Commonwealth v. Craig

783 S.W.2d 387, 1990 Ky. LEXIS 9, 1990 WL 2760

• Court: Kentucky Supreme Court
• Decided: January 18, 1990
• Docket: 88-SC-675-DG
• Status: Published

Opinions

GANT, Justice.

Respondent, Ramona Craig, was indicted for the murder of her husband, George Craig. She was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to ten years imprisonment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, and this court granted discretionary review.

The sole issue on this review is the “battered woman syndrome” and the evidence concerning this given by a witness, Phyllis Alexander, and other evidence given by Ms. Alexander and excluded by the court.

In deciding this case, we must examine several factors. The first of these is the use of the word “syndrome” in this particular field. Certain syndromes are medical in nature and so defined, such as Guillain-Barré syndrome, which is acute febrile po-lyneuritis. The diagnosis of such a syndrome requires specialized medical expertise and qualifications.

However, the word “syndrome” as used in connection with the question posed herein is not medical in nature, either physical or mental, and no similar diagnosis is required. This type syndrome is defined in Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary as “a set of concurrent things (as emotions or actions) that usually form an identifiable pattern.” It is also defined as “a characteristic pattern of behavior”; “the emotional and behavioral characteristics of a person”; “a set of characteristics regarded as identifying a certain type.”

We next examine the actions of the decedent which may have culminated in the creation of an identifiable pattern of a “battered woman syndrome.” Over the five-year period of their courtship and marriage, the scenario is virtually a textbook example of abuse. Once during Ramona’s pregnancy George held a hot iron to her inflated stomach and on a second occasion during this pregnancy he was observed chasing her down an alley and knocking her down. He beat her on numerous occasions, threw a hammer at her when she refused him sex, handcuffed her to a bed once and to a large fan on another occasion. He followed her to work one day and choked her until the manager intervened.

In fact, he was given a 60-day suspended sentence for a part of this conduct, which was probated on condition he have no contact with his wife. He promptly violated this condition by going to the house where Ramona was staying and, in front of Ramona’s children, pulled a gun and shot Ramona in the head, leaving the place in shambles and covered with blood. He was again arrested, serving 30 days with 60 days probated, and again the condition of probation was to stay away from Ramona. He again violated the probation, and threatened to kill Ramona. Three days after this threat, Ramona shot and killed him.

The third piece of this puzzle concerns the qualifications of Phyllis Alexander. She was the Director of the Y.W.C.A. Spouse Abuse Center in Lexington and in daily contact with battered women for five to six years. She has a Master’s degree in counseling and had devoted the past five to six years teaching, studying, researching and writing in the field of “battered woman syndrome.” She has testified as an expert on the subject in courts and before the General Assembly of Kentucky.

Prior to trial, the defense served required notice that it intended to use Ms. Alexander as an expert witness and, for the convenience of the court, took her video deposition. The yardstick to be applied to expert opinions is set out in Lawson, Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, Sec. 6.10, as follows:

(A) Proper Subject Matter: Expert opinion testimony is admissible only if (i) it involves a matter that is scientific, technical or specialized in character and is outside the scope of common knowledge and experience, and (ii) it will aid the jury in understanding the evidence or resolving the issues.

(B) Expert Qualifications: An expert witness is one who possesses specialized knowledge about a subject matter that is appropriate for expert opinion testimony. The qualifications of such a witness in a given case is a matter that addresses itself to the sound discretion of the trial court.

Professor Lawson goes on to say:

Nearly everything of value that could be said about the general qualifications of expert witnesses is contained in this statement:

While it is clear that a witness in order to be competent as an expert must show himself to be skilled in the business or profession to which the subject about which he is called to testify relates, there is no precise rule as to the mode in which such skill or experience must be acquired. A witness may become qualified by practice or an acquaintance with the subject. He may possess the requisite skill by reason of actual experience or long observation. The decision as to qualification of the witness as an expert rests in the discretion of the trial court. Kentucky Power Company v. Kilbourn, Ky., 307 S.W.2d 9, 12 (1957).

The entire problem in this case can be laid at the feet of Commonwealth v. Rose, Ky., 725 S.W.2d 588 (1987). This case placed the battered wife syndrome under the category of a mental condition and held that only a psychiatrist or a clinical psychologist would thereby be qualified to testify as an expert. This holding was unnecessary to the case in Rose, as the registered nurse who was sought to be utilized as an expert did not qualify by reason of training or experience. However, Rose now stands for two erroneous maxims — one, that the battered wife syndrome is a mental condition and, two, that only a psychiatrist or a clinical psychologist can testify as an expert. For that reason, Commonwealth v. Rose, supra, is expressly overruled.

At trial, the lower court permitted Phyllis Alexander to testify “regarding the characteristics and consequences of the battered wife syndrome” but, under the constraints of Rose, supra, would not allow her to go further. On remand, the lower court should permit Ms. Alexander to be qualified as an expert and, as such, subject to the general rules applicable to expert opinions, including her opinion of whether Ramona Craig was suffering from that syndrome at the time of the shooting of George Craig. She shall not, however, be permitted to voice her opinion on whether the shooting was the result of the syndrome.

The Court of Appeals is affirmed, and this case is remanded to the Fayette Circuit Court for a new trial in accordance with this opinion.

COMBS, LAMBERT and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur. STEPHENS, C.J., LEIBSON and VANCE, JJ., dissent.

LEIBSON, J., files a dissenting opinion in which STEPHENS, C.J., joins.

VANCE, J., files a dissenting opinion in which STEPHENS, C.J., joins.