Commonwealth, Aplt. v. Williams, N.

• Court: Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: February 19, 2025
• Docket: 17 EAP 2024
• Status: Published

Opinion

[J-49-2024] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA EASTERN DISTRICT

TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, McCAFFERY, JJ.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : No. 17 EAP 2024 : Appellant : Appeal from the Order of the : Superior Court entered on : September 20, 2023, at No. 980 v. : EDA 2021, affirming the Order of : the Court of Common Pleas of : Philadelphia County, Criminal NATHANIEL WILLIAMS, : Division, entered on April 22, 2021, : at No. MC-51-CR-0030428-2019. Appellee : : ARGUED: September 10, 2024

OPINION

JUSTICE DOUGHERTY FILED: February 19, 2025 In this case the Commonwealth charged a police detective with multiple criminal

offenses related to his alleged abuse of his position. Specifically, the Commonwealth

alleged the detective assisted his cousin in stalking a woman and subsequently attempted

to coverup his misconduct. But the lower courts — including the preliminary hearing court,

the court of common pleas, a three-judge panel of the Superior Court, and the Superior

Court en banc — concluded the Commonwealth failed to produce prima facie evidence

to support any of the charges against the detective and so dismissed the case. We

granted allowance of appeal to consider whether this legal conclusion, which was

grounded in part on the lower courts’ interpretation of the relevant criminal statutes, was

correct. We hold it was not. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the Superior Court and

remand for further proceedings. On October 14, 2017, at about noon, Theresa Williams was in the parking lot of a

store when Edwin Williams approached her.1 Edwin asked Theresa for her phone number

and if she was interested in going out with him. He also mentioned that he was married

and worked as a bus driver for the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority

(SEPTA). Theresa told Edwin she wasn’t interested, and he walked off. Theresa got into

her car and began to back up. Edwin pulled up behind her and looked in the direction of

her car. He then drove away. Theresa never told Edwin where she lived, and she was

not interested in him going to her house. That same day, Edwin exchanged text

messages with defendant, who at the time was a detective in the Homicide Division of the

Philadelphia Police Department.2

Three days later, on October 17, 2017, there were additional text messages

between defendant and Edwin at 3:06, 3:07, 3:12, and 3:13 p.m., and then later at 7:41

p.m. In the interval between the initial texting and the texting in the early evening,

defendant used several police databases to perform computer searches related to

Theresa. Specifically, at 3:35 p.m., defendant searched Theresa’s license plate number

in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) system;3 at 3:36 p.m., he searched her

1 We henceforth refer to Theresa Williams and Edwin Williams by their first names to

avoid confusion. Edwin and appellee Nathaniel Williams (defendant) are cousins, but Theresa is not related to either man. 2 Previously, between March 5, 2017 and October of 2017, there were 20 phone calls and

182 text messages between defendant and Edwin. 3 “The NCIC is an electronic clearinghouse of criminal data that can be accessed by most

criminal justice agencies nationwide, to assist in the apprehension of fugitives, locate missing persons, recover stolen property, and identify terrorists.” Commonwealth v. Santiago, 209 A.3d 912, 915 n.3 (Pa. 2019).

[J-49-2024] - 2 address in the VOTE system;4 and at 3:42 pm, he searched her name in the Pennsylvania

Justice Network (JNET) system.5

On October 21, 2017, Theresa was at home with her children when Edwin knocked

on her door. She opened the door and asked him how he found her. Edwin replied that

he “had his ways.” N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 9/11/20, at 14. Theresa wanted him to

leave so her children wouldn’t get upset but he refused. Eventually, to encourage him to

leave her alone, she asked him to write his phone number down on a piece of paper.

Edwin did so and left.

Over the next few days, Edwin left a greeting card for Theresa on her car. The

card stated:

Hi Ms. T. It’s me. I’m still thinking about you. P.S. hello. . . .

It’s just me with a little hi. P.S. hello. Just in case you’re feeling like texting me, calling me or going out with me. Sometimes being persistent pays off and nothing beats a failure but a try. And at least you know I don’t lie.

Id. at 19. He also left roses for her on her car. There were text messages between Edwin

and defendant on October 18, 21, 22, 23, and 28, and phone calls between the men on

October 27 and November 5.

Theresa filed a formal written complaint about Edwin with the SEPTA police. She

also submitted an email complaint to the Philadelphia police. Lieutenant James Clough

of the Internal Affairs Division (IAD) of the Philadelphia Police Department was assigned

to investigate the matter. On November 24, 2017, Lieutenant Clough interviewed Edwin.

4 The VOTE system identifies the registered voter(s) living at a particular address.

5 “JNET’s integrated justice portal provides a unified online platform for authorized users

to access crucial public safety and criminal justice information from various municipal, county, state, and federal agencies.” https://www.pa.gov/en/agencies/jnet.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2025).

[J-49-2024] - 3 Edwin claimed he really did not know defendant, and he had never spoken to him on the

phone or texted with him. That same day, defendant replaced his phone.

On December 27, 2017, Lieutenant Clough took a statement from defendant. The

statement noted at the outset that it was being taken at IAD and concerned an IAD

investigation. Thereafter in his statement, defendant claimed he was investigating a

homicide that occurred on Williams Avenue when he saw the target of his investigation,

Tashaun Curtis, get into a car on the 6600 block of Ogontz Avenue. He told the

Lieutenant the case number of the Williams Avenue homicide: M17-185. Defendant

alleged that on October 17, 2017, he conducted a computer search of the license plate

number for this car, which indicated Theresa was the registered owner. In addition, he

searched Theresa “every way [he] could to establish a connection to Tashaun Curtis[,]”

including in the VOTE and JNET systems. N.T. Refiling Hearing, 4/22/21, at 42.

However, he was unable to connect Theresa with Curtis. Defendant insisted his searches

on the VOTE and JNET systems were conducted for business rather than personal

reasons. He acknowledged Edwin was his cousin but claimed he had not spoken to him

for “maybe a year or more.” Id. at 36, 47. In particular, he denied disseminating Theresa’s

motor vehicle and voter registration information to Edwin.

Defendant signed each page of the statement. His signature on the final page

attested he had read the entire statement, and that it was true and correct to the best of

his knowledge.

