, 1993
Docket21S01-9312-CR-1438
StatusPublished
Cited by54 cases

This text of 626 N.E.2d 803 (Conner v. State) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Indiana Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Conner v. State, 626 N.E.2d 803, 1993 Ind. LEXIS 213, 1994 WL 1100 (Ind. 1993).

Opinions

ON PETITION TO TRANSFER

SHEPARD, Chief Justice.

If only James Conner had filled his sandwich baggies with real marijuana instead of the harmless moist plant material he sold to the police informant. To his surprise and dismay, under Indiana’s drug statutes selling fake marijuana is classified as a much more serious crime than selling actual marijuana.

Conner was convicted of distributing a substance represented to be a controlled substance, a class C felony, Ind.Code Ann. § 35-48-4-4.6 (West Supp. 1993). A divided Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction, but remanded for a new sentencing. Conner v. State (1993), Ind.App., 613 N.E.2d 484. Conner raises several issues in his petition for transfer, including a claim under Article I, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution that his punishment is disproportionate to the nature of the offense for which he was convicted. We grant transfer to consider this contention.

I. The Buy

Deputy Ted McQuinley of the Fayette County Sheriff’s Department arranged for police informant Mark Evers to purchase $1,600 worth of marijuana from Conner. During the transaction, Conner produced sixteen small plastic bags of plant material, which he conveyed to Evers in exchange for the $1,600 in cash. The State Police chemist subsequently found no traces of marijuana in the various samples of the plant material he tested. Together, the content of all the baggies weighed a total of 145.4 grams.

II. The Statutes

Dealing in a non-controlled substance represented to be a controlled substance is a class D felony. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-48-4-4.5 (West Supp. 1993). Manufacturing or distributing a non-controlled substance represented to be a controlled substance is a class C felony. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-48-4-4.6 (West Supp. 1993). All fake drugs are treated alike; these statutes are indifferent to the type of drug the non-controlled substance is represented to be.

According to Ind.Code Ann. § 35-48-2-4(d)(14) (West Supp. 1993), marijuana is a schedule I drug. Nevertheless, our General Assembly specifically exempted marijuana from the statutory scheme’ covering schedule I drugs. Ind.Code Ann. §§ 35-48-4-2(a)(l) and (2) (West Supp.1993). Unlike all other controlled substances, the penalty for dealing in which is a felony of one class or another, dealing in 30 grams [805]*805or less of marijuana (or comparatively small amounts of hash oil and hashish) is only a misdemeanor. As Judge Baker observed in dissent, the legislature explicitly “insiste[d] that offenses involving marijuana be punished less severely.” Conner, 613 N.E.2d at 495.

Ordinarily, once tests reveal even a trace of a controlled substance, the drug present determines the class of the offense.1 In most instances, dealing in an actual controlled substance carries a greater penalty than dealing in a fake controlled substance. For example, dealing in heroin, a schedule I drug, is a class B felony, but passing off fake heroin for the real thing is a class D felony.2 This statutory scheme under which sales of non-controlled substances are accorded more lenient treatment breaks down, however, when the drug in question is marijuana.3

Dealing in more than thirty grams of marijuana is a class D felony, Ind.Code Ann. § 35-48-4-10(b)(l)(B) (West Supp. 1993), carrying a maximum prison term of three years. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-50-2-7 (West Supp.1993). Since the State’s chemist did not find any traces of marijuana in the samples he tested from among the 145.4 grams of material sold to the police informant, Conner was instead convicted of distributing4 a substance represented to be a controlled substance — a class C felony— for which he received a six year prison sentence. The maximum sentence for a class C felony is eight years. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-50-2-6 (West Supp.1993).

Conner’s sentence was thus twice as long as the maximum penalty he would have faced had the chemist found any evidence of marijuana.5 Given this discrepancy in penalties, purveyors of less than pure pot presumably would be prosecuted not for peddling pot, but for either dealing or distributing any amount of oregano or other non-controlled substance found mixed-in with the demon weed. Indeed, dealing nearly ten pounds of real marijuana exposes one to less criminal liability than distributing even one gram of fake marijuana.

[806]*806 III. The Indiana Constitution

In its direction that “[a]ll penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense,” Article I, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution makes clear that the State’s ability to exact punishment for criminal behavior is not without limit. This provision goes beyond the protection against cruel and unusual punishment contained in the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Taylor v. State (1987), Ind., 511 N.E.2d 1036. Much of the recent case law interpreting Section 16 involves challenges to sentences enhanced according to the habitual offender statute. See, e.g., Best v. State (1991), Ind., 566 N.E.2d 1027; Mills v. State (1987), Ind., 512 N.E.2d 846; and Taylor, 511 N.E.2d 1036. In such cases, the two-part analysis reviews the nature and gravity of the present offense as well as the nature of prior offenses.

When the challenge does not stem from the defendant’s status as an habitual offender, however, the analysis is more straightforward. As we observed in Hollars v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 229, 236, 286 N.E.2d 166, 170, Section 16 applies “only when a criminal penalty is not graduated and proportioned to the nature of an offense.”

While this Court cannot set aside a legislatively sanctioned penalty merely because it seems too severe, id., “the fact that appellant’s sentence falls within parameters affixed by the legislature does not relieve this Court of the constitutional duty [under Section 16] to review the duration of appellant’s sentence as it is possible for the statute under which appellant is convicted to be constitutional, and yet be unconstitutional as applied to appellant in this particular instance.” Clark v. State

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
626 N.E.2d 803, 1993 Ind. LEXIS 213, 1994 WL 1100, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/conner-v-state-ind-1993.