Commonwealth v. Palmer

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

Commonwealth v. Palmer

552 A.2d 321, 122 Pa. Commw. 379, 1988 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 995

CourtCommonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

DecidedDecember 28, 1988

DocketAppeal 2318 C.D. 1986

StatusPublished

Cited by4 cases

This text of 552 A.2d 321 (Commonwealth v. Palmer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Commonwealth v. Palmer, 552 A.2d 321, 122 Pa. Commw. 379, 1988 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 995 (Pa. Ct. App. 1988).

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Opinion

Opinion by

Judge McGinley,

This is an appeal by the Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (Department) from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) which sustained the appeal of Charles E. Palmer (Appellee) from the Departments suspension of Appellees operating privileges for a period of one year. We reverse.

Appellee received a notice of suspension from the Department, dated January 24, 1985, which stated that because of Appellees conviction of August 1, 1984, under Section 3731 of the Vehicle Code (Code) 1 (Driving Under Influence of Alcohol or Controlled Substance) his license would be suspended for one year effective February 28, 1985. 2 In his appeal to the trial court, Appellee argued that he was entitled to credit for time served toward the suspension for the time period during which the Borough of Aldan Police Department confiscated his drivers license; more precisely, from May 14, 1984, the date of his arrest on unrelated charges 3 until the license was forwarded to the Department. The trial court withheld disposition of the case until the Appellee could ascertain when the Aldan Police Department forwarded the license. When informed that the Aldan Police Department had failed to forward *381 Appellees drivers license to the Department, 4 the trial court determined that the Appellee had already served the one year suspension and sustained Appellees appeal. This appeal followed. Our scope of review is limited to determining whether the trial courts findings are supported by competent evidence and whether it committed an error of law or manifestly abused its discretion. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Grasso, 97 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 262, 508 A.2d 643 (1986).

The Department argues that the trial court abused its discretion by granting Appellee credit against the suspension period. Specifically, the Department argues that the sole issue before the trial court was the determination of the validity of the suspension, and that at hearing the Department was not prepared or required to address a request for a credit against the period of suspension. We agree.

Section 1540(b) of the Code 5 provides that a suspension shall be effective from the date of surrender of the license to the Department if it is surrendered pursuant *382 to the Departments notice to surrender the license. In Department of Transportation v. Stiver, 100 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 573, 515 A.2d 99 (1986) we interpreted Section 1541 of the Code 6 to mean that a suspension begins to run from the date of surrender if submitted earlier than the effective date given in the notice. Stiver, at 575-576, 515 A.2d at 99. In Stiver, we also noted that once the suspension has been served the Department is required to restore the drivers license.

The Department argues that in Department of Transportation v. Yarbinitz, 97 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 169, 508 A.2d 641 (1986) our Court held that a trial court lacks the authority to compute and give credit for any time that the Department may have been in possession of a drivers license. Yarbinitz involved a situation wherein a motorist surrendered his drivers license at the same time he pleaded guilty to a traffic violation. This was prior to receiving a notice of suspension from the Department. Section 1540(a) of the Code provides that a suspension will be effective from the date of surrender only if that date is subsequent to the Departments notice to surrender the license.

In the present case, the Appellee did not surrender his license to the Department prior to the January 24, 1985 notice. His license was confiscated by the Aldan Police Department on May 14, 1984, pursuant to his arrest on unrelated charges and not for violation of Section 3731 of the Code. It was error for the trial court to *383 determine that Appellees suspension began to run from the date the license was confiscated.

In Yarbinitz, we held that:

Once the identity of the party whose license is suspended is established and the grounds for the suspension are found to be proper, the trial courts inquiry is ended. Even assuming appellee was entitled to credit, this is not a basis for sustaining the appeal. If the person whose license is suspended committed the offense, and if the offense is a valid basis for suspension . . . the suspension must be upheld and the operators appeal dismissed.

Yarbinitz, at 171, 508 A.2d at 642. (Emphasis in original.)

There is no dispute that Appellee was the individual whose license was revoked and who committed the offense which resulted in the license suspension. 7 If the Appellee believes he is entitled to credit, his recourse is to apply to the Department. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Lapinsky, 120 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 196, 548 A.2d 382 (1988).

Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the trial court.

.Order

Now, December 28, 1988, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, at No. 5023 January Term 1985, dated July 1, 1986 is hereby reversed.

1

75 Pa. C. S. §3731.

2

Section 1532(b)(3) of the Code, 75 Pa. C. S. § 1532(b)(3) provides:

The department shall suspend the operating privilege of any driver for 12 months upon receiving a certified record of the drivers conviction of section 3731 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) or an adjudication of delinquency based on section 3732.

3

Appellees arrest date for--violation of Section 3731 of the Code was January 31, 1984 (Official Record (O.R.) at 15a).

4

Appellees drivers license was sent to the Department by the Aldan Police Department on June 25, 1986 (O.R. at 17a).

5

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Opinion by

Judge McGinley,

This is an appeal by the Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (Department) from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) which sustained the appeal of Charles E. Palmer (Appellee) from the Departments suspension of Appellees operating privileges for a period of one year. We reverse.

