Com. v. Rawls, J.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: September 8, 2025
• Docket: 1503 EDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-S30024-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JULIUS FRANCIOS RAWLS : : Appellant : No. 1503 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 26, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0004033-2022

BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 8, 2025

Julius Francois Rawls (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered following his open guilty plea to 136 counts of criminal use of a

communication facility; 44 counts of manufacture, delivery, or possession with

intent to deliver or manufacture controlled substances (cocaine) (PWID); two

counts each of criminal conspiracy and persons not to possess a firearm; and

one count of corrupt organizations.1 Appellant challenges the discretionary

aspects of his sentence. After careful review, we affirm.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18Pa.C.S.A. § 7512(a); 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30); 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903, 6105(a)(1), 911(b)(1). J-S30024-25

On September 16, 2021, following an extensive investigation of

Appellant’s drug activity, which included the use of wiretaps and seven

controlled purchases of cocaine, the City of Chester Police Department filed a

criminal complaint against Appellant. The complaint charged Appellant with

one count each of possession of a controlled substance, PWID, corrupt

organizations, persons not to possess firearms, and criminal use of a

communication facility; and two counts of criminal conspiracy. On September

25, 2023, the Commonwealth filed an amended criminal information, which

charged Appellant as follows:

Counts 1-44 – manufacture, delivery, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver controlled substances;

Count 45 – conspiracy to manufacture, deliver, or possession with intent to manufacture or deliver controlled substances;

Count 46 – corrupt organizations;

Counts 47 – conspiracy to commit corrupt organizations;

Counts 48-50 – persons not to possess firearms; and

Counts 51-187 – criminal use of a communications facility.

See Trial Court Opinion, 9/27/24, at 3.

On October 2, 2023, Appellant’s scheduled trial date, Appellant entered

an open guilty plea to all charges listed on the amended information, except

Count 50 (persons not to possess firearms). On January 26, 2024, following

the preparation of a pre-sentence investigation report (PSI) and a hearing,

the trial court sentenced Appellant as follows:

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COUNTS 1-44: 7-14 years in prison (all concurrent to one another);

COUNT 45: 5-10 years in prison (concurrent with Counts 1-44);

COUNT 46: 3.5-7 years in prison (concurrent with Count 45);

COUNT 47: 2-4 years in prison (concurrent with Count 46);

COUNT 48: 7-14 years (consecutive to Counts 1-44);

COUNT 49: 7-14 years in prison (consecutive to Count 48); and

Counts 51-187: 1-2 years in prison (concurrent with Counts 48- 49).

See id. at 4. Thus, the trial court imposed an aggregate prison term of 21-

42 years.

Appellant timely filed a motion to reconsider sentence. The trial court

conducted a hearing on the motion on May 13, 2024. On May 15, 2024, the

trial court denied Appellant’s motion for reconsideration. Appellant timely

appealed. Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

[1.] Whether an aggregate sentence of 21 to 42 years[,] within the sentencing guidelines for [Appellant,] is a manifestly unreasonable decision by the trial court because the sentence is excessive given [Appellant’s] history and effectively [constituted] a de facto life sentence for a 44-year-old man in a non-capital case?

[2.] Whether an aggregate sentence of 21 to 42 years[,] within the sentencing guidelines, [which is] effectively a de facto life sentence for a 44-year-old man in a non-capital case, violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, forbidding cruel and unusual punishment?

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Appellant’s Brief at 4.

Appellant’s first issue challenges the discretionary aspects of his

sentence, from which there is no automatic right to appeal. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9781(b).2 Rather, an appellant challenging the sentencing court’s discretion

must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by

(1) filing a timely notice of appeal; (2) properly preserving the issue at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion; (3) complying with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f), which requires a separate section of the brief setting forth a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal of the discretionary aspects of a sentence; and (4) presenting a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b), or sentencing norms.

Commonwealth v. Schroat, 272 A.3d 523, 526-27 (Pa. Super. 2022).

