JOHNSTONE, Justice.
Appellant, Commonwealth of Kentucky Board of Claims, appeals from the April 6, 2000 decision of the McCracken Circuit Court remanding Appellee Harris’s suit to the Board of Claims. The Board of Claims argues that it does not have jurisdiction over claims against the county appellees under the Board of Claims Act. We agree and reverse and remand.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 8, 1996, Randall Lee Harris was arrested on the charge of driving under the influence and taken to the McCracken County Jail. At 3:05 a.m. Harris was processed on that charge and placed into custody. Harris, a leg amputee, advised the jailers that he was taking medication for depression, that his wife had been recently hospitalized, and that he had suffered a recent head injury. In addition to these facts, the admitting officers confessed that Harris appeared drunk. However, Harris was not placed in a showerless detox cell as required by McCracken County Jail policy. Rather, he was placed in an isolation cell because that cell had a bunk. The jailers thought this would be more comfortable for Harris with his artificial leg. Also, Harris was allowed to keep his belt — this too was against jail policy — because the jailers thought Harris [898]*898needed it to keep his prosthetic leg in place. At about 6:00 a.m., Harris was found dead, hanging by his belt from the showerhead in his cell.
On December 12, 1996, the McCracken District Court named Appellee Randall Wayne Harris as the Administrator and Personal Representative of the Estate of Randall Lee Harris. On October 6, 1997, Appellee Harris filed a verified complaint with the Board of Claims against Appel-lees Gary Barlow, Don Bondurant, Cliff Gill, Kenny Meeks, John Ringstaff, and Lewis Wood (hereinafter collectively referred to as “county appellees”). The complaint filed against the county appel-lees was made against each individually and in their official capacities as jailer (Cliff Gill) or deputy jailers of the McCracken County Jail. Claims also were asserted against the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Department of Corrections, Corrections Cabinet, and the Local Corrections Facilities Construction Authority. On October 7,1997, Appellee Harris filed a tort action in McCracken Circuit Court against the same parties in their individual and official capacities, as well as the architects and engineers involved in the construction of the McCracken County Jail.
On May 21, 1998, the Board of Claims dismissed Appellee Harris’s claims, finding that it did not have jurisdiction over claims against counties or county officials under the Board of Claims Act, KRS 44.070, et seq. Appellee Harris appealed the Board of Claims’ ruling to the McCracken Circuit Court. The Circuit Court consolidated Appellee Harris’s tort action with the appeal. The county appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, in which they argued that the Board of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction over the claims against them. The Circuit Court then held the matter in abeyance.
On April 6, 2000, the McCracken Circuit Court entered a judgment reversing the Board’s decision dismissing Appellee Harris’s claims for lack of jurisdiction and remanded the claims against both the county appellees and the state agencies to the Board of Claims for a hearing on the merits. Also, it abated the county appel-lees’ summary judgment motion pending resolution of the claims remanded to the Board of Claims. The Board filed a timely Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals on May 1, 2000. The Board only appealed from that part of the trial court’s order that found that the Board has exclusive jurisdiction over claims against counties and county officers and employees.
The Board of Claims moved this Court to accept the transfer of this appeal from the Court of Appeals. In support of the motion, it cited a large number of pending appeals that concern the issue of whether the Board of Claims has jurisdiction over claims against counties under the Board of Claims Act and the uncertainty which exists among the members of the bar as to the proper venue in which to file claims against a county or county employees. Pursuant to CR 74.02, we granted the motion by order entered on August 24, 2000. This appeal followed.
RIPENESS
The trial court’s ruling made no distinction between the claims brought against the county appellees in their individual and official capacities. Because the distinction is important, we make it here.
