Commonwealth, Transportation Cabinet v. Weinberg

150 S.W.3d 75, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 319, 2004 WL 2423824
CourtCourt of Appeals of Kentucky
DecidedOctober 29, 2004
Docket2003-CA-001464-MR
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 150 S.W.3d 75 (Commonwealth, Transportation Cabinet v. Weinberg) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Kentucky primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commonwealth, Transportation Cabinet v. Weinberg, 150 S.W.3d 75, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 319, 2004 WL 2423824 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004).

Opinion

OPINION

TAYLOR, Judge.

The Commonwealth of Kentucky, Transportation Cabinet (the Cabinet) brings this appeal from a February 27, 2002, judgment of the Knott Circuit Court. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

On September 15, 1993, William Weinberg was cited for speeding 16-25 mph over the speed limit in Fayette County, Kentucky, and was convicted of the violation in the Fayette District Court on October 5,1993. On March 22,1994, Weinberg was again cited for speeding 16-25 mph over the speed limit in Fayette County and was convicted of the violation in the Fay-ette District Court on March 31, 1994. Consequently, Weinberg was assessed six points per speeding violation and, thus, accumulated twelve points in a two-year period.

Under 601 Ky. Admin. Regs. (KAR) 13:025 (the point system), 2 the accumulation of twelve or more points within a period of two years constituted cause for suspension of an individual’s driving privilege. The Cabinet sent Weinberg notice that he had accumulated twelve points within two years and notice of a show cause hearing as to why his driving privilege should not be suspended. See 601 KAR 13:025 § 12. At the hearing, Weinberg put on evidence, and the Cabinet elected to offer no evidence other than the two traffic convictions. Eventually, Weinberg was found to have accumulated twelve points in a two-year period and, thus, to be an habitually reckless or negligent driver. See Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 186.570(l)(d). Weinberg was offered probation in lieu of suspension, but he refused. Thereupon, Weinberg’s driving privilege was suspended for a period of six months.

Weinberg filed a written “grievance” with the Cabinet and also filed a complaint in the Knott Circuit Court on May 26, 1994. See 601 KAR 13:025 § 12. In the complaint, Weinberg claimed he was denied a due process hearing by the Cabinet; 601 KAR 13:025 was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to use accident-cause statistics in assessing points for traffic violations; and the regulation was unconstitutional. On February 27, 2002, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of Weinberg. Therein, the court concluded *77 601 KAR 13:025 amounted to an arbitrary exercise of power because the point system failed to rely upon accident-cause statistics as mandated by the regulation. This appeal follows.

Our review of an administrative agency’s decision focuses upon arbitrariness. American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Comm’n, Ky.App., 379 S.W.2d 450 (1964). Arbitrariness has many facets; most notable are whether the agency acted in excess of granted powers, whether procedural due process was afforded the parties, and whether the administrative agency’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. Athough never specifically articulated by a Court of this Commonwealth, it is axiomatic that failure of an administrative agency to follow its own rule or regulation generally is per se arbitrary and capricious. See State ex rel. Wyoming Workers’ Compensation Div. v. Brown, 805 P.2d 830 (1991); 2 Am.Jur.2d Administrative Law § 499 (2004). With the forgoing legal authority in mind, we shall undertake an analysis of 601 KAR 13:025. 3

The Cabinet derived its specific authority to promulgate 601 KAR 13:025 from KRS 186.400 and KRS 186.570. KRS 186.400 specifically grants the Cabinet the authority to promulgate regulations to carry out the directives of KRS 186.570. KRS 186.570(l)(d) provides, in part, that the Cabinet may suspend an operator’s license if the Cabinet has reason to suspect that a “person is an habitually reckless or negligent driver of a motor vehicle or has committed a serious violation of the motor vehicle laws.”

In an effort to fulfill the directives of KRS 186.570(l)(d), the Cabinet promulgated 601 KAR 13:025 (the point system), which provides in part:

This regulation specifies the driver licensing point system in which traffic offense convictions are assigned a certain number of points, according to the seriousness of the offense as determined by either accident-cause statistics or by statute. Certain offenses have proven so dangerous that they are made cause for suspension periods rather than point accumulation. The purpose of the point system is to establish a criterion whereby the discretion allowed the Transportation Cabinet in determining the “habitually reckless or negligent driver” or the “serious violator” is not exercised arbitrarily and capriciously, but each license holder will be treated like every other one, and each will know or can determine his point status at any given time, (emphasis added).

From the above regulatory language, it is clear that 601 KAR 13:025 mandated the creation of a point system whereby a specific traffic offense would be assigned a certain number of points based upon the seriousness of that offense as determined by accident-cause statistics. Stated differently, ■ accident-cause statistics were to be utilized to assign the number of points to a particular traffic offense. Presumably, if a specific traffic offense had a higher percentage of accidents attributed to it, the offense would be assigned a higher number of points. In contrast, if a traffic offense is associated with a lower number of accidents, the offense would be assigned a lower number of points. Under 601 KAR 13:025, an operator’s driving privilege may be suspended if he accumulates twelve points in a two-year period or if he *78 is convicted of certain “serious violations of the motor vehicle laws.” 4

As 601 KAR 13:025 specifically mandated the use of accident-cause statistics, it was incumbent upon the Cabinet to have followed such mandate in creating the point system. Upon review of the record as a whole, the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates the Cabinet did not utilize accident-cause statistics in creating the point system under 601 KAR 13:025.

In its judgment, the circuit court specifically outlined the abundant evidence demonstrating the Cabinet’s failure to utilize accident-cause statistics:

8.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
150 S.W.3d 75, 2004 Ky. App. LEXIS 319, 2004 WL 2423824, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commonwealth-transportation-cabinet-v-weinberg-kyctapp-2004.