J-S28012-25
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : ANTONIO LEE BRETADO : : Appellant : No. 1838 MDA 2024
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 24, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-54-CR-0000276-2024
BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: OCTOBER 20, 2025
Antonio Lee Bretado appeals from the judgment of sentence of twenty
to forty years in prison, followed by two years of probation, imposed for
multiple convictions related to the sexual assault of his minor sister. After
careful review, we affirm.
On the morning of February 6, 2024, then-twenty-one-year-old
Appellant was at home with his mother (“Mother”), step-father, and siblings.
His two brothers were getting ready for school, while his younger sister
planned to stay home because she had been sick the day before. That day,
however, she was feeling energetic as normal. The girl, who was born in July
2017, was diagnosed as having non-verbal autism. After Appellant’s brothers
left for school and his step-father went to work, Mother ran an errand leaving
Appellant alone with his sister for approximately forty-five minutes around J-S28012-25
lunchtime. The girl was not potty-trained and required diapers, which only
Mother was supposed to change. When Mother returned, she noticed that the
daughter did not act excited like she typically would, and her hair was wet.
Appellant explained that he showered the sister because she had a dirty
diaper.
At around 2:00 p.m., when Appellant’s brothers returned home from
school, one of the brothers, who also had autism, was playing with the sister
for approximately fifteen minutes. He was verbal, but very sensitive to
physical contact and did not like being touched. The girl began to cry, so
Mother took her away to change her diaper. Mother, however, noticed blood
on the daughter’s inner thigh and “a big clot coming out of her vaginal area.”
See N.T. Trial, 6/12-13/25, at 62. She immediately took the girl to the
Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia (“CHOP”). On the way, the victim bled
through her diaper.
Once at CHOP, the girl had to be put under general anesthesia for the
examination and required emergency surgery. It was discovered that she had
a “complete transection of the hymen” and a laceration in the vaginal area.
Id. at 124. Corporal Karl Harig of the Tamaqua Police Department responded
to the potential sexual abuse call at CHOP. Following a discussion with Mother,
he initially suspected that Appellant’s brother, who had been alone with her
immediately before Mother discovered the blood, was responsible for the
victim’s injuries. Mother did not believe that he could have done this because
-2- J-S28012-25
he had an aversion to physical touch, and the clot was too large to have
formed within fifteen minutes. Corporal Harig attempted to interview the
younger brother at CHOP, but had difficulty communicating with him.
During the investigation, Corporal Wesley Levan of the Pennsylvania
State Police became involved and was tasked with conducting a series of
interviews. During Appellant’s interview, he confessed to injuring his sister
through digital penetration. Appellant admitted to the crime in multiple
subsequent video-recorded interviews. Corporal Levan informed Corporal
Harig of Appellant’s confessions, and Corporal Harig thereafter conducted his
own interview. On video, Appellant again explained his involvement and also
signed a written statement.
Based on the aforementioned events, Appellant was charged with two
counts of aggravated indecent assault of a child,1 and one count each of
aggravated indecent assault of a person less than thirteen years of age,
indecent assault of a person under thirteen years old, corruption of minors,
indecent assault of a person with a mental disability, and endangering the
welfare of a child. Appellant filed several motions in limine, including a request
to bifurcate the trial based on the corpus delicti rule, which the court denied,
____________________________________________
1 One of the charges was premised on lack of consent, and the other was based upon the victim’s mental disability. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125 (a)(1), (6), (b).
-3- J-S28012-25
stating that it would give a relevant jury instruction concerning that
evidentiary doctrine. See Order, 5/28/24, at ¶ 5.
The matter proceeded to trial. The Commonwealth introduced the
testimony of Mother, Appellant’s step-father, Candance LeFlame, D.O., an
expert in child abuse, and Corporal Harig to establish that the victim suffered
a sexual injury and the extent thereof. The Commonwealth then called
Corporal Levan, who explained his involvement in the case. Before the jury
was presented with the video-recorded interviews by him of Appellant, the
court issued the promised jury instruction regarding the corpus delicti rule.