The individual capacity claims may or may not implicate Board of Claims’ jurisdiction. Yanero v. Davis, Ky., 2001 WL 1485877 (2001), holds that public employees, while acting in their individual capacities, do not share the immunity of the governmental unit for which they [899]*899work. Id. at-,1 Rather than sharing their government employer’s immunity, public employees acting in their individual capacities are entitled only to official immunity for their discretionary acts occurring within the scope of their employment and to no immunity for their ministerial acts. Id. at-. While official immunity can be absolute, as where the employee is sued in his or her official capacity, in most cases public employees only enjoy a qualified official immunity. Id. at-. Jailers and deputy jailers can be sued for their tortious acts or omissions occurring within the scope of them employment. See, e.g., Sudderth v. White, Ky.App., 621 S.W.2d 33 (1981). If those acts or omissions occur during the performance of ministerial functions, they can be held liable in circuit court and the Board of Claims would have no jurisdiction over them. Yanero, — S.W.3d at-(Any attempt by the General Assembly to transfer jurisdiction over non-immune officers and employees from the Circuit Court to the Board of Claims is unconstitutional.). The issue then becomes whether the Board of Claims has jurisdiction over county employees when sued in their official capacities, or when sued in their individual capacities for acts with respect to which they are entitled to qualified official immunity, i. e., discretionary acts performed in good faith. Yanero, — S.W.3d at-.
The individual capacity claims only indirectly implicate the issue on appeal in this case to the extent that the county appellees may enjoy qualified immunity, since that determination first must be made by the trial court rather than this court. But the official capacity claims against the county appellees directly implicate the question of whether the Board of Claims has jurisdiction over counties and county agencies, officers, and employees. The jailer is a constitutionally elected officer of the county under Section 99 of the Kentucky Constitution. And, the jailer reports to the fiscal court, which oversees the jail’s operation and budget. See generally KRS Chapter 441. Thus, the official capacity claims are in essence claims alleging negligent operation of the jail and are, therefore, claims against the county. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114, 121 (1985) (Official capacity suits “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.
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JOHNSTONE, Justice.
Appellant, Commonwealth of Kentucky Board of Claims, appeals from the April 6, 2000 decision of the McCracken Circuit Court remanding Appellee Harris’s suit to the Board of Claims. The Board of Claims argues that it does not have jurisdiction over claims against the county appellees under the Board of Claims Act. We agree and reverse and remand.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 8, 1996, Randall Lee Harris was arrested on the charge of driving under the influence and taken to the McCracken County Jail. At 3:05 a.m. Harris was processed on that charge and placed into custody. Harris, a leg amputee, advised the jailers that he was taking medication for depression, that his wife had been recently hospitalized, and that he had suffered a recent head injury. In addition to these facts, the admitting officers confessed that Harris appeared drunk. However, Harris was not placed in a showerless detox cell as required by McCracken County Jail policy. Rather, he was placed in an isolation cell because that cell had a bunk. The jailers thought this would be more comfortable for Harris with his artificial leg. Also, Harris was allowed to keep his belt — this too was against jail policy — because the jailers thought Harris [898]*898needed it to keep his prosthetic leg in place. At about 6:00 a.m., Harris was found dead, hanging by his belt from the showerhead in his cell.
On December 12, 1996, the McCracken District Court named Appellee Randall Wayne Harris as the Administrator and Personal Representative of the Estate of Randall Lee Harris. On October 6, 1997, Appellee Harris filed a verified complaint with the Board of Claims against Appel-lees Gary Barlow, Don Bondurant, Cliff Gill, Kenny Meeks, John Ringstaff, and Lewis Wood (hereinafter collectively referred to as “county appellees”). The complaint filed against the county appel-lees was made against each individually and in their official capacities as jailer (Cliff Gill) or deputy jailers of the McCracken County Jail. Claims also were asserted against the Commonwealth of Kentucky, Department of Corrections, Corrections Cabinet, and the Local Corrections Facilities Construction Authority. On October 7,1997, Appellee Harris filed a tort action in McCracken Circuit Court against the same parties in their individual and official capacities, as well as the architects and engineers involved in the construction of the McCracken County Jail.
On May 21, 1998, the Board of Claims dismissed Appellee Harris’s claims, finding that it did not have jurisdiction over claims against counties or county officials under the Board of Claims Act, KRS 44.070, et seq. Appellee Harris appealed the Board of Claims’ ruling to the McCracken Circuit Court. The Circuit Court consolidated Appellee Harris’s tort action with the appeal. The county appellees filed a motion for summary judgment, in which they argued that the Board of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction over the claims against them. The Circuit Court then held the matter in abeyance.
