Com. v. Gates, C.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: November 17, 2025
• Docket: 199 MDA 2025
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S28011-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CHRISTOPHER L. GATES : : Appellant : No. 199 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 23, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-08-CR-0000415-2024

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : CHRISTOPHER L. GATES : : Appellant : No. 200 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 23, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-08-CR-0000515-2024

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: NOVEMBER 17, 2025

Christopher L. Gates appeals from the judgment of sentence of one and

one-half to nine years of imprisonment imposed after he pled guilty to various

offenses stemming from two separate incidents. In this Court, Victoria E.

Martin, Esquire, has petitioned to withdraw and filed a brief pursuant to

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. J-S28011-25

Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009). We grant the petition to withdraw and

affirm the judgment of sentence.

We glean the following factual background from the certified record. On

March 20, 2024, while on patrol, Trooper Waylon Smith of the Pennsylvania

State Police (“PSP”) observed a vehicle that had crossed into the incoming

lane and hit a guardrail. Upon contact with the driver, later identified as

Appellant, Trooper Smith noticed several signs of impairment and multiple

open containers inside the vehicle. Appellant admitted to consuming alcohol

and consented to field sobriety testing and a blood draw, the results of which

revealed a blood-alcohol content of .261. He was arrested and charged with

driving under the influence (“DUI”) highest rate, DUI general impairment,

driving with a suspended or revoked license, disregarding traffic lanes, driving

on the right side of the roadway, and careless driving. The magisterial district

judge set nonmonetary bail and Appellant was released.

Subsequently, on August 23, 2024, PSP Trooper Luke Geiger received a

call from Appellant’s neighbor concerning a potential instance of domestic

violence. Trooper Geiger responded to Appellant’s residence and interviewed

his wife, Lorraine Gates. She explained that Appellant had thrown a can of

beer at her, which struck her in the head and nearly hit their infant, and placed

her in a headlock. Appellant was again arrested and charged with simple

assault, strangulation, and endangering the welfare of a child.

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The court appointed Attorney Martin. For both cases, the

Commonwealth offered Appellant the opportunity to plead guilty to DUI

highest rate, simple assault, and endangering the welfare of a child in

exchange for dismissing the remaining charges and agreeing to have the court

impose a sentence at the bottom of the standard range for the DUI offense.

Appellant accepted the offer, after which the court accepted the plea and

deferred sentencing to obtain a pre-sentence investigation (“PSI”) report.

At the ensuing sentencing hearing, Attorney Martin explained that

Appellant was attending drug and alcohol classes while imprisoned. Ms. Gates

also submitted a victim impact statement, which asked for Appellant to return

home, or alternatively for the court to impose a county sentence so that

Appellant could continue to have access to drug and alcohol treatment.

Appellant took responsibility for his crimes and apologized to his family and

the community. The Commonwealth explained that although Appellant had a

positive work history, that success did not negate his considerable criminal

record. The court orally recited the content of Appellant’s PSI report,

confirming his recidivism. In accordance with the plea agreement, the court

imposed the bottom of the standard range for the DUI offense. However,

considering the nature of the offenses and Appellant’s rehabilitative needs,

the court sentenced Appellant to consecutive sentences of five to sixty months

for DUI, eight to twenty-four months on simple assault, and five to twenty-

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four months for endangering the welfare of a child, amounting to an aggregate

sentence of one and one-half to nine years in prison.

Appellant filed a post-sentence motion alleging that the sentence was

“too harsh” and that Ms. Gates “did not wish to see long incarceration per her

victim impact statement requesting his return home.” See Post Sentence

Motion, 12/31/24, at ¶¶ 5-6. The court denied the motion, and Appellant

timely appealed.1 He and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

As mentioned, Attorney Martin has petitioned to withdraw in this Court

and submitted an Anders brief. Accordingly, the following legal principles

apply to our consideration of these filings:

Direct appeal counsel seeking to withdraw under Anders must file a petition averring that, after a conscientious examination of the record, counsel finds the appeal to be wholly frivolous. Counsel must also file an Anders brief setting forth issues that might arguably support the appeal along with any other issues necessary for the effective appellate presentation thereof[.]

Anders counsel must also provide a copy of the Anders petition and brief to the appellant, advising the appellant of the right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se or raise any additional points worthy of this Court’s attention.

If counsel does not fulfill the aforesaid technical requirements of Anders, this Court will deny the petition to withdraw and remand the case with appropriate instructions (e.g., directing counsel either to comply with Anders or file an advocate’s brief on Appellant’s behalf). By contrast, if counsel’s petition and brief satisfy Anders, we will then undertake our own review of the appeal to determine if it is wholly frivolous.

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1 This Court consolidated the cases sua sponte.

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Commonwealth v. Falcey, 310 A.3d 313, 314-15 (Pa.Super. 2024)

(citations omitted).

Our Supreme Court has further detailed counsel’s duties as follows:

[I]n the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed counsel’s petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.

Our review confirms that Attorney Martin has substantially complied

with the above requirements. The brief summarizes the procedural and

factual background of this matter. See Anders brief at 7-9. Although counsel

does not cite to the record in her statement of the case, she does so when

articulating the relevant facts in the argument section. Id. at 12-13. Attorney

Martin also stated her determination that the appeal is wholly frivolous,

supported with citations to legal authority. Id. at 10-15. Further, counsel

supplied the brief to Appellant and advised him of his right to hire new counsel

or represent himself in this Court. Id. at Appendix. Appellant did not file a

response to the petition. Therefore, we proceed to “make an independent

judgment to decide whether the appeal is in fact wholly frivolous.”

