HAYS, Circuit Judge.
The Commissioner petitions for review of a decision of the Tax Court which held that the Commissioner had erroneously disallowed the sum of $70,222.04 as a marital deduction under Section 2056(b) (5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. § 2056(b) (5)1 We affirm the Tax Court.
[1010]*1010The facts are fairly simple and are not in dispute.
On April 9, 1930 the decedent set up a trust by the terms of which the income was to be paid to his wife during her lifetime. Upon the death of the wife the corpus was to be paid to the grantor or his estate. The trust was amendable and revocable.
On February 6,1931 decedent amended the trust instrument to grant to his wife a general power of appointment. She was empowered to appoint by her will the corpus of the trust to any “persons and/or corporations.” The amendment provided, for a disposition over in the event the wife failed to exercise her power of appointment.
On October 25, 1951, the wife executed a document by which she purported to release a portion of her general power of appointment under the trust and to convert it into a special power of appointment.2
It appears from the - document itself and it is readily conceded by the trustee, which proposed to Mr. and Mrs. Bosch the execution of the release, that the purpose of the release was to take advantage of the Powers of Appointment Act of 1951, Ch. 165, 65 Stat. 91, amending Int. Bev. Code of 1939, § 811(f) (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2041), then recently enacted, and thus “to prevent the assets of the trust being taxed as part of Margaret Bosch’s estate.”
On April 6, 1957 Herman Bosch died. His executor claimed a marital deduction for the value of the trust. The Commissioner determined that the trust did not qualify for the marital deduction and asserted a federal tax deficiency based upon the disallowances of the amount of $70,-222.04, the value of the corpus of the trust.
The executor filed a petition in the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency. While the action was pending in the Tax Court, the trustee, which was also executor of the estate of Herman Bosch, brought a proceeding in the New York Supreme Court for a settlement of [1011]*1011its account as trustee. In connection with the proceeding in the New York Supreme Court, the trustee asked for a determination of the validity of Mrs. | Bosch’s release of part of her power of (appointment. Respondent stipulated and conceded that the New York proceeding was instituted “at least in part for the purpose of affecting [the] outcome of the case before the Tax Court. The trustee’s petition in the New York court described the proceedings then pending in the Tax Court, and stated the position taken in that proceeding by the executor.
The issue in the state proceeding was whether the release executed by Mrs. Bosch on October 25, 1951 was effective. Three briefs were filed in the New York proceeding, one for Mrs. Bosch, one for the trustee, and one by a guardian ad litem in behalf of a minor interested in the trust by reason of being a possible beneficiary in the event Mrs. Bosch died without exercising her power of appointment. All three briefs argued that the release was a nullity. No argument for the validity of the release was presented to the court.
There were twenty-two persons having the same interest as the infant who was represented by the guardian ad litem. Although they received notice of the proceeding, none of them appeared.
The state court held that Mrs. Bosch’s purported release was a nullity.3
[1012]*1012The Tax Court decided to accept the New York decision and gave the following reasons for doing so:
1. The New York court had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of the proceeding, and its judgment was final and conclusive as to those parties. Therefore, Mrs. Bosch now has a general power of appointment which she could exercise in favor of herself, her estate, her creditors, or the creditors of her estate.
2. Decisions of the Supreme Court of the State of New York represent legal precedent for courts throughout the state, unlike decisions of local courts with limited geographical jurisdiction whose decisions are not binding upon other courts of the state.
3. The Commissioner was fully aware of the proceeding in the New York court and could have sought the opportunity to present his views to that court. Indeed, he agreed to the continuance of the hearing before the Tax Court so that the New York proceeding might be brought to a conclusion.
4. The New York court rendered a reasoned opinion and reached a deliberate conclusion.
5. The New York court’s decision, which is binding upon Mrs. Bosch, may have certain offsetting tax' consequences in respect to her own estate tax. The New York decree establishing that she has a general power of appointment will result in the inclusion in her gross estate of any property passing under her exercise of that power, and the record indicates that it is not reasonable to assume that this power of appointment will remain unexercised.
The Tax Court stated that it was not necessary for it to say that it was “bound” by the New York decision. It held that it was sufficient to state, for all of the above reasons, that it would accept the New York decision “as an authoritative exposition of New York law and adjudication of the property rights involved.”
In deciding whether the Tax Court ascribed proper effect to the state decision, a few preliminary observations may be helpful. We believe that much of the confusion in the cases is caused by the failure of the courts carefully to formulate the issue. For example, it is quite clear that the state decision is not binding upon the federal courts because the situation is covered by the principle of res judicata. See Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35, 43, 54 S.Ct. 308, 78 L.Ed. 634 (1934). Obviously the Commissioner is not bound by the state decision in a res judicata sense, since he was not a party to the litigation which resulted in the decision. It may be that it would be desirable to hold the Commissioner bound when he has received notice and an opportunity to appear as in this case, but that is clearly not the law now, and any such change in the law would [1013]*1013no doubt require legislative action. Similarly the federal courts are not bound ih this situation by the rule of Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). It is for this reason that most of the Commissioner’s argument must be considered to be beside the point. The task here is not to discover the general New York law applicable to releases of powers of appointment.
