Floyd County Detention Center v. Vernie Gibson, as Administratrix of the Estate of Cody Chaffins

• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky
• Decided: January 16, 2026
• Docket: 2024-CA-1437
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RENDERED: JANUARY 16, 2026; 10:00 A.M. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky Court of Appeals NO. 2024-CA-1437-MR

FLOYD COUNTY DETENTION CENTER AND STEVE LITTLE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS FLOYD COUNTY JAILER APPELLANTS

APPEAL FROM FLOYD CIRCUIT COURT v. HONORABLE JOHNNY RAY HARRIS, JUDGE ACTION NO. 23-CI-00544

VERNIE GIBSON, AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF CODY CHAFFINS APPELLEE

OPINION REVERSING AND REMANDING

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BEFORE: CALDWELL, MCNEILL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: The Floyd County Detention Center and Steve Little, in

his official capacity as Floyd County Jailer, appeal from an order denying their

motion for summary judgment. We reverse and remand. We need not recite in detail the tragic facts underlying this action

because they are not germane to the narrow legal issues before us. Six days after

entering the Floyd County Detention Center (“the Detention Center”), Cody

Chaffins died from a fentanyl overdose. Vernie Gibson, as the administratrix of

Chaffins’ estate, brought this action against the Detention Center and Steve Little

(“Little”), in his individual capacity and his official capacity as Floyd County

Jailer. Gibson’s claims against other Detention Center personnel are not at issue in

this appeal. Gibson later dropped her individual capacity claims against Little

when she filed amended complaints.

The Detention Center and Little jointly filed a motion for summary

judgment. The Detention Center claimed it was immune from Gibson’s claims

because it is an arm of Floyd County, Kentucky. Little claimed he was entitled to

immunity because the official capacity claims were essentially claims against

Floyd County itself. The trial court issued a one-sentence order denying the

motion, after which the Detention Center and Little filed this appeal.

Although an interlocutory order denying summary judgment is usually

not appealable, such an order denying a claim of immunity is appealable. See, e.g.,

Long v. Department of Revenue, 718 S.W.3d 868, 878 (Ky. 2025). However, in

that situation the appellate court may only address the propriety of the denial of

immunity. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health and Family Services, Department

-2- for Medicaid Services v. Sexton, By and Through Appalachian Regional

Healthcare, Inc., 566 S.W.3d 185, 190 (Ky. 2018). We review de novo the trial

court’s determination of whether a party is entitled to immunity. Jacobi v.

Holbert, 553 S.W.3d 246, 252 (Ky. 2018).

As to the Detention Center, “pure sovereign immunity, for the state

itself, has long been the rule in Kentucky . . . . Counties, which predate the

existence of the state and are considered direct political subdivisions of it, enjoy

the same immunity as the state itself.” Comair, Inc. v. Lexington-Fayette Urban

Cnty. Airport Corp., 295 S.W.3d 91, 94 (Ky. 2009) (paragraph break omitted).

KRS1 441.025(1) requires a county to “provide for the incarceration of

prisoners arrested in the county or sentenced or held by order of the courts in the

county.” Thus, our Supreme Court has held that a county jail (or regional

detention center) enjoys immunity because its “only identity is to serve as a tool of

county government, which furthers the state purpose of incarcerating lawbreakers”

and thus the jail “is entitled to sovereign immunity as an alter ego of the county.”

Bryant v. Pulaski Cnty. Detention Center, 330 S.W.3d 461, 465 (Ky. 2011).

Gibson cites to nothing to distinguish this case from Bryant. In fact,

Gibson erroneously asserts in her responsive brief that there is no published

precedent holding that a county jail enjoys immunity—even though the Detention

1 Kentucky Revised Statutes.

-3- Center cited Bryant in its opening brief. Under Bryant, the Detention Center is

plainly immune from Gibson’s claims.

Little is also entitled to immunity from Gibson’s official capacity

claims. Our Supreme Court has held, albeit in a factually distinguishable context:

The jailer is a constitutionally elected officer of the county under Section 99 of the Kentucky Constitution. And, the jailer reports to the fiscal court, which oversees the jail’s operation and budget. See generally KRS Chapter 441. Thus, the official capacity claims are in essence claims alleging negligent operation of the jail and are, therefore, claims against the county. . . . This cloaks the jailer, in his official capacity, with the county’s sovereign immunity.

Commonwealth v. Harris, 59 S.W.3d 896, 899 (Ky. 2001) (citation omitted).

Gibson cites to nothing to materially distinguish this case from Harris. Thus,

Little is entitled to immunity for Gibson’s official capacity claims against him.

Finally, we are not persuaded by Gibson’s argument that she was

entitled to conduct additional discovery to further her negligence and related

claims. “A wrong is a wrong, whether intentionally or negligently committed, but

unless our Constitution is changed the sovereign state cannot be held liable in a

court of law for either intentional or unintentional torts committed by its agents.”

Calvert Investments, Inc. v. Louisville & Jefferson Cnty. Metropolitan Sewer Dist.,

805 S.W.2d 133, 139 (Ky. 1991). Immunity should be addressed “at the earliest

possible stage in litigation[,]” and “further discovery on [Gibson’s] part would be

-4- futile[.]” City of Paintsville v. Haney, 718 S.W.3d 812, 828 (Ky. 2025) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted). Sovereign immunity is “absolute” and

“precludes the maintaining of any suit against the state unless the state has given

its consent or otherwise waived its immunity.” Yanero v. Davis, 65 S.W.3d 510,

517 (Ky. 2001). Gibson points to no waiver of immunity here.

Any further arguments in the briefs which are not discussed herein

lack merit or relevance to our resolution of the narrow issues before us. Schell v.

Young, 640 S.W.3d 24, 29 n.1 (Ky. App. 2021). We express no opinion on

Gibson’s claims against other defendants.

For the foregoing reasons, the Floyd Circuit Court is reversed, and the

case is remanded with instructions to grant the motion for summary judgment filed

by the Floyd County Detention Center and Steve Little.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS: BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Jonathan C. Shaw John W. Walters Paintsville, Kentucky Brianna C. Palmer Lexington, Kentucky

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