The jury was then shown the interview videos. The Commonwealth recalled
Corporal Harig to play his recorded conversations with Appellant and to
present the written confession. The Commonwealth also recalled Mother, and
she recounted a conversation she had with Appellant after he confessed
wherein she told him that she could not forgive him for his crimes, and he
admitted that he could not forgive himself either. Appellant did not testify,
but his defense was that his brother, not he, committed the assault.
The jury convicted Appellant of all charges except for endangering the
welfare of a child, and the court deferred sentencing to obtain a pre-sentence
investigation (“PSI”) report. At the ensuing sentencing hearing, Appellant’s
counsel stated that Appellant was remorseful, did not have a prior criminal
history, was still a young man, and had aspirations outside of prison. See
N.T. Sentencing, 10/24/24, at 9-10. Appellant exercised his right to
-4- J-S28012-25
allocution, maintaining that he did not commit these crimes and his brother
was responsible. Id. at 10-16. The court imposed the standard ten-year
minimum sentence for the two counts of aggravated indecent assault of a child
and ran them consecutively. The remaining terms of incarceration were run
concurrently, and the court imposed a consecutive two-years of probation for
the corruption of minors offense. The court stated that a consecutive sentence
for the two counts of aggravated assault was appropriate for the protection of
the public and Appellant’s rehabilitative needs. Id. at 16-17.
Appellant filed a post-sentence motion seeking a hearing. See Motion
to Reconsider Sentence, 11/1/24. The court granted the request, and at the
hearing Appellant asserted that the court should have imposed concurrent,
rather than consecutive, sentences for the aggravated assault convictions.
See N.T. Motion for Reconsideration, 1/17/25, at 3. He essentially reiterated
the position that he deserved a lesser sentence based on his age, lack of prior
offenses, and business aspirations. Id. at 3-4.
The court denied the motion and this timely appeal followed. Appellant
and the court complied with the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 1925. He raises
the following issues for our consideration, which we have reordered for ease
of disposition:
1. Whether the Commonwealth provided sufficient evidence to support a conviction for two counts of aggravated indecent assault of a child?
-5- J-S28012-25
2. Whether the Commonwealth provided sufficient evidence to support a conviction for a conviction [sic] of corruption of minors?
3. Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s motion in limine to bifurcate the issue of corpus delicti, thereby preventing the jury from first determining whether the corpus delicti was proven beyond a reasonable doubt before considering Appellant’s statements and subsequently determining guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
4. Whether the trial court erred in permitting the Assistant District Attorney to argue facts not in evidence during closing argument over Appellant’s objection?
5. Whether the sentence imposed was excessive to the degree that it amounted to an abuse of discretion?
Appellant’s brief at 6-7.
Appellant’s first two questions relate to the sufficiency of the evidence.
In the brief, however, counsel asserts that “pursuing argument on those two
issues would be frivolous.” See Appellant’s brief at 20. Specifically,
Appellant’s attorney maintains that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s
verdicts. Id. at 21-23. Since counsel has not petitioned to withdraw from
representation, such an assertion is improper.
In Commonwealth v. Morrison, 173 A.3d 286 (Pa.Super. 2017), this
Court made clear that an appellate brief should not “present issues that
counsel, in his or her professional judgment, has determined to be frivolous,
even if the client indicates he or she wishes those issues to be included.” Id.
at 293. We explained that frivolous issues are suited for applications to
withdraw from representation, which are only appropriate where counsel has
-6- J-S28012-25
determined, after a “conscientious examination,” that the appeal is “wholly
frivolous.” Id. (emphasis in original). In that circumstance, counsel “must
seek to withdraw from representation on appeal by using the procedure
outlined by the United States Supreme Court and our Supreme Court.” Id.
On the other hand, if an attorney does not wish to withdraw from
representation, counsel should exercise professional judgment and “must only
raise and/or brief the issues that counsel believes, consistent with counsel’s
ethical duty, to be nonfrivolous.” Id.