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HAYS, Circuit Judge.
The Commissioner petitions for review of a decision of the Tax Court which held that the Commissioner had erroneously disallowed the sum of $70,222.04 as a marital deduction under Section 2056(b) (5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 26 U.S.C. § 2056(b) (5)1 We affirm the Tax Court.
[1010]*1010The facts are fairly simple and are not in dispute.
On April 9, 1930 the decedent set up a trust by the terms of which the income was to be paid to his wife during her lifetime. Upon the death of the wife the corpus was to be paid to the grantor or his estate. The trust was amendable and revocable.
On February 6,1931 decedent amended the trust instrument to grant to his wife a general power of appointment. She was empowered to appoint by her will the corpus of the trust to any “persons and/or corporations.” The amendment provided, for a disposition over in the event the wife failed to exercise her power of appointment.
On October 25, 1951, the wife executed a document by which she purported to release a portion of her general power of appointment under the trust and to convert it into a special power of appointment.2
It appears from the - document itself and it is readily conceded by the trustee, which proposed to Mr. and Mrs. Bosch the execution of the release, that the purpose of the release was to take advantage of the Powers of Appointment Act of 1951, Ch. 165, 65 Stat. 91, amending Int. Bev. Code of 1939, § 811(f) (now Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2041), then recently enacted, and thus “to prevent the assets of the trust being taxed as part of Margaret Bosch’s estate.”
On April 6, 1957 Herman Bosch died. His executor claimed a marital deduction for the value of the trust. The Commissioner determined that the trust did not qualify for the marital deduction and asserted a federal tax deficiency based upon the disallowances of the amount of $70,-222.04, the value of the corpus of the trust.
The executor filed a petition in the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency. While the action was pending in the Tax Court, the trustee, which was also executor of the estate of Herman Bosch, brought a proceeding in the New York Supreme Court for a settlement of [1011]*1011its account as trustee. In connection with the proceeding in the New York Supreme Court, the trustee asked for a determination of the validity of Mrs. | Bosch’s release of part of her power of (appointment. Respondent stipulated and conceded that the New York proceeding was instituted “at least in part for the purpose of affecting [the] outcome of the case before the Tax Court. The trustee’s petition in the New York court described the proceedings then pending in the Tax Court, and stated the position taken in that proceeding by the executor.
The issue in the state proceeding was whether the release executed by Mrs. Bosch on October 25, 1951 was effective. Three briefs were filed in the New York proceeding, one for Mrs. Bosch, one for the trustee, and one by a guardian ad litem in behalf of a minor interested in the trust by reason of being a possible beneficiary in the event Mrs. Bosch died without exercising her power of appointment. All three briefs argued that the release was a nullity. No argument for the validity of the release was presented to the court.
There were twenty-two persons having the same interest as the infant who was represented by the guardian ad litem. Although they received notice of the proceeding, none of them appeared.
The state court held that Mrs. Bosch’s purported release was a nullity.3
[1012]*1012The Tax Court decided to accept the New York decision and gave the following reasons for doing so:
1. The New York court had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter of the proceeding, and its judgment was final and conclusive as to those parties. Therefore, Mrs. Bosch now has a general power of appointment which she could exercise in favor of herself, her estate, her creditors, or the creditors of her estate.
2. Decisions of the Supreme Court of the State of New York represent legal precedent for courts throughout the state, unlike decisions of local courts with limited geographical jurisdiction whose decisions are not binding upon other courts of the state.
3. The Commissioner was fully aware of the proceeding in the New York court and could have sought the opportunity to present his views to that court. Indeed, he agreed to the continuance of the hearing before the Tax Court so that the New York proceeding might be brought to a conclusion.
4. The New York court rendered a reasoned opinion and reached a deliberate conclusion.
5. The New York court’s decision, which is binding upon Mrs. Bosch, may have certain offsetting tax' consequences in respect to her own estate tax. The New York decree establishing that she has a general power of appointment will result in the inclusion in her gross estate of any property passing under her exercise of that power, and the record indicates that it is not reasonable to assume that this power of appointment will remain unexercised.
The Tax Court stated that it was not necessary for it to say that it was “bound” by the New York decision. It held that it was sufficient to state, for all of the above reasons, that it would accept the New York decision “as an authoritative exposition of New York law and adjudication of the property rights involved.”