On April 6, 2000, the McCracken Circuit Court entered a judgment reversing the Board’s decision dismissing Appellee Harris’s claims for lack of jurisdiction and remanded the claims against both the county appellees and the state agencies to the Board of Claims for a hearing on the merits. Also, it abated the county appel-lees’ summary judgment motion pending resolution of the claims remanded to the Board of Claims. The Board filed a timely Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals on May 1, 2000. The Board only appealed from that part of the trial court’s order that found that the Board has exclusive jurisdiction over claims against counties and county officers and employees.
The Board of Claims moved this Court to accept the transfer of this appeal from the Court of Appeals. In support of the motion, it cited a large number of pending appeals that concern the issue of whether the Board of Claims has jurisdiction over claims against counties under the Board of Claims Act and the uncertainty which exists among the members of the bar as to the proper venue in which to file claims against a county or county employees. Pursuant to CR 74.02, we granted the motion by order entered on August 24, 2000. This appeal followed.
RIPENESS
The trial court’s ruling made no distinction between the claims brought against the county appellees in their individual and official capacities. Because the distinction is important, we make it here.
The individual capacity claims may or may not implicate Board of Claims’ jurisdiction. Yanero v. Davis, Ky., 2001 WL 1485877 (2001), holds that public employees, while acting in their individual capacities, do not share the immunity of the governmental unit for which they [899]*899work. Id. at-,1 Rather than sharing their government employer’s immunity, public employees acting in their individual capacities are entitled only to official immunity for their discretionary acts occurring within the scope of their employment and to no immunity for their ministerial acts. Id. at-. While official immunity can be absolute, as where the employee is sued in his or her official capacity, in most cases public employees only enjoy a qualified official immunity. Id. at-. Jailers and deputy jailers can be sued for their tortious acts or omissions occurring within the scope of them employment. See, e.g., Sudderth v. White, Ky.App., 621 S.W.2d 33 (1981). If those acts or omissions occur during the performance of ministerial functions, they can be held liable in circuit court and the Board of Claims would have no jurisdiction over them. Yanero, — S.W.3d at-(Any attempt by the General Assembly to transfer jurisdiction over non-immune officers and employees from the Circuit Court to the Board of Claims is unconstitutional.). The issue then becomes whether the Board of Claims has jurisdiction over county employees when sued in their official capacities, or when sued in their individual capacities for acts with respect to which they are entitled to qualified official immunity, i. e., discretionary acts performed in good faith. Yanero, — S.W.3d at-.
The individual capacity claims only indirectly implicate the issue on appeal in this case to the extent that the county appellees may enjoy qualified immunity, since that determination first must be made by the trial court rather than this court. But the official capacity claims against the county appellees directly implicate the question of whether the Board of Claims has jurisdiction over counties and county agencies, officers, and employees. The jailer is a constitutionally elected officer of the county under Section 99 of the Kentucky Constitution. And, the jailer reports to the fiscal court, which oversees the jail’s operation and budget. See generally KRS Chapter 441. Thus, the official capacity claims are in essence claims alleging negligent operation of the jail and are, therefore, claims against the county. See, e.g., Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105, 87 L.Ed.2d 114, 121 (1985) (Official capacity suits “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent. As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.”) (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted). This cloaks the jailer, in his official capacity, with the county’s sovereign immunity. See Yanero, — S.W.3d at -. Since the county is entitled to sovereign immunity, Cullinan v. Jefferson County, Ky., 418 S.W.2d 407, 408 (1967), the sole question presented on appeal, i.e., whether the Board of Claims has jurisdiction over county governments, county agencies, officials, and county employees, is an actual controversy before us that is ripe for review. See Associated Industries of Kentucky v. Commonwealth, Ky., 912 S.W.2d 947, 951 (1995).
BOARD OF CLAIMS’ JURISDICTION
The Board of Claims Act, KRS 44.070(1), states in pertinent part that:
[900]*900A Board of Claims ... is created and vested with fall power and authority to investigate, hear proof, and to compensate persons for damages sustained to either person or property as a proximate result of negligence on the part of the Commonwealth, any of its cabinets, departments, bureaus, or agencies, or any of its officers, agents, or employees....
