WIEAND, Judge:
Luis Miguel Sanchez was tried by jury and was found guilty of second degree murder, rape, robbery and burglary in connection with the rape and strangulation death of an eighteen year old woman in Philadelphia on September 21, 1989. He was sentenced to prison for life.1 On direct appeal from the judgment of sentence, he argues in the alternative that judgment should be arrested because of insufficient evidence or a new trial granted because of trial errors. Of the alleged trial errors the most significant is appellant’s contention that it was prejudicial error to allow the jury to hear evidence of a post-arrest, suicidal ideation.
[165]*165When police were summoned to 1804 North Seventh Street, Philadelphia, on September 21, 1989, they found the body of Rosario Sosa lying on the third floor staircase with the cord from an iron drawn tightly around her neck. The medical examiner pronounced her dead at the scene and determined the cause of death to be homicide by ligature strangulation. Vaginal and rectal swabs were positive for the presence of spermatozoa, and vaginal bleeding and tearing suggested forcible rape.
Eighteen year old Rosario had remained home alone when other members of her family had gone to church. Family members leaving for church and neighbors had observed appellant seated a few doors down from the Sosa home. Appellant, therefore, was deemed a suspect. When it was learned that there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest, police were instructed to take him into custody. Several hours later, appellant was observed by police a block from the scene of the crime. When he was asked to approach the police car, however, appellant fled. After a short chase, in which additional officers participated, appellant was taken into custody. At the homicide unit, appellant waived his rights under Miranda2 and gave a statement. He admitted that he had been present in the Sosa house, from which he had stolen a VCR, but he denied raping or killing Rosario. Rather, he said, he had tied her to the railing to prevent her from running away, and she had fallen and hung herself while trying to escape. Evidence was also introduced to show that bloodstains on the shirt worn by appellant, which he had attempted to discard while being chased by police, were of the same type as the blood of the victim. Moreover, appellant’s blood type placed him within that group of people who were capable of producing the seminal fluid found in the victim’s vagina. There was also evidence that two bedrooms in the Sosa house had been ransacked and that a VCR, two watches and $700 in cash had been taken.
[166]*166Appellant argues that in the absence of an illegally obtained, inculpatory statement, there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s several findings of guilt. In advancing such an argument appellant misperceives the applicable law. A “request for a limited review of the evidence to determine its sufficiency to sustain the jury’s verdict is inappropriate.” Commonwealth v. DiSabatino, 399 Pa.Super. 1, 4, 581 A.2d 645, 646 (1990). “ ‘It is well settled ... that in determining the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict, we are required to consider all evidence actually received, whether the trial court’s rulings on evidence were correct or incorrect.’ ” Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Pankraz, 382 Pa.Super. 116, 119-120, 554 A.2d 974, 976 (1989). See also: Commonwealth v. Smith, 523 Pa. 577, 582, 568 A.2d 600, 602-603 (1989); Commonwealth v. Manhart, 349 Pa.Super. 552, 556, 503 A.2d 986, 988 (1986). The proper test is whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial, together with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, the jury could have found that each and every element of the charged offenses was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See: Commonwealth v. Smith, supra 523 Pa. at 581, 568 A.2d at 602; Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, 519 Pa. 236, 246, 546 A.2d 1101, 1105 (1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S.Ct. 1169, 107 L.Ed.2d 1072 (1990); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 506 Pa. 469, 472-473, 485 A.2d 1102, 1103 (1984). When all the evidence is so viewed, including appellant’s inculpatory statement to police, it is abundantly clear that sufficient evidence was produced by the Commonwealth to support appellant’s several convictions.
Appellant’s inculpatory statement, moreover, was properly received and was entitled to full jury consideration. In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence,
‘we must determine whether the factual findings are supported by the record. When it is a defendant who has appealed, we must consider only the evidence of the [167]*167prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as, fairly read in the context of the record as a whole, remains uncontradicted. Assuming that there is support in the record, we are bound by the facts as are found and we may reverse the suppression court only if the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are in error.’