Immediately after interviewing defendant, Lieutenant Clough went to the Homicide

Division of the Philadelphia Police Department. From the parking lot, he called an officer

in the Homicide Division and requested the homicide file for the murder on Williams

Avenue. He then went inside to the Homicide Division and retrieved the file, which

consisted of one folder. Back at IAD, Lieutenant Clough inspected the contents of the

[J-49-2024] - 4 folder. Nothing in the folder contained any reference to Theresa. The next day, however,

defendant informed IAD there was a second folder in the file of the Williams Avenue

homicide. This folder contained a printout of a publicly available Facebook photograph

of Theresa and her children. On the back of the printed photograph were handwritten

notes of Theresa’s name and license plate number, as well as the following handwritten

notations: “no record/no wants,” “75-48A negative,” “no friends shared,” “autism

supporter,” “poss,”6 and “neighbors.” N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 9/11/20, at 78-79. This

was the only item in the folder referencing Theresa, and the only item with handwritten

notes on it.

The Commonwealth subsequently charged defendant with four counts of unsworn

falsification to authorities,7 and one count each of tampering with or fabricating physical

evidence,8 tampering with public records or information graded as a felony of the third

6 “Poss” is an abbreviation for “possibly.” See N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 9/11/20, at 78. 7 See 18 Pa.C.S. §4904(a) (“A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if,

with intent to mislead a public servant in performing his official function, he: (1) makes any written false statement which he does not believe to be true; (2) submits or invites reliance on any writing which he knows to be forged, altered or otherwise lacking in authenticity; or (3) submits or invites reliance on any sample, specimen, map, boundary mark, or other object which he knows to be false.”). 8 See 18 Pa.C.S. §4910 (“A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if,

believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he: (1) alters, destroys, conceals or removes any record, document or thing with intent to impair its verity or availability in such proceeding or investigation; or (2) makes, presents or uses any record, document or thing knowing it to be false and with intent to mislead a public servant who is or may be engaged in such proceeding or investigation.”).

[J-49-2024] - 5 degree,9 and obstructing administration of law or other governmental function.10 On

September 11, 2020, the Commonwealth amended the charges to include only one count

of each offense. A joint preliminary hearing for defendant and Edwin was then conducted

before the Honorable William Meehan of the Philadelphia Municipal Court. Ultimately,

the preliminary hearing court held co-defendant Edwin for court but dismissed the charges

against defendant for lack of evidence.

On September 17, 2020, the Commonwealth filed a notice of refiling of criminal

complaint.11 The Commonwealth requested to reinstate the dismissed charges and also

add a charge of official oppression. The Honorable Crystal Bryant-Powell of the

Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas presided over the refile hearing, which was held on

April 21, 2021. The Commonwealth moved into evidence the transcript of the preliminary

hearing held on September 11, 2020. Subsequently, during argument, the

9 See 18 Pa.C.S. §4911(a) (“A person commits an offense if he: (1) knowingly makes a

false entry in, or false alteration of, any record, document or thing belonging to, or received or kept by, the government for information or record, or required by law to be kept by others for information of the government; (2) makes, presents or uses any record, document or thing knowing it to be false, and with intent that it be taken as a genuine part of information or records referred to in paragraph (1) of this subsection; or (3) intentionally and unlawfully destroys, conceals, removes or otherwise impairs the verity or availability of any such record, document or thing.”); id. at §4911(b) (“An offense under this section is a misdemeanor of the second degree unless the intent of the actor is to defraud or injure anyone, in which case the offense is a felony of the third degree.”). 10 See 18 Pa.C.S. §5101 (“A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he

intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function by force, violence, physical interference or obstacle, breach of official duty, or any other unlawful act, except that this section does not apply to flight by a person charged with crime, refusal to submit to arrest, failure to perform a legal duty other than an official duty, or any other means of avoiding compliance with law without affirmative interference with governmental functions.”). 11 See Pa.R.Crim.P. 544(a) (“When charges are dismissed or withdrawn at, or prior to, a

preliminary hearing, or when a grand jury declines to indict and the complaint is dismissed, the attorney for the Commonwealth may reinstitute the charges by approving, in writing, the re-filing of a complaint with the issuing authority who dismissed or permitted the withdrawal of the charges.”).

[J-49-2024] - 6 Commonwealth conceded it failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of official

oppression. In the end, the court ruled “the Commonwealth has failed to demonstrate the

elements of the crimes based on a preponderance of the evidence and the motion to re-

file is denied.” N.T. Refiling Hearing, 4/22/21, at 77.

In its opinion, the refile court explained “the Commonwealth failed to meet its

burden of establishing a prima facie case on any of the charges[.]” Trial Court Op.,

10/18/21, at 8. First, with respect to the charge of unsworn falsification to authorities, the

court determined the Commonwealth failed to make out a prima facie case that defendant

had the intent to mislead a public servant in performing his official function, or that he

made a written false statement which he did not believe to be true. Regarding the charge

of tampering with or fabricating physical evidence, the court argued the evidence did not

support a prima facie case that defendant “did any of the required elements of the statute

‘believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted[.]’”

Id. at 8-9, quoting 18 Pa.C.S. §4910. Next, the court reasoned that “not only does the

evidence presented fail to make a prima facie case for the required elements of”

tampering with public records or information, “it is also hard to fathom that even viewed

in its best light for the Commonwealth, that the legislative intent of this statute was

intended to address any of” defendant’s alleged conduct. Id. at 9. Lastly, the court

concluded the evidence did not support the charge of obstructing the administration of

law or other governmental function because the Commonwealth did not prove obstruction

or the required means of force, violence, physical interference or obstacle, breach of

official duty, or other unlawful act.

On the Commonwealth’s appeal to the Superior Court, a three-judge panel initially

affirmed. Thereafter, however, the Superior Court granted the Commonwealth’s request

for reargument and withdrew its prior decision. On September 20, 2023, the court en

[J-49-2024] - 7 banc again affirmed, in a published, split decision.12 The majority opinion noted that for

a defendant to be held for court at the preliminary hearing stage, “the Commonwealth

bears the burden of establishing at least a prima facie case that a crime has been

committed and that the accused is probably the one who committed it.” Commonwealth

v. Williams, 302 A.3d 1238, 1243 (Pa. Super. 2023) (en banc), quoting Commonwealth

v. Perez, 249 A.3d 1092, 1102 (Pa. 2021). The majority continued:

A prima facie case exists when the Commonwealth produces evidence of each of the material elements of the crime charged and establishes probable cause to warrant the belief that the accused committed the offense. The evidence need only be such that, if presented at trial and accepted as true, the judge would be warranted in permitting the case to be decided by the jury. The weight and credibility of the evidence are not factors at the preliminary hearing stage, and the Commonwealth need only demonstrate sufficient probable cause to believe the person charged has committed the offense. Id., quoting Perez, 249 A.3d at 1102 (cleaned up).