In deciding whether the Tax Court ascribed proper effect to the state decision, a few preliminary observations may be helpful. We believe that much of the confusion in the cases is caused by the failure of the courts carefully to formulate the issue. For example, it is quite clear that the state decision is not binding upon the federal courts because the situation is covered by the principle of res judicata. See Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35, 43, 54 S.Ct. 308, 78 L.Ed. 634 (1934). Obviously the Commissioner is not bound by the state decision in a res judicata sense, since he was not a party to the litigation which resulted in the decision. It may be that it would be desirable to hold the Commissioner bound when he has received notice and an opportunity to appear as in this case, but that is clearly not the law now, and any such change in the law would [1013]*1013no doubt require legislative action. Similarly the federal courts are not bound ih this situation by the rule of Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). It is for this reason that most of the Commissioner’s argument must be considered to be beside the point. The task here is not to discover the general New York law applicable to releases of powers of appointment. That may well be the subject of the required search in a case which concerns a taxpayer whose own special status under New York law has never been authoritatively determined by a New York tribunal. In the determination of the present case we are not required to take issue with our learned colleague, Judge Friendly, whose brilliant lecture In Praise of Erie — And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 383 (1964) is quoted in the Commissioner’s Reply Brief. We may indeed agree with him that- the correct view, that “the Erie doctrine applies, whatever the ground for federal jurisdiction, to any issue or claim which has its source in state law,” is set forth by Judge Waterman in Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 541 n. 1 (2d Cir. 1956). The reference in the quoted passage is to the great run of cases in which the federal courts are obliged to search out the general principle of state law in order to apply that principle to a case under consideration. It does not refer, and was never intended to refer, to the question of whether or not a federal court is to "accept a state determination of the rights under state law of a party to a federal action. In the latter situation, which is that in the case at bar, the party comes into the federal court with his rights already fixed by a decision of a state tribunal. There is no occasion to inquire into the general law of the state to ascertain what those rights are.
The issue is, then, strictly speaking, not whether the federal court is “bound by” the decision of the state tribunal, but whether or not a state tribunal has authoritatively determined the rights under state law of a party to the federal action.
This is clearly the effect of Sharp v. Commissioner, 303 U.S. 624, 58 S.Ct. 748, 82 L.Ed. 1087 (1938), reversing, 91 F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 1937), Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5, 57 S.Ct. 330, 81 L.Ed. 465 (1937) and Freuler v. Helver-ing, 291 U.S. 35, 54 S.Ct. 308, 78 L.Ed. 634 (1934). In the Blair case, the issue was whether a certain trust was a spendthrift trust under the law of Illinois. The Circuit Court of Appeals, examining the general law of Illinois on the subject, held it to be a spendthrift trust. The trustees thereupon brought an action in the Illinois courts to obtain a construction of the will and the Appellate Court of Illinois, an intermediate appellate court, held that the trust was not a spendthrift trust. The United States Supreme Court ruled that the Commissioner was required to accept the Illinois decision as dispositive. The Court said:
“In this instance, it is not necessary to go beyond the obvious point that the decision was in a suit between the trustees and the beneficiary and his assignees, and the decree which was entered in pursuance of the decision determined as between these parties the validity of the particular assignments.” 300 U.S. at 10, 57 S.Ct. at 332.
In deciding whether the determination of the rights under state law of a party to a federal action has been authoritative, the majority of federal courts in which the question has been raised have refused to accept the result in cases which were non-adversary.4 However, there is [1014]*1014very respectable authority for the proposition that, if the state decision is binding on the parties as tq their rights under state law (as it would not be if it resulted from fraud or collusion), it is conclusive as to those rights for purposes .of federal taxation. In Gallagher v. (Smith, 223 F.2d 218, 223 (3d Cir. 1955), the court said:
“An adjudication of such a question of title by a court.of the state must accordingly be given effect, not because it is res judicata against the United States, but because it is conclusive of the parties’ property rights which alone are to be taxed. So far as those parties are concerned the law of the state is what the state court has declared and applied in their case. If the state court’s judgment has binding final effect under the state law the rights of the parties can only be what the court has held them to be. It is for this reason that the federal court should not in a case of this kind make an independent examination and application of state law. For if it reaches a different conclusion from the state court as to what the parties’ rights should be under the state law its decision will not change those rights which will necessarily remain what the state court has declared them to be.”
See Flitcroft v. Commissioner, 328 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1964); Estate of Dar-lington v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1962); Eisenmenger v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d 103 (8th Cir. 1944); Sharpe v. Commissioner, 107 F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 665, 60 S.Ct. 591, 84 L.Ed. 1013 (1940).
It may fairly be said, we think, that the question is an open one in this circuit. (However, compare Kelly’s Trust v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 198 (2d Cir. 1948). The decision in Second National Bank v. United States, 351 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1965), was based, as the court makes clear,5 on the holding that the determination of the Connecticut Probate Court was not authoritative in Connecticut.
An able Tax Court judge quite explicitly undertook to balance several relevant factors (see pp. 2494-2495 supra) before deciding to accept the New York judgment as authoritative of the rights of parties. We, too, have considered all of the circumstances and feel that the decision below was correct. We hold that the New York judgment, rendered by a court which had jurisdiction over parties and subject matter, authoritatively settled the rights of the parties, not only for New York, but also for purposes of the application to those rights of the relevant provisions of federal tax law. Mrs. Bosch now has a general power of appointment under the trust. The corpus of the trust therefore qualifies for the marital deduction.
[1015]*1015The decision of the Tax Court is affirmed.
The Tax Court said “[W]e cannot reasonably assume that she will permit that power to remain unexercised, for there are indications in the record that the immediate natural objects of her bounty do not include all of the many relatives of her husband who would take in default of her exercise of the power.”