FILED Sep 20 2024, 8:49 am
CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court
IN THE
Court of Appeals of Indiana Commitment of G.W., Appellant-Respondent,
v.
Madison State Hospital, Appellee-Petitioner.
September 20, 2024
Court of Appeals Case No. 23A-MH-2452
Appeal from the Marion Superior Court
The Honorable David Certo, Judge
Trial Court Cause No. 49D08-2303-MH-12196
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-2452 | September 20, 2024 Page 1 of 16 Opinion by Senior Judge Robb Judges Bailey and Weissmann concur.
Robb, Senior Judge.
Statement of the Case [1] G.W. is a deaf person who has been diagnosed with several medical conditions,
including mental illness. He appeals the trial court’s order of regular
commitment, directing that he remain at the Madison State Hospital
(“Hospital”) for at least ninety days. It appears that G.W. is still at the 1 Hospital, and in any event the Hospital does not claim this appeal is moot.
[2] G.W. challenges the trial court’s decision to hold an evidentiary hearing via
video conference. He also challenges the appropriateness of his placement at
the Hospital. We conclude the trial court did not commit reversible error in
holding the hearing via video conference, but the Hospital failed to show its
facility is the appropriate place for G.W. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and
remand with instructions.
1 On June 4, 2024, G.W. filed a status report to inform the Court he is still hospitalized. The Hospital has moved to strike the status report and other items from the record. We grant the Hospital’s motion by separate order.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-2452 | September 20, 2024 Page 2 of 16 Facts and Procedural History [3] G.W. was fifty-eight years old during the time relevant to this appeal. The
record tells us little about G.W.’s medical history or diagnoses before his
current involuntary commitment, except that he was taking medication for
mental illness. He had lived in a group home for deaf persons and worked in a
restaurant. The group home closed due to lack of funding. G.W. moved to an
apartment complex near other deaf people, but he could not afford to continue
living there. He decompensated due to not taking his medication and losing
access to his deaf community, and he ended up in a homeless shelter.
[4] This case began on March 24, 2023, when the Community Health Network
(“the Network”) filed a report on emergency detention regarding G.W. On
March 27, the trial court committed G.W. to the Network’s care for up to
ninety days because he was “mentally ill and gravely disabled.” Appellant’s
App. Vol. II, p. 9.
[5] On May 11, 2023, G.W. was transferred to the Hospital’s facility in Madison,
Indiana under circumstances not explained in the record. On June 6, the
Hospital filed a “Report Requesting Extension of Temporary Commitment and
Physician’s Statement.” Id. at 10. The trial court held a hearing by video
conference and concluded G.W. “is suffering from Psychosis, unspecified,
Mood Disorder, unspecified, PTSD, Generalized Anxiety Disorder, Personality
Disorder, unspecified[.]” Id. at 48. The court further determined G.W. was
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-2452 | September 20, 2024 Page 3 of 16 gravely disabled. As a result, the court ordered G.W. to remain at the Hospital
for no more than ninety days.
[6] On August 30, 2023, the Hospital filed a Report Requesting Regular
Commitment, alleging G.W. needed inpatient treatment for longer than ninety
days. The Hospital provided a statement from G.W.’s psychiatrist, Dr. Jill
Zinner. Dr. Zinner discussed G.W.’s condition and further stated, “A
courtroom hearing will have a harmful effect on the Respondent’s health or
well-being. It is recommended that the hearing be held at the [Hospital] or
other suitable place[.]” Id. at 19.
[7] On September 11, 2023, the trial court issued an order scheduling an
evidentiary hearing for September 18, to be held “over video.” Id. at 20. The
order cited Dr. Zinner’s statement.
[8] On September 14, the Hospital moved to appear via telephonic or video
technology. At a minimum, the Hospital asked that its witnesses and counsel
be allowed to appear remotely rather than being required to travel to Marion
County. On the same day, G.W. filed an objection to holding the hearing via
video conference and asked the court to arrange for him to be transported to
Marion County for an in-person hearing. He argued that as a deaf person, an
in-person hearing would better meet his needs and satisfy the requirements of
“due process[.]” Id. at 28.
[9] The evidentiary hearing was held as scheduled via video conference on
September 18. A team of interpreters was present. Two of them were “ASL,”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-2452 | September 20, 2024 Page 4 of 16 or American Sign Language, interpreters, and two others were “CVI” (perhaps
a mistype of CDI, meaning Certified Deaf Interpreter). Tr. Vol. 2, p. 4. One of
the interpreters explained it was her first time working in this setting. Another
interpreter expressed concerns that G.W. may not have visual access to her and
may not understand the proceedings.