Commonwealth v. Whitney, 511 Pa. 232, 239-240, 512 A.2d 1152, 1156 (1986), quoting Commonwealth v. Cortez, 507 Pa. 529, 532, 491 A.2d 111, 112 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 950, 106 S.Ct. 349, 88 L.Ed.2d 297 (1985). See also: Commonwealth v. O’Shea, 523 Pa. 384, 395, 567 A.2d 1023,1028 (1989), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 111 S.Ct. 225, 112 L.Ed.2d 180 (1990); Commonwealth v. Hughes, 521 Pa. 423, 438-439, 555 A.2d 1264, 1271-1272 (1989). Contrary to appellant’s argument, the police had ample probable cause to take him into custody prior to his interrogation. The evidence produced at a pre-trial suppression hearing was reviewed by the trial court as follows:
Police [OJfficer Joseph Sisea testified that the defendant and the victim’s family had difficulties which predated this brutal attack. These difficulties included boasts by the defendant that he had raped two of the sisters previously. The officer also testified that the defendant told the victim’s sister to keep Rosario (the victim) in the house today and not to let her out. The defendant made this statement prior to watching the family leave the house for church without the victim.
Police Officer Pedro Yargos testified that he received information concerning a possible perpetrator at the scene also and passed this information on to the detectives assigned.
Police Officer Luis Lazarde testified that at roll call he was told to be on the lookout for a “Hispanic male wearing black baseball cap, white sweatshirt, working boots, possibly wanted for a homicide, 1804 North 7th Street.” This information was provided by Sergeant Richard Fehrle.
[168]*168Detective Raymond Dougherty, the assigned homicide detective[,] collected all of the information at the scene concerning the suspect. This information along with a description was given to the officers at [the] scene and they were directed to pass this information along to the officers reporting for duty at midnight. Detective Dougherty also telephoned his information into homicide headquarters and at approximately 11:30 p.m. received notice that the defendant was also the subject of an outstanding bench warrant for failure to appear at a court proceeding.
Police [0]fficer Lazarde while on patrol received flash information over the radio that the defendant was being pursued by Sergeant Fehrle. Officer Lazarde took up the chase which was approximately one block from the crime scene and within several hours of discovering the victim’s body. As he pursued the defendant, Officer Lazarde noticed that the defendant removed the baseball cap and sweatshirt he was wearing and discarded them. These items fit the clothing description which had been broadcast concerning the defendant.
Officer Lazarde caught up with the defendant and after a brief struggle during which the officer was knocked to the ground and injured, the defendant was taken into custody. The defendant was transported to the homicide unit of the Police Administration Building, where, after waiving his Miranda rights, he gave a statement.
“To be constitutionally valid, a warrantless arrest must be supported by probable cause.” Commonwealth v. Anderson, 360 Pa.Super. 466, 470, 520 A.2d 1184, 1186 (1987). See also: Commonwealth v. Lewis, 394 Pa.Super. 403, 408, 576 A.2d 63, 66 (1990); Commonwealth v. Merriwether, 382 Pa.Super. 411, 419, 555 A.2d 906, 910 (1989).
In this Commonwealth, the standard for evaluating whether probable cause exists is the “totality of the circumstances” test set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. [169]*169213,103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). See Commonwealth v. Baker, 513 Pa. 23, 518 A.2d 802 (1986), Commonwealth v. Gray, 509 Pa. 476, 503 A.2d 921 (1985). The bench mark of a warrantless arrest is the existence of probable cause, namely, whether the facts and circumstances which are within the knowledge of the officer at the time of the arrest, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime. Commonwealth v. Wagner, 486 Pa. 548, 406 A.2d 1026 (1979).
Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 526 Pa. 268, 272-273, 585 A.2d 988, 990 (1991). See also: Commonwealth v. Fromal, 392 Pa.Super. 100, 112-113, 572 A.2d 711, 717 (1990); Commonwealth v. Butler, 354 Pa.Super. 533, 537-538, 512 A.2d 667, 669-670 (1986).
‘When we examine a particular situation to determine if probable cause exists, we consider all the factors and their total effect, and do not concentrate on each individual element ... We also focus on the circumstances as seen through the eyes of the trained officer, and do not view the situation as an average citizen might ... Finally, we must remember that in dealing with questions of probable cause, we are not dealing with certainties. We are dealing with the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men act. This is not the same ‘beyond-a-reasonable-doubt’ standard which we apply in determining guilt or innocence at trial. Commonwealth v. Devlin, 221 Pa.Super. 175, 289 A.2d 237 (1972).’