Commonwealth v. Flowers, 113 A.3d 1246, 1249 (Pa.Super. 2015)

(cleaned up).

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Counsel sets forth one issue that could arguably support an appeal: “Did

the trial court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Appellant to an aggregate

sentence of [one and one-half] to [nine years].” Anders brief at 3 (some

articles omitted).

We begin with the applicable legal principles. Questions concerning the

discretionary aspects of sentencing are not appealable as of right. See

Commonwealth v. Perzel, 291 A.3d 38, 46 (Pa.Super. 2023). Rather, to

garner this Court’s review of the merits, an appellant must first demonstrate

that he: “(1) timely appealed; (2) properly preserved his objection in a post-

sentence motion; (3) included in his brief a Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) concise

statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal; and (4) raised

a substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate under the Sentencing

Code.” Commonwealth v. Strouse, 308 A.3d 879, 882 (Pa.Super. 2024).

This appeal is timely, Appellant’s issue was preserved in a post-sentence

motion, and counsel included a Rule 2119(f) statement in the Anders brief.2

2 To the extent counsel’s Rule 2119(f) statement is noncompliant because it

merely states the standard for determining a substantial question, this Court may overlook an erroneous statement where, like here, the Commonwealth does not object. See Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830 A.2d 1013, 1017 (Pa.Super. 2003) (“If an appellant fails to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) and the Commonwealth does not object, the reviewing Court may overlook the omission if the presence or absence of a substantial question can easily be determined from the appellant’s brief.” (cleaned up)). Additionally, in the Anders context, “this Court has reviewed the matter even absent a separate Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement.” Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 112 A.3d 656, 661 (Pa.Super. 2015).

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Appellant believes that the court imposed an excessive sentence and

overlooked mitigating factors, including Ms. Gates’s victim impact statement.

This raises a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117

A.3d 763, 770 (Pa.Super. 2015) (“[A]n excessive sentence claim—in

conjunction with an assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating

factors—raises a substantial question.”). Thus, we proceed to the merits of

Appellant’s claim.

This Court reviews a discretionary aspect of sentencing issue for an

abuse of discretion, keeping in mind that sentencing “is a matter vested in the

sound discretion of the sentencing judge[.]” Commonwealth v. Davis, 241

A.3d 1160, 1177-78 (Pa.Super. 2020) (cleaned up). A sentencing court “must

consider the factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), including the protection

of the public, the gravity of the offense in relation to the impact on the victim

and the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.”

Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 313 A.3d 265, 286 (Pa.Super. 2024) (cleaned

up).

Where the court imposes a sentence that is within the standard range

of the sentencing guidelines, “Pennsylvania law views the sentence as

appropriate under the Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth v. Hill, 210 A.3d

1104, 1117 (Pa.Super. 2019). In addition, where the court has reviewed a

PSI report, “it is presumed that the court was both aware of and appropriately

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weighed all relevant information contained therein.” Commonwealth v.

Brown, 249 A.3d 1206, 1212 (Pa.Super. 2021) (cleaned up).

The trial court opined that it did not impose an excessive sentence where

it was within the standard range. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/11/25, at 3-4.

The court also confirmed that it considered the written declaration of Ms.

Martin and summarized that she “stated that Appellant was a great husband;

and his actions were the result of alcoholism; she wants him to get the

treatment; she wants him to remain local; and she wants him home with her

and their young child.” Id. at 3. When it issued the sentence of

imprisonment, the court explained that it balanced the wishes of Ms. Gates,

Appellant’s recidivism, the seriousness of his offenses, and his need for

rehabilitation. Id. at 4.

Attorney Martin echoes that Appellant’s sentence was presumptively

reasonable because it was within the standard range, and she attached the

guideline sentence forms. See Anders brief at 13-14, Appendix. Further,

she highlights that the court had Appellant’s PSI report, and that it seemingly

“made findings that were consistent with the protection of the public, the

gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and

on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of Appellant.” Id. at 12-13

(articles omitted). Counsel lastly states that the court “had the benefit of a

victim impact statement” from Ms. Gates where she advocated for Appellant

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to return home and for drug and alcohol treatment if he was imprisoned. Id.

at 11.

We agree with Attorney Martin that if this issue were raised on appeal,

it would be wholly devoid of merit. The court considered the victim impact

statement and appropriately weighed that information against Appellant’s

rehabilitative needs and the seriousness of his crimes. See Lawrence, 313

A.3d at 286. The court also reviewed Appellant’s PSI report and therefore we

presume that it considered all mitigating factors. See Brown, 249 A.3d at

1212. Furthermore, Appellant’s sentence was presumptively reasonable

where it was within the standard guideline range for each offense. See Hill,

210 A.3d at 1117. Hence, we discern no abuse of discretion.

Finally, our “simple review of the record to ascertain if there appear[s]

on its face to be arguably meritorious issues that counsel, intentionally or not,

missed or misstated[,]” has revealed no additional matters that counsel failed

to address.3 See Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 272

(Pa.Super. 2018) (en banc). Accordingly, we grant Attorney Martin’s petition

to withdraw and affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

3 We have conducted our independent review cognizant of the fact that “upon entry of a guilty plea, a defendant waives all claims and defenses other than those sounding in the jurisdiction of the court, the validity of the plea, and what has been termed the legality of the sentence imposed.” Commonwealth v. Adams, 327 A.3d 667, 669 (Pa.Super. 2024) (cleaned up). Since Appellant entered open pleas, a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence was also available. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Luketic, 162 A.3d 1149, 1159 (Pa.Super. 2017).

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Petition of Victoria E. Martin, Esquire, to withdraw granted. Judgment

of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 11/17/2025

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