COMAIR ROTRON, INC. v. Nippon Densan Corp.

154 F. Supp. 2d 326, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14398, 2001 WL 863432
CourtDistrict Court, D. Connecticut
DecidedJuly 25, 2001
DocketCIVA291CV00032CFD
StatusPublished

This text of 154 F. Supp. 2d 326 (COMAIR ROTRON, INC. v. Nippon Densan Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Connecticut primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
COMAIR ROTRON, INC. v. Nippon Densan Corp., 154 F. Supp. 2d 326, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14398, 2001 WL 863432 (D. Conn. 2001).

Opinion

MARKMAN RULING CONCERNING CERTAIN DISPUTED CLAIM TERMS IN U.S. PATENT NO. 4,494,028

DRONEY, District Judge.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Comair Rotron, Inc. (“Rotron”) brought this action against defendants Nippon Densan Corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary Nidec Corporation (collectively “Nidec”) alleging infringement of United States Patent Nos. 4,494,028 (the “’028 patent”) and 4,779,069 (the “’069 patent”). The patents, which are owned by Rotron, concern rotor magnets used in brushless direct current (“DC”) fans. In its Ruling on Pending Discovery Motions, dated March 21, 2000, the Court concluded that a hearing was needed to construe three disputed claim terms pursuant to the holding in Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 870, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996). The disputed claim terms are the following: (1) “substantially unmagnetized”; (2) “substantial angular length”; and (3) “field and commutation portion.” The Court held the Markman hearing on November 30, 2000, and has concluded that the terms should be construed as explained below.

For purposes of this ruling, familiarity is presumed with the Court’s Ruling on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment [Doc. # 189] (the “summary judgment ruling”), dated September 28, 1998, and in particular, the facts and descriptions recited therein.

II. Standard

The Court has the responsibility of construing the claims of a patent in a patent infringement case that is to be tried to a jury. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed.Cir.1995) (en banc) (Markman I), aff'd, 517 U.S. 370, 116 S.Ct. 1384, 134 L.Ed.2d 577 (1996) (Markman II). The purpose of claim construction is to decide “the meaning and scope of the patent claims asserted to be infringed.” Id. at 976. “[A]fter the court has defined the claim with whatever specificity and precision is warranted by the language of the claim and the evidence bearing on the proper construction, the task of determining whether the construed claim reads on the accused product is for the finder of fact.” PPG Indus. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 156 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed.Cir.1998).

In construing a claim, a court initially looks to intrinsic evidence, which includes “the patent itself, including the claims, the specification, and, if in evidence, the prosecution history.” Vitronics *330 Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed.Cir.1996). In examining the intrinsic evidence, 'the court first considers “the words of the claims themselves, both asserted and nonasserted, to define the scope of the patented invention.” Id. These words are to be given their ordinary and customary meaning, which is presumed to be correct unless a different meaning is clearly and deliberately set forth in the intrinsic materials or unless the ordinary and accustomed meaning would deprive the claim of clarity. See K-2 Corp. v. Salomon S.A., 191 F.3d 1356, 1362-63 (Fed.Cir.1999). The court also may reference other intrinsic evidence, including the specification and prosecution history, the latter of which contains the record of proceedings before the Patent and Trademark Office and the prior art cited therein. See id.; Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583; Markman I, 52 F.3d at 980. However, “one may not read a limitation into a claim from the written description, but ... one may look to the written description to define a term already in the claim limitation, for a claim must be read in view of the specification of which it is a part.” Renishaw PLC v. Marposs Societa’ per Azioni, 158 F.3d 1243, 1248 (Fed.Cir.1998). “[TJhere is sometimes a fine line between reading a claim in light of the specification, and reading a limitation into the claim from the specification.” Comark Communications, Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1186 (Fed.Cir.1998). Similarly, “[although the prosecution history can and should be used to understand the language used in the claims, it too cannot ‘enlarge, diminish, or vary’ the limitations in the claims.” Markman I, 52 F.3d at 980 (citation omitted).

While an analysis of the intrinsic evidence generally will resolve ambiguity in a disputed term, the court may look to extrinsic evidence when this is not the case. See Vitronics 90 F.3d at 1583-84. Extrinsic evidence includes expert testimony, inventor testimony, dictionaries, technical treatises and articles, and prior art not cited in the specification or file history. See Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 182 F.3d 1298, 1308 (Fed.Cir. 1999); Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584. This evidence, and in particular expert testimony, may be used only to assist the court in arriving at the proper understanding of the claims; it may not be used to vary or contradict the claim language or other parts of the specification. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584. However, “it is entirely appropriate, perhaps even preferable, for a court to consult trustworthy extrinsic evidence to ensure that the claim construction it is tending to from the patent file is not inconsistent with clearly expressed, plainly apposite and widely held technical understandings in the pertinent technical field.” Pitney Bowes, Inc., 182 F.3d at 1309.

III. Discussion

As indicated above, the disputed claim terms are the following: (1) “substantially unmagnetized”; (2) “substantial angular length”; and (3) “field and commutation portion.”

A. “Substantially Unmagnetized”

The term “substantially unmagne-tized” is contained in Claims 1 and 9 of the ’028 patent, which are independent claims, and Claim 3 of the ’028 patent, which is a dependent claim. Rotron contends that the term “substantially un-magnetized” need not be construed in a way that distinguishes the substantially unmagnetized sectors from the prior art, such as U.S. Patent No. 4,030,005 to Doe-men (“Doemen ’005”), because those sectors are inherently different than the change-over areas and pole gaps or clearances disclosed in the prior art. Accord *331

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154 F. Supp. 2d 326, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14398, 2001 WL 863432, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/comair-rotron-inc-v-nippon-densan-corp-ctd-2001.