Instantly, Appellant timely filed his notice of appeal and properly

preserved his sentencing issue in his post-sentence motion. Appellant’s brief

includes the required statement of reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal,

in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). Therefore, we next consider whether

2 Section 9781(b) provides that

[t]he defendant or the Commonwealth may file a petition for allowance of appeal of the discretionary aspects of a sentence for a felony or a misdemeanor to the appellate court that has initial jurisdiction for such appeals. Allowance of appeal may be granted at the discretion of the appellate court where it appears that there is a substantial question that the sentence imposed is not appropriate under this chapter.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

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Appellant has presented a substantial question that the sentence is not

appropriate under the Sentencing Code or violates sentencing norms. See id.

Generally, to raise a substantial question, an appellant must advance “a

colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions were either: (1)

inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary

to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process.” Schroat,

272 A.3d at 527.

In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Appellant argues his aggregate sentence

is excessive and unreasonable, and fails to comport “with the protection of the

public, gravity of the offense, and his rehabilitative needs.” Appellant’s Brief

at 12. Appellant asserts,

[t]he [sentencing] court did not properly consider the rehabilitative needs of [Appellant] by concluding that past efforts to rehabilitate [Appellant] failed, when no such evidence was presented at the [s]entencing [h]earing. The court focused solely on the seriousness of the offense[s].

Id. Appellant further asserts the trial court abused its sentencing discretion

by imposing the 7- to 14-year prison term at Count 48 consecutive to his 7-

to 14-year sentences imposed at Counts 1-44. Id. Appellant claims this

resulted in a de facto life sentence “for a 44-year-old man in a non-capital

case.” Id.

Appellant points out that he completed only one drug and alcohol

treatment program, and there is no evidence he received mental health

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treatment. Id. Appellant further complains that he was prosecuted as an

adult, at age 17 years old, without any decertification hearing. Id. at 12-13.

We conclude Appellant’s claim of an excessive sentence, based on the

trial court’s failure to consider his rehabilitative needs and mitigating

circumstances, raises a substantial question. See Commonwealth v.

Johnson, 125 A.3d 822, 826 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“an excessive sentence claim

— in conjunction with an assertion that the court failed to consider mitigating

factors — raises a substantial question”); Commonwealth v. Swope, 123

A.3d 333, 340 (Pa. Super. 2015) (concluding that a claim of an unduly

excessive sentence, together with a claim that the court failed to consider the

defendant’s rehabilitative needs and mitigating factors, presents a substantial

question).

Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing

an aggregate prison term of 21-42 years for non-capital offenses. Appellant’s

Brief at 21. According to Appellant, the trial court improperly

focused solely on the seriousness of [Appellant’s] offenses, to the complete exclusion of his personal history, character, and treatment and rehabilitative needs. As this violated Section 9721(b) of the Sentencing Code, the trial court abused its sentencing discretion.

Id. Appellant points out that no evidence was presented regarding past

restorative or rehabilitative efforts by Appellant. Id. Appellant directs our

attention to statements made during the sentencing hearing that at the time

Appellant could have been learning a trade, he was in state custody. Id.

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Appellant further points to testimony that as soon as any of Appellant’s

employers found out about Appellant’s criminal history, Appellant would be

fired. Id.

Appellant acknowledges that the trial court had the benefit of a PSI,

which indicated that Appellant completed his high school education while in

state custody. Id. at 22. Appellant argues that the trial court improperly

focused solely on the serious nature of the offenses when imposing its

sentences. Id. at 23. Appellant repeatedly emphasizes he was never

provided with mental health treatment while in state custody. Id. Appellant

further claims the trial court abused its discretion by not considering mitigating

evidence when fashioning its sentence. Id. at 24.

We consider Appellant’s sentencing challenge mindful of the following:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

When imposing [a] sentence, a court is required to consider the particular circumstances of the offense and the character of the defendant. In considering these factors, the court should refer to the defendant’s prior criminal record, age, personal characteristics and potential for rehabilitation.

