Com. v. Strouse, C.

2024 Pa. Super. 8, 308 A.3d 879

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: January 18, 2024
• Docket: 2470 EDA 2022
• Status: Published

Opinion

J-A14034-23

2024 PA Super 8

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CHRISTOPHER JAMES STROUSE : : Appellant : No. 2470 EDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 12, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-52-CR-0000092-2022

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

OPINION BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 18, 2024

Christopher James Strouse (“Strouse”) appeals from the judgment of

sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to fleeing or attempting to elude a

police officer.1 We affirm in part and vacate in part.

In December 2021, police in Pike County arrested and charged Strouse

with fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer and related offenses. At

the time of his arrest, Strouse was on probation in Bucks, Montgomery, and

Philadelphia Counties. Additionally, Strouse had an outstanding bench

warrant in Florida.

In June 2022, Strouse pleaded guilty in the instant matter,2 and on

August 12, 2022, the trial court sentenced him to two years of probation. The

court’s sentencing order required Strouse to “surrender to all active warrants

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1 See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733(a).

2 The Commonwealth agreed to the dismissal of all other charged counts in

exchange for the plea. See Sentencing Order, 8/17/22 at 3. J-A14034-23

within ten days” as a condition of probation. Sentencing Order, 8/12/22, at

2 (unnumbered). Additionally, the court suspended Strouse’s driver’s license

for twelve months. See id.

Strouse timely filed a post-sentence motion for reconsideration of the

probation condition to surrender on all active warrants. Strouse noted he was

under probation supervision in Montgomery County until February 2023, in

Philadelphia County until March 2024, and in Bucks County until April 2025.

See Post-Sentence Motion, 8/17/22, at 1 (unnumbered).3 He referenced his

outstanding warrant in Florida and argued that he would violate the terms of

his probation in the other Pennsylvania counties if he travelled to Florida to

surrender. See id.

At a hearing on the post-sentence motion, Strouse testified that Florida

had not sought his extradition. See N.T., 9/1/22, at 2-3. Discussing his

communications with the other Pennsylvania counties concerning his

surrender on the Florida warrant, Strouse indicated one county refused him

permission to go to Florida until he paid fines and completed driver safety

courses, another county “d[id not] care,” and a third county had not

responded to his inquiries. Id. at 3-4. Strouse’s counsel focused on the ten-

day period for Strouse to surrender on all warrants and requested the court

allow him to either address the Florida warrant as a condition of his release

3 We note Strouse later indicated that he had upcoming court dates for possible violation of probation proceedings in two of those counties. See N.T., 9/1/22, at 5.

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from probation or wait until the other probation offices allowed him to leave

the Commonwealth. See id. at 4, 7. Upon questioning by the

Commonwealth, Strouse conceded that he had not filed motions to modify his

probation in the other counties to accommodate his surrender on the Florida

warrant. See id. at 5-6. The court denied relief, and Strouse timely appealed.

Both he and the court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Strouse raises the following issues for review:

I. Did the sentencing court abuse its discretion when it imposed as a condition of [his] probation that he surrender to all active warrants within ten (10) days where said condition was not reasonably related to [his] rehabilitation . . .[?]

II. Did the sentencing court abuse its discretion when it imposed as a condition of [his] probation that he surrender to all active warrants where such an order is, in effect, an extradition both outside its discretion and outside of the court’s powers, and in violation of the rights afforded him under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act[?4]

Strouse’s Brief at 7 (some capitalization omitted).

Strouse’s first issue implicates the reasonableness of the trial court’s

probation condition and presents a challenge to the discretionary aspects of

sentencing. An appellant wishing to appeal the discretionary aspects of a

sentence has no absolute right to do so and must petition this Court for

permission to address his issue. See Commonwealth v. Starr, 234 A.3d

755, 759 (Pa. Super. 2020). To invoke this Court’s jurisdiction, the appellant

must establish he has: (1) timely appealed; (2) properly preserved his ____________________________________________

4 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9101-9148.

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objection in a post-sentence motion; (3) included in his brief a Pa.R.A.P.

2119(f) concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal;

and (4) raised a substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate under

the Sentencing Code. See id.