[10] The trial court arranged to place the interpreters, G.W., and his counsel in a
private virtual room so they could discuss how to proceed. Before the private
conference began, the court advised G.W. that if he intended to “pursue the
objection” to a virtual hearing, the case “should” be transferred to Jefferson
County. Id. at 5.
[11] After the conference, the interpreters explained to the court they had worked
out a process to interpret for G.W. Next, G.W., by counsel, stated he did not
want to transfer the case to Jefferson County and establish a new attorney-client
relationship with only four days left in his term of commitment. He preferred
“to go forward today.” Id. at 8. But G.W. noted it would be “cumbersome and
fatiguing” for the interpreters and G.W. to participate in a two-to-three-hour
hearing. Id. at 9. He asked the court to break the hearing down into shorter
sessions over the next three days. The court denied G.W.’s proposal as
“unworkable” and proceeded. Id. We address the evidence presented at the
hearing in the discussion section of this opinion. During the hearing, a member
of the interpreter team had to leave and was replaced by another interpreter.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-2452 | September 20, 2024 Page 5 of 16 [12] After the hearing, the trial court issued an order stating G.W. is mentally ill and
gravely disabled. In particular, the court noted G.W.’s “judgment and
reasoning” are suspect, as shown by his paranoid belief that Hospital staff “may
attack him.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 15. The court directed that he remain 2 at the Hospital for at least ninety days. This appeal followed.
Discussion and Decision I. Holding Evidentiary Hearing by Video Conference [13] G.W. argues the trial court violated Indiana’s administrative rules, as well as
his constitutional rights to due process and due course of law, by holding the
evidentiary hearing remotely rather than in person. He first cites Indiana
Administrative Rule 14(C) (effective January 1, 2023):
A court must conduct all testimonial proceedings in person except that a court may conduct the proceedings remotely for all or some of the case participants for good cause shown or by agreement of the parties. Remote proceedings must comply with constitutional and statutory guarantees.
[14] Commentary to the rule provides: “Presenting live testimony in court remains
of utmost importance.” Id. And our Supreme Court has stated: “in-person
evidentiary hearings are vital in certain proceedings, such as involuntary civil
commitment hearings, where a party’s liberty interests are at stake.” B.N. v.
2 We held oral argument on July 31, 2024 at the State House in Indianapolis. We thank the parties for their excellent presentations.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-2452 | September 20, 2024 Page 6 of 16 Health & Hosp. Corp., 199 N.E.3d 360, 365 (Ind 2022). We apply de novo
review to “question[s] of the scope and applicability of Indiana Administrative
Rule 14[.]” C.S. v. State, 131 N.E.3d 592, 595 (Ind. 2019). But we review a trial
court’s good-cause determination for an abuse of discretion. B.N., 199 N.E.3d
at 363.
[15] G.W. claims his agreement to go forward with the virtual hearing was invalid
because the trial court forced him to choose between having a virtual hearing
with his current counsel, with all the difficulties a virtual hearing potentially
posed for him as a deaf person, or possibly having an in-person hearing via a
Jefferson County court, with new counsel. He characterizes the trial court’s
offer as a “Hobson’s choice.” Appellant’s Br. p. 21.
[16] Administrative Rule 14(C) emphasizes that in-person hearings should be the
norm rather than the exception. Further, in his objection to a remote hearing,
G.W. explained why an in-person hearing would have better met his needs as a
deaf person. But the court’s choice of language at the beginning of the
evidentiary hearing, that the case “should” be transferred to Jefferson County
for an in-person hearing, would have given a reasonable person the impression
that the court would not agree to an in-person hearing. G.W. understandably
concluded he could not have an in-person hearing without a change of venue
and a new attorney appointed by the new trial court. Considering all of the
circumstances, it does not appear G.W. knowingly or voluntarily consented to
hold the evidentiary hearing via video conference.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-2452 | September 20, 2024 Page 7 of 16 [17] Even so, Administrative Rule 14(C) authorized the trial court to hold the
hearing via video conference, over G.W.’s objection, if the trial court
determined there was good cause. A finding of good cause under Rule 14
requires a showing of “particularized and specific factual support.” B.N., 199
N.E.3d at 364. There must be “something specific to the moment, the case, the
court, the parties, the subject matter, or other relevant considerations.” Id. at
364-65.
[18] Dr. Zinner, who was G.W.’s treating psychiatrist, told the court, “A courtroom
hearing will have a harmful effect on the Respondent’s health or well-being.”
Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 19. The trial court cited Dr. Zinner’s statement
when scheduling the video conference hearing. This evidence is sufficiently
specific to the case to have supported a finding of good cause. Because the
record would have supported a finding of good cause, we cannot conclude
G.W.’s invalid consent provides grounds for reversal. See B.N., 199 N.E.3d at
365-66 (trial court did not commit reversible error by holding involuntary
commitment hearing remotely despite no individualized finding of good cause;
any error was harmless).
