Affirmed by published opinion. Judge WILLIAMS wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge HAMILTON joined. Senior Judge PHILLIPS wrote a dissenting opinion.
OPINION
WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge:
The Attorney General of the State of South Carolina (the State) challenged the constitutionality of the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act (DPPA), see 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2721-2725 (West Supp.1998), in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina on the grounds that it violated the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments to the United States Constitution.1 The United [456] States defended the DPPA, arguing that it was lawfully enacted pursuant to Congress’s powers under both the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. After reviewing the parties’ arguments, the district court held that the DPPA violated the Tenth Amendment and permanently enjoined its enforcement in the State of South Carolina. See Condon v. Reno, 972 F.Supp. 977, 979 (D.S.C.1997).
On appeal, the United States first contends that the DPPA was lawfully enacted pursuant to Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. Although Congress may regulate entities engaged in interstate commerce, Congress is constrained in the exercise of that power by the Tenth Amendment. As a result, when exercising its Commerce Clause power, Congress may only “subject state governments to generally applicable laws.” New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992). The DPPA exclusively regulates the disclosure of personal information contained in state motor vehicle records. Thus, rather than enacting a law of general applicability that incidentally applies to the States, Congress passed a law that, for all intents and purposes, applies only to the States. Accordingly, the DPPA is simply not a valid exercise of Congress’s Commerce Clause power.
In the alternative, the United States contends that the DPPA was lawfully enacted pursuant to Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. When enacting legislation under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, Congress’s power “extends only to enforcing] the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.” City of Boerne v. Flores, — U.S. -,-, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2164, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997) (emphasis added). The United States asserts that individuals possess a Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy in their names, addresses, and phone numbers, and that the DPPA enforces that constitutional right. Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court, however, has ever recognized a constitutional right to privacy with respect to such information. Congress is granted a remedial power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, not a substantive power. As a consequence, the DPPA is not a valid exercise of Congress’s Enforcement Clause power.
Under our system of dual sovereignty, “[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. Const, amend. X. Because Congress lacked the authority to enact the DPPA under either the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
I.
As recited by the district court, the pertinent facts are as follows:
Congress enacted the DPPA in 1994 in an effort to remedy what it perceived to be a problem of national concern: i.e., the active commerce in, and consequent easy availability of, personal information contained in State motor vehicle records. Testimony before Congress established that as many as 34 States allowed easy access to personal information contained in motor vehicle records and that criminals had used such information to locate victims and commit crimes. Congress also found that many States sell or other wise permit the use of information contained in motor vehicle records for direct marketing purposes.
The DPPA, which [was] scheduled to become effective on September 13, 1997, generally prohibits “a State department of motor vehicles, and any officer, employee, or contractor, thereof, [from] knowingly disclosing] or otherwise mak[ing] available to any person or entity personal information about any individual obtained by the department in connection with a motor vehicle record.” 18 U.S.C. § 2721(a). The DPPA specifies a list of exceptions when personal information contained in a State motor vehicle record may be obtained and used. See 18 U.S.C. § 2721(b). Addition[457] ally, the DPPA permits State motor vehicle departments to:
[Establish and carry out procedures under which the department or its agents, upon receiving a request for personal information that does not fall within one of the exceptions in [§ 2721(b) ], may mail a copy of the request to the individual about whom the information was requested, informing such individual of the request, together with a statement to the effect that the information will not be released unless the individual waives such individual’s right to privacy under [§ 2721],
18 U.S.C. § 2721(d). The DPPA also prohibits “any person [from] knowingly ... obtaining] or disclosing] personal information, from a motor vehicle record, for any use not permitted under section 2721(b),” 18 U.S.C. § 2722(a), and from “mak[ing] false representation to obtain any personal information from an individual’s motor vehicle record.” 18 U.S.C. § 2722(b).