Commonwealth v. Summers, 245 A.3d 686, 692-93 (Pa. Super. 2021).

Finally, we review sentences with regard for:

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(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant[;] (2) the opportunity of the sentencing court to observe the defendant, including any [PSI;] (3) the findings upon which the sentence was based[;] and (4) the guidelines promulgated by the commission.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(d).

Our review of the record discloses that at the sentencing hearing, the

trial court summarized the PSI on the record. N.T., 1/26/24, at 4-12. In

doing so, the trial court recognized that Appellant’s lengthy criminal history

included four juvenile adjudications and nine adult convictions. Id. at 4. The

trial court also observed that Appellant’s criminal history began when

Appellant was thirteen years old. Id. The trial court noted that Appellant had

been granted five paroles, one of which was revoked. Id. The trial court

stated, on the record, each of Appellant’s prior criminal convictions. Id. at 5-

7. The trial court found that Appellant “is not eligible … for the State Drug

Treatment Program, short sentence parole program, the Recidivism Reduction

Act program, or motivational bootcamp.” Id. at 12. The trial court finally

reviewed the sentencing guidelines for each offense. Id. at 12-13.

At the hearing, the Commonwealth stated that the police investigation

originally focused on Appellant’s stepbrother. Id. at 14. However, officers

subsequently identified Appellant as the supply source for the narcotics being

distributed. Id. The Commonwealth represented that Appellant participated

in a narcotics criminal enterprise for the sale and distribution of cocaine. Id.

at 15-17. The Commonwealth emphasized that the narcotics enterprise did

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not involve merely an isolated incident, but that Appellant engaged in bulk

cocaine purchases and distribution. Id. at 18.

The Commonwealth further pointed out that Appellant kept two firearms

in his bedroom, with one firearm placed under his bed. Id. at 21. The

Commonwealth further presented evidence that Appellant utilized multiple

vehicles to facilitate his narcotics transactions. Id. at 22. According to the

Commonwealth, Appellant “had all of the support and foundation necessary in

order to lead a productive life,” but nevertheless chose to traffic narcotics. Id.

At the hearing, Appellant’s counsel asserted that Appellant had accepted

responsibility, and was forthcoming during the presentence investigation. Id.

at 28-29. Appellant’s counsel acknowledged that although Appellant’s prior

convictions resulted in shorter sentences, he was not afforded rehabilitative

services. Id. at 31. Counsel acknowledged that Appellant had employment,

but was not making a “livable wage.” Id. Counsel emphasized Appellant was

not getting rich from his drug transactions, and that the individuals involved

in the enterprise still lived “in poverty.” Id. at 32.

Appellant presented the testimony of Danielle Jones (Ms. Jones), the

“second mother to [Appellant’s] daughter.” Id. at 34. Ms. Jones testified that

Appellant was making an effort to “do better.” Id. According to Ms. Jones,

Appellant had accepted temporary jobs, started a limited liability company,

and tried to fix his credit rating. Id. at 35. Ms. Jones testified that Appellant

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“became a dad for my daughter[.]” Id. Although Appellant was selling drugs,

Ms. Jones explained that Appellant was trying to provide for his family. Id.

Jacclyn Goldsborough (Ms. Goldsborough), Appellant’s aunt, also

testified on Appellant’s behalf. Id. at 37. Ms. Goldsborough confirmed that

Appellant was offered no rehabilitation services during his previous periods of

incarceration. Id.

When imposing its sentence, the trial court explained that it considered

the PSI, which it had reviewed on the record. Id. at 38. The trial court further

considered the witnesses’ testimony at the hearing and the sentencing

guidelines. Id. The trial court considered Appellant’s age, background, family

life, and employment history. Id. at 39. According to the trial court, it further

considered Appellant’s guilty plea and acceptance of responsibility. Id.