Commonwealth v. Simmons, 295 Pa.Super. 72, 83, 440 A.2d 1228, 1234 (1982), quoting Commonwealth v. Kazior, 269 Pa.Super. 518, 524, 410 A.2d 822, 824-825 (1979). See also: Commonwealth v. Chase, 394 Pa.Super. 168,171-172, 575 A.2d 574, 575-576 (1990); Commonwealth v. Ellis, 354 Pa.Super. 11, 17-18, 510 A.2d 1253, 1256 (1986) (en banc).
In making an arrest, a police officer may also rely on information which he or she has received via police radio. [170]*170See: Commonwealth v. Groff, 356 Pa.Super. 477, 489, 514 A.2d 1382, 1388 (1986); Commonwealth v. Prengle, 293 Pa.Super. 64, 68, 437 A.2d 992, 994 (1981). In this regard, the Superior Court has said:
‘An arresting officer, in executing a valid arrest, may rely upon radio broadcasts emanating from police facilities provided, however, that the arresting officer has been either (1) ordered or directed to perform the arrest by an officer in possession of facts justifying the arrest; (2) received information justifying arrest; or (3) heard information which, coupled with facts he personally observed, provided probable cause to arrest. Commonwealth v. Gambit, 274 Pa.Super. 571, 577-578, 418 A.2d 554, 557 (1980), affd., 501 Pa. 453, 462 A.2d 211 (1983). Accord Commonwealth v. Prengle, 293 Pa.Super. 64, 67, 437 A.2d 992, 994 (1981).’
Commonwealth v. Reddix, 355 Pa.Super. 514, 519, 513 A.2d 1041, 1043 (1986), quoting Commonwealth v. Evans, 343 Pa.Super. 118, 128, 494 A.2d 383, 388 (1985). See also: Commonwealth v. Fromal, supra 392 Pa.Super. at 112, 572 A.2d at 717.
Instantly, ample probable cause existed for appellant’s arrest for the killing of Rosario Sosa. Not only did police have knowledge that the victim’s family had had problems with appellant, but appellant had been observed outside the victim’s house when the rest of the family went to church. He also had told the victim’s sister earlier that day that she should not let the victim out of the house. Finally, police knew that there was an outstanding bench warrant for appellant's arrest. Under these circumstances, it is abundantly clear that appellant’s arrest was proper and that his motion to suppress his statement to police was correctly denied.
During cross-examination at trial, appellant was asked whether he had voluntarily signed himself into the psychiatric unit upon his arrival at prison. Appellant conceded that he had been in the psychiatric unit for about a month but denied that he had voluntarily signed himself [171]*171into the unit and said that he had been admitted for tests. He also denied that he had told anyone that he wanted to kill himself or that he had been thinking of killing himself. The Commonwealth, in rebuttal, called the record custodians for the prison’s health care system and its mental health care services program. Barbara Powell, the records supervisor for Correctional Health Care Solutions, testified that appellant, upon arrival at the prison, had been given a medical intake exam by a physician’s assistant who recorded that appellant had said that he felt suicidal. As a result, appellant had been referred for a psychiatric consultation, and a petition had been filed to place appellant in the psychiatric unit. James Sheffer, the records custodian for Hahnemann University Correctional Mental Health Services, testified that the patient discharge summary contained a statement of reasons for appellant’s admission into the prison psychiatric unit reciting that “because of the nature of his charges he is thinking about killing himself in the near future.” The psychiatric records further reflected that appellant had signed a voluntary commitment form under Section 201 of the Mental Health Procedures Act, and that, upon his admission into the psychiatric unit, suicide precautions had been taken involving close monitoring by medical personnel. On redirect examination, the following notation by a staff psychiatrist was also read into the record:
At the time of admission he was sad, motor activity was decreased. Speech was slow and soft and he was withdrawn. Flow of thought was slow. Mood revealed anxiety and depression. There were suicidal thoughts and he felt guilty and worthless. He denied auditory hallucinations. Sensorium, intelligence] and insight were intact. Prior to charging the jury, the trial court determined that
it would not refer to the evidence of appellant’s suicide ideation during its instructions to the jury. The court said:
The only case that I have on suicide is where the person involved has attempted to commit suicide. I have no case as — my law clerk has not found any, no, which deals with [172]*172having an ideation of suicide. I will charge on flight, which deals with, of course, his running, his throwing away articles that may have been used for identification. And I will make the appropriate charge on that. That is the only thing that I know of in the flight charge.
