Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Eddy Alexandre and Eminifx, Inc.

District Court, S.D. New York·Decided July 2, 2026·No. 1:22-cv-03822·Unknown

Opinion

MEMO ENDORSED eo

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK USDC SDNY COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION, DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED Plaintiff, : DOC #: -against- DATE FILED: 7/2/2026 EDDY ALEXANDRE and EMINIFX, INC., Defendants. : Case No.: 22 Civ. 3822 (VEC) Hon. Valerie E. Caproni, U.S.D.J. DEFENDANT EDDY ALEXANDRE'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF OMNIBUS ORDER (DKT. 586) PURSUANT TO LOCAL CIVIL RULE 6.3 Eddy Alexandre, pro se, Reg. No. 00712-510, respectfully submits this Motion for Reconsideration of this Court's Omnibus Order entered June 12, 2026 (Dkt. 586), pursuant to Local Civil Rule 6.3. |. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT This motion is timely. Dkt. 586 was entered June 12, 2026. Under Local Civil Rule 6.3, a motion for reconsideration must be filed within fourteen days, by June 26, 2026. Defendant submits this motion within that window, and it is deemed filed on the date delivered to FCC Allenwood Low prison officials for mailing pursuant to Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988). This motion does not re-argue positions previously presented. It presents: (1) a controlling constitutional right that no order in this case has ever addressed; (2) new authority issued after briefing closed that directly controls the outcome; (3) an institutional admission by the prosecuting agency itself confirming the central defense; and (4) a material change in circumstances, the pending criminal 2255 motion, that directly undermines the collateral estoppel foundation upon which eve civil fraud count rests. Each of these grounds, independently, satisfies the Local Rule 6.3 standard. Together, they establish that this Court's Omnibt Order was entered on an incomplete record that, if supplemented, could reasonably alter the outcome. ll. STANDARD OF REVIEW Local Civil Rule 6.3 provides that a motion for reconsideration must identify ‘the matters or controlling decisions which counsel believes the court has overlooked.' The standard is met when the movant presents: (1) an intervening change of controlling la (2) new evidence not previously available; or (3) a need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice. Shrader v. CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). Reconsideration is appropriate where the Court has overlooked facts or controlling precedent that would alter the outcome. In re Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc. Sec. Litig., 113 F. Supp. 2d 613, 614 (S.D.N. 2000). Ill. GROUNDS FOR RECONSIDERATION A. Ground One: The Seventh Amendment Requires a Jury Trial on the Civil Monetary Penalty, An Argument No Order in Thi Case Has Ever Addressed The Supreme Court held in SEC v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109 (2024), that when the government seeks civil monetary penalties fo common law fraud, the Seventh Amendment guarantees the defendant the right to a jury trial. The CFTC's fraud claims under the Commodity Exchange Act sound in common law fraud, they allege misrepresentation, material omission, and

misappropriation, the same elements at the core of Jarkesy. The ~$45 million civil monetary penalty sought against Defendar and awarded in principle in Dkt. 586 was imposed without a jury. This constitutional argument has been preserved from Defendant's initial motion to dismiss. No order in this case, not the Summary Judgment Opinion (Dkt. 515), not the Omnibus Order (Dkt. 586), and not any interim order, has ever addressed or decided the Jarkesy question. The Seventh Amendment is not a procedural rule; it is a constitutional right. A $45 million pena cannot be imposed over a timely and preserved Seventh Amendment objection without a jury. The Court's failure to address | right in any order is itself grounds for reconsideration. The historical inquiry Jarkesy requires confirms the right. Actions for fraudulent misrepresentation and misappropriation were tried at law, before juries, in English courts prior to 1791. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 41-42 (1989); Beaco Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510 (1959). The CFTC cannot transform a legal claim into an equitable one merely filing in a regulatory enforcement posture. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. at 124. The Court should reconsider Dkt. 586 to the extent it authorized or imposed any civil monetary penalty without a jury trial, as required by the Seventh Amendment and Jarkesy. B. Ground Two: The March 17, 2026 Joint SEC/CFTC Guidance Is New Evidence Directly Material to This Proceeding On March 17, 2026, after all prior briefing in this case was complete , the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission jointly issued interpretive guidance that they themselves described as the first of its kind, defining categories of digital assets and establishing how each category will be treated under federal law. SEC Chairma Paul Atkins publicly stated that the guidance was intended to end ‘more than a decade of uncertainty’ for market participants and acknowledged that his predecessor had ‘declined to commit to tailored policies for the crypto sector, leaving a longstandi gap in regulatory certainty.’ ; This guidance constitutes a judicially noticeable fact under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, its existence, date, and content are matters of official public record that cannot reasonably be disputed. Kramer v. Time Warmer Inc., 937 F.2d 767, 774 (2d Cir. 1991); Staehr v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Grp., Inc., 547 F.3d 406, 425 (2d Cir. 2008), Defendant previously filed a Request for Judicial Notice of this guidance (Dkt. 572), but the Court declined to address it on the merits in Dkt. 586. The Joint Guidance directly bears on this proceeding in two ways. First, it is the government's own confirmation that the regulatory framework governing EminiFX's conduct did not exist in settled form in May 2022. If the framework had been clear then, the agencies would have had no need to create it for the first time in 2026 , nearly four years after Defendant's arrest. D process requires that laws give persons of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited. Upton v. SEC, 75 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 1996). A defendant cannot be convicted of knowingly violating a regulatory framework that did □ exist until years after the alleged conduct. Second, the Joint Guidance is directly material to scienter. Defendant has maintained throughout this proceeding that he acte in good faith, complied with CFTC registration requests, engaged compliance consultants, and signed a $500,000 compliance software contract. The fact that the two most sophisticated regulatory agencies in financial markets, with full access to legal resources and institutional expertise, required until March 2026 to define the applicable framework powerfully corroborates th good faith belief. The Court should take judicial notice of this guidance and reconsider its impact on the fraud and scienter findings in Dkt. 586. _ C. Ground Three: United States v. Cardenas Is Controlling Second Circuit Authority That Issued After Briefing Closed and Wi Never Adjudicated United States v. Cardenas, No. 24-2734 (2d Cir.

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Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Eddy Alexandre and Eminifx, Inc., (S.D.N.Y. 2026).

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Related

Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover
359 U.S. 500 (Supreme Court, 1959)
Houston v. Lack
487 U.S. 266 (Supreme Court, 1988)
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg
492 U.S. 33 (Supreme Court, 1989)
Bruce C. Shrader v. Csx Transportation, Inc.
70 F.3d 255 (Second Circuit, 1995)
Staehr v. Hartford Financial Services Group, Inc.
547 F.3d 406 (Second Circuit, 2008)
In Re Health Management Systems, Inc. Securities Litigation
113 F. Supp. 2d 613 (S.D. New York, 2000)
Shore v. Parklane Hosiery Co.
565 F.2d 815 (Second Circuit, 1977)
SEC v. Jarkesy
603 U.S. 109 (Supreme Court, 2024)