[19] G.W. next argues that holding the hearing remotely violated his rights to due
process under the Fourteenth Amendment and to due course of law under the
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-2452 | September 20, 2024 Page 8 of 16 3 Indiana Constitution. “Civil commitment proceedings have two purposes – to
protect both the public and the rights of the person for whom involuntary
commitment is sought.” Matter of Commitment of C.D., 206 N.E.3d 392, 394
(Ind. Ct. App. 2023). “The liberty interest at stake in a civil-commitment
proceeding goes beyond a loss of one’s physical freedom because commitment
is accompanied by serious stigma and adverse social consequences.” Id.
“Accordingly, proceedings for civil commitment are subject to the requirements
of the Due Process Clause.” Id. A judgment rendered in violation of the Due
Process Clause is void. B.A. v. State, 219 N.E.3d 134, 138-39 (Ind. Ct. App.
2023). “We review whether a judgment is void or valid de novo.” Id. at 139.
“In the context of a procedural right to remedy by due course of law in a civil
proceeding, . . . the Indiana Constitution has developed a body of law
essentially identical to federal due process doctrine.” McIntosh v. Melroe Co., 729
N.E.2d 972, 976 (Ind. 2000) (internal quotation omitted).
[20] According to G.W., failing to conduct the evidentiary hearing in person
violated his right to due process because: (1) the interpreters had to develop an
ad hoc interpretation process “on the fly” (Appellant’s Br. p. 30); (2) one
interpreter was replaced during the hearing; and (3) the interpreters could not
confirm G.W. understood them. G.W. claims he was, in effect, involuntarily
3 The Hospital argues G.W. waived these claims by failing to present them to the trial court. We disagree, based on our review of the record. The Hospital further claims G.W. invited any error as to his rights by agreeing to hold the hearing via video conference. As noted above, we are unconvinced G.W. voluntarily decided to drop his objection to an in-person hearing.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-2452 | September 20, 2024 Page 9 of 16 absent from his own hearing. The Hospital argues the trial court’s management
of the hearing met due process requirements because G.W. understood what
was happening.
[21] We find guidance in Diaz v. State, 934 N.E.2d 1089 (Ind. 2010). In that case, a
petitioner for post-conviction relief claimed his guilty plea was not knowing and
voluntary. In particular, Diaz argued Spanish was his native language, and the
English language translator did such a poor job that he did not understand the
proceedings. Diaz presented evidence that the translator mistranslated the
proceedings. The Supreme Court stated that court proceedings must be
simultaneously translated to allow a defendant to effectively participate in the
hearing. Id. at 1095. The Court further concluded the record did not
demonstrate whether Diaz was provided with accurate interpreting and, as a
result, he may not have understood the proceedings. Remand was necessary to
resolve the issue.
[22] In G.W.’s case, the facts lead to a different outcome. After some uncertainty at
the beginning of the evidentiary hearing, the four-person interpretive team
established an interpretive process for G.W. Then, during G.W.’s counsel’s
discussion with the trial court, an interpreter briefly interrupted to ensure
G.W.’s screen was pinned to view the person who was signing to him. Just
before the parties began to present evidence, G.W.’s counsel invited the
interpreters or G.W. to speak up if they did not understand the proceedings.
None of them subsequently expressed difficulty understanding the evidence.
To the contrary, during the Hospital’s presentation of evidence, G.W.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-2452 | September 20, 2024 Page 10 of 16 attempted to interject several times to disagree with or respond to witnesses’
statements. And at the beginning of his testimony, G.W. stated he had
understood what the Hospital’s witnesses had said. One of the interpreters was
replaced during the hearing, but there is no evidence that the replacement
affected G.W.’s understanding of the proceedings.
[23] G.W. points out that he held his face close to his computer screen throughout
the hearing. But the evidence demonstrates that he understood what was being
said. In sum, we cannot conclude the record shows G.W.’s rights to due
process and due course of law were violated by the way the trial court
conducted the video conference. See S.E. v. Ind. Dep’t. of Child Servs., 15 N.E.3d
37, 44 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (notwithstanding waiver, no due process violation
in requiring deaf person to testify via interpreter; there was no evidence of
interpreter mistakes or that witness had trouble explaining herself), trans. denied.
2. Involuntary Commitment – Choice of Placement [24] G.W. argues the trial court should not have authorized his continued placement
at the Hospital. A petitioner seeking to have a person involuntarily committed
must “prove by clear and convincing evidence that . . . the individual is
mentally ill and either dangerous or gravely disabled; and . . . detention or
commitment of that individual is appropriate.” Ind. Code § 12-26-2-5(e) (2007).