The DPPA provides that “[a]ny State department of motor vehicles that has a policy or practice of substantial noncompliance ... shall be subject to a civil penalty imposed by the Attorney General of not more than $5,000 a day for each day of substantial noncompliance.” 18 U.S.C. § 2723(b). The DPPA also creates a criminal fíne, 18 U.S.C. § 2723(a), and a civil cause of action against a “person” who knowingly violates it. 18 U.S.C. § 2724(a).
South Carolina currently has its own statutory provisions regarding the disclosure and use of its motor vehicle records, and South Carolina’s scheme differs significantly from the DPPA. See S.C.Code Ann. §§ 56-3-510 to -540. Under South Carolina law a person who requests information contained in South Carolina’s motor vehicle records must submit the request on a form provided by the State Department of Public Safety (“the Department”) and must specify, inter alia, his or her name and the reason for the request, and must certify that the information will not be used for the purpose of telephone marketing or solicitation. S.C.Code Ann. § 56-3-510. The Department must retain all requests for motor vehicle record information for five years and must release a copy of all requests relating to a person upon that person’s written request. S.C.Code Ann. § 56-3-520. The Department is authorized to charge a fee for releasing motor vehicle record information, and is required to promulgate certain procedural regulations relating to the release of motor vehicle record information, S.C.Code Ann. § 56-3-530, and to implement procedures to ensure that persons may “opt-out” and prohibit the use of motor vehicle record information about them for various commercial activities. S.C.Code Ann. § 56-3-540.' The undisputed evidence submitted establishes that implementation of the DPPA would impose substantial costs and effort on the part of the Department in order for it to achieve compliance.
Condon v. Reno, 972 F.Supp. 977, 979-81 (D.S.C.1997) (footnotes omitted) (all but first alteration in original).
In addition to challenging the constitutionality of the DPPA, the State sought a permanent injunction prohibiting enforcement of the DPPA. The United States filed a motion to dismiss the suit based upon its contention that the DPPA was lawfully enacted pursuant to Congress’s powers under both the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.' In response, the State moved for summary judgment in its favor. After reviewing the parties’ motions, the district court concluded that the DPPA was unconstitutional. Accordingly, the district court denied the United States’ motion to dismiss, granted the State’s motion for summary judgment, and permanently enjoined the enforcement of the DPPA in the State of South Carolina. This appeal followed.
II.
In this case, we must determine whether the DPPA violates the Tenth Amendment. Like all Acts of Congress, the DPPA is “presumed to be a constitutional exercise of legislative power until the contrary is clearly established.” Close v. Glenwood Cemetery, 107 U.S. 466, 475, 2 S.Ct. 267, 27 L.Ed. 408 (1883); see also I.N.S. v. [458] Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 77 L.Ed.2d 317 (1983) (“We begin, of course, with the presumption that the challenged .statute is valid.”). Whether the contrary has been clearly established in this case, as the district court found, is a legal question subject to de novo review. See Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 734 (4th Cir.1997).
The Constitution provides: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S. Const, amend. X. When, however, Congress “is acting within the powers granted it under the Constitution, [it] may impose its will on the States.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991). On appeal, the United States contends that the DPPA was lawfully enacted pursuant to Congress’s powers under both the Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. We address these arguments in turn.
A.
The United States first contends that the DPPA is constitutional because Congress enacted it pursuant to its power under the Commerce Clause. Congress, however, is constrained in the exercise of that power by the Tenth Amendment. Thus, the question before this Court is not whether the DPPA x-egulates commerce, but whether it is consistent with the system of dual sovereignty established by the Constitution.
1.
When Congress exercises its Commerce Clause power against the States, the resulting enactment is analyzed by the Supreme Court under one of two different lines of cases. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160-61, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992) (recognizing the two distinct lines of cases); see also West v. Anne Arundel County, Md., 137 F.3d 752, 759-60 (4th Cir.1998) (same). The first line of cases concerns the authority of Congress to regulate the States as States. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985). Under this line of cases, Congress may enact laws of general applicability that incidentally apply to state governments. The second line of cases concerns the authority of Congress to direct the States to implement or administer a federal regulatory scheme. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 138 L.Ed.2d 914 (1997). Under this line of cases, Congress may not enact any law that would direct the functioning of the States’ executives or legislatures. Not surprisingly, the United States contends that the instant case falls under the first line, while the State argues (and the district court found) that the ease is controlled by the latter line of cases.
a.