During closing argument, however, the prosecuting attorney made the following remarks:
One of the things that the Court, I’m sure, will instruct you on is flight. And where there is flight you may infer a consciousness of guilt from the defendant’s actions in the fleeing. And [] trying to throw away any evidence such as the sweatshirt, that that is evidence of consciousness of guilt. I submit to you that [] his words to the doctors, when he got up to the prison, of feeling guilty and worthless, and the possible suicide thoughts, were also evidence of his feelings of guilt at that point. And that all ties together, (emphasis added).
Appellant argues that a mere suicidal ideation is both irrelevant and prejudicial.
In general, “[ejvidence that the accused attempted to commit suicide is relevant as a circumstance tending in some degree to show consciousness of guilt.” 1 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, § 159, at p. 649 (14th ed. 1985). It is admissible on the theory that “[a]n attempt at suicide may be construed as an attempt to flee and escape forever from the temporal consequences of one’s misdeed.” 2 Wigmore, Evidence § 276(f), at p. 131 (Chadbourn rev. 1979). As a general rule, therefore,
[tjhe fact that one charged with a crime attempts to commit suicide soon after the offense occurs, or in order to escape prosecution for committing such crime, is admissible in evidence. The principle upon which evidence of flight of one accused of a crime is admitted is applicable to evidence that the accused, when in custody, charged with crime, attempted to take his own life and thereby escape further prosecution. Attempted suicide, as does flight, tends to show a consciousness of guilt.
[173]*17329 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 284 (footnotes omitted). See also: Annot., Admissibility of Evidence Relating To Accused’s Attempt to Commit Suicide, 22 A.L.R.3d 840 (1968).
In Commonwealth v. Giacobbe, 341 Pa. 187, 193, 19 A.2d 71, 74 (1941), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a jury had properly been allowed to consider two suicide attempts by the defendant following police interrogation because such attempts tended to establish consciousness of guilt. This evidence was admissible, the Supreme Court observed, “on the same theory as flight, or manifestations of mental distress, fear, nervousness or excitement on the part of one charged with crime.” Id. In Commonwealth v. Homeyer, 373 Pa. 150, 94 A.2d 743 (1953), the Supreme Court further stated:
Flight, manifestations of mental distress, fear at the time of or just before or just after discovery of the crime, an attempt to commit suicide at such time, as well as evidence to prove motive, intent, plan or design are admissible. Cf. Commonwealth v. Giacobbe, 341 Pa. 187, 19 A.2d 71; Commonwealth v. Boschino, 176 Pa. 103, 34 A. 964; Commonwealth v. Del Giorno, 303 Pa. 509, 154 A. 786; Hester v. Commonwealth, 85 Pa. 139; McManus v. Commonwealth, 91 Pa. 57; McMeen v. Commonwealth, 114 Pa. 300, 306, 9 A. 878; Commonwealth v. Minoff, 363 Pa. 287, 69 A.2d 145, and other cases cited in Commonwealth v. Peay, 369 Pa. 72, 81, 90, 85 A.2d 425; Commonwealth v. Marshall, 287 Pa. 512, 135 A. 301; Commonwealth v. Guida, 298 Pa. 370, 148 A. 501.
Id. 373 Pa. at 159, 94 A.2d at 747. Under this rule announced by the Supreme Court, not only an attempted suicide by a defendant is admissible to show consciousness of guilt, but also a defendant’s conduct evidencing fear or mental distress.
Instantly, appellant does not attempt to distinguish evidence of suicide ideation from evidence of an actual attempt to commit suicide. He argues, rather, that the mere mention of suicide is so prejudicial as to deprive a defendant of a fair trial. He relies upon language used by the Superior [174]*174Court in Seals, Inc. v. Tioga County Grange Mutual Insurance Co., 359 Pa.Super. 606, 519 A.2d 951 (1986), appeal dismissed, 518 Pa. 75, 541 A.2d 314 (1988), wherein the Court said:
To commit suicide is in the minds of many a reprehensible, even immoral and sinful act. At minimum, it is the violent act of a severely troubled person. To this jury, evidence of such violence and mental instability, or even immorality, might have been enough to support in the jurors’ minds an inference of arson. Since they may have decided on this clearly improper basis, a new trial without the suicide evidence is required.