We further explained that if an appellant disagrees as to which issues
should be presented “prior to counsel’s filing of briefs, the appellant is free to
petition for the withdrawal of counsel in order for the appellant to attempt to
proceed pro se or with privately-retained counsel.” Id. However, “[i]f the
disagreement arises after briefs have been filed by appointed counsel, and the
appellant remains convinced of the merit of his or her proposed issues, the
appellant may later challenge the effectiveness of his or her appellate counsel
in a timely-filed collateral attack pursuant to the [Post Conviction Relief Act
(‘PCRA’)].” Id.
Here, counsel has impermissibly presented this Court with ostensibly
frivolous issues in an appellate brief otherwise advocating for relief. See
Appellant’s brief at 20-23. This was improper since counsel did not conclude
that the appeal was wholly frivolous. See Morrison, 173 A.3d at 293.
Instead of advocating against her client, counsel ought to have used her
-7- J-S28012-25
professional judgment to simply refrain from developing these claims in the
brief. Id. Accordingly, we will not address the issues counsel deems frivolous.
If Appellant believes that these assertions have arguable merit, he may
present an ineffective assistance of counsel claim in a timely PCRA petition.
Id.
Shifting to the remaining contentions, we begin with the court’s denial
of Appellant’s motion to bifurcate the trial based upon the corpus delicti rule.
The following legal precepts guide our analysis:
The corpus delicti rule is a rule of evidence. Our standard of review on appeals challenging an evidentiary ruling of the trial court is limited to a determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion. The corpus delicti rule places the burden on the prosecution to establish that a crime has actually occurred before a confession or admission of the accused connecting him to the crime can be admitted. The corpus delicti is literally the body of the crime; it consists of proof that a loss or injury has occurred as a result of the criminal conduct of someone. The criminal responsibility of the accused for the loss or injury is not a component of the rule. The historical purpose of the rule is to prevent a conviction based solely upon a confession or admission, where in fact no crime has been committed. The corpus delicti may be established by circumstantial evidence. Establishing the corpus delicti in Pennsylvania is a two-step process. The first step concerns the trial judge’s admission of the accused’s statements and the second step concerns the fact finder’s consideration of those statements. In order for the statement to be admitted, the Commonwealth must prove the corpus delicti by a preponderance of the evidence. In order for the statement to be considered by the fact finder, the Commonwealth must establish the corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt.
Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 39 A.3d 406, 410–11 (Pa.Super. 2012)
(cleaned up).
-8- J-S28012-25
Appellant maintains that “[a] bifurcated trial would have required the
Commonwealth to present evidence establishing that a crime occurred first,
before presenting [his] admissions and confessions[.]” Appellant’s brief at 33.
He argues that by denying his motion to bifurcate, “the trial court failed to
adhere to the procedural safeguards intended to prevent convictions based
solely on confessions or admissions without independent proof of a crime.”
Id. Appellant avers that separating the trial into stages, where the
Commonwealth first presented testimonial evidence from multiple witnesses
establishing that the victim suffered a sexual injury, before presenting
Appellant’s recorded confessions, “did not cure the defect.” Id. at 34. Finally,
he does not believe that the trial court’s corpus delicti instruction was an
appropriate remedy. Id.
The court explained that it denied Appellant’s motion to bifurcate the
trial and instead had the Commonwealth “establish the elements of the crime
first through their witnesses prior to presenting the confessions and written
statements of Appellant.” Trial Court Opinion, 2/12/25, at 7. It explained
that “[t]his meant that a few witnesses were recalled by the Commonwealth
at the end of their case to effectuate this.” Id. at 8. The court believed that
“[t]he Commonwealth certainly established to the [c]ourt’s satisfaction that
the crimes were committed by a preponderance of the evidence prior to the
statements being admitted into evidence.” Id. Additionally, the court “read
the standard jury instruction for corpus delicti, instructing the jury that they
-9- J-S28012-25
must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a crime had occurred, prior to
considering Appellant’s statements.” Id.
The court’s determinations are supported by the record. Appellant cites
no caselaw requiring a court to bifurcate a trial where a confession is involved.
The safeguards of the corpus delicti rule were respected here where the
Commonwealth presented multiple witnesses to establish that the victim had
suffered severe sexual abuse that required surgery, which clearly indicated
that a crime had occurred, prior to the introduction of Appellant’s confessions.