Significantly, the trial court stated it considered Appellant’s

rehabilitative needs. Id. Nevertheless, the trial court stated, “the preeminent

focus” in sentencing Appellant “is on protecting the public.” Id. at 40. The

trial court emphasized that Appellant is not a street-level addict selling to

support his addiction, but “at least a high-level manager of that business in

this particular case.” Id. Thus, the record contradicts Appellant’s claim that

the trial court failed to consider mitigating evidence and his rehabilitative

needs.

Finally, we emphasize that the trial court had the benefit of a PSI. We

therefore “presume that the sentencing judge was aware of relevant

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information regarding [Appellant’s] character and weighed those

considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v.

Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (Pa. 1988). Our Supreme Court has stated,

[a] PSI constitutes the record and speaks for itself. In order to dispel any lingering doubt as to our intention of engaging in an effort of legal purification, we state clearly that [sentencing courts] are under no compulsion to employ checklists or any extended or systematic definitions of their punishment procedure. Having been fully informed by the [PSI], the sentencing court’s discretion should not be disturbed. This is particularly true, we repeat, in those circumstances where it can be demonstrated that the judge had any degree of awareness of the sentencing considerations, and there we will presume also that the weighing process took place in a meaningful fashion. It would be foolish, indeed, to take the position that if a court is in possession of the facts, it will fail to apply them to the case at hand.

Id.

In summary, the record contradicts Appellant’s claim that the trial court

considered only the seriousness of the offenses when fashioning its sentences.

Further, the trial court had the benefit of a PSI, and appropriately weighed all

sentencing factors when sentencing Appellant. See id. Appellant’s first issue

merits no relief.

In his second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court’s sentence of

21-42 years in prison constitutes a de facto life sentence, thereby violating

the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 3 and Article 1,

3 The Eighth Amendment provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,

nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. CONST Amend. VIII.

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Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. 4 Appellant’s Brief at 25.

According to Appellant, his aggregate sentence violates the constitutional

prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in this non-capital case. Id.

Appellant recognizes that “[t]he Eighth Amendment does not require

strict proportionality between the crime committed and the sentence imposed;

rather it forbids only extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to

the crime.” Id. at 26 (quoting Commonwealth v. Lankford, 164 A.3d 1250,

1252 (Pa. Super. 2017)). Appellant argues that “there is a gross

[dis]proportionality between the de facto life sentence and the noncapital

crime of selling drugs and possessing firearms.” Id. at 27. Appellant directs

our attention to statistics demonstrating the challenges to former prison

inmates, especially those in a racial minority, when reentering society

following incarceration. Id. at 28.

Appellant argues that his de facto life sentence is extreme and grossly

disproportionate to the crimes of drug dealing and firearm possession. Id. at

29. Appellant asserts the trial court’s sentencing determination constitutes

cruel and unusual punishment. Id.

The Commonwealth disagrees, pointing out that the trial court imposed

sentences within the standard range of the sentencing guidelines.

4 Article I, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states, “Excessive bail

shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel punishments inflicted.” PA CONST Art. 1, § 13.

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Commonwealth’s Brief at 18-19. The Commonwealth maintains that the three

sentences imposed consecutively were all within the standard guideline

ranges. Id. at 19. According to the Commonwealth, because standard-range

sentences are presumed reasonable, they cannot be considered excessive or

grossly disproportionate. Id.

Initially, we observe that Appellant’s claim that his sentences violate the

cruel and unusual constitutional prohibitions presents a question of law; “thus,

our scope of review is plenary, and our standard of review is de novo.”

Commonwealth v. Hill, 238 A.3d 399, 409-10 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation

omitted).

Upon review, we first disagree with Appellant’s claim that his sentence

of 21-42 years constitutes a de facto life sentence. Appellant was 44 years

old at the time of sentencing, and will be 65 years old at the expiration of his

minimum sentence. In Commonwealth v. Anderson, 224 A.3d 40 (Pa.

Super. 2019), this Court concluded that a defendant did not receive a de facto

life sentence, where he would be eligible for parole at 67 years of age. 5

Consequently, Appellant’s claim of a de facto life sentence is without merit.

