J-S50024-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellee : : v. : : KENNETH EUGENE SPARKS, : : Appellant : No. 171 WDA 2014
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 26, 2013, In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County, Criminal Division, at No. CP-26-CR-0000164-2013.
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., SHOGAN and ALLEN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 24, 2014
Appellant, Kenneth Eugene Sparks, appeals from the judgment of
sentence entered following his conviction of violations of the Controlled
Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16) &
(30). We affirm.
The trial court summarized the facts surrounding this incident as
follows:
On December 16, 2011, at 12:45 A.M. Pennsylvania State Trooper Keith Abels and his partner were dispatched for an incident at 56 Oliver Road in North Union Township, Fayette County, Pennsylvania. The incident involved a tenant of arate entrance in the front portion of the home owned by [Appellant] at 56 Oliver Road.
After speaking with tenant, Lillian Arnold, Trooper Abels, at J-S50024-14
separate entrance to talk with him relative to the incident. [Appellant] responded to the door. While talking with [Appellant] about the incident, Trooper Abels observed a strong odor of burnt marijuana emanating from the residence. Trooper Abels then inquired of [Appellant] about the strong odor. [Appellant] stated to the officer that he had just smoked marijuana with another person. Officer Abels then asked [Appellant] if he could conduct a search of the residence and the attached garage for marijuana. [Appellant] gave his permission to Officer Abels to search the residence and garage. Upon entering the garage from the kitchen area, Officer Abels noticed a sheet hanging over something along the rear wall of the garage. When the officer removed the sheet, he observed what he determined to be two marijuana plants hanging upside down. According to Trooper Abels, both plants were approximately six feet in height with the root system intact. Upon inquiry, [Appellant] made a statement to Officer Abels indicating that he did not sell marijuana and that the marijuana was for recreational use. [Appellant] also stated that he does not grow the marijuana at his residence. He stated that he grows the marijuana on a farm that he does not own. He also stated to Trooper Abels that the plants were hanging upside down for the purpose of drying the marijuana. He stated that he was the person who hung the plants to dry.
Officer Abels photographed the plants, took them into custody and transported the plants to the Uniontown Barracks of the Pennsylvania State Police. He thereafter removed the root systems from each plant with a saw, placed the plants in a sealed bag which was then entered into a secured evidence facility. Trooper Abels then prepared a request for forensic analysis. The evidence was subsequently transported to the Pennsylvania State Police Crime Laboratory in Greensburg, Pennsylvania, for analysis.
Forensic scientist Leonard McCoy conducted testing on the plants and determined that the evidence was marijuana, a Schedule I controlled substance with a weight of 1,060 grams, in excess of two pounds.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/30/14, at 2-3 (citation omitted).
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Appellant was charged with possessing with the intent to manufacture
a controlled substance (marijuana) and possession of a controlled substance
(marijuana). Following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of both charges.
Appellant was sentenced on the conviction for manufacturing marijuana to a
term of incarceration of not less than one year nor more than three years,
pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7508,1 and to pay costs and fines. No further
penalty was imposed for the conviction of possession of marijuana.
Appellant filed a timely appeal. The trial court ordered a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
statement, and Appellant timely complied. The trial court issued an opinion
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
1 We are mindful of the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Alleyne v. United States
Alleyne, 133 S.Ct. at 2155. In Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc), this Court recognized that many mandatory minimum statutes in Pennsylvania are no longer constitutional based on Alleyne. Nevertheless, we find that the holding in Alleyne does not affect the sentence in the present case.
In Watley mandatory was not illegal because the facts that triggered the mandatory minimum sentence were proven and decided by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Such is the case here. In the case sub judice, the jury made a determination, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant was guilty of po
verdict slip gave the jury two options in response to the question of the pounds or more but less than 10
Verdict Slip, 12/10/13, at 1. Thus, an Alleyne issue is not raised by the facts of this case.
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Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
Issue No. 1: Was the evidence insufficient to find the Appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the criminal charges[?]
Issue No. 2: Did the court err by refusing to read requested jury instructions proposed by the defense?
