Commonwealth v. One Box Benedictine

137 A. 90, 290 Pa. 121, 1927 Pa. LEXIS 624
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedApril 11, 1927
DocketAppeal, 201
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 137 A. 90 (Commonwealth v. One Box Benedictine) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commonwealth v. One Box Benedictine, 137 A. 90, 290 Pa. 121, 1927 Pa. LEXIS 624 (Pa. 1927).

Opinion

Opinion by

Mr. Justice Kephart,

This proceeding in the court below was for the confiscation of contraband liquor and was not a prosecution against an individual. The Commonwealth, through the district attorney of Philadelphia County, petitioned the court of quarter sessions for authority to proceed against and forfeit a large quantity of beer of high alcoholic content, several barrels of whiskey, a large quantity of champagne, and other liquors, seized by Philadelphia police officers in a house on the west side of Wissahickon Avenue. The court of quarter sessions refused to make the order, the Superior Court reversed and this appeal followed.

The petition for confiscation averred the property seized was unlawfully used and possessed in violation of the Act of March 27, 1923, commonly known as the Snyder Act, and that no permit, as defined by the National Prohibition Act, had been issued to any one for the possession of said liquor. The answer denied the articles seized were unlawfully held and possessed, averred the place searched was a private dwelling, and that the seizure was under a search warrant unlawfully issued.

When the matter came on for hearing, the burden lay on the Commonwealth to establish the essential averments contained in the petition. Many witnesses were called to show the character of the place when the seizure was made, and the manner and method under which it was conducted,, all such events occurring prior to the raid of the.officers. Appellant contends that the Commonwealth’s own case shows the premises to be a private dwelling and the search an unlawful one. The inquiry arises as to what is a “private dwelling” which, *125 under the Snyder Act, is, immune from search unless there is a sale of liquor.

Section 2, paragraph (d), broadens the ordinary definition of a private dwelling. It was interpreted by this court in Com. v. Berdenella, 288 Pa. 510, 515. A private dwelling means not only a dwelling in the ordinary sense but includes as well the rooms used and occupied as a residence in an apartment house, hotel, or boarding house, wherein intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes was possessed at the time the act went into effect, or such place or dwelling later acquired by lease, purchase or otherwise, to which liquor, possessed at the time the act went into effect, may be lawfully transported under the Snyder Act under a permit from the national government. The act does not attempt to limit the kind of a building that may be used as a dwelling, but makes a distinction as to uses of such places. The term thus includes: (1) A private dwelling house used as dwelling house only; (2) A dwelling in a building used as an apartment, hotel or boarding house; (3) A dwelling used in part for some business place such as a store, shop, saloon, restaurant, boarding house, warehouse or public garage. To all dwellings, section 4 of the act applies. It reads: “It shall not be unlawful, however, to possess intoxicating liquor for beverage purposes in one’s bona fide private dwelling while the same is occupied and used by him as his dwelling only, provided such liquor was lawfully acquired prior to the passage of this act.”

The act gives the right to search for contraband liquor,—that is, liquor bought in violation of the act since prohibition went into effect, or any liquor sold in violation of the act. The limitation on the right to search is general as to all places and specific as to others. Generally, the search warrant shall not issue unless probable cause for its issuance be first made to appear. That is, it must be reasonably certain, either from personal knowledge of the one procuring the warrant, or informa *126 tion .from a reliable source, that the law has been violated. It must not be founded on suspicion, but upon personal knowledge or belief founded on reliable information. The magistrate issuing the warrant must be satisfied that probable cause exists.

As to private dwelling houses, a further limitation on right to search is added. Section 8 of the act reads: “No search warrant shall issue to search any private dwelling occupied as such, unless it is being used for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor, or unless it is in part used for some business purpose, such as store, shop, saloon, restaurant, hotel, boarding house, warehouse, or public garage.”

When a building is “a private dwelling occupied as such” or used as a “private dwelling house only,” it is protected against a search warrant unless “the private dwelling house is being used [like a ‘speak easy’] for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquor.” To search a private dwelling for intoxicating liquor, in addition to the general precautions necessary before issuance of a search warrant, the affiant must know that the dwelling house “is being used for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors.” The language is plain and mandatory. The search warrant cannot issue unless the “private dwelling” is used for unlawful sale. This fact must be known by the person who makes the affidavit, either by direct, or circumstantial evidence. Moreover, the magistrate who issues the warrant has the duty of investigating whether that fact,—“sale,”—is present. This may be found by the same kind of evidence that caused the warrant to issue. To swear falsely to an affidavit for a search warrant causes the affiant to be guilty of perjury. A magistrate who issues a warrant to search a building used as a private dwelling only without probable cause on a proper affidavit, or, after an investigation, if one is had,- -without it thereby appearing that a sale had been made, as we said above, is guilty of malfeasance in office, and the officer who executes such *127 a warrant, knowing that it has been wrongfully issued, is a trespasser. All such may be prosecuted criminally. This is part of the security placed about a “private dwelling house occupied as such.” The fact that liquor may be discovered through a search warrant unlawfully issued will not condone nor can it be used in justification of the crime committed in procuring the search warrant.

But all dwelling houses are not entitled to this protection. A dwelling house used in part for business purposes loses its “sanctuary” aspect. Those mentioned in the third class above cannot claim ,its benefit. The act reads: “unless it [the private dwelling] is in part used for some business purpose such as a store, shop, saloon, restaurant, hotel, boarding house, warehouse, or public garage.” It is the use of the building for public purposes that takes from it the protection of the act. But the general limitation as to issuance of search warrants still applies.

The use made of such premises, being of a public nature, can be easily and readily ascertained. The “dwelling house” must be used in part for business purposes. It is not necessary that a sign should label the use as a store, etc. If the place possesses the characteristics of the business mentioned, it is enough. A building may have all the outward appearances of a dwelling and be in part a fully equipped restaurant, or it may have all the essentials surrounding a saloon. This is evidenced by the conduct of the public generally in visiting the place, coming and going, exhibiting some of the external appearances of what is usually purchased in saloons.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
137 A. 90, 290 Pa. 121, 1927 Pa. LEXIS 624, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-v-one-box-benedictine-pa-1927.