OPINION
McDERMOTT, Justice.
Following a non-jury trial appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, recklessly endangering another person, a weapons offense and conspiracy. After post-verdict motions were filed and argued, the trial court granted a new [627] trial on the grounds of after-discovered evidence. On appeal by the Commonwealth a Superior Court panel (Opinion, Watkins, J., joined by Brosky and Montgomery, JJ.) reversed and reinstated the original verdicts. Commonwealth v. Scott, 284 Pa.Super. 440, 426 A.2d 128 (1981). This appeal followed. The pertinent factual and procedural history is as follows:
At trial the Commonwealth’s evidence established that on October 22, 1978, Michael Edwards, James Smith and James Browne were the victims of an unprovoked gun attack while they sat in their car. The trio had been followed to their car by four males who gathered around the car and prevented them from driving away. According to the Commonwealth’s evidence, appellant struck a handgun inside the car and fired at Browne, while another one of the attackers, Kevin Hill, fired a shotgun blast through the car’s front window. When the barrage of gunfire had ceased, a bullet had been lodged in Edward’s thigh.
During his trial appellant was identified as one of the assailants by Edwards and Browne.1 Both victims testified that at the time of the attack, appellant was clothed in a dark cap and a brownish red waist length jacket. An hour after the attack, appellant had been apprehended by the police in the vicinity of the scene, clad in identical clothing.
Another Commonwealth witness, James Lark, testified that after the shooting appellant, who was dressed in the above described clothing, approached him and said: “My name is Johnny Scott and I killed someone” and “I’m the one that shot your homies [friends].” On this evidence appellant was subsequently found guilty of the above enumerated charges.
In post-trial motions appellant alleged the existence of after-discovered evidence. The unsworn post-verdict motion alleged that appellant’s counsel, Patricia Pierce, was informed by a Mr. Franklin Green, counsel for co-indictee, Kenneth Hill, that his client told him that he could exoner[628] ate appellant. The motion acknowledged, however, that Hill had previously given contrary sworn testimony at his own trial denying any involvement in the shooting.
An evidentiary hearing was held on July 18, 1979. At the hearing, appellant called Mr. Green in an attempt to elicit from him his client’s statement. Invoking the attorney-client privilege, Green refused to testify. The hearing judge suggested to the prosecutor that Hill be offered immunity from prosecution for perjury so he could testify on behalf of appellant. Alternatively, appellant’s counsel argued that the attorney-client privilege between Green and Hill had been waived by the former when he disclosed Hill’s statement to appellant’s counsel. The trial court disagreed. When the Commonwealth refused to grant immunity, the trial court found that although it did not have the power to grant judicial immunity to Hill, a new trial was warranted based on the contents of the unsworn post-trial motion, notwithstanding its double hearsay nature, since the judge considered it to be reliable and credible.
In reversing the order of a new trial and reinstating the verdicts, the Superior Court found that since the proposed statement was unavailable at the post-trial hearing, there was no admissible after-discovered evidence. It further reasoned that even if the alleged after-discovered evidence was produced it would have been perjurious, and therefore improper upon which to base a new trial.
Initially, appellant contends that the Superior Court erred in its conclusion. He complains that his co-indictee’s statement was of such a nature that if he was granted a new trial a different verdict would be likely. The trial court agreed and granted appellant a new trial for that reason.
It is well settled in this Commonwealth that a new trial is not warranted on the basis of after-discovered evidence, unless it could not have been discovered until after the trial despite reasonable diligence, is not used for merely cumulative or impeachment purposes, and is of such a nature that it would compel a different outcome. Com[629] monwealth v. Hugney, 491 Pa. 222, 420 A.2d 422 (1980); Commonwealth v. Cooney, 444 Pa. 416, 282 A.2d 29 (1971); Commonwealth v. Green, 858 Pa. 192, 56 A.2d 95 (1948).
Here, the record is barren of any proof that Hill’s statement was producible or admissible. At the post-trial hearing, Mr. Green, attorney for Hill, was called by appellant’s counsel for the sole purpose of repeating to the court his client’s prior inconsistent out-of-court statement, which had been made in the confines of their attorney-client relationship. Declining to endanger his client’s rights Mr. Green invoked the attorney-client privilege and refused to testify. In response to the trial court’s questions, Mr. Green advised the trial judge that if Hill were called to testify for appellant he would be jeopardizing his right against self-incrimination by opening himself up to a charge of perjury based upon his sworn trial testimony, and if so, would invoke his Fifth Amendment right. Over appellant’s counsel’s objections, the trial court ruled that Mr. Green’s privilege claim was proper and that he could not be questioned further concerning his client’s statement. Because Hill intended to assert his right against self-incrimination, he was never subpoenaed to testify at the hearing. Appellant, however, presented no evidence that, even if Hill was called as a witness, he would have testified favorably for him.
