Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Ehrlich

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. New York
DecidedAugust 29, 2024
Docket1:23-cv-08962
StatusUnknown

This text of Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Ehrlich (Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Ehrlich) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Ehrlich, (S.D.N.Y. 2024).

Opinion

PAV UIVIEULN □ ELECTRONICALLY FILE DOC #: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DATE FILED: 8/29/24 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ce ee ee ee ee ee te ee ee ee ee eee ee eer eee HHH KH HX COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, Plaintiff, -against- 23-cv-08962 (LAK) STEPHEN EHRLICH, Defendant. ce ee eee ee ee ee ee et ee ee ee eee ee ee eee HHH HH HX

MEMORANDUM OPINION DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Appearances:

Rachel Hayes Alan T. Simpson COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION Attorneys for Plaintiff Helen Harris Matthew Letten DAY PITNEY LLP Sarah Krissoff COZEN O’ CONNOR Attorneys for Defendant

LEWIS A. KAPLAN, District Judge. The Commodity Exchange Act (the “Act’”) requires commodity pool operators (“CPOs”) to register with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) and to abide by

2 certain other statutory and regulatory requirements. In this case, the CFTC alleges that Voyager,1 a now bankrupt digital asset platform, was an unregistered CPO and that its co-founder and former chief executive officer (“CEO”), defendant Stephen Ehrlich, was an unregistered associated person (“AP”) of a CPO.2 It alleges also that Ehrlich and Voyager defrauded Voyager’s customers. Ehrlich

moves to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).3 For the reasons explained below, the motion is denied.

Facts From February 2018 to July 2022, Voyager and Ehrlich operated the Voyager Platform, a digital asset trading and custody platform.4 Simply stated, the Voyager Platform allowed customers to buy, sell, trade, and store digital assets such as crypto currencies (e.g., Bitcoin).5 Two selling points differentiated Voyager’s offering: the promise that “Voyager would operate with the same level of rigor and trust as traditional financial institutions”6 and the Rewards Program, which

1 The complaint refers to several Voyager entities collectively as “Voyager.” Those entities include, Voyager Digital Ltd., Voyager Digital Holdings, Inc., and Voyager Digital, LLC. 2 The complaint alleges that Ehrlich is liable as a control person for Voyager’s alleged violations of commodities laws and regulations. Dkt 1 (Compl.) at ¶ 156. 3 Dkt 15. 4 Dkt 1 (Compl.) at ¶¶ 1–2. As it must, the Court accepts as true the factual allegations put forth in the CFTC’s complaint. 5 Id. at ¶ 28. 6 Id. at ¶ 3 (internal quotation marks omitted). 3 paid customers interest on assets held on the Voyager Platform.7 These returns often substantially exceeded those available from, for example, interest-bearing accounts at traditional financial institutions.8 In order to fund the Rewards Program, Voyager generated revenue in two principal ways. First, Voyager charged transaction fees.9 Second, “Voyager pooled the digital asset

commodities that its customers purchased or stored and transferred certain of those pooled assets to third parties” in the form of “putative loans.”10 These loans would prove Voyager’s undoing. For a time, however, Voyager was successful. “Based on Ehrlich and Voyager’s promises of high-yield returns and responsible safekeeping, the Voyager Platform facilitated the sale, purchase, and storing of billions of dollars’ worth of digital asset commodities.”11 Indeed, “[d]uring the Relevant Period,” which the complaint defines as February 28, 2022 through July 5, 2022, “the value of the digital asset[s] . . . stored on the Voyager Platform often exceeded $2 billion.”12 A significant proportion of these assets were “pooled” and “transferred . . . to multiple