Id. 359 Pa.Super. at 616, 519 A.2d at 956 (citations omitted). Seals, however, was a civil action to recover the proceeds of a fire insurance policy. The defendant insurance company defended on grounds that the insured had intentionally set the fire. The only evidence offered to support the claim of arson was the fact that the insured had murdered his girlfriend and then committed suicide just ten days after the fire. The Superior Court held that the evidence of the insured’s suicide was irrelevant because there was no evidence to suggest that the insured’s suicide had been related to the fire. The Superior Court reasoned:
The evidence of Plank’s suicide is only relevant to the arson defense if in fact Plank killed himself because he had set the fire. Our examination of the record in this case leads us to conclude that Tioga failed to lay an adequate foundation by way of expert or other testimony as to the reasons for Plank’s suicide. Tioga submitted evidence that Plank was “nervous” when discussing the fire. It also showed that Plank had discussed the fire with some investigators who were investigating the fire and that they had asked Plank about his whereabouts the night of the fire and told him they thought the fire might have been arson. This alone does not at all demonstrate that Plank took his life because he feared prosecution for arson.
[175]*175We find unpersuasive Tioga’s citation to criminal cases in which evidence of attempted suicide by an accused has been admitted to show guilty conscience and, therefore, guilt. See Commonwealth v. Giacobbe, 341 Pa. 187, 19 A.2d 71 (1941); Commonwealth v. Homeyer, 373 Pa. 150, 94 A.2d 743 (1953). In both Giacobbe and Homeyer, the connection between the guilt of the defendant and the attempted suicide was clear.
Id. 359 Pa.Super. at 614-615, 519 A.2d at 955.
In the instant case, there was ample evidence from which a jury could infer a connection between appellant’s thoughts of suicide and the crimes with which he had been charged. Here, the thoughts of suicide were expressed after appellant had been arrested, interrogated and confined on charges of murder and rape. His suicide ideation was first conveyed to the physician’s assistant who was conducting a medical intake evaluation. Later, upon being moved to the prison psychiatric unit, it was noted on appellant’s chart that he had been admitted because he was thinking of killing himself as a result of the nature of the charges against him. Thus, although there could have been other reasons to explain appellant’s suicidal thoughts, there was support for an inference that he was thinking of killing himself because he was conscious of guilt. Under these circumstances, we do not find Seals to be controlling.
Our research has disclosed decisions from other jurisdictions which have permitted a defendant’s attempted suicide to be considered by the jury as a circumstance evidencing consciousness of guilt. See, e.g.: People v. Barrett, 22 Cal.App. 780, 136 P. 520 (1913); McKinney v. State, 466 A.2d 356 (Del.1983); State v. Hargraves, 62 Idaho 8, 107 P.2d 854 (1940); People v. Duncan, 261 Ill. 339, 103 N.E. 1043 (1913); State v. Mitchell, 450 N.W.2d 828 (Iowa 1990); Commonwealth v. Goldenberg, 315 Mass. 26, 51 N.E.2d 762 (1943); State v. Campbell, 146 Mont. 251, 405 P.2d 978, 22 A.L.R.3d 824 (1965); State v. Painter, 329 Mo. 314, 44 S.W.2d 79 (1931); State v. Exum, 213 N.C. 16, 195 S.E. 7 [176]*176(1938); State v. Plunkett, 62 Nev. 258, 149 P.2d 101 (1944); State v. Brown, 128 N.H. 606, 517 A.2d 831 (1986); State v. Mann, 244 NJ.Super. 484, 582 A.2d 1048 (1990); State v. Blancett, 24 N.M. 433,174 P. 207 (1918), appeal dismissed, 252 U.S. 574, 40 S.Ct. 395, 64 L.Ed. 723 (1920); State v. White, 649 S.W.2d 598 (Tenn.Cr.App.1982). However, we have found only one decision which addresses mere threats by a defendant to commit suicide. In People v. O’Neil, 18 Ill.2d 461, 165 N.E.2d 319 (1960), it was observed that “the threat of suicide, as does flight, tends to show a consciousness of guilt.” Id. at 465, 165 N.E.2d at 321. In O’Neil, the Supreme Court of Illinois reasoned that the defendant’s post-arrest threat to kill himself was an additional circumstance corroborating his confession and, thus, aided in establishing the corpus delicti for arson.