Applying these standards, the majority first held “[t]he trial court did not err in

finding that the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case of unsworn

falsification to authorities.” Id. at 1244. The majority determined defendant’s interview

with Lieutenant Clough, “which was conducted as an oral interview, memorialized in

writing by . . . Clough, and signed by [defendant], does not constitute a ‘written false

statement,’ under the statute.” Id.

Next, the majority concluded the trial court did not err in dismissing the charge of

tampering with or fabricating physical evidence, reasoning as follows:

The Commonwealth failed to present prima facie evidence that the information regarding Theresa was added to the file after [defendant] learned of the Internal Affairs Division’s investigation. Rather, the . . .

12 The majority opinion was authored by Judge McLaughlin and joined by then-President

Judge Panella, then-Judge, now President Judge Lazarus, Judge Nichols, and then- Judge, now Justice, McCaffery. The dissenting opinion was authored by Judge Olson and joined by President Judge Emeritus Bender and Judges Stabile and Dubow.

[J-49-2024] - 8 detective merely testified he retrieved the file, and the prosecution presented no testimony from anyone that he obtained the entire file when he initially procured it. That the second file was not included with the first is not evidence, even at a prima facie level, that the material was added after Williams learned of the investigation. Id. at 1245.

Turning to the charge of tampering with public records or information, the majority

likewise concluded this charge was properly dismissed. The majority acknowledged the

file for the Williams Avenue homicide was a “public record or thing . . . as contemplated

by” Section 4911(a). Id. at 1246 (quotation marks omitted). Nonetheless, it held the

Commonwealth failed to present a prima facie case that defendant made a false entry or

alteration to the file. According to the majority, defendant simply “added his own notes

and computer printouts to the file[,]” and the Commonwealth’s argument that he falsified

the second folder was “mere supposition and speculation.” Id. at 1247.

Finally, the majority ruled the Commonwealth failed to adduce a prima facie case

of obstructing administration of law or other governmental function. The majority

reasoned that “mere lying” during a police interview or “add[ing] information to the

homicide file” would not constitute an “unlawful act” for purposes of Section 5101. Id. at

1248. “Moreover,” the majority contended, “because the Commonwealth did not establish

a prima facie case for the other crimes charged, those charges do not meet the ‘any other

unlawful act’ catchall provision. Although the Commonwealth maintains the alleged

addition to the homicide file was a breach of official duty, it has provided no legal authority

to support this claim, and we are aware of none.” Id.

The dissent, in contrast, argued the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence

at the preliminary hearing stage to hold defendant for court on all four charges. It criticized

the majority for applying a “more stringent standard” for a prima facie case than the one

provided by “well-settled law.” Id. at 1248 (Olson, J., dissenting). In the dissent’s view,

the majority erroneously required the Commonwealth “to disprove or rebut interpretations

[J-49-2024] - 9 of the evidence that favor [defendant], even when the evidence presented provides for a

reasonable inference that a crime was committed and that [defendant] was the person

who probably committed the crime.” Id.

Regarding the specific offenses, the dissent contended the trial court erred as a

matter of law in dismissing the unsworn falsification charge. The dissent disagreed with

the majority that defendant’s statement to Lieutenant Clough was not a “written

statement” for purposes of Section 4904(a). It found “nothing in the language of the

statute that requires the defendant to be the actual scrivener of the written statement at

issue[,]” and insisted defendant’s signing of each page of the statement and his

attestation at the conclusion of the statement that it was true and correct to the best of his

knowledge “ma[d]e the statement [defendant’s] own.” Id. at 1253. Moreover, the dissent

contended the Commonwealth established a prima facie case that defendant’s written

statement included false information. In particular, the dissent argued there was prima

facie evidence defendant was untruthful when he claimed in the statement that he had

not spoken with Edwin for a year or more, and also when he claimed that he obtained

Theresa’s personal information as part of a homicide investigation rather than to provide

this information to Edwin.

The dissent likewise maintained the charge of tampering with or fabricating

physical evidence should not have been dismissed. “When viewed in a light most

favorable to the Commonwealth,” the dissent submitted, “the evidence and all reasonable

inferences drawn therefrom support a prima facie case that [defendant] altered the

homicide file by creating a second folder with [Theresa’s] photograph and personal

information to mislead and thwart an official investigation.” Id. at 1256.

Similarly, the dissent found error in the trial court’s dismissal of the charge of

tampering with public records or information. In this regard, the dissent argued:

[J-49-2024] - 10 I believe that it is more likely than not that [defendant] used official computer systems to help Edwin locate [Theresa] then tried to cover it up by manipulating a government record to make it appear as if [Theresa] were involved in a murder investigation. [Defendant] acted intentionally to create a second folder as part of the M17-185 homicide investigation file to deceive Lieutenant Clough and mislead him to believe that his purpose for accessing these systems was legitimate. I acknowledge [defendant] gave an innocent explanation for his actions; however, it is not proper at this stage of the proceedings to rely on [defendant’s] self-serving statements and completely disregard the evidence that reasonably leads to the conclusion [defendant] tampered with public records in violation of [Section 4911(a)]. Id. at 1258.

The dissent also insisted the final charge of obstruction was supported by prima

facie proof and therefore erroneously dismissed. The dissent maintained that since the

Commonwealth established a prima facie case for the other crimes charges, and “[s]ince

there [wa]s no question that Lieutenant Clough was engaged in the administration of a

governmental function while investigating [defendant], all of the elements of Section 5101

were met.” Id. at 1259.

This Court granted the Commonwealth’s petition for allowance of appeal,

rephrasing the issues for clarity as follows:

(1) Did the Superior Court err in holding that a signed and initialed transcription of a police interview is not a “written statement” for purposes of establishing a prima facie case of unsworn falsification to authorities under 18 Pa.C.S. §4904?

(2) Did the Superior Court err in holding that the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima facie case of obstructing administration of law or other governmental function under 18 Pa.C.S. §5101?