Issue No. 3: Did the court err by refusing
When an appellant raises both a sufficiency-of-the-evidence issue and
a suppression issue, we address the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
the conviction first, and we do so without a diminished record:
[W]e are called upon to consider all of the testimony that was presented to the jury during the trial, without consideration as to the admissibility of that evidence. The question of sufficiency is not assessed upon a diminished record. Where improperly admitted evidence has been allowed to be considered by the jury, its subsequent deletion does not justify a finding of insufficient evidence. The remedy in such a case is the grant of a new trial.
Commonwealth v. Sanford, 863 A.2d 428, 431 432 (Pa. 2004) (emphasis
in original). Thus, we begin by addressing the sufficiency of the evidence, as
Commonwealth v.
Mullins, 918 A.2d 82, 85 (Pa. 2007) (citations omitted).
In his first issue, Appellant argues that evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to enable the trier of fact to find every element of the crimes
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and co
Id. at 13.
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine
whether the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as
verdict winner, were sufficient to prove every element of the offense beyond
a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211, 1220 (Pa.
t
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 955 A.2d 441, 444 (Pa.
Super. 2008). The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every
element of the crime by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.
Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa. Super. 2011).
Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re-weigh the evidence and
substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Commonwealth v.
Kelly, 78 A.3d 1136, 1139 (Pa. Super. 2013).
We first consider whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain
Section 780-113(a)(30). This portion of the Act provides:
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(30) Except as authorized by this act, the manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance by a person not registered under this act, or a practitioner not registered or licensed by the appropriate State board, or knowingly creating, delivering or possessing with intent to deliver, a counterfeit controlled substance.
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30). Providing as such, the Act criminalizes the
the Act as follows:
means the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, conversion or processing of a controlled substance, other drug or device or the packaging or repackaging of such substance or article, or the labeling or relabeling of the commercial container of such substance or article, but does not include the activities of a practitioner who, as an incident to his administration or dispensing such substance or article in the course of his professional practice, prepares, compounds, packages or labels such substance or article. The term
substance, other drug or device.
35 P.S. § 780-
controlled
Id. It is undisputed that, for purposes of the Act, marijuana
is a controlled substance. 35 P.S. § 780 104(1)(iv). Growing a small
Section 780-113(a)(30):
The statute does not fix any requirements governing the quantity manufactured; presumably, had the Legislature contemplated a minimum quantity requirement, it would have included one. Finally, we note our Supreme Court has held that a harsher penalty for the manufacture (versus simple
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possession) of marijuana is a rational deterrent to the increased production and sale of an illegal drug and the attendant social harm. Commonwealth v. Burnsworth, 543 Pa. 18, 669 A.2d 883, 889 (1995).
We hold that growing even a small amount of marijuana
controlled substance within the meaning of, and in violation of, 35 P.S. § 780 113(a)(30).
Commonwealth v. Van Aulen, 952 A.2d 1183, 1185 (Pa. Super. 2008).
The crime of simple possession of narcotics prohibits:
[k]nowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled or counterfeit substance by a person not registered under this act, or a practitioner not registered or licensed by the appropriate State board, unless the substance was obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription order or order of a practitioner, or except as otherwise authorized by this act.
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16).
Where the contraband a person is charged with possessing is not
found on the person of the defendant, the Commonwealth is required to
prove constructive possession. Commonwealth v. Kirkland, 831 A.2d
exercise conscious control or dominion over the illegal substance and the
Id.
inference arising from a set of facts that possession of the contraband was
Commonwealth v. Parker, 847 A.2d 745, 750 (Pa.
Super. 2004).
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Read in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner,
the evidence established that Appellant possessed marijuana and did so for
purposes of manufacturing. The record reflects that two marijuana plants,
which were approximately six-feet in height and had the root systems intact,
officers permission to search his property. N.T., 12/10/13, at 10-11. The
Commonwealth produced evidence that Appellant was the owner of this
property, was the primary resident and the only individual present at
Id. at 54-56, 68.
Moreover, Appellant told the Officers that he had grown the plants on
a farm that he did not own and had hung the plants upside down for
purposes of drying the marijuana. N.T., 12/10/13, at 23, 82. Corporal
Ulery provided the following testimony regarding the hanging of the plants:
Once the plants are harvested they are always dried to a certain [sic] before they are used to be smoked, and they almost always hang them upside down. Sometimes they separate the leaves, the buds, the stems, and hang them separately. Sometimes they hang them with the entire plant, and based on the photographs I had reviewed earlier, this one here was all intact with the root system, the stem and the leaves and the buds were all intact on the plant all hanging.