Emphasis added. As additional clarification, KRS 44.072, which is entitled “Legislative intent as to sovereign immunity in negligence claims,” states that:
It is the intention of the General Assembly to provide the means to enable a person negligently injured by the Commonwealth, any of its cabinets, departments, bureaus or agencies, or any of its officers, agents or employees while acting within the scope of their employment by the Commonwealth or any of its cabinets, departments, bureaus or agencies to be able to assert their just claims as herein provided. The Commonwealth thereby waives the sovereign immunity defense only in the limited situations as herein set forth.
It is further the intention of the General Assembly to otherwise expressly preserve the sovereign immunity of the Commonwealth ... in all other situations except where sovereign immunity is specifically and expressly waived as set forth by statute.
Emphasis added.
The Board of Claims argues that, because the Board of Claims Act fails to expressly include language pertaining to counties directly or as a political subdivision of the Commonwealth, the General Assembly purposely excluded counties from the limited waiver of sovereign immunity contained therein. We agree.
Language pertaining to counties, its officers, agents, and employees is conspicuous in its absence from the listing contained in KRS 44.070(1). A general rule of statutory construction provides that the enumeration of particular items excludes other items that are not specifically mentioned. Smith v. Wedding, Ky., 303 S.W.2d 322 (1957). “We win find waiver only where stated by the most express language or by such overwhelming implications from the text as [will] leave no room for any other reasonable construction.” Withers v. University of Kentucky, Ky., 939 S.W.2d 340, 346 (1997). Obviously, there is no specific, express language of waiver in the Board of Claims Act. Nor does it contain an “overwhelming implication” of waiver as there is not a single reference in the Act to counties.
In support of his argument that county sovereign immunity is waived in the Board of Claims Act, Appellee Harris relies heavily on language contained in Franklin County v. Malone: “The Court of Appeals erroneously held that KRS 44.070 et seq. has no application to counties.” Malone, 957 S.W.2d at 203-04. Apparently, and understandably, this language has caused the wave of new claims to be brought before the Board of Claims attempting to hold counties hable for their torts in that forum. We agree with the Board of Claims that the above-cited language from Malone is merely dicta. Nonetheless, as a matter of clarity, we hereby overrule Malone to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion.
Relatedly, Appellee Harris points to the following language in Withers in support of his argument that claims against counties are within the jurisdiction of the Board of Claims:
All claims against immune entities fall squarely within the purview of the Board of Claims Act where resides exclusive jurisdiction for claims against the entity. The Board of Claims Act and [901]*901sovereign immunity are co-extensive.... It follows that a plea of sovereign immunity is an admission of Board of Claims jurisdiction.
Withers, 989 S.W.2d at 846.
But Withers concerned a claim against the University of Kentucky, which, by statute, is an agency of the Commonwealth. Id. at 343. It is funded with money from the Commonwealth’s treasury and is under direct control of the state government. Id. Thus, the University of Kentucky is a state agency entitled to governmental immunity. Yanero, — S.W.3d at-. As such, it expressly falls within the jurisdiction of the Board of Claims Act. KRS 44.070(1). Withers did not concern, directly or indirectly, whether a claim against a county can be brought in the Board of Claims and, therefore, can be distinguished from the case at bar. No language in Withers should be construed as holding that counties are submitting to Board of Claims’ jurisdiction by virtue of claiming a defense of sovereign immunity.
Therefore, we reaffirm our prior holdings that KRS 44.070 does not grant the Board of Claims jurisdiction over claims against counties, county agencies, officers, or employees. See, e.g., Ginter v. Montgomery County, Ky., 327 S.W.2d 98, 99 (1959). The trial court erred in ruling that the Board of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over county governments and officials. Therefore, we hold that the Board of Claims has no jurisdiction over the claims against the county appellees in either their individual or official capacities.
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse that part of the McCracken Circuit Court’s order that remands the claims against the county appellees to the Board of Claims, and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
COOPER, GRAVES, and KELLER, JJ., concur.
COOPER, J., also concurs by separate opinion, with GRAVES and JOHNSTONE, JJ., joining.
LAMBERT, C.J., dissents by separate opinion, with STUMBO and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., joining.