Nevertheless, Judge Lois Forer found that the statement by appellant’s counsel of what Mr. Green had told her of what his client told him, although double hearsay, was reliable, trustworthy and legitimate testimonial evidence; and that “if Mr. Green had testified” ... she “would have granted a new trial,” (Slip op. Forer, J. at 4.).
The judge justified the admissibility of the hearsay statement by finding that Hill’s statement was against his penal interest, thereby qualifying as an exception to the hearsay rule. The court then found that because Mr. Green was Hill’s attorney his post-trial hearing testimony of what his client told him was unquestionably reliable, and that appellant’s counsel’s statement of what Mr. Green told her also [630] had the same reliability attributes as Mr. Green’s hearsay statement.
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OPINION
McDERMOTT, Justice.
Following a non-jury trial appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, recklessly endangering another person, a weapons offense and conspiracy. After post-verdict motions were filed and argued, the trial court granted a new [627] trial on the grounds of after-discovered evidence. On appeal by the Commonwealth a Superior Court panel (Opinion, Watkins, J., joined by Brosky and Montgomery, JJ.) reversed and reinstated the original verdicts. Commonwealth v. Scott, 284 Pa.Super. 440, 426 A.2d 128 (1981). This appeal followed. The pertinent factual and procedural history is as follows:
At trial the Commonwealth’s evidence established that on October 22, 1978, Michael Edwards, James Smith and James Browne were the victims of an unprovoked gun attack while they sat in their car. The trio had been followed to their car by four males who gathered around the car and prevented them from driving away. According to the Commonwealth’s evidence, appellant struck a handgun inside the car and fired at Browne, while another one of the attackers, Kevin Hill, fired a shotgun blast through the car’s front window. When the barrage of gunfire had ceased, a bullet had been lodged in Edward’s thigh.
During his trial appellant was identified as one of the assailants by Edwards and Browne.1 Both victims testified that at the time of the attack, appellant was clothed in a dark cap and a brownish red waist length jacket. An hour after the attack, appellant had been apprehended by the police in the vicinity of the scene, clad in identical clothing.
Another Commonwealth witness, James Lark, testified that after the shooting appellant, who was dressed in the above described clothing, approached him and said: “My name is Johnny Scott and I killed someone” and “I’m the one that shot your homies [friends].” On this evidence appellant was subsequently found guilty of the above enumerated charges.
In post-trial motions appellant alleged the existence of after-discovered evidence. The unsworn post-verdict motion alleged that appellant’s counsel, Patricia Pierce, was informed by a Mr. Franklin Green, counsel for co-indictee, Kenneth Hill, that his client told him that he could exoner[628] ate appellant. The motion acknowledged, however, that Hill had previously given contrary sworn testimony at his own trial denying any involvement in the shooting.
An evidentiary hearing was held on July 18, 1979. At the hearing, appellant called Mr. Green in an attempt to elicit from him his client’s statement. Invoking the attorney-client privilege, Green refused to testify. The hearing judge suggested to the prosecutor that Hill be offered immunity from prosecution for perjury so he could testify on behalf of appellant. Alternatively, appellant’s counsel argued that the attorney-client privilege between Green and Hill had been waived by the former when he disclosed Hill’s statement to appellant’s counsel. The trial court disagreed. When the Commonwealth refused to grant immunity, the trial court found that although it did not have the power to grant judicial immunity to Hill, a new trial was warranted based on the contents of the unsworn post-trial motion, notwithstanding its double hearsay nature, since the judge considered it to be reliable and credible.
In reversing the order of a new trial and reinstating the verdicts, the Superior Court found that since the proposed statement was unavailable at the post-trial hearing, there was no admissible after-discovered evidence. It further reasoned that even if the alleged after-discovered evidence was produced it would have been perjurious, and therefore improper upon which to base a new trial.
Initially, appellant contends that the Superior Court erred in its conclusion. He complains that his co-indictee’s statement was of such a nature that if he was granted a new trial a different verdict would be likely. The trial court agreed and granted appellant a new trial for that reason.
It is well settled in this Commonwealth that a new trial is not warranted on the basis of after-discovered evidence, unless it could not have been discovered until after the trial despite reasonable diligence, is not used for merely cumulative or impeachment purposes, and is of such a nature that it would compel a different outcome. Com[629] monwealth v. Hugney, 491 Pa. 222, 420 A.2d 422 (1980); Commonwealth v. Cooney, 444 Pa. 416, 282 A.2d 29 (1971); Commonwealth v. Green, 858 Pa. 192, 56 A.2d 95 (1948).