See Hernandez, 39 A.3d at 410-11. Additionally, before the jury watched
the videos and read Appellant’s sworn statement, the court issued the
standard instruction for the corpus delicti rule, which the jury presumptively
obeyed. See Commonwealth v. Tyson, 119 A.3d 353, 360 (Pa.Super.
2015) (“Jurors are presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions.” (cleaned
up)). Therefore, this argument likewise lacks merit.
Appellant’s next challenge concerns the Commonwealth’s purported
misconduct during closing statements, which we review for an abuse of
discretion. See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 340 A.3d 334, 341
(Pa.Super. 2025) (cleaned up). “[A]ny challenged prosecutorial comment
must not be viewed in isolation, but rather must be considered in the context
in which it was offered.” Commonwealth v. Jaynes, 135 A.3d 606, 615
(Pa.Super. 2016) (cleaned up). We are tasked with evaluating “whether a
defendant received a fair trial, not a perfect trial.” Id. Prosecutorial
- 10 - J-S28012-25
misconduct only takes place where “the unavoidable effect of the comments
at issue was to prejudice the jurors by forming in their minds a fixed bias and
hostility toward the defendant, thus impeding their ability to weigh the
evidence objectively and render a true verdict.” Commonwealth v.
Santiago-Burgos, 314 A.3d 535, 548 (Pa.Super. 2024) (cleaned up).
Additionally, “prosecutorial misconduct will not be found where comments
were based on the evidence or proper inferences therefrom or were only
oratorical flair.” Id. Lastly, a trial court “may remove taint through curative
instructions,” and this Court must “consider all surrounding circumstances
before finding that curative instructions were insufficient and the extreme
remedy of a mistrial is required.” Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d
763, 774 (Pa.Super. 2015).
Appellant takes issue with the following statement given during closing
arguments: “How did that blood clot get there? Was it Appellant’s brother?
No. It was a clot. It was a large clot. Clotting takes time. Who was with her
about two hours before? Perfect amount of time for a clot to form. It was
Appellant.” Appellant’s brief at 29-30 (quoting N.T. Trial, 6/12/24, at 237)
(cleaned up). Appellant acknowledges Mother’s testimony that the victim had
a large enough blood clot that would not have formed within the time that the
younger brother spent with the sister, but states that Dr. LeFlame, the expert
witness, did not attest to the amount of time it would take for a blood clot to
form. Id. at 30. He claims that the statement was prejudicial because “it had
- 11 - J-S28012-25
the potential to influence the jury’s determination of guilt or innocence” by
“directly contradict[ing] Appellant’s line of defense that [his younger] brother
was responsible for [the] injury sustained[,] which deprived [him] of a fair
and impartial determination of guilt or innocence.” Id. at 31.
The court explained that it overruled Appellant’s objection to the
prosecutor’s statement because the Commonwealth had “referred to the large
blood clots found in the victim’s vaginal area and in her pull ups, which were
testified to by both the victim’s mother and Dr. LeFlame.” Trial Court Opinion,
2/12/25, at 6. Consequently, the court stated, the Commonwealth made an
“inference” that “it takes time for blood to clot.” Id. The court further
instructed the jury that “the arguments of the attorneys are not evidence” and
it should “only be guided by each side’s arguments to the extent they are
supported by the evidence.” Id. at 6-7. Hence, it concluded, “the comments
made about blood clots by the Assistant District Attorney were simply an
inference he deduced from the evidence, and regardless, the jury was properly
instructed they were the sole decider of fact and to only consider the
arguments of the attorneys as much as they were supported by the evidence.”
Id. at 7.
The court’s analysis is apt. Mother and Dr. LeFlame attested to the size
of the clot, and Mother specifically stated that she did not believe that a clot
of that size could have formed within the short amount of time that the
younger brother was playing with the sister. See N.T. Trial, 6/12-13/24, at
- 12 - J-S28012-25
75. Thus, the Commonwealth made a reasonable inference based upon the
evidence. See Santiago-Burgos, 314 A.3d at 548. Moreover, the court
instructed the jury that it was the ultimate fact finder and must only
contemplate the arguments made during closing if they were supported by
the evidence. See Caldwell, 117 A.3d at 774. This assertion warrants no
relief.