(3) In holding that the evidence was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of tampering with or fabricating physical evidence, 18 Pa.C.S. §4910, and tampering with public records or information, 18 Pa.C.S. §4911, did the Superior Court fail to evaluate the evidence under the correct standard of review? Commonwealth v. Williams, 315 A.3d 841 (Pa. 2024) (per curiam). These issues raise

“pure question[s] of law involving statutory interpretation,” so “our scope of review is

[J-49-2024] - 11 plenary and our standard of review is de novo.” Commonwealth v. Gamby, 283 A.3d 298,

304 (Pa. 2022); accord Perez, 249 A.3d at 1102 (whether the evidence is sufficient to

establish a prima facie case is a question of law).

“The preliminary hearing is not a trial.” Perez, 249 A.3d at 1102, quoting

Commonwealth v. McBride, 595 A.2d 589, 591 (Pa. 1991). The purpose of a criminal trial

is to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. “The principal function of a

preliminary hearing[,]” on the other hand, is to “protect an individual’s right against an

unlawful arrest and detention.” Id., quoting McBride, 595 A.2d at 591. Thus, “[a]t the

preliminary hearing stage of a criminal prosecution, the Commonwealth need not prove

the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but rather, must merely put forth

sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of guilt.” Commonwealth v. Karetny,

880 A.2d 505, 513-14 (Pa. 2005). “A prima facie case exists when the Commonwealth

produces evidence of each of the material elements of the crime charged and establishes

probable cause to warrant the belief that the accused committed the offense.” Perez, 249

A.3d at 1102, quoting Karetny, 880 A.2d at 514.13 Under this formulation, “‘a prima facie

case’ entails a mere determination of probable cause[.]” Talley, 265 A.3d at 517. Put

13 Our caselaw through the years has included “various articulations” of the prima facie

standard. Commonwealth v. Harris, 315 A.3d 26, 34 n.7 (Pa. 2024). However, both parties appear to agree with the foregoing formulation. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 16 (“A prima facie case exists where the evidence establishes each of the material elements of the crime charged and sufficient probable cause to warrant the belief that the accused committed the offense.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Appellee’s Brief at 25 (“To establish a prima facie case against a defendant, the Commonwealth . . . must show sufficient probable cause that the defendant committed the offense, and the evidence should be such that if presented at trial and accepted as true, the judge would be warranted in allowing the case to go to the jury.”). Moreover, the weight of authority appears to support this articulation of the prima facie standard. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Talley, 265 A.3d 485, 517 (Pa. 2021); Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 234 A.3d 523, 533 (Pa. 2020); Commonwealth v. Weigle, 997 A.2d 306, 311 (Pa. 2010); Commonwealth v. Santos, 876 A.2d 360, 363 (Pa. 2005); Commonwealth v. Huggins, 836 A.2d 862, 866 (Pa. 2003); Commonwealth v. McBride, 595 A.2d 589, 591 (Pa. 1991). Accordingly, for purposes of this appeal, we too apply this formulation.

[J-49-2024] - 12 simply, “probable cause ‘is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.’” Commonwealth v.

Sangricco, 379 A.2d 1342, 1343 (Pa. 1977), quoting McCarthy v. DeArmit, 99 Pa. 63, 69

(1881). In assessing whether a prima facie case has been demonstrated, “[i]nferences

reasonably drawn from the evidence of record which would support a verdict of guilty are

to be given effect, and the evidence must be read in the light most favorable to the

Commonwealth’s case.” Perez, 249 A.3d at 1102, quoting Huggins, 836 A.2d at 866.

Moreover, “[t]he weight and credibility of the evidence are not factors at the preliminary

hearing stage[.]” Id.

Having explicated the legal principles governing our analysis, we now consider

whether the Commonwealth established a prima facie case as to each of the four charged

offenses.

Unsworn Falsification to Authorities

A defendant is guilty of unsworn falsification to authorities “if, with intent to mislead

a public servant in performing his official function, he . . . makes any written false

statement which he does not believe to be true[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. §4904(a)(1). In other

words, a defendant is guilty of unsworn falsification under Section 4904(a)(1) if: (1) he

makes a written false statement, (2) which he does not believe to be true, and (3) he does

so with intent to mislead a public servant in performing his official function.

The Commonwealth contends the en banc majority’s holding that the evidence

was insufficient to hold defendant for court for unsworn falsification “defies logic” and “this

Court’s precedent.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 17. It argues that while “the Superior Court

majority’s one-sentence analysis implies that the transcript of defendant’s interview [with

Lieutenant Clough] was not a ‘written false statement,’ the court’s actual holding can

logically only be understood as one concluding that defendant did not personally ‘make’

the statement.” Id. at 18. Indeed, the Commonwealth insists it is indisputable the

[J-49-2024] - 13 interview was reduced to writing and constituted a statement, i.e., a representation. Thus,

it argues the majority’s true holding is that defendant did not “make” the statement

because Lieutenant Clough “was the person who physically reduced defendant’s words

to writing.” Id. And in so holding, the Commonwealth posits, the majority contravened its

own decision in Commonwealth v. Cherpes, 520 A.2d 439, 444 (Pa. Super. 1987) (finding

evidence sufficient to support conviction of unsworn falsification to authorities where

witness testified, contrary to Cherpes’s claim otherwise, that Cherpes signed financial

disclosure form which failed to disclose certain income from his insurance business). It

also perceives “direct tension” between the majority’s holding and this Court’s decision in

Commonwealth v. Lively, 610 A.2d 7 (Pa. 1992) (holding prior inconsistent statement of

non-party witness is admissible as substantive evidence if statement was given under

oath at formal legal proceeding, reduced to writing signed and adopted by witness, or

contemporaneous verbatim recording). Id. Moreover, the Commonwealth maintains

“[d]efendant knew that his statement that he had not spoken with his cousin Edwin in

almost a year was false because his phone records showed that they had communicated

with each other merely two months earlier[.]” Id. at 19. It contends too that it may be

reasonably inferred based on the totality of the evidence that defendant lied in his

statement with the express objective of misleading Lieutenant Clough in performing his

IAD investigation.