In the case sub judice, Strouse has timely appealed, objected to the

reasonableness of the probation condition in his timely post-sentence motion,

and included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief. Moreover, Strouse’s issue

that the probation condition was not reasonably related to his rehabilitation

raises a substantial question that the condition was inconsistent with the

Sentencing Code. See Commonwealth v. Fullin, 892 A.2d 843, 853 (Pa.

Super. 2006). Thus, we will address Strouse’s first issue.

Our standard of review for challenges to the discretionary aspects of

sentencing is well settled:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Carr, 262 A.3d 561, 568 (Pa. Super. 2021) (internal

citation omitted).

A trial court must attach conditions of probation “it deems necessary to

ensure or assist the defendant in leading a law-abiding life.” 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9754(b). The court, among other conditions, may require the defendant

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“[t]o do things reasonably related to rehabilitation.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §

9763(b)(15). The court has the discretion to fashion conditions of probation,

but those conditions “must be reasonable and devised to serve rehabilitative

goals, such as recognition of wrongdoing, deterrence of future criminal

conduct, and encouragement of law-abiding conduct.” Carr, 262 A.3d at 568

(internal citation and quotation mark omitted).

Strouse asserts the probation condition to surrender himself on all active

warrants is unrelated to his rehabilitation and unduly burdensome. He notes

the condition requires his surrender on the Florida warrant. He argues his

ability to travel is limited by his probation supervision in the other

Pennsylvania counties and the suspension of his driver’s license. He claims

he cannot “easily comply” with the requirement he surrender on the Florida

warrant without violating the terms of his probation in Bucks County.

Strouse’s Brief at 10.

The trial court, in relevant part, explained that it considered Strouse’s

arguments to modify the probation condition that he surrender on all active

warrants and denied relief because Strouse had not sought modification of his

probation supervision in the other counties. See Trial Court Opinion,

11/16/22, at 3. The court also noted that if the other counties refused him

permission to leave Pennsylvania, Strouse could then request a modification

of the condition. See id. The court further asserted that Strouse had yet to

suffer sanctions due to his failure to surrender to Florida authorities within ten

days of the sentencing order. See id.

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Following our review, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the trial

court’s imposition of the probation condition or its refusal to modify the terms

of the condition. A condition to surrender on all active warrants reasonably

promotes a defendant’s recognition of his wrongdoing and encourages his law-

abiding conduct. Strouse does not assert that the condition is unreasonable

as a general matter. His claim focuses on his particular circumstances,

namely, being the subject of probationary supervision in three other

Pennsylvania counties and having an active warrant in another state. We

acknowledge that Strouse, as he notes, could not “easily comply” with the

probation condition under these circumstances. Yet, these circumstances

were of Strouse’s own making. Here, the probation condition was not unduly

burdensome in requiring Strouse to confront the consequences of his crimes,

work promptly and in good faith with the justice system to resolve the

circumstances, and, if necessary, seek modification of the condition by

presenting verifiable evidence of an actual inability to comply.5 Thus, we will

not disturb the probation condition requiring Strouse to surrender to all active

warrants.

5 We regard the probationary term giving Strouse a ten-day period to comply

as moot since more than ten days passed from the trial court’s entry of the sentencing order to the hearing on Strouse’s post-sentence motion. Our decision that the probation condition was reasonable does not suggest that a blind enforcement of the ten-day provision would be proper at this point. However, the trial court decision not to modify that term was reasonable at the time of the post-sentence motion hearing to impress upon Strouse the need for prompt, good-faith efforts.

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Strouse’s second issue challenges the trial court’s authority to impose a

probation condition that amounts to a de facto extradition.

A sentence is illegal if no statutory authority exists for the sentence.

See Commonwealth v. Pi Delta Psi, Inc., 211 A.3d 875, 889-90, 892 (Pa.

Super. 2019) (holding that a probation condition enjoining a corporation from

conducting any business within the Commonwealth for ten years lacked any

statutory or common law authority and was illegal). “The legality of a criminal

sentence is non-waivable, and this Court may raise and review an illegal

sentence sua sponte.”6 Id. at 889 (internal citation and quotation marks

omitted). When reviewing the legality of a sentence, our standard of review

is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. See id.