Appellant’s final issue concerns the discretionary aspects of his
sentence. Such attacks are not appealable as of right. Instead, to invoke this
Court’s jurisdiction, an appellant must satisfy the following four-pronged test
by demonstrating that he: “(1) timely appealed; (2) properly preserved his
objection in a post-sentence motion; (3) included in his brief a Pa.R.A.P.
2119(f) concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal;
and (4) raised a substantial question that the sentence is inappropriate under
the Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth v. Strouse, 308 A.3d 879, 882
(Pa.Super. 2024). In his brief, Appellant asserts that the court abused its
discretion in imposing consecutive sentences on his aggravated assault
convictions without considering mitigating factors. See Appellant’s brief at
26.
Appellant has met the first element of the test by filing a timely appeal.
With respect to the second prong, we note that “issues challenging the
discretionary aspects of a sentence must be raised in a post-sentence motion
or by presenting the claim to the trial court during the sentencing proceedings.
- 13 - J-S28012-25
Absent such efforts, an objection to a discretionary aspect of a sentence is
waived.” Commonwealth v. Perzel, 291 A.3d 38, 47 (Pa.Super. 2023). An
appellant must “give the trial judge an opportunity to reconsider or modify the
sentence imposed[,]” and the “failure to do so deprives the trial court of this
chance.” Id. at 48. Additionally, “a post-sentence motion only preserves
challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing that are specifically
included in the post-sentence motion.” Commonwealth v. Williams, 198
A.3d 1181, 1186 (Pa.Super. 2018).
Appellant declined to present a written argument within his post-
sentence motion. Rather, he requested a hearing to assert his claims therein.
See generally Motion to Reconsider Sentence, 11/1/24. At that hearing, he
alleged that he should have received concurrent, rather than consecutive,
sentences for his aggravated assault crimes based upon certain mitigating
factors. See N.T. Motion for Reconsideration, 1/17/25, at 3-4. Although
Appellant failed to assert this argument with particularity in the post-sentence
motion, in accordance with the above principles, we will consider the issue
preserved for purposes of appeal because the trial court had an opportunity
to address it.2 See Perzel, 291 A.3d at 47.
2 Appellant also seeks relief on the basis that the court considered impermissible factors during sentencing. He raises this contention for the first time on appeal and, thus, it has not been preserved. See Williams, 198 A.3d at 1186.
- 14 - J-S28012-25
As to the third element of the test, Appellant included a Rule 2119(f)
statement in his brief but erroneously affixed it to his merits argument. See
Appellant’s brief at 23-27. Nevertheless, where the Commonwealth does not
object to an appellant’s failure to comply with Rule 2119(f), the noncompliance
will not automatically result in waiver. See Commonwealth v. Kurtz, 294
A.3d 509, 535 (Pa.Super. 2023). Here, the Commonwealth has not objected
to this error. See Commonwealth’s brief at 2 (relying upon the trial court’s
opinion as to Appellant’s discretionary aspect of sentencing issue).
Accordingly, we will address whether Appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement
raises a substantial question.
As mentioned, Appellant argues that the court abused its discretion in
issuing a consecutive sentence. This Court has held that, generally, “the
court’s exercise of discretion in imposing consecutive as opposed to concurrent
sentences is not viewed as raising a substantial question that would allow the
granting of allowance of appeal.” Commonwealth v. Morrobel, 311 A.3d
1153, 1157 (Pa.Super. 2024) (citation omitted). However, we have held that
where an appellant has asserted that the court failed to consider mitigating
factors in conjunction with a claim that a court abused its discretion in issuing
consecutive sentences, he has raised a substantial question. Id. at 1157-58.
Here, Appellant insists that the court should have issued concurrent
sentences on the two counts of aggravated indecent assault of a minor and
cites multiple mitigating circumstances that he believes would have warranted
- 15 - J-S28012-25
a lesser sentence. See Appellant’s brief at 26-27. Therefore, he has raised a
substantial question, and we will address the merits. See Morrobel, 311
A.3d at 1157-58.