Defendant responds that even assuming he made false statements to Lieutenant

Clough when he claimed to have not spoken to Edwin in a year and denied giving him

Theresa’s personal information, the evidence was still insufficient because it did not show

he made a written statement as required by Section 4904(a)(1). He argues he “did not

write the statement[,]” and as such, did not “make” the statement as required under the

statute. Appellee’s Brief at 15. According to defendant:

[J-49-2024] - 14 the statute was not broadly drafted to encompass the acts of adopting, affirming or endorsing a written statement. Rather, it was narrowly drawn to criminalize only the act of making a false written statement. Since it is a basic canon of statutory interpretation that a court may not insert a word into a statute where the legislature itself has failed to do so, . . . this Court should reject the Commonwealth’s improper invitation to extend the scope of 18 Pa.C.S. §4904 to statements that were not made in writing by the defendant himself. Id. (citation omitted). He adds that “[i]f the legislature had wished to criminalize the

making of a verbal statement to a public servant, it would have written the statute to

penalize the making of any ‘oral or written false statement’ as it has done in other

instances.” Id. at 16 n.4. Furthermore, defendant submits the Commonwealth’s reliance

on Cherpes is misplaced. In his view, the takeaway principle from Cherpes is not that the

Commonwealth may satisfy its burden of proof in the absence of evidence the defendant

personally made the written statement, but rather that witness credibility is the exclusive

province of the fact-finder, and thus the jury was free to reject Cherpes’s testimony that

he did not sign the statement in favor of the witness’s testimony that he did.

We conclude the Commonwealth presented prima facie proof of each of the three

elements of unsworn falsification to authorities under Section 4904(a)(1). Reading the

evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and drawing all reasonable

inferences in its favor, there is probable cause to believe defendant: (1) made a written

false statement, (2) which he did not believe to be true, and (3) that he did so with intent

to mislead a public servant in performing his official function.

Initially, the first element of unsworn falsification — the making of a written false

statement — is satisfied at the prima facie level. The word “makes” is not defined in the

statute or elsewhere in the Crimes Code, nor has it acquired a particular and appropriate

meaning. Hence, this word is construed according to its common and approved usage.

See 1 Pa.C.S. §1903(a) (“Words and phrases shall be construed according to rules of

grammar and according to their common and approved usage; but technical words and

[J-49-2024] - 15 phrases and such others as have acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning or are

defined in this part, shall be construed according to such peculiar and appropriate

meaning or definition.”). “The common and approved meaning of a word . . . is

appropriately gleaned from dictionary definitions.” Commonwealth v. Chisebwe, 310 A.3d

262, 269 (Pa. 2024). The verb “make” is pertinently defined as “to produce; cause to exist

or happen; bring about[.]”14

Presently, defendant caused a written statement to exist by giving oral answers,

which were then transcribed by Lieutenant Clough, and by signing each page of the

statement and signing it at the end in attestation that its contents were accurate.15

Defendant’s signatures on the transcription brought about a written statement as defined

by Section 4904(a)(1); without them, the statement would not exist. To be sure, as

defendant emphasizes, he did not physically write every word of the statement. Only the

signatures were actually supplied by his hand. But the statute does not require the

defendant to be the sole or even a scrivener of the written statement. Its application is

not limited to only those circumstances where the defendant “drafts” the written

statement. Rather, Section 4904(a)(1) uses the broader verb “makes,” which

encompasses defendant’s actions in supplying the contents of the statement and then

adopting it as his own.16

14 Make, Dictionary.com, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/make (last visited Jan. 21,

2025). 15Defendant’s statement is, of course, written, as defendant acknowledges. See Appellee’s Brief at 13 (“Lieutenant Clough memorialized the conversation in writing[.]”). 16 As defendant correctly observes, in adopting Section 4904(a)(1) the General Assembly

plainly did not seek to criminalize the making of an oral false statement to a public official. See Appellee’s Brief at 16 n.4. Our interpretation herein is not to the contrary. We merely recognize that one who adopts a written statement — regardless of whether the written statement is derived from or an exact transcription of oral statements — “makes a written statement” for purposes of Section 4904(a)(1).

[J-49-2024] - 16 Moreover, there is prima facie evidence the written statement defendant made is

false. Indeed, the statement, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,

as it must be, appears to contain multiple untruths. For example, defendant claimed in

the statement he had not spoken to Edwin for “maybe a year or more.” N.T. Refiling

Hearing, 4/22/21, at 36. However, telephone records show twenty phone calls between

the men from March 5, 2017 to October of 2017; calls or attempted calls between them

on October 6, 7, and 8 of 2017; and calls on October 27 and November 5, 2017. See

N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 9/11/20, at 87-88.17 In addition, defendant told Lieutenant

Clough he searched for Theresa on the VOTE and JNET systems on October 17, 2017

for business rather than personal reasons. See N.T. Refiling Hearing, 4/22/21, at 41-42.

Yet, defendant and Edwin exchanged text messages three days earlier, when Edwin first

encountered Theresa, as well as just minutes before defendant actually performed the

searches. See N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 9/11/20, at 87-88. The timing of these

communications supports the reasonable inference that defendant conducted the

searches at his cousin’s behest and not pursuant to official police business. Furthermore,

defendant alleged to the Lieutenant that he never shared Theresa’s motor vehicle or

confidential voter registration information with Edwin. See N.T. Refiling Hearing, 4/22/21,

at 39, 41. These allegations are contradicted by Edwin’s appearance at her doorstep four

days later and his suspicious claim that he “had his ways” for finding her. See N.T.

17 “At best,” defendant argues, “the records showed that the men traded calls but that any

‘call’ captured by the records was less than two minutes long, and thus likely was not answered and sent to voice mail.” Appellee’s Brief at 20 n.6, citing N.T. Refiling Hearing, 4/22/21, at 64-65. However, he cites the argument of his counsel, not the telephone records themselves, which are not part of the record on appeal. In any case, defendant’s argument improperly casts the evidence in a light most favorable to himself. For example, even assuming none of the many calls between the men was more than two minutes long, it is certainly possible to have a brief conversation in this time. At the preliminary hearing stage, we are required to draw this reasonable inference in the Commonwealth’s favor. See Perez, 249 A.3d at 1102.

[J-49-2024] - 17 Preliminary Hearing, 9/11/20, at 9, 14. The first element of Section 4904(a)(1) is satisfied

on this evidence.

There is likewise prima facie evidence defendant did not believe his statement was

true, thus meeting the second element. Defendant surely would have known if he had in

fact spoken with Edwin over the past year, conducted the computer searches for Edwin’s

personal benefit, and communicated what he learned to Edwin. To the extent his

assertions to the contrary in his interview with Lieutenant Clough were fabrications, they

were knowingly untrue.