5 We recognize that the trial court imposed some sentences consecutively. The decision of whether to impose consecutive, rather than concurrent sentences is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3 127, 133 (Pa. Super. 2014). As stated above, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in sentencing Appellant.

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Regarding Appellant’s claim that his sentence violates the Eighth

Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 13 of the

Pennsylvania Constitution, we observe that “[t]he protections provided by

Article I, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution are coextensive with

those provided by the Eighth Amendment.” Commonwealth v. May, 271

A.3d 475, 484 (Pa. Super. 2022).

In its opinion, the trial court considered and rejected Appellant’s claim

that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel

and unusual punishment:

In Eighth Amendment challenges, [f]ederal and Pennsylvania [c]ourts look to the three objective criteria set out in Solem v. Helm[, 463 U.S. 277 (1983)]: (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions. [Id.] at 298; See[,] e.g.[,] Commonwealth v. Howell, 266 A.3d 690, 693 (Pa. 2021).

[Appellant] was a high-level manager in Chester City’s drug trade. Supported by illegal firearms, he introduced into the City of Chester large amounts of cocaine. Prior to the case at bar, repeated incarceration for drug offenses had not rehabilitated or deterred [Appellant] from these offenses. Recidivism has long been recognized as a legitimate basis for increased punishment and is a serious public safety concern. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003).

In U.S. v. Walker, 473 F.3d 71 (3rd Cir. 2007), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in [addressing] an Eighth Amendment challenge, justified the harshness of a 55-year sentence because “… the threat posed to the individual and society by possessing firearms in connection with serious felonies, such as the armed robberies and drug-trafficking crimes [the defendant] committed, is momentous enough to warrant the deterrence and retribution of lengthy consecutive sentences, such

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as those imposed on [the defendant] in this case.” [Id. at 83 (citation omitted; emphasis added by the trial court)]. [In the instant case, Appellant’s sentence of] 21 to 42 years is justified[,] given the gravity of the offenses committed.

This jurisdiction has sentenced [d]efendants similarly situated as [Appellant] to similar terms. In Commonwealth v. Rickabaugh, 706 A.2d 826 (Pa. 1997), [the d]efendant was convicted of six counts of [PWID] cocaine, one count of possession of cocaine, [35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16),] three counts of conspiracy[,] and one count of corrupt organizations. [The d]efendant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 40 to 64 years. The [d]efendant was sentenced under a section of the statute requiring that the defendant possessed at least 100 grams of cocaine. Id. at 847.

Similar to Rickabaugh, [Appellant] … was a recidivist who was charged with conspiracy charges, corrupt organization charges, and possession charges related to cocaine. [Appellant] has the additional consecutive charges for [persons not to possess firearms,] and numerically many more counts for drug offenses. Yet, he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment much shorter than the [d]efendant in Rickabaugh. The same jurisdiction has sentenced defendants more harshly for the same or lesser offenses.

The [f]ederal case law accords with denying [Appellant’s] Eighth Amendment challenge. In [Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991),] the U.S. Supreme Court held a life sentence for possession with intent to distribute conviction involving 672 grams of cocaine was not a violation of the Eighth Amendment. [Id. at] 994. Similarly, in Huto v. Davis, [454 U.S. 370 (1982),] the U.S. Supreme [rejected] an Eighth Amendment challenge to a 40-year sentence for the crime of possessing nine ounces (255 grams) of marijuana. [Id. at 371-72.] Certainly, [Appellant’s] sentence is less severe than the [f]ederal standard for Eighth Amendment challenges.

[Appellant’s] … sentence of 21 to 42 years is not cruel or unusual punishment.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/27/24, at 15-17 (emphasis added; footnotes and some

citations omitted). We agree with the trial court’s reasoning and conclusion.

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See id. Appellant’s claim that his sentence violated the constitutional

prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment merits no relief.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 9/8/2025

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