This Court has explained that “we will not disturb a sentence absent a
manifest abuse of discretion, which will only be found where the sentencing
court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of
partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable
decision.” Commonwealth v. Ratliff, 328 A.3d 1042, 1056 (Pa.Super.
2024). The court must impose a sentence “that is consistent with the
protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact
on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs
of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b).
When a sentence is within the standard range of the sentencing
guidelines, “Pennsylvania law views the sentence as appropriate under the
Sentencing Code.” Commonwealth v. Hill, 210 A.3d 1104, 1117
(Pa.Super. 2019). Additionally, where the court has a defendant’s PSI report,
“the court is presumed to have weighed all relevant information regarding the
defendant’s character against any mitigating factors.” Commonwealth v.
Mulkin, 228 A.3d 913, 917 (Pa.Super. 2020).
Appellant argues that his sentence is “excessive and manifestly
unreasonable” because he “set forth goals and aspirations to better
himself . . . during his allocution.” Appellant’s brief at 27. He acknowledges
- 16 - J-S28012-25
that he has not taken responsibility for the crimes, but points out that he
expressed “fear” to the court that the victim was still living with “the true
perpetrator[.]” Id. Finally, he highlights that he was only twenty-one years
old at the time of sentencing and had never been convicted of a prior crime.
The trial court stated its reasoning for Appellant’s sentence as follows:
The harm caused to the victim in this case was horrific. A sexual assault to a mentally disabled six[-]year[-]old child that required extensive surgery and recuperation in a hospital specializing in pediatric sexual assault is an especially egregious crime. In addition to the specific acts and injury caused, Appellant’s statement at the time of sentencing was an incoherent, rambling statement of a very distorted view of reality. It concerned th[e c]ourt deeply that Appellant very clearly committed these egregious acts, and yet, rather than speak of remorse, or of the impact of these events on the victim whatsoever, he spoke entirely about himself. Appellant’s attempt to recant his four confessions and blame his brother for his actions just did not add up. Appellant appear[ed] to have a complete disconnect with reality, the severity of the situation at hand, and the trauma to his little sister and his family. The court [wa]s extremely concerned for the safety of the public if Appellant [wa]s sentenced to anything shorter than what was imposed. The court’s intention was to incarcerate Appellant for a lengthy period of time to protect to [sic] the public and give him time to be rehabilitated and receive mental health sexual offender treatment. The court was bound to impose the mandatory minimum sentences on the aggravated indecent assault of a child [convictions]. The only question for the court was whether or not to run these sentences concurrent. After considering the totality of the circumstances, the court felt it necessary to impose a consecutive sentence to achieve these goals. The sentence was appropriate considering the gravity of the offense.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/12/25, at 5-6 (some capitalization altered).
- 17 - J-S28012-25
The court’s reasoning is sound and supported by the record. Appellant
exercised his right to allocution and refused to take responsibility for the
crimes despite his multiple confessions. See N.T. Sentencing, 10/24/24, at
10-16. Instead, he attempted to blame his younger brother. Id. The court
appropriately considered Appellant’s lack of remorse, the severity of the
convictions, and Appellant’s need for rehabilitation in issuing consecutive
sentences. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b); N.T. Sentencing, 10/24/24, at 16-17.
Moreover, the court’s sentence was presumptively reasonable where it
imposed a standard-range sentence and had the benefit of a PSI report. See
Hill, 210 A.3d at 1117; Mulkin, 228 A.3d at 917. This argument is meritless.
In sum, we decline to address the issues concerning the sufficiency of
the evidence that counsel improperly presented to this Court with argument
against his client’s position, although counsel did not deem the appeal wholly
frivolous and did not seek leave to withdraw. Concerning the issues for which
counsel supplied advocacy, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court
rejecting his request to bifurcate his trial based on the corpus delicti rule,
overruling Appellant’s objection to a portion of the Commonwealth’s closing
statement, and imposing consecutive sentences of imprisonment. Thus, we
affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.
- 18 - J-S28012-25
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 10/20/2025
- 19 -