Finally, there is a prima facie case defendant intended to mislead Lieutenant

Clough in performing his official function. Defendant’s apparent repeated fabrications in

his statement to the Lieutenant — concerning his past contacts with Edwin, the reason

for his computer searches of Theresa, and his communication of her privileged

information to Edwin — implied defendant intended to divert or end the Lieutenant’s IAD

investigation. See Commonwealth v. Carbone, 574 A.2d 584, 589 (Pa. 1990) (“The

fabrication of false and contradictory statements by an accused are evidence from which

a jury may infer that they were made with ‘an intent to mislead the police or other

authorities[.]’”), quoting Commonwealth v. Gockley, 192 A.2d 693, 701 (Pa. 1963). His

intent to frustrate the IAD investigation is also evident in the fact that he replaced his

phone the very same day the Lieutenant interviewed Edwin. See N.T. Preliminary

Hearing, 9/11/20, at 88. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the

evidence established a prima facie case that defendant intended to mislead Lieutenant

Clough in performing his internal affairs investigation.

In sum, we conclude the Superior Court committed an error of law when it held the

written statement adopted by defendant “does not constitute a ‘written false statement’”

under Section 4904(a)(1). Williams, 302 A.3d at 1244. Moreover, viewing the evidence

[J-49-2024] - 18 under the proper standards, we hold the Commonwealth produced prima facie evidence

of each of the three material elements of unsworn falsification to authorities under Section

4904(a)(1).

Tampering with or Fabricating Physical Evidence

A person commits the crime of tampering with or fabricating physical evidence if,

inter alia, “believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be

instituted, he . . . alters, destroys, conceals or removes any record, document or thing

with intent to impair its verity or availability in such proceeding or investigation[.]” 18

Pa.C.S. §4910(1).18 Hence, a crime under Section 4910(1) is made out if the

Commonwealth proves a defendant: (1) who believed an official proceeding or

investigation was pending or about to be instituted, (2) altered, destroyed, concealed, or

removed a record, document, or thing, (3) with the intent to impair the verity or availability

of the item to the proceeding or investigation.

The Commonwealth contends the en banc Superior Court majority, in concluding

the evidence did not establish defendant added the information regarding Theresa to the

homicide file after he learned of the IAD investigation, failed to acknowledge that the

Commonwealth may sustain its prima facie burden by means of wholly circumstantial

evidence. It also claims the majority “usurped the role of a trial fact-finder when it opined

that the mere fact that ‘the second file was not included with the first is not evidence, even

at a prima facie level, that the [information about (Theresa)] was added after [defendant]

learned of the investigation.’” Commonwealth’s Brief at 23, quoting Williams, 302 A.3d at

18 The Commonwealth argues in its brief there was a prima facie case under Subsection

(2) of this provision as well as Subsection (1). See Commonwealth’s Brief at 21-22. However, the Commonwealth charged defendant under Subsection (1) only. See Trial Disposition and Dismissal Form at 2; Oral Argument Tr. at 4:20:47-4:21:33, Commonwealth v. Williams, J-49-2024 (Sept. 10, 2024) (Commonwealth conceding it charged defendant under Section 4910(1) only). Accordingly, we confine our analysis to whether there is a prima facie case under Section 4910(1).

[J-49-2024] - 19 1245. The Commonwealth emphasizes it was not just the mere existence of the second

file, but the markedly different content and format of this file, i.e., the file’s inclusion of an

untraceable and undated printout of Theresa’s Facebook profile picture with handwritten

notes on the back, which supports an inference of defendant’s probable guilt. Indeed, it

dubs the second file “a clumsy, after-the-fact addendum to the true file.” Id. The

Commonwealth insists “[a]n entirely reasonable inference from the totality of th[e]

evidence is that defendant manufactured the second . . . file to mislead [Lieutenant]

Clough in his investigation.” Id. at 24.

Defendant counters that the Commonwealth has failed to establish any of the three

elements of tampering with evidence. He argues his inclusion of information related to

Theresa in the homicide file, even if extraneous, hardly constituted the destruction,

alteration, or concealment of evidence within the meaning of the statute. “To hold

otherwise[,]” he submits, “would subject every law enforcement officer to criminal charges

for documenting investigative leads that turned out to be dead ends or otherwise

unrelated to the case at hand.” Appellee’s Brief at 27. In addition, defendant claims that,

in the absence of testimony regarding when he printed the Facebook photograph, it is

impossible to conclude it was placed in the homicide file after his interview with Lieutenant

Clough. As such, he asserts, the Commonwealth did not carry its burden to establish he

had the requisite knowledge an investigation was pending into his actions. Finally,

defendant contends “there was no evidence that [he] acted with the requisite intent to

impair the availability of the item to the proceeding or investigation[.]” Id. at 29. Rather,

“[t]he information [he] printed and placed in the homicide investigation file remained in the

investigation file, and it was therefore accessible to anyone who wished to review it.” Id.

We find the evidence sufficient to make out a prima facie case of each element of

tampering with or fabricating physical evidence. First, there is prima facie evidence

[J-49-2024] - 20 defendant believed an IAD investigation was pending when he engaged in his allegedly

unlawful conduct. At the latest, defendant learned there was a pending IAD investigation

into his activities when he gave his statement to Lieutenant Clough on December 27,

2017, as defendant himself acknowledges. See Appellee’s Brief at 28 (“December 27,

2017 [is] the date that [defendant] was interviewed by IAD and learned that an

investigation was pending.”). Indeed, defendant’s signed statement to the Lieutenant on

that date expressly noted at the outset that it took place at the “Internal Affairs Division”

and concerned “IAD Investigation 17-533.” N.T. Refiling Hearing, 4/22/21, at 30.

Immediately after taking defendant’s statement, Lieutenant Clough proceeded directly to

the Homicide Division, requested the file for the Williams Avenue homicide, and was

provided with a single folder. See N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 9/11/20, at 77. The

Lieutenant then promptly reviewed this folder and determined it contained no information

whatsoever regarding Theresa. See id. at 78. The very next day, however, defendant

called IAD and informed them there was actually a second folder for the Williams Avenue

homicide file. See id. Unlike the first folder, this second folder contained information

regarding Theresa: a publicly available photograph of Theresa with her children printed

from Facebook with handwritten notes about Theresa on the back of it.