Id. at 32. Appellant also stated that he grew and harvested the plants for
ana.2 Id. at 12.
2 As previously stated, growing even a small amount of marijuana solely for
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Thus, this evidence, if accepted as true by the jury within its province
as sole finder of fact, permitted the determination that Appellant possessed
the marijuana plants discovered in his garage, and possessed them with the
intent to manufacture consumable marijuana. The jury made this finding.
Appellant next contends that the trial court erred in refusing to issue a
8. At the close
of trial, Appellant requested that the jury be given the following instruction:
Guilt by association is unacceptable, mere presence of one person, among a group, at the scene of contraband, is not a strong factor indicative of guilt.
Id. at 18. Appellant asserts that the evidence at trial established that the
were the reason that the police were called for an incident unrelated to this
case. Id.
We review a challenge to jury instructions with the following standards
in mind:
the discretion of the court, so long as the court accurately
Commonwealth v. Kim, 888 A.2d 847, 852 (Pa.Super.2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hartey, 424 Pa.Super. 29, 621
charge clearly, adequately, and accurately presents the law to
the meaning of, and in violation of, 35 P.S. § 780 113(a)(30). Van Aulen, 952 A.2d at 1185.
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the jury for its co Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Collins, 810 A.2d 698, 701 (Pa.Super.2002)). The jury charge
ascertain whether it fairly conveys the required legal principles Commonwealth v. McClendon, 874 A.2d 1223, 1232 (Pa.Super.2005).
Commonwealth v. Willis, 990 A.2d 773, 776 (Pa. Super. 2010). A new
trial is required because of an erroneous jury instruction only if the
instruction under review contained fundamental error, misled or confused
the jury. Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 986 A.2d 759, 792 (Pa. 2009).
We first note that a party is required to make a specific objection to a
jury charge or an omission from the charge before the jury retires to
deliberate. Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(B). The failure to make such specific objection
will constitute waiver of the issue on appeal. Commonwealth v. Baker,
subsequent denial of proposed points for charge that are inconsistent with or
omitted from the instructions actually given will not suffice to preserve an
Commonwealth v. Marquez, 980 A.2d 145, 150-151 (Pa. Super. 2009)
(citing Commonwealth v. Pressley, 887 A.2d 220, 225 (Pa. 2005)).
Here, Appellant has failed to cite to the record indicating that he made
fact, a review of the transcript reflects that upon conclusion of the charge,
the court inquired as to whether the parties wanted to make any additions or
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corrections to the charge. N.T., 12/10/13, at 132. Both parties declined.
647(B); see Commonwealth v. Russell, 938 A.2d 1082, 1093 (Pa. Super.
2007) (holding that, in order to preserve for appeal a challenge to a jury
charge, the defendant must lodge a specific objection or exception to the
jury charge itself).
However, even if Appellant made such objection, the trial court did not
counsel stated the following in terms of the requested jury charge:
case law indicates that guilt by association is unacceptable, mere presence of one person among group at scene of contraband not strong factor indicative of guilt.
N.T., 12/10/13, at 86. The trial court determined that the instruction was
not appropriate based on the facts of the case, specifically that Appellant
Id.; Trial Court Opinion, 5/30/14, at 10-11.
A review of the record reflects that Appellant was the only individual
present at his residence when the Officers approached him on the date in
e scene of
garage. Additionally, testimony regarding the tenant, Lillian Arnold,
consistently established that she is a tenant in a unit entirely separate from
(N.T., 12/10/13, at 68-69) and that she was not
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requested point for charge was not appropriate given the factual pattern in
this case. As such, the trial court properly denied the instruction.
In his third claim, Appellant maintains that the trial court erred in
at 20.
Appellant asserts that he made incriminating statements and that these
Our Supreme Court has declared:
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial enial of a suppression motion is whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. When reviewing the ruling of a suppression court, we must consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence of the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.
Commonwealth v. Eichinger, 915 A.2d 1122, 1134 (Pa. 2007) (internal
factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given
Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 896 A.2d 583, 585 (Pa.