After careful consideration, there appears to us to be no sound basis for excluding evidence of a defendant’s post-arrest, suicide ideation. Evidence of actual attempts to commit suicide are uniformly admitted as evidence tending to show consciousness of guilt on the part of the defendant, and a similar inference can be drawn from a threat to commit suicide. In reaching this conclusion, we are guided by our Supreme Court’s pronouncement that not only attempts to commit suicide, but also manifestations of mental distress tend to demonstrate a defendant’s consciousness of guilt.3 See: Commonwealth v. Homeyer, supra; Commonwealth v. Giacobbe, supra. Certainly, by expressing a desire to kill himself, a defendant manifests emotional distress as an aftermath of being arrested and subjected to pre-trial incarceration. We hold, therefore, that a jury can reasonably infer consciousness of guilt from the fact that an accused has made one or more threats to commit suicide or has expressed suicidal thoughts.
[177]*177The Commonwealth’s evidence that appellant had been suicidal following arrest and confinement was contained in prison medical and psychiatric records. Appellant, although conceding the admissibility of business records, argues that reports of his suicide ideation were excludable as a second level of hearsay.
In Hreha v. Benscoter, 381 Pa.Super. 556, 554 A.2d 525 (1989), the Superior Court said:
A business record, of course, is recognized as an exception to the hearsay exclusion. See: 42 Pa.C.S. § 6108; In re Indyk’s Estate, 488 Pa. 567, 413 A.2d 371 (1979); Fauceglia v. Harry, 409 Pa. 155, 185 A.2d 598 (1962); Packel and Poulin, Pennsylvania Evidence, Ch. VIII, § 803.6 (1987). Where a business record contains multiple levels of hearsay, however, it is admissible only if each level falls within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule. See: Felice v. Long Island Railroad Co., 426 F.2d 192, 197 (2nd Cir.1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 820, 91 S.Ct. 37, 27 L.Ed.2d 47 (1970). Cf. Commonwealth v. Scott, 503 Pa. 624, 630, 470 A.2d 91, 94 (1983) (“When dissecting a double hearsay statement, the reliability and trustworthiness of each declarant must be independently established.”).
Id. 381 Pa.Super. at 565, 554 A.2d at 529.
Here, however, appellant’s statements regarding suicide were clearly admissible. They were admissible as admissions. In Commonwealth v. Tervalon, 463 Pa. 581, 345 A.2d 671 (1975), the Supreme Court said:
As a general rule voluntary, extrajudicial statements made by a defendant may be used against that defendant although they contain no admission of guilt. Commonwealth v. Wentzel, 360 Pa. 137, 150, 61 A.2d 309 (1948); Commonwealth v. Tenbroeck, 265 Pa. 251, 254, 108 A. 635 (1919). See generally, McCormick, Law of Evidence, § 144 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972). These extrajudicial statements, which differ from confessions in that they do not acknowledge all essential elements of a crime, are generally considered to qualify for introduction into evidence [178]*178under the admission exception to the hearsay rule. McCormick, supra, § 262; 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1048 (Chadboum rev. 1972).
Id. 463 Pa. at 590, 345 A.2d at 676 (footnote omitted). See also: Commonwealth v. Smith, 518 Pa. 15, 39, 540 A.2d 246, 257 (1988); Commonwealth v. Hoyman, 385 Pa.Super. 439, 449-450, 561 A.2d 756, 761-762 (1989).
His statements were also admissible because they were statements made to a doctor for diagnosis and treatment and referred to symptoms, feelings and conditions. See: Cody v. S.K.F. Industries, Inc., 447 Pa. 558, 291 A.2d 772 (1972). See also: Commonwealth v. Sanford, 397 Pa.Super. 581, 594-596, 580 A.2d 784, 791-792 (1990); Hreha v. Benscoter, supra 381 Pa.Super. at 565-566, 554 A.2d at 529-530.