These circumstances raise a prima facie case defendant created the second folder

after his interview with Lieutenant Clough, that is, after he believed (indeed knew) an IAD

investigation was pending against him. For one, the fact that immediately following

defendant’s interview with Lieutenant Clough, the Homicide Division provided the

Lieutenant with just the first folder indicates this was the only existing folder at that

juncture. Any extant second folder would have presumably been included with the first,

and the Homicide Division would have presumptively disclosed the entire file in response

to IAD’s request. The fact defendant contacted IAD to advise them of the second folder

[J-49-2024] - 21 also implies it was newly created. If the second folder had existed all along, it is difficult

to see why defendant would have deemed it necessary to tell IAD about it. Instead, the

logical inference is that he would have simply assumed IAD acquired it along with the first

folder when Lieutenant Clough retrieved the file a day earlier.

Further, the distinct nature of the information regarding Theresa — a printout of a

publicly available Facebook photo with handwritten notes on the back — suggests a post-

interview addendum to the true file. Based on his interview with Lieutenant Clough,

defendant knew that if he printed information from a restricted access system like NCIC,

VOTE, or JNET, the timing of his search would be evident to IAD. By contrast, a printout

of a photo publicly accessible on the internet and handwritten notes were at least more

difficult (and perhaps impossible) to date, and presented a potentially undetectable way

to supplement the file after the fact. While a different sequence of events is perhaps

theoretically possible, the reasonable inference most favorable to the Commonwealth,

and hence the inference required under our governing standards of review, is that

defendant generated the second folder following his IAD interview, and thus with full

knowledge of the pending investigation into his conduct.

There is also prima facie evidence defendant altered a record, document, or thing.

Initially, as defendant does not appear to dispute, and we readily conclude, the file for the

Williams Avenue homicide fits comfortably within the scope of the broad phrase, “any

record, document[,] or thing[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. §4910(1). The disputed question is whether

defendant altered the file. The word “alter,” which is not specially defined by statute or

case law, is relevantly defined as “to make different in some particular, as size, style,

course, or the like; modify[.]”19 Based on this definition, we conclude an alteration can be

19Alter, Dictionary.com, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/alter (last visited Jan. 21, 2025).

[J-49-2024] - 22 effected by adding to a record, document, or thing just as it may be effected by deleting

from a record, document, or thing. Here, for example, by allegedly adding the second

folder to the homicide file, defendant made the file different; he supplemented its contents

with a new folder containing additional items. Thus, he altered the file for purposes of the

statute.20

Lastly, the Commonwealth established a prima facie case defendant intended to

impair the verity, i.e., the truth, of the homicide file. Again, the printout of the Facebook

photograph with the handwritten notes on the back was the only item in the entire

homicide file which referenced Theresa. See N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 9/11/20, at 79.

Unlike a printout from a restricted access database, this item could not be readily traced

and dated. It suddenly and suspiciously came to light the very next day after defendant’s

interview with IAD. The photograph offered corroboration of defendant’s claim in his IAD

interview that his computer searches for Theresa were conducted pursuant to his

investigation of the Williams Avenue homicide. It is reasonably inferred from these

circumstances that defendant did not add the second folder to the file because Theresa

was a legitimate subject of the homicide investigation, but rather to manipulate the file to

give the false impression she was a bona fide part of the investigation to justify his prior

computer searches.

In holding otherwise, the en banc majority reasoned that since the Commonwealth

“presented no testimony from anyone that [Lieutenant Clough] obtained the entire file

20 We reject defendant’s claim that this holding “subject[s] every law enforcement officer

to criminal charges for documenting investigative leads that turn[ ] out to be dead ends or otherwise unrelated to the case at hand.” Appellee’s Brief at 27. This position fails to account for the offense’s remaining material elements, which require proof the defendant made the alteration with the intent to impair the verity or availability of the item to an official proceeding or investigation the defendant believed was pending or about to be instituted. The mere fact that an officer documented a lead that turns out to be a dead end does not satisfy these other elements.

[J-49-2024] - 23 when he initially procured it[,]” the evidence failed to establish, “even at a prima facie

level, that the material was added after [defendant] learned of the [IAD] investigation.”

Williams, 302 A.3d at 1245. This reasoning was erroneous for at least two reasons. First,

it failed to assign any weight to the evidence the Commonwealth presented. See id.

(“That the second file was not included with the first is not evidence[.]”). It is well settled

that “[t]he weight and credibility of the evidence are not factors at the preliminary hearing

stage[.]” Perez, 249 A.3d at 1102. Second, in suggesting it was more likely Lieutenant

Clough failed to obtain the entire file when he first procured it, rather than that defendant

generated the second folder following his IAD interview, the majority disregarded the

principle that “[i]nferences reasonably drawn from the evidence of record which would

support a verdict of guilty are to be given effect, and the evidence must be read in the

light most favorable to the Commonwealth’s case.” Id.

Tampering with Public Records or Information

A defendant commits the crime of tampering with public records or information if

he “knowingly makes a false entry in, or false alteration of, any record, document or thing

belonging to, or received or kept by, the government for information or record, or required

by law to be kept by others for information of the government[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. §4911(a)(1).21

This offense is graded as “a misdemeanor of the second degree unless the intent of the

actor is to defraud or injure anyone, in which case the offense is a felony of the third

degree.” 18 Pa.C.S. §4911(b). Thus, the felony version of this crime is established upon

proof the accused: (1) knowingly made a false entry in, or false alteration of, any record,

document, or thing (2) belonging to, or received or kept by, the government for information

or record, or required by law to be kept by others for information of the government, and

(3) intended to defraud or injure anyone.

21 The Commonwealth charged defendant under Subsection (a)(1) of Section 4911 only.

[J-49-2024] - 24 The Commonwealth submits defendant added the second folder to the file for the

Williams Avenue homicide “knowing it to be false and with the intent to mislead

[Lieutenant] Clough in conducting [his] official investigation.” Commonwealth’s Brief at

25. It also maintains that “[b]ecause defendant himself claimed that the second file was

a supplement to the first, official file, the evidence supported the reasonable inference

that the fabricated file was a ‘false alteration of’ the first.” Id., quoting 18 Pa.C.S.

§4911(a)(1).

Defendant responds “the Commonwealth failed to establish that [he] knowingly

made a false entry in or alteration” to the homicide file. Appellee’s Brief at 30. He alleges

“[t]he fact that [he] included his own notes and computer [printouts] related to [Theresa]

and her vehicle in the file can hardly be considered a ‘false entry’ or ‘false alteration,’

particularly given that there was no evidence to suggest that the information about her

residence or vehicle was in any way false or inaccurate, or that the social media profile

information attributed to [Theresa] did not in fact belong to her.” Id. at 31. He additionally

asserts the Commonwealth failed to establish his intent to defraud or injure. According

to defendant, “an intent to defraud necessarily encompasses an element of pecuniary or

property loss, or the loss of an important right[,]” and “the Commonwealth has failed to

allege or show how [his] inclusion of information about [Theresa] in a homicide

investigation file induced anyone to part with property or forego a legal right.” Id. at 34.