The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence with respect to the first line of cases has not been a model of consistency. In Maryland Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 88 S.Ct. 2017, 20 L.Ed.2d 1020 (1968), the Supreme Court first held that Congress could subject state governments to generally applicable laws, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act. In National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96 S.Ct. 2465, 49 L.Ed.2d 245 (1976), the Supreme Court overruled WiHz. In particular, the Court held that the Commerce Clause did not give Congress the authority to regulate the “States as States.” Id. at 845, 96 S.Ct. 2465 (holding that state employees are not subject to the Fair Labor Standards Act). In other words, Congress could “not exercise [Commerce Clause] power so as to force directly upon the States its choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions are to be made.” Id. at 855, 96 S.Ct. 2465.2
[459] The Supreme Court subsequently overruled National League of Cities in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985). In Garcia, the Supreme Court decided to leave to the political process the protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress’s Commerce Clause powers.3 Id. at 547-56, 105 S.Ct. 1005. Thus, under Garcia and its progeny, Congress may once again subject the States to legislation that is also applicable to private parties. See id. (upholding application of the FLSA to state and local governments because it was a generally applicable law); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 103 S.Ct. 1054, 75 L.Ed.2d 18 (1983) (upholding application of the ADEA to state and local governments because it was a generally applicable law); South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 108 S.Ct. 1355, 99 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988) (upholding application of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 to state and local governments because it was a generally applicable law); see also Printz, — U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 2383 (noting that under Garcia “the incidental application to the States of a federal law of general applicability” was lawful); New York, 505 U.S. at 160, 112 S.Ct. 2408 (noting that under Garcia and its progeny, Congress may only “subject state governments to generally applicable laws”).4
b.
In contrast, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence with respect to the second line of cases has been a model of consistency. In New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992), the Supreme Court reviewed a federal statute that, among other things, required the individual States either to enact legislation regulating low-level radioactive waste generated within their borders or to take title to the waste. As an initial matter, the Supreme Court noted that this was not a simple case of Congress attempting to regulate the States, which would fall under the Garcia line of cases. See id. at 160, 112 S.Ct. 2408. Rather, the Supreme Court framed the issue as concerning “the circumstances under which Congress may use the States as implements of regulation; that is, whether Congress may direct or otherwise motivate the States to regulate in a particular field or a particular way.” Id. at 161, 112 S.Ct. 2408. In answering that question in the negative, the Supreme Court held that Congress could not “commandeer[ ] the legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.” Id. at 176, 112 S.Ct. 2408 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In Printz v. United States, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 138 L.Ed.2d 914 (1997), the Court reviewed an act of Congress, popularly referred to as the “Brady Bill,” which regulated the sale of handguns. The Brady Bill, among other things, required state law enforcement officers “to participate, albeit only temporarily, in the administration of [the] federally enacted regulatory scheme.” Id. at [460] -, 117 S.Ct. at 2369. As in NewYork, the Supreme Court- found that the Garcia line of cases was inapplicable to the question before the Court. See id. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 2383 (application of the Garcia line of cases is inappropriate “where, as here, it is the whole object of the law to direct the functioning of the state executive”). Instead, the Supreme Court framed the issue as the constitutionality of “the forced participation of the States’ executive[s] in the actual administration of a federal program.” Id. at-, 117 S.Ct. at 2376. Noting-that in New York it had held “that Congress cannot compel the States to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program,” the Supreme Court in Printz held “that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the State’s officers directly.” Id. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 2384. The Court went on to note that
[t]he Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters not whether policymaking is involved, and no ease-by-ease weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.
Id.
2.