Clear and convincing evidence is “an intermediate standard of proof greater
than a preponderance of the evidence and less than proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.” T.D. v. Eskenazi Health Midtown Cmty. Mental Health Ctr., 40 N.E.3d
507, 510 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). A court may order that a person needing Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-2452 | September 20, 2024 Page 11 of 16 commitment should be placed “in an appropriate facility . . . [or] an outpatient
therapy program[.]” Ind. Code § 12-26-7-5(a) (2018).
[25] When reviewing a trial court’s order of commitment, we look only to the
evidence most favorable to the judgment and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom. E.F. v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 194 N.E.3d 1130,
1135 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). We will affirm if, after considering the probative
evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the decision, a reasonable trier of
fact could have found the necessary elements proven by clear and convincing
evidence. Matter of B.N., 137 N.E.3d 330, 336 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). “The
determination of whether an involuntary commitment is appropriate is fact-
sensitive.” R.P. v. Optional Behav. MHS, 26 N.E.3d 1032, 1037 (Ind. Ct. App.
2015).
[26] G.W. does not appear to dispute the trial court’s determination that he is
mentally ill and gravely disabled. Instead, he claims the record shows being
placed at the Hospital was not appropriate because the employees could not
accommodate his deafness, thereby exacerbating rather than addressing his
mental health challenges.
[27] Dr. Zinner attributed G.W.’s original need for hospitalization to both isolation
from his deaf community and failure to take medications for his mental
illnesses. She also acknowledged that G.W.’s separation from the deaf
community can profoundly and negatively impact his mental health. At oral
argument, the Hospital conceded G.W.’s needs must be considered
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-2452 | September 20, 2024 Page 12 of 16 “holistically,” Oral Arg. at 42:36, and his deafness “does inform the
discussion,” id. at 40:07.
[28] Despite this undisputed showing that G.W.’s deafness is an essential
component of his mental health challenges, the Hospital presented no evidence
to show how it would accommodate his disability as part of his treatment. To
the contrary, the Hospital does not have deaf personnel or interpreters on staff,
and during the time relevant here, had only one other deaf patient. That patient
was often unavailable due to unspecified challenges. Aspire, a State of Indiana-
supported group that assists deaf and hard of hearing individuals, meets with
G.W. virtually, only once a week, to provide “an outlet for communicating in
[sign language].” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 41. There is no evidence showing that this
once-a-week virtual meeting is sufficient to keep G.W. connected to the deaf
community. In the absence of such evidence, it appears G.W. continues to be
isolated from the deaf community at the Hospital.
[29] In addition, G.W.’s caseworker, Molly Williamson, works with patients in
group sessions addressing a variety of topics. But the Hospital does not provide
G.W. with interpreter services for those sessions. Instead, she gives G.W.
handouts or videos with subtitles. Williamson could not say whether G.W.
benefitted from the group sessions without an interpreter, noting only that she
“assume[d]” there was a positive effect because he seemed to be doing better
overall. Id. at 20.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-2452 | September 20, 2024 Page 13 of 16 [30] Further, when Williamson meets with G.W. one-on-one, she does not use an
interpreter unless he needs to review “mail or other legal papers.” Id. at 14.
For all other meetings, he has to communicate using a whiteboard. Aspire
virtually attends G.W.’s treatment team meetings, where his case is discussed,
but Dr. Zinner generally uses only online interpreters when treating G.W. The
Hospital does not point to any evidence that it considered whether in-person
interpretive services would be better for his treatment.
[31] Based on this evidence, we conclude the Hospital failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that its facility is an appropriate place for G.W. G.W.
appears to need in-patient treatment, but there is no evidence the Hospital
considered whether its facility can provide reasonable accommodations for his
deafness that will work best for his treatment. See Civil Commitment of W.S. v.
Eskenazi Health et al., 23 N.E.3d 29, 36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (reversing civil
commitment order on question of forced medication; petitioner presented no
evidence that it considered other treatments and considered medication to be
least restrictive treatment), trans. denied.
[32] We do not hold that the Hospital, or any other in-patient facility, is inherently
inappropriate for G.W. But here, the Hospital failed to meet its burden of
proof.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-2452 | September 20, 2024 Page 14 of 16 Conclusion [33] For the reasons stated above, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand
with instructions to hold a new evidentiary hearing to address the appropriate
placement for G.W.
[34] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Bailey, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT Talisha R. Griffin Casey Farrington Marion County Public Defender Agency Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Attorney General of Indiana
Evan M. Comer Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE INDIANA DISABILITY RIGHTS Thomas E. Crishon Samuel M. Adams Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF THE DEAF Christopher Taylor-Price Taylor-Price Law, LLC Indianapolis, Indiana
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-2452 | September 20, 2024 Page 15 of 16 Drake Darrah Silver Spring, Maryland
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-MH-2452 | September 20, 2024 Page 16 of 16