Strouse observes that the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (or “the Act”)

generally vests the executive with the authority to affect the extradition of

individuals to another state and provides a defendant with procedural rights

to challenge the causes of his detention and transfer. See Strouse’s Brief at

18 (citing Commonwealth v. Jacobs, 466 A.2d 671, 674 (Pa. Super. 1983),

which reversed an extradition order where the trial court failed to afford the

6 Strouse did not raise this issue in his post-sentence motion or his Rule 1925(b) statement. See Starr, 234 A.3d at 759; see also Commonwealth v. Kitchen, 814 A.2d 209, 214 (Pa. Super. 2002) (concluding that the failure to include a discretionary aspect of sentencing claim in a Rule 1925(b) resulted in waiver). The trial court did not address this issue in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. Nevertheless, we will address Strouse’s issue to the extent it implicates the legality of sentencing. Cf. Commonwealth v. Wilson, 67 A.3d 736, 745 (Pa. 2013) (invalidating a probation condition permitting suspicionless searches of a probationer).

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defendant reasonable time to challenge the legality of his detention on an

extradition warrant). He concludes the trial court did not have the authority

to affect an extradition and disregard his procedural rights under the Act.

Strouse’s arguments lack any legal or record support. As stated above,

the Sentencing Code authorizes the trial court to impose a probation condition

that requires a defendant “[t]o do things reasonably related to rehabilitation”

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9763(b)(15). Strouse attempts to manufacture a conflict

between the trial court’s authority to impose a probation condition and the

procedures governing an extradition where none exist. “Extradition is a

constitutionally mandated process . . ..” Jacobs, 466 A.2d at 674; see also

U.S. Constitution, Article IV, Section 2, Clause 2. Extradition generally

involves a demand from the executive of one state to detain and return an

individual found and in custody in another state. See Jacobs, 466 A.2d at

672-73. Here, there is no indication in the record that Strouse was arrested

or detained on the Florida warrant or that Florida requested his extradition.

Thus, the trial court’s probation condition was not a formal or de facto

extradition, and Strouse’s attempts to limit or invalidate the trial court’s

authority to order he surrender on the Florida warrant is misplaced.

Therefore, his second issue fails.

Lastly, we consider, sua sponte, whether the trial court had the authority

to suspend Strouse’s driver’s license. See Sentencing Order, 8/12/22, at 2

(unnumbered); Pi Delta Psi, 211 A.3d at 889. Section 1532(b)(3) of the

Motor Vehicle Code provides that the Department of Transportation (also

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referred to as “the department”) “shall suspend the operating privilege of any

driver for [twelve] months upon receiving a certified record of the driver’s

conviction of section 3733 (relating to fleeing or attempting to elude police

officer) . . ..” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1532(b)(3).

Our Supreme Court has stated that “Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Code

sets forth a statutory scheme which requires the executive branch of

government to issue and regulate motor vehicle licenses.” Commonwealth

v. Mockaitis, 834 A.2d 488, 500 (Pa. 2003). This Court’s prior decisions have

interpreted language similar to section 1532(b)(3) as both authorizing the

Department of Transportation to suspend driver’s licenses and limiting the

judiciary’s role to determinations of guilt for predicate offenses. See

Commonwealth v. Thornton, 1180 WDA 2022, 2023 WL 5769464, at *5

(Pa. Super. 2023) (unpublished memorandum); Commonwealth v. Zeruth,

2172 EDA 2022, 2023 WL 3092768, at *2-3 (Pa. Super. 2023) (unpublished

memorandum); Commonwealth v. Kandel, 954 MDA 2022, 2023 WL

2767688, at *2-4 (Pa. Super. 2023) (unpublished memorandum).7 Here, we

likewise conclude section 1532(b)(3) vests the department with the power to

suspend a driver’s license, and the trial court exceeded its authority in

ordering a license suspension. Therefore, we vacate the portion of the

7 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (providing that unpublished memoranda filed by this

Court after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value).

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sentence suspending Strouse’s driver’s license as illegal. See Pi Delta Psi,

211 A.3d at 889-90.

In sum, Strouse’s challenges to the probation condition requiring him to

surrender on all active warrants merit no relief. The trial court’s order

suspending Strouse’s driver’s license, however, was illegal. Thus, we vacate

that portion of the judgment of sentence ordering a license suspension and

affirm in all other respects.8

Judgment of sentence affirmed in part and vacated in part. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Date: 1/18/2024

8 Nothing in our decision affects the department’s authority to suspend Strouse’s license.

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