On appeal, the United States relies primarily upon Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985), and its progeny, while the State relies principally upon New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992), and Printz v. United States, — U.S.-, 117 S.Ct. 2365, 138 L.Ed.2d 914 (1997). The district court rejected the United States’ argument and analyzed the constitutionality of the DPPA under the New York/Printz line of cases. See Condon v. Reno, 972 F.Supp. 977, 985 (D.S.C.1997); see also Travis v. Reno, 12 F.Supp.2d 921 (W.D.Wis.1998) (finding the DPPA unconstitutional under New York /Printz line of cases); Oklahoma v. United States, 994 F.Supp. 1358, 1363 (W.D.Okla.1997) (finding the DPPA unconstitutional under New York /Printz line of cases). But see Pryor v. Reno, 998 F.Supp. 1317, 1326-31 (M.D.Ala.1998) (finding that the DPPA does not compel the states to regulate and, therefore, is constitutional under New York and Printz):
We recognize, as the United States argues, that the DPPA is different in several respects from the statutes struck down in New York and Printz. Unlike the federal statute in New York, the DPPA does not commandeer the state legislative process. In particular, the DPPA does not require the States to enact legislation regulating the disclosure of personal information contained in their motor vehicle records. Instead, Congress enacted the regulations limiting the dissemination of information from those records. Moreover, unlike the federal statute in Printz, the DPPA does not conscript state officers to enforce the regulations established by Congress. Indeed, the DPPA does not require that state officials report or arrest violators of the DPPA. Instead, the DPPA is enforced through civil penalties imposed by the United States Attorney General against the States and permits criminal fines and civil causes of action against individuals.
Nevertheless, state officials must, as the district court found, administer the DPPA. See Condon, 972 F.Supp. at 985-86. The Supreme Court, in both New York and Printz, has made it perfectly clear that the Federal Government may not require State officials to administer a federal regulatory program. See Printz, — U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 2384 (holding that “[t]he Federal Government may [not] issue directives requiring the States to ... administer or enforce a federal regulatory program”); New York, 505 U.S. at 176, 112 S.Ct. 2408 (holding that the Federal Government cannot compel the States to administer “a federal regulatory program”). Indeed, allowing the Federal Government to do so would be plainly incompatible with our system of “dual sovereignty.” Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991); see also Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458, 110 S.Ct. 792, 107 L.Ed.2d 887 (1990).
[461] The United States attempts to sidestep this problemj however, by contending that the holdings in Printz and New York apply only when the law in question requires a State to regulate the behavior of its citizens. Rather than requiring a State to regulate its citizens, the United States contends that the DPPA requires a State to regulate its own behavior. Because the DPPA simply regulates a state activity, ie., the disclosure of personal information contained in state motor vehicle records, the United States contends that the instant case is controlled by the National League of Cities /Garcia line of cases.
Even assuming that the United States’ narrow reading of Printz and New York is correct, analyzing the constitutionality of the DPPA under the Garcia line of cases will not salvage the statute. Under Garcia and its progeny, Congress may only “subject state governments to generally applicable laws.” New York, 505 U.S. at 160, 112 S.Ct. 2408 (explaining the difference between the two lines of cases); see also Printz, — U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 2383 (noting that under Garcia “the incidental application to the States of a federal law of general applicability” was lawful). In other words, Congress may only subject the States to legislation that is also applicable to private parties. See New York, 505 U.S. at 160, 112 S.Ct. 2408 (noting that under Garcia, Congress may only “subject[ ] a State to the same legislation applicable to private parties”).
