Commonwealth v. Woods

307 A.2d 880, 452 Pa. 546, 1973 Pa. LEXIS 479

• Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: July 2, 1973
• Docket: Appeal, 94
• Status: Published

Opinions

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Roberts,

Appellant, Curtis Lee Woods, was indicted for various offenses arising from the murder of Sonia Rosenbaum. On June 26, 1970, appellant appeared before Judge MoDevitt and entered pleas of guilty to murder generally, aggravated robbery and conspiracy. After conducting an on-the-record colloquy, as required by Pa. R. Grim. I*. 319(a), the trial court accepted appellant’s guilty plea. Pursuant to a request by the prosecutor, the trial court deferred further proceedings until after the trials of appellant’s alleged co-conspirators.

On December 27, 1971—prior to the degree of guilt hearing and before sentence—appellant obtained new counsel and filed a petition to withdraw his guilty plea. He asserted in his petition that “[a]t the time these pleas of guilty were entered, [he] was taking the advice of counsel, Herbert G. Hardin, Esq. and was not, in fact, guilty of any of these offenses.” A hearing on the petition was held December 30 and 31, 1971 and on March 14, 1972, the court denied appellant’s withdrawal petition.

Subsequently, a hearing was held in accordance with Pa. B. Grim. P. 319A to determine whether “the case may constitute murder in the first degree.” Having determined that such a case had been established, the court convened a three judge panel which adjudged appellant guilty of first degree murder. On September 26, 1972, appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment on the murder bill, ten to twenty years imprisonment on the aggravated robbery charge and one to three years imprisonment on the conspiracy count, all sentences to run concurrently.¹

On this direct appeal, appellant contends² that the trial court erred in denying his plea withdrawal request—made prior to the degree of guilt hearing and, thus, prior to imposition of sentence. We agree and, therefore, reverse.

In Commonwealth v. Forbes, 450 Pa. 185, 190-91, 299 A. 2d 268, 271 (1973), we said: “Although there is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, properly received by the trial court, it is clear that a request made before sentencing—here, that request was made at even an earlier stage—should be liberally allowed. See United States ex rel. Culbreath v. Bundle, 466 F. 2d 730 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Young, 424 F. 2d 1276 (3d Cir. 1970); United States v. Stayton, 408 F. 2d 559 (3d Cir. 1969); Pa. R. Crim. P. 320; ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Belating to Pleas of Guilty §2.1 (Approved Draft, 1S68) ; Note, Pre-Sentence Withdrawal of Guilty Pleas in Federal Courts, 40 N.Y.U. L. Bev. 759 (1965). In United States ex rel. Culbreath v. Bundle, supra, the Third Circuit stated: ‘It has been recognized under Pennsylvania and Federal law that a trial judge has discretion to refuse a request to retract a plea of guilty since there is no absolute right to withdraw such a plea. However, a request made before sentencing has been generally construed liberally in favor of the accused.’ Id. at 732 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).

“The ABA Standards are in complete harmony with this view. The standards state: ‘(b) In the absence of a showing that withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice, a defendant may not withdraw his plea of guilty or nolo contendere as a matter of right once the plea has been accepted by the court. Before sentence, the court in its discretion may allow the defendant to withdraw his plea for any fair and just reason unless the prosecution has been substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant’s plea.’ ABA Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Belating to Pleas of Guilty §2.1 (b) (Approved Draft, 1968). See also Commonwealth v. Neely, 449 Pa. 3, 4, 295 A. 2d 75, 76 (1972) (Roberts, J., concurring opinion).”

Again in Commonwealth v. Santos, 450 Pa. 492, 494, 301 A. 2d 829, 830 (1973), we stated: “We agree with the Commonwealth’s general proposition that the grant or refusal of an application for leave to withdraw a guilty plea is within the sound discretion of the trial court. See Commonwealth v. Culbreath, 439 Pa. 21, 264 A. 2d 643 (1970); Commonwealth v. Scoleri, 415 Pa. 218, 202 A. 2d 521 (1964). However, since guilty pleas involve the simultaneous waiver of so many constitutional rights, we have recently emphasised ‘that a request [to withdraw] made before sentencing . . . should be liberally allowed.’ Commonwealth v. Forbes, 450 Pa. 185, 190, 299 A. 2d 268, 271 (1973).” (Emphasis added) (Footnote omitted.) Cf. Commonwealth v. Starr, 450 Pa. 485, 490 n.5, 301 A. 2d 592, 595 n.5 (1973).

Here, it must be concluded that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to “liberally” allow withdrawal of appellant’s pleas of guilty.³ Appellant stated, as the basis for his withdrawal request—made nine months before adjudication and imposition of sentence ■—that “at no time was he guilty of any of these offenses.” At the hearing on the withdrawal petition, appellant testified: “Q. Were you involved in any of these burglaries at the time, or this larceny, or this murder? A. I didn’t have nothing to do with the burglary. Q. How about the homicide, the murder? A. I had nothing to do with that. The Court: Were you there? By Mr. Alessandroni: Q. Were you present when it happened? A. I wasn’t there when that happened. I didn’t see nobody. I wasn’t there.”

The Court’s conclusion in Commonwealth v. Forbes, supra at 192, 299 A. 2d at 272, is equally applicable here: “Obviously, appellant, by this assertion of innocence—so early in the proceeding—offered a ‘fair and just’ reason for withdrawal of his plea. Moreover, on this record there is not even the slightest suggestion that the prosecution was in any sense ‘substantially prejudiced by reliance upon the defendant’s plea.’ ABA Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty, supra.”

Judgment of sentence reversed and a new trial granted.

Mr. Chief Justice Jones took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. Mr. Justice Eagen dissents.

1 Other bills charging larceny and burglary were nol pressed.

2 Appellant also alleges that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered. However, in view of our disposition, we need not reach this issue.

3 Appellant explained that he initially pleaded guilty because, “I wanted to hurry up so I can go home, because Mr. Hardin [appellant’s counsel when the plea was entered] say he going to get me out of here, plus the D.A. had the piece of paper, the recommendation for early parole and all this, and I just wanted to get out.” We do not decide whether—on this record—Mr. Hardin encroached upon appellant’s right to decide what plea to enter. However, as we said in Commonwealth v. Forbes, 450 Pa. 185, 189, 299 A. 2d 268, 270-71 (1973) : “What plea to enter is a decision which must be made voluntarily and intelligently, ty the accused. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709 (1969) ; McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 89 S. Ct. 1166 (1969) ; ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Defense Function §5.2(a) (Approved Draft, 1971). Comment, Criminal Waiver: The Requirements of Personal Participation, Competence and Legitimate State Interest, 54 Cal. L. Rev. 1262, 1267-68 (1966).” (Emphasis in original.) (Footnote omitted.)