Appellee received a notice of suspension from the Department, dated January 24, 1985, which stated that because of Appellees conviction of August 1, 1984, under Section 3731 of the Vehicle Code (Code) 1 (Driving Under Influence of Alcohol or Controlled Substance) his license would be suspended for one year effective February 28, 1985. 2 In his appeal to the trial court, Appellee argued that he was entitled to credit for time served toward the suspension for the time period during which the Borough of Aldan Police Department confiscated his drivers license; more precisely, from May 14, 1984, the date of his arrest on unrelated charges 3 until the license was forwarded to the Department. The trial court withheld disposition of the case until the Appellee could ascertain when the Aldan Police Department forwarded the license. When informed that the Aldan Police Department had failed to forward *381 Appellees drivers license to the Department, 4 the trial court determined that the Appellee had already served the one year suspension and sustained Appellees appeal. This appeal followed. Our scope of review is limited to determining whether the trial courts findings are supported by competent evidence and whether it committed an error of law or manifestly abused its discretion. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Grasso, 97 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 262, 508 A.2d 643 (1986).

The Department argues that the trial court abused its discretion by granting Appellee credit against the suspension period. Specifically, the Department argues that the sole issue before the trial court was the determination of the validity of the suspension, and that at hearing the Department was not prepared or required to address a request for a credit against the period of suspension. We agree.

Section 1540(b) of the Code 5 provides that a suspension shall be effective from the date of surrender of the license to the Department if it is surrendered pursuant *382 to the Departments notice to surrender the license. In Department of Transportation v. Stiver, 100 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 573, 515 A.2d 99 (1986) we interpreted Section 1541 of the Code 6 to mean that a suspension begins to run from the date of surrender if submitted earlier than the effective date given in the notice. Stiver, at 575-576, 515 A.2d at 99. In Stiver, we also noted that once the suspension has been served the Department is required to restore the drivers license.

The Department argues that in Department of Transportation v. Yarbinitz, 97 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 169, 508 A.2d 641 (1986) our Court held that a trial court lacks the authority to compute and give credit for any time that the Department may have been in possession of a drivers license. Yarbinitz involved a situation wherein a motorist surrendered his drivers license at the same time he pleaded guilty to a traffic violation. This was prior to receiving a notice of suspension from the Department. Section 1540(a) of the Code provides that a suspension will be effective from the date of surrender only if that date is subsequent to the Departments notice to surrender the license.

In the present case, the Appellee did not surrender his license to the Department prior to the January 24, 1985 notice. His license was confiscated by the Aldan Police Department on May 14, 1984, pursuant to his arrest on unrelated charges and not for violation of Section 3731 of the Code. It was error for the trial court to *383 determine that Appellees suspension began to run from the date the license was confiscated.

In Yarbinitz, we held that:

Once the identity of the party whose license is suspended is established and the grounds for the suspension are found to be proper, the trial courts inquiry is ended. Even assuming appellee was entitled to credit, this is not a basis for sustaining the appeal. If the person whose license is suspended committed the offense, and if the offense is a valid basis for suspension . . . the suspension must be upheld and the operators appeal dismissed.

Yarbinitz, at 171, 508 A.2d at 642. (Emphasis in original.)

There is no dispute that Appellee was the individual whose license was revoked and who committed the offense which resulted in the license suspension. 7 If the Appellee believes he is entitled to credit, his recourse is to apply to the Department. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Lapinsky, 120 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 196, 548 A.2d 382 (1988).

Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the trial court.

.Order

Now, December 28, 1988, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, at No. 5023 January Term 1985, dated July 1, 1986 is hereby reversed.

1

75 Pa. C. S. §3731.

2

Section 1532(b)(3) of the Code, 75 Pa. C. S. § 1532(b)(3) provides:

The department shall suspend the operating privilege of any driver for 12 months upon receiving a certified record of the drivers conviction of section 3731 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) or an adjudication of delinquency based on section 3732.

3

Appellees arrest date for--violation of Section 3731 of the Code was January 31, 1984 (Official Record (O.R.) at 15a).

4

Appellees drivers license was sent to the Department by the Aldan Police Department on June 25, 1986 (O.R. at 17a).

5

75 Pa. C. S. § 1540(b). This section provides:

(b) Suspension or revocation of operating privilege.—Upon the suspension or revocation of the operating privilege of any person by the department, the department shall forthwith notify the person in writing at the address of record to surrender his drivers license to the department for the term of suspension or revocation. The suspension or revocation shall be effective upon a date determined by the department or the date of surrender of the license to the department if that date is subsequent to the department’s notice to surrender the license, whichever occurs first. Upon surrender of the license, the department shall issue a receipt showing the date that it received the license. (Emphasis added.)

6

75 Pa. C. S. §1541. Section 1541(a) provides in part:

(a) Commencement of period.—The period of revocation or suspension of the operating privilege shall commence as provided for in section 1540 (relating to surrender of license). No credit toward the revocation or suspension shall be earned until the drivers license is surrendered to the department, the court or the district attorney as the case may be.

7

At the hearing de novo, Appellee did not appear and neither party presented testimony. Hearing Transcript, May 22, 1986, (H.T.) at 3-4.

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552 A.2d 321, 122 Pa. Commw. 379, 1988 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 995, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-palmer-pacommwct-1988.

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