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See Commonwealth v. Charleston, 16 A.3d 505, 516 (Pa.
Super. 2011), (quoting Commonwealth v. Chacko, 459 A.2d 311, 317 n.5
(Pa. 1983)).3
Under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), a suspect has a
right to have an attorney present during custodial interrogation. Prior to any
custodial interrogation, the police must inform a suspect of his rights under
Miranda
asserts his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, not only must the current
interrogation cease, but he may not be approached for further interrogation
until counsel has been made available to him, unless he himself initiates
Commonwealth v. Keaton, 45 A.3d
1050, 1067 (Pa. 2012).
In order to determine whether a custodial interrogation took place, we
consider the following:
A law enforcement officer must administer Miranda warnings prior to custodial interrogation. The standard for determining
3 The Supreme Court recently held that the scope of review of a suppression
hearing, and not the whole record. In the Interest of L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1076 (Pa. 2013). That case does not apply here, however, because the ruling is prospective and was decided after this case had commenced. Id. at
Commonwealth-
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police have initiated a custodial interrogation is an objective one based on a totality of the circumstances, with due consideration given to the reasonable impression conveyed to the person interrogated. Custodial interrogation has been defined as initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his [or her]
in response to custodial interrogation, the statement is classified as gratuitous, and is not subject to suppression for lack of warnings.
Commonwealth v. Baker, 24 A.3d 1006, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Mannion, 725 A.2d 196, 200 (Pa. Super. 1999)(en
banc) (citations omitted). An interrogation is custodial when the subject of
the interrogation reasonably believes her freedom was restricted in a
significant way. Commonwealth v. Schwing, 964 A.2d 8, 11 (Pa. Super.
2008). In other words, the circumstances of the interrogation must become
Commonwealth v. Baker, 963 A.2d 495, 501 (Pa. Super. 2008). Relevant
factors include:
the basis for the detention; its length; its location; whether the suspect was transported against his or her will, how far, and why; whether restraints were used; whether the law enforcement officer showed, threatened or used force; and the investigative methods employed to confirm or dispel suspicions. The fact that a police investigation has focused on a particular
Miranda warnings.
Id. at 501.
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The testimony provided by Officer Partee reflects that when he and
residence, near the front door. N.T., 12/10/13, at 80-81. Officer Partee
testified that the exchange was conversational and that Appellant was not
under arrest, was not handcuffed and was not threatened in any way. Id. at
81.
Officer Abels testified that when he asked Appellant about the smell of
burnt marijuana, Appellant related that he had just smoked marijuana with
another person. N.T., 12/10/13, at 9. During this conversation, Appellant
Id. at 9-10. Appellant
was not handcuffed and was not placed in custody. Id. at 9. Officer Abels
testified that he asked Appellant if he could sear
garage, and Appellant gave him permission. Id. at 10. Moreover, during
troopers permission to search his residence and garage. Id. at 67.
The trial court provided the following analysis in support of its decision
Here, [Appellant] was never taken into custody or restrained by the police in any manner. All contact with [Appellant] by the police was conducted in the familiar surrounds
officer smelled the odor of burnt marijuana he asked [Appellant] about it. [Appellant] related that he just smoked marijuana with another person. He was not threatened in any way and no force was used against [Appellant] in order to obtain a statement.
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The officer inquired as to whether [Appellant] would consent to a search of his residence and garage for marijuana, and [Appellant] readily agreed. [Appellant] accompanied the officers as they looked through the residence and garage. When the marijuana plants were found in the garage [Appellant] told the officers that he did not sell marijuana, that it was only used for recreational purposes, that he did not grow it in his residence but grew it on a farm that he does not own, and he admitted hanging the marijuana plants upside down in his garage to dry. Although, at trial, [Appellant] denied making certain admissions to the officers, he never indicated that the officers had taken him into custody. Based upon the totality of the circumstances, the
Trooper Abels posed questions to him regarding the marijuana. Therefore, the Miranda warnings were not required. [A intelligently and of his own free will and, therefore, were not subject to suppression.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/30/14, at 18-19.
ed by the
record and the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. As
motion to suppress.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary
Date: 9/24/2014
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