Appellant also contends that statements which he made in the prison psychiatric unit were protected from disclosure by the statutory psychiatrist-patient privilege found at 42 Pa.C.S. § 5944 and by the confidentiality provisions of the Mental Health Procedures Act.4 However, appellant did not assert these bases for excluding the [179]*179evidence during trial and did not assert them in his post-trial motions.5 Therefore, neither the psychiatrist-patient privilege nor the confidentiality provisions of the Mental Health Procedures Act have been preserved as issues for appellate review. “[T]he failure to raise an issue, objection, or argument in a timely manner during trial forecloses further review of an alleged error in post-trial motions or at the appellate level.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 368 Pa.Super. 427, 435, 534 A.2d 511, 515 (1987). “ ‘It is fundamental that the parties in a trial are obligated to inform the court of alleged violations of evidence law or trial procedure, and that the failure to so inform the court by a timely and specific objection, motion, exception, request, or offer of proof will constitute a waiver of that ground for relief.’ ” Commonwealth v. Schneider, 386 Pa.Super. 202, 214, 562 [180]*180A.2d 868, 874 (1989), quoting Packel & Poulin, Pennsylvania Evidence, Ch. I, § 103, at p. 5 (1987).
As part of the defense strategy, appellant attempted to focus the finger of suspicion on the victim’s stepfather. In this regard, the defense emphasized that there was no evidence of a forcible entry at the victim’s house, suggesting thereby that the perpetrator had used a key to gain entry. Evidence was also produced that an older sister of the victim had on one occasion complained to the police that she had been sexually abused by the stepfather. Although several Commonwealth witnesses testified that the stepfather had been attending church services at the time when the victim was raped and murdered, the Commonwealth did not call the stepfather as a witness to deny assertions made by the defense. Therefore, the defense sought to have the jury instructed that it could draw an adverse inference from the Commonwealth’s failure to call the stepfather as a witness. The trial court refused the requested instruction.
In Commonwealth v. Moore, 453 Pa. 302, 309 A.2d 569 (1973), the Supreme Court stated:
Generally, when a potential witness is available to only one of the parties to a trial, and it appears this witness has special information material to the issue, and this person’s testimony would not be merely cumulative, then if such party does not produce the testimony of this witness, the jury may draw an inference it would have been unfavorable. See McCormick, Law of Evidence, 534 (1954). See also: Bentivoglio v. Ralston, 447 Pa. 24, 288 A.2d 745 (1972), and Commonwealth v. Wright, 444 Pa. 536, 282 A.2d 323 (1971).
Id., 453 Pa. at 305, 309 A.2d at 570. See also: Commonwealth v. Manigault, 501 Pa. 506, 510-511, 462 A.2d 239, 241 (1983); Commonwealth v. Jones, 455 Pa. 488, 495, 317 A.2d 233, 237 (1974); Commonwealth v. Boyd, 356 Pa.Super. 302, 306, 514 A.2d 623, 625 (1986). There are, however, several exceptions to the missing witness rule. These ex[181]*181ceptions were listed by the Superior Court in Commonwealth v. Harley, 275 Pa.Super. 407, 418 A.2d 1354 (1980), as follows:
1. The witness is so hostile or prejudiced against the party expected to call him that there is a small possibility of obtaining unbiased truth;
2. The testimony of such a witness is comparatively unimportant, cumulative, or inferior to that already presented;
3. The uncalled witness is equally available to both parties;
4. There is a satisfactory explanation as to why the party failed to call such a witness;
5. The witness is not available or not within the control of the party against whom the negative inference is desired; and,
6. The testimony of the uncalled witness is not within the scope of the natural interest of the party failing to produce him.
Id., 275 Pa.Superior Ct. at 413, 418 A.2d at 1357. See also: Commonwealth v. Dorman, 377 Pa.Super. 419, 431-432, 547 A.2d 757, 763 (1988). When one of these exceptions applies, a missing witness instruction is not required. See, e.g.: Commonwealth v. Manigault, supra (defendant not entitled to missing witness instruction where he had equal opportunity to question or call the witness); Commonwealth v. Berry, 355 Pa.Super. 243, 252, 513 A.2d 410, 414-415 (1986) (defendant not entitled to instruction where missing witnesses could have offered only cumulative testimony). Here, the trial court properly refused the defense request for a missing witness charge. Not only did the evidence place the stepfather in church at the time of the rape and murder and thus negative his possession of special information, but the record discloses that the witness was also available to the defense and could have been called by the defense if it had chosen to do so.
[182]*182After a careful review of the record, we find no error requiring the granting of a new trial. The judgment of sentence, therefore, is
Affirmed.
JOHNSON, J., files a dissenting opinion.