In Garcia, the Supreme Court upheld application of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to state and local governments because the FLSA was generally applicable. Thus, Congress was only allowed to regulate how much the States pay their hourly employees because Congress also regulates how much private parties pay their hourly employees. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 528, 105 S.Ct. 1005 (noting that the FLSA is generally applicable); see also EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 103 S.Ct. 1054, 75 L.Ed.2d 18 (1983) (same with the ADEA); South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 108 S.Ct. 1355, 99 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988) (same with the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982).5 Here, the DPPA does not attempt to regulate the disclosure of personal information contained in all public and private databases, which would incidentally apply to state motor vehicle records. Rather, the DPPA exclusively regulates the disclosure of information contained in state motor vehicle records. Of course, there is no private counterpart to a state Department of Motor Vehicles. Private parties simply do not issue drivers’ licenses or prohibit the use of unregistered motor vehicles. Thus, rather than enacting a law of general applicability that incidentally applies to the States, Congress enacted a law that, for all intents and pur[462] poses, applies only to the States. See Travis, 12 F.Supp.2d at 929 (“To state the obvious, the [DPPA] is not a law of general applicability.”); Oklahoma v. United States, 994 F.Supp. at 1362 (noting that a “cursory review of the [DPPA] indicates that it is directed at States”); Condon, 972 F.Supp. at 986-86 (“[I]nstead of bringing the States within the scope of an otherwise generally applicable law, Congress passed the DPPA specifically to regulate the States’ control of their property.”).
Although recognizing that the DPPA does not regulate private parties, the Government nevertheless argues that the DPPA is constitutional under the Garcia line of cases. For instance, the United States contends that the DPPA is constitutional because it “subject[s] the States to the same type of regulation to which a private party could be subjected.” Appellant’s Br. at 20 (emphasis added). Not surprisingly, the United States failed to provide even a single authority to support this proposition. Under Garcia, a statute is constitutional only if it is generally applicable. A law is not generally applicable simply because it could he generally applicable. That Congress could subject private parties to the same type of regulation is irrelevant to the Tenth Amendment. Congress may invade the sovereignty of the States only when it actually enacts a law of general applicability. Nothing short of that will pass constitutional muster.
The United States also contends that the DPPA is constitutional under Garcia because Congress has already restricted private parties from disclosing personal information in several statutes. In particular, the United States cites the Video Privacy Protection Act, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 2710 (West Supp. 1998) (restricting disclosure of personal information contained in video rental records); the Cable Communications Policy Act, see 47 U.S.C.A. § 551 (West 1991 & Supp.1998) (restricting disclosure of personal information about cable subscribers); and the Fair Credit Reporting Act, see 15 U.S.C.A. § 1618b (West 1998 & Supp.1998) (restricting disclosure of credit reports). Although Congress has regulated the disclosure of personal information by some private parties, the Constitution permits Congress to regulate the conduct of individuals. In contrast, Congress may not, as a general matter, regulate the conduct of the States. See New York, 505 U.S. at 166, 112 S.Ct. 2408 (“[T]he Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not States.” (quoted with approval in Printz, — U.S. at-, 117 S.Ct. at 2377)). The one exception, of course, is that Congress may regulate the conduct of the States through laws of general applicability. Thus, that Congress has “regulatefd] the disclosure of information gathered by a variety of private entities,” Appellant’s Br. at 12 (emphasis added), does not mean that Congress may regulate the disclosure of information gathered by the States absent a generally applicable law.
During oral argument, the United States suggested, for the fust time, that the DPPA is generally applicable when considered together with the aforementioned statutes regulating private parties. According to the United States, Congress may enact a statute regulating the States if it has already enacted a statute regulating the same conduct by private parties. Even if the general applicability of the DPPA could be determined in this manner, which we doubt, Congress has simply not enacted a statute regulating the same conduct by private parties. To be sure, Congress has regulated the disclosure of personal information gathered by video stores, cable providers, and credit bureaus. The regulation of these three entities, however, does not provide Congress with a basis for regulating the States. Indeed, we seriously doubt that the Supreme Court would have applied either the FLSA or the ADEA to the States had Congress applied those Acts only to video stores, cable providers, and credit bureaus. It bears repeating that Congress may regulate the conduct of the States only through laws of general applicability. At best, Congress has enacted several laws of limited applicability. Thus, even if the general applicability of a statute could be determined in the manner urged upon us by the United States, Congress has not yet enacted a statute regulating the disclosure of personal information by all private parties.
[463] Because the DPPA is not generally applicable, like the FLSA or ADEA, Congress did not have authority under our system of dual sovereignty to enact it.6
B.