7 Id. at ¶¶ 4, 38. 8 Id. 9 Id. at ¶ 34. 10 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at ¶ 56. 11 Id. at ¶ 5. 12 Id. 4 high-risk third parties (including Firms A–D)” in the form of loans.13 Firm A, in particular, received over $650 million worth of digital assets from Voyager.14 Despite the materiality of this lending activity — the loans to Firm A alone were “sufficient to bankrupt Voyager in the event of non-repayment” — Voyager never conducted “any meaningful diligence” of its borrowers’ ability to repay loans.15 Thus, before lending to it, Voyager “did not receive Firm A income statements,

cash flow statements, balance sheets, or even a debt-to-asset ratio,” and “Voyager did not conduct any stress testing of Firm A’s liquidity.”16 Firm A did, however, disclose to Voyager that it “planned to use Voyager’s transferred assets to engage in spot-futures arbitrage trading.”17 Voyager lent to Firm A, among others, because it “needed significant revenue to help fund its Rewards Program and to be able to pay the promised return to customers for storing their assets on the Voyager Platform.”18 In May 2022, the price of two crypo currencies associated with the Terra blockchain ecosystem, terraUSD (“UST”) and LUNA, collapsed.19 As Voyager knew, Firm A had “significant

13 Id. at ¶ 46. At some times, Voyager’s loans to just three borrowers represented over three-quarters of total assets held on the platform. Id. at ¶ 87. 14 Id. at ¶ 47. 15 Id. 16 Id. at ¶ 58. 17 Id. at ¶ 66. 18 Id. at ¶ 50. 19 Id. at ¶ 81. 5 equity investments in the Terra Luna ecosystem.”20 In response, Voyager attempted to assess Firm A’s exposure to this downturn.21 Voyager itself also “beg[an] to experience its own operational

liquidity issues.”22 On June 13, 2022, with concern swirling over the stability of the Luna ecosystem, generally, and Firm A, specifically, Voyager recalled 1,250 Bitcoins (worth tens of millions of U.S. dollars) it had loaned to Firm A.23 The next day, Voyager recalled its remaining loans to Firm A.24

“Beginning . . . around June 12, 2022, to ensure its own survival but at the expense of its customers, Voyager,” authorized by Ehrlich, “initiated a sustained and deliberate campaign to conceal from the public its high-risk exposure to Firm A and its own precarious financial

condition.”25 Its “goal in doing so was to prevent customers from receiving information that might lead customers to withdraw assets from the Voyager Platform.”26 For example, Voyager tweeted and

Ehrlich retweeted reassurance that “[a]ll Voyager products and services are fully operational and

20 Id. at ¶ 82; see id. at ¶ 83. 21 Id. at ¶ 85. 22 Id. at ¶ 86 (internal quotation marks omitted). 23 Id. at ¶¶ 88–91. 24 Id. at ¶ 93. 25 Id. at ¶ 94. 26 Id. 6 remain unaffected by current market conditions . . . . We take risk management very seriously . . . . We have never engaged in DeFi lending activities and have no exposure to stETH.”27 These

statements, alleges the complaint, were false.28 Firm A never repaid Voyager.29 On July 6, 2022, Voyager announced that it was bankrupt.30 As a result, Voyager’s customers lost over $1.7 billion.31

Based on these substantive allegations, the CFTC brought a four-count complaint against Ehrlich. Counts One and Two allege fraud. Count Three alleges that Voyager failed to register as a commodity pool operator and that Ehrlich failed to register as an AP of a CPO. Count

Four alleges that Voyager failed to provide required CPO disclosure documents to prospective customers.

27 Id. at ¶ 95 (second alteration in original). “DeFi” stands for “Decentralized finance” and “stETH” stands for “staked ether,” a type of digital asset. Dkt 21 (Pl. Mem.) at 11 n.4 28 Dkt 1 (Compl.) at ¶ 96. 29 Id. at ¶ 93. 30 Id. at ¶ 128. 31 Id. at ¶ 129. 7 Discussion Ehrlich moves to dismiss Count One on the ground that the complaint fails to allege that he acted with the requisite scienter. Ehrlich moves to dismiss Counts Two, Three, and Four on the grounds that Voyager was not a CPO and that he was not an AP of a CPO. For the reasons that

follow, the Court denies the motion. I.

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