Commonwealth v. Patterson

247 A.2d 218, 432 Pa. 76, 1968 Pa. LEXIS 487

• Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: October 28, 1968
• Docket: Appeal, 36
• Status: Published

Opinions

Opinion by

Mb. Justice Roberts,

This appeal results from the denial, without an evidentiary hearing, of a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed in the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Allegheny County, Appellant was indicted and tried on a charge of murder. At his trial before a jury beginning February 26, 1962, appellant pleaded not guilty, but near the close of the trial he was permitted to change his plea to guilty to a charge of murder generally. The matter then proceeded before the court, to determine the degree of guilt, which hearing resulted in a finding of guilty of murder in the first degree. Patterson was sentenced to life imprisonment, and took no appeal.

While we need not, at this time, pass on whether appellant is entitled to the writ of habeas corpus, we do think that the court below erred in dismissing this matter without holding an evidentiary hearing. Among other things, Patterson alleged that his guilty plea was not voluntary. To this end, he asserted as matters of fact, that during a trial recess he and his attorney were passed in the hallway by the district attorney who stated that unless he changed his plea to guilty “it would be too late to save him.” Appellant next alleged that his own counsel agreed with this evaluation, and “threatened” Patterson with the electric chair unless the guilty plea was entered.¹

We recognize the fact that hope for a more lenient sentence can certainly form a valid basis for a guilty plea. However, the plea must nevertheless be the free and uncoerced product of its maker. Thus, it is one thing to say that a man voluntarily chooses to plead guilty with the hope of avoiding a death sentence, yet quite another to say that he enters his plea solely out of the fear injected into his mind by what could almost appear, to a man untrained in the law, as some sort of private agreement between opposing counsel to which the defendant himself was not even privy.² In order to properly decide exactly what motivated Patterson’s plea, therefore, it is necessary for the court below to hold an evidentiary hearing.

This in no way should indicate that we believe appellant was, in fact, coerced into entering his plea. We hold only that, accepting as true the facts alleged in appellant’s habeas corpus petition, the plea cannot stand.³ In Commonwealth ex rel. West v. Myers, 423 Pa. 1, 222 A. 2d 918 (1966), appellant also alleged that his guilty plea was entered involuntarily and at the sole urging of counsel. In holding that this allegation was sufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing we said, quite simply: “If accepting the petitioner’s allegations as true the writ would issue, then it is incumbent upon the court to hold a hearing affording the petitioner the opportunity to establish the truth of his allegations.” Id. at 4, 222 A. 2d at 921.⁴

Appellant also alleges, albeit in rather unsophisticated terms (the habeas petition was drawn and filed pro se), that a coerced confession caused him to enter the plea. Once again, we cannot say without an evidentiary hearing ever having been held that this allegation is not meritorious. Commonwealth v. Garrett, 425 Pa. 594, 229 A. 2d 922 (1967), admittedly requires that the coerced confession be the primary motivation for the entry of a plea if that plea is to be overturned because of the confession. Thus, if appellant wishes to attack his confession collaterally, he will have to abandon his allegation that the plea was entered because counsel “threatened” Patterson with the electric chair, and vice versa. However, not since the days of Blackstone have internally consistent pleadings been required in any case, civil or criminal, in this Commonwealth. Since appellant would be entitled to relief by proving the truth of either allegation concerning the reason for his plea, he must be given a hearing.

The order of the Court of Oyer and Terminer of Allegheny County is vacated, and the record is remanded to that court with instructions to hold an evidentiary hearing.

Mr. Chief Justice Bell concurs in the result. Mr. Justice Musmanno did not participate in the decision of this case. Mr. Justice Cohen took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.

1 Appellant couched this allegation in terms of an ineffective counsel claim, rather than a guilty plea claim. We shall not, however, permit this rather crude petition to blind us to the real nature of Patterson’s claim, since appellant was without the aid of counsel when the writ was initially sought.

2 The Supreme Court of the United States has said: “A guilty plea, if induced by promises or threats which deprive it of the character of a voluntary act, is void.” Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493, 82 S. Ct. 510, 513 (1962). See also American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty, p. 30 (Tent. Draft 1967).

3 On remand, of course, the burden will be on appellant to demonstrate the actual invalidity of his plea. Commonwealth v. Hill, 427 Pa. 614, 235 A. 2d 347 (1967).

4 While the present ease, as well as West, arose under the old Pennsylvania habeas corpus procedure, the present Post Conviction Hearing Act, Act of January 25, 1966, P. L. (1965) 1580, §9, 19 P.S. §1180-9 (Supp. 1967) also requires that the court hold a hearing whenever the petitioner alleges facts sufficient to require relief if proven, except if the allegations are patently frivolous and “without a trace of support either in the record or from other evidence submitted by the petitioner.”