The United States also contends that the DPPA was properly enacted pursuant to Congress’s power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. In light of the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in City of Boeme v. Flores, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997), we are constrained to disagree.7
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
Section 1. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any per[464] sons within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
U.S. Const, amend. XIV, §§ 1, 5. Section 5 “is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651, 86 S.Ct. 1717, 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966). In fact, “when properly exercising its power under § 5, Congress is not limited by the same Tenth Amendment constraints that circumscribe the exercise of its Commerce Clause powers.” EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. at 243 n. 18, 103 S.Ct. 1054 (emphasis added) (citing City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179, 100 S.Ct. 1548, 64 L.Ed.2d 119 (1980)). Congress’s power to enact legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment is not unlimited, however. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, — U.S. -,-, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2171, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997) (holding that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is “a considerable congressional intrusion into the States’ traditional prerogatives,” and that Congress exceeded its power under the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting the statute); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 469, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991) (stating that “the Fourteenth Amendment does not override all principles of federalism”); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 128, 91 S.Ct. 260, 27 L.Ed.2d 272 (1970) (noting that “[a]s broad as the congressional enforcement power is, it is not unlimited”). For instance, Congress’s power “extends only to enforcing] the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.” City of Boerne, — U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 2164 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). Of perhaps equal importance, it is only a preventative or remedial power, not a substantive power. See id. at-, 117 S.Ct. at 2167. As a result, Congress does not possess “the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.” Id. at-, 117 S.Ct. at 2164.
Whether Congress properly exercised its power under Section 5 when it enacted the DPPA turns, therefore, on whether the Act enforces some right guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The United States contends “that automobile owners and operators have a reasonable expectation [of privacy in] their names, addresses, and phone numbers,” Appellant’s Br. at 24, and that the DPPA enforces that constitutional right.
As an initial matter, we note that “there is no general constitutional right to privacy.” Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 608, 97 S.Ct. 869, 51 L.Ed.2d 64 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, the Supreme Court has limited the “right to privacy” to matters of reproduction, see Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S.Ct. 1110, 86 L.Ed. 1655 (1942), contraception, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), abortion, see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973), and marriage, see Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 98 S.Ct. 673, 54 L.Ed.2d 618 (1978).
Of particular importance here, neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever found a constitutional right to privacy with respect to the type of information found in motor vehicle records.8 Indeed, this is the very sort of information to which individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of pri[465] vacy. First, “pervasive schemes of regulation,” like vehicle licensing, must “necessarily lead to reduced expectations of privacy.” California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 392, 105 S.Ct. 2066, 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985); cf. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 113, 106 S.Ct. 960, 89 L.Ed.2d 81 (1986) (noting that individuals have a diminished expectation of privacy in matters related to their automobiles).
Second, the same type of information is available from numerous other sources.9 For example, the identical information can be obtained from public property tax records. As a result, an individual does not have a reasonable expectation that the information is confidential. See Walls v. City of Peters-burg, 895 F.2d 188, 192 (4th Cir.1990) (holding that an individual must have a reasonable expectation of confidentiality to have a constitutional right to privacy).
Third, as amici point out, there is a long history in the United States of treating motor vehicle records as public records. See Brief of Amici Curiae at 5-20.10 In fact, in United States Dept. of Health & Human Services v. FLRA, 833 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir.1987), this Court observed that an individual’s name and home address “is a matter of public record in motor vehicle registration and licensing records.” Id. at 1135 n. 8.
Finally, such information is commonly provided to private parties. For instance, a State-issued driver’s license is often needed to cash a check, use a credit card, board an airplane, or purchase alcohol. We seriously doubt that an individual has a constitutional right to privacy in information routinely shared with strangers.
In sum, the information found in motor vehicle records is not the sort of information to which individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy. As such, there is no constitutional right to privacy in the information contained in motor vehicle records. Accordingly, Congress did not have the authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact the DPPA.
III.
For the reasons stated, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.