Here, the record is barren of any proof that Hill’s statement was producible or admissible. At the post-trial hearing, Mr. Green, attorney for Hill, was called by appellant’s counsel for the sole purpose of repeating to the court his client’s prior inconsistent out-of-court statement, which had been made in the confines of their attorney-client relationship. Declining to endanger his client’s rights Mr. Green invoked the attorney-client privilege and refused to testify. In response to the trial court’s questions, Mr. Green advised the trial judge that if Hill were called to testify for appellant he would be jeopardizing his right against self-incrimination by opening himself up to a charge of perjury based upon his sworn trial testimony, and if so, would invoke his Fifth Amendment right. Over appellant’s counsel’s objections, the trial court ruled that Mr. Green’s privilege claim was proper and that he could not be questioned further concerning his client’s statement. Because Hill intended to assert his right against self-incrimination, he was never subpoenaed to testify at the hearing. Appellant, however, presented no evidence that, even if Hill was called as a witness, he would have testified favorably for him.
Nevertheless, Judge Lois Forer found that the statement by appellant’s counsel of what Mr. Green had told her of what his client told him, although double hearsay, was reliable, trustworthy and legitimate testimonial evidence; and that “if Mr. Green had testified” ... she “would have granted a new trial,” (Slip op. Forer, J. at 4.).
The judge justified the admissibility of the hearsay statement by finding that Hill’s statement was against his penal interest, thereby qualifying as an exception to the hearsay rule. The court then found that because Mr. Green was Hill’s attorney his post-trial hearing testimony of what his client told him was unquestionably reliable, and that appellant’s counsel’s statement of what Mr. Green told her also [630] had the same reliability attributes as Mr. Green’s hearsay statement.
This Court has previously warned that post-verdict accomplice testimony should be considered with caution. Commonwealth v. Gaddy, 492 Pa. 434, 424 A.2d 1268 (1981); Commonwealth v. Coleman, 438 Pa. 373, 264 A.2d 649 (1970). Although the trial court did not actually hear testimony from co-indictee Hill, the post-trial motion statement exonerating appellant was clearly untrustworthy and unreliable, bordering on charade. During his own trial, Hill disclaimed any complicity in the assault.2 Then following appellant’s trial, appellant’s attorney discovered another statement made by Hill in which he simultaneously confessed to the shooting and exonerated appellant. These two polarized statements were totally inconsistent and contradictory. Both of them could not be true. To say that the second statement was more reliable and credible than the first would be pure speculation, especially when the first one was given under oath while the second was not.
Moreover, appellant’s attorney’s statement was twice removed from its source without any exceptions to the hearsay rule to qualify it as admissible. Appellant’s counsel was attempting to gain a new trial based on a statement which had been relayed to her by another attorney, which in turn had been told to him by his client. When dissecting a double hearsay statement, the reliability and trustworthiness of each declarant must be independently established. Appellant has offered no theory as to how his counsel’s statement would qualify as an exception to the hearsay rule, nor do we see one.
Appellant further argues that the statement of Mr. Green would be admissible at a subsequent trial because the attorney-client privilege had been waived by Mr. Green when he repeated the statement of his client to appellant’s [631] attorney. Appellant misconstrues the applicable statute and controlling precedent. Under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5916, the right to waive the attorney-client privilege belongs to the client.3 Only in the limited situation when the client’s rights or interest can not be possibly affected adversely, can his attorney waive it. Kramer v. Kister, 187 Pa. 227, 40 A. 1008 (1898); Hamilton v. Neel, 7 Watts 517 (1838). See 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2292 (McNaughton rev. 1961); Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 4, DR 4-101.
Mr. Green’s own testimony revealed that if he repeated his client’s statement he would be acting against his client’s interest and would subject him to a charge of perjury. Since the only interest that would be served would be that of appellant’s and not Mr. Green’s client, Mr. Green was not in a position to waive his client’s privilege.
Thus, appellant has failed to show how this alleged exculpatory statement would be producible or admissible at his trial. In cases involving after-discovered evidence, in addition to meeting the requirements set forth in Hugney, supra, the proposed evidence must also be both producible and admissible. Since there was no showing as to how the proposed statement would fit both categories, the Superior Court was correct when it held that the alleged statement was non-existent evidence.
Appellant also claims that co-indictee Hill should have been immunized so that he might offer the alleged exonerating testimony. The difficulty with this argument is that such testimony would have been perjurious. Whatever the policy reasons, they are inapplicable here. Hill’s testimony would be in direct contradiction of his previous [632] sworn testimony; and hence, perjurious and within the prohibition of Glickstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139, 32 S.Ct. 71, 56 L.Ed. 128 (1911) and our own statutory scheme for witness immunization. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5947.
Therefore, we hold that appellant had no right to the immunization of his co-indictee, and since the alleged after-discovered evidence was not admissible in the form offered, it was error for the trial court to award a new trial.
The judgment of the Superior Court is hereby affirmed.
ROBERTS, C.J., files a dissenting opinion in which FLAHERTY and ZAPPALA, JJ., join.