We hold the evidence is sufficient at the prima facie level to support this charge.

As discussed, defendant’s supplementation of the homicide file with the second folder

constituted an “alteration” of the file. The addition of the second folder modified the

composition of the file. What’s more, from the totality of the suspicious circumstances

attending this change — defendant’s sudden “discovery,” on the very next day after his

IAD interview, of a previously unknown second homicide folder containing a difficult-to-

[J-49-2024] - 25 trace document which, uniquely among the items in the file, referenced Theresa and

conveniently substantiated his claims in his interview — it is reasonably inferred the

alteration was knowingly false.22 To wit, it purposely and incorrectly indicated Theresa

was a genuine part of the investigation of the Williams Avenue homicide, when she in fact

had no connection to the case. Furthermore, the file for the homicide was maintained by

the Homicide Division of the Philadelphia Police Department. As such, it clearly

constitutes a record, document, or thing belonging to, or kept by, the government for

information or record. Indeed, on this point, the sharply divided en banc panel below

unanimously agreed. See Williams, 302 A.3d at 1246 (“The homicide file is a ‘public

record or thing,’ as contemplated by the statute, as it is kept by the government and is

something that police officers are required to compile.”); id. at 1257 (Olson, J., dissenting)

(“I agree with the learned Majority that the homicide file relied upon by [defendant] to

establish the legitimacy of his inquiries regarding [Theresa] is a ‘record, document or thing

belonging to, or received or kept by, the government for information or record.’”).

Finally, we hold there is a prima facie case defendant intended to defraud. The

legal definition of “defraud” is “[t]o cause injury or loss to (a person or organization) by

deceit; to trick (a person or organization) in order to get money.” Defraud, Black’s Law

Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). An “injury” is “[t]he violation of another’s legal right, for which

the law provides a remedy; a wrong or injustice.” Injury, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed.

2024). Accordingly, an individual may be deemed to have an intent to defraud if he

intends to violate another’s legal right or cause a wrong or injustice by deceit. The intent

22 As it did with the previous offense, the en banc majority failed to assign the proper

weight and inferences to the Commonwealth’s evidence on this point. See Williams, 302 A.3d at 1247 (suggesting the defendant simply “added his own notes and computer printouts to the file” and chastising the Commonwealth for supposedly relying on “mere supposition and speculation”).

[J-49-2024] - 26 to cause pecuniary or property loss is not required. Here, it is reasonably inferred

defendant’s deceptive manipulation of the homicide file to validate his claims in his

interview with Lieutenant Clough was intended to derail the Lieutenant’s investigation into

his misconduct. Scuttling the investigation would effect a wrong or injustice against

Lieutenant Clough and, more broadly, against the IAD, the police department, and the

general public. Moreover, by falsely associating Theresa with the Williams Avenue

homicide, defendant committed a wrong or injustice against her, and potentially violated

her legal rights. In multiple respects, then, defendant evinced an intent to defraud for

purposes of Subsection 4911(b), elevating his offense to a felony.

Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Governmental Function

A defendant is guilty of obstructing administration of law or other governmental

function “if he intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other

governmental function by force, violence, physical interference or obstacle, breach of

official duty, or any other unlawful act[.]” 18 Pa.C.S. §5101.23 As such, a defendant

violates this provision if he: (1) intentionally (2) obstructs, impairs, or perverts the

administration of law or other governmental function (3) by force, violence, physical

interference or obstacle, breach of official duty, or any other unlawful act.

Focusing exclusively on the third element, the Commonwealth argues that

“[b]ecause the evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case that defendant

committed the ‘unlawful act’ of unsworn falsification to authorities, the Superior Court

majority also erred as a matter of law by holding that the evidence was insufficient to

establish the same for obstructing administration of law or other governmental functions.”

Commonwealth’s Brief at 20. Defendant replies that the record “belies” the conclusion

he lied to Lieutenant Clough when he told him he had not spoken to Edwin in a year or

23 The exception to liability under Section 5101, see supra note 10, is not implicated here.

[J-49-2024] - 27 more. Appellee’s Brief at 19. In any event, he insists lying is not an “unlawful act” under

Section 5101. In addition, he contends the Commonwealth “provided no evidence at the

preliminary hearing to support” that he fabricated the second homicide folder after his IAD

interview, and even if it had, any such proof “would not have established the elements for

the offense of unsworn falsification[.]” Id. at 21-22.

We conclude the Commonwealth adduced prima facie evidence of this offense as

well. Initially, there is prima facie proof defendant intentionally obstructed a governmental

function. The IAD investigation into his potential wrongdoing was plainly a governmental

function, and his multiple apparent falsehoods in his interview and apparent post hoc

falsification of the homicide file hindered this function, making it more difficult. Moreover,

it is reasonably inferred defendant’s repeated falsehoods were not an unlikely series of

honest mistakes, but rather an intentional effort to mislead the IAD investigation. The first

two elements of the offense are therefore met. So too is the third. As detailed above,

there is prima facie evidence of three other unlawful acts: unsworn falsification to

authorities, tampering with or fabricating physical evidence, and tampering with public

records or information. This easily satisfies the third element of the offense. Accordingly,

we need not address the en banc majority’s conclusions that “mere lying” during a police

interview and “add[ing] information to the homicide file” do not constitute “unlawful acts”

for purposes of Section 5101. Williams, 302 A.3d at 1248.

In conclusion, we hold the evidence was sufficient to support a prima facie case

as to each of the four criminal charges against defendant. The en banc majority below

— indeed, all the lower courts in this matter — misconstrued the relevant statutes and

failed to correctly apply the governing standards. Accordingly, we reverse the order of

the Superior Court and remand to the trial court for further proceedings. In so doing, we

respectfully remind the lower courts that the weight and credibility of the evidence are not

[J-49-2024] - 28 factors at the preliminary hearing stage, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in

the Commonwealth’s favor.

Jurisdiction is relinquished.

Chief Justice Todd and Justices Donohue, Wecht, Mundy and Brobson join the

opinion.

Justice McCaffery did not participate in the consideration or decision of this